The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  In the beginning, this force comprised about 1,150 of all ranks, with four guns (artillery) and two Maxim machine guns, besides a gargantuan logistics set-up consisting of a ‘field hospital, engineer field parks, telegraph, postal and sundry detachments’. Transportation of loads for this force, a herculean task indeed, was planned on a multimode basis, with about 10,000 porters, over 7,000 mules, ponies, yaks, etc. The weapons and equipment carried by this force were far superior to anything the Tibetans possessed. The Maxim machine guns, recently introduced in European armies, were a great force multiplier. With a cyclic rate of firing of 600 rounds a minute, they were an advanced weapon system of that time. The force also had two antiquated light guns (seven-pounders) named ‘Bubble’ and ‘Squeak’, which had been in service for over forty years.6 The ‘Tibet Mission Force’ was commanded by a sapper officer, as perhaps, militarily, the challenge posed by the terrain was far greater than the threat of the Tibetan army. In resource-deficient Tibet, construction of roads, cart tracks, bridges, culverts, river-crossing expedients and habitat demanded a wide range of engineering skills and advance planning for many types of equipment and resources. For example, the expeditionary force carried foldable ‘Berthon boats’ manufactured at Bengal Engineering Group Centre in Roorkee, India, to cross the Tsangpo in case the local boats were sunk.

  On 12 December 1903, the historic Younghusband expedition took off from Kupup, located at an altitude of about 4,000 metres, and climbed to the Jelep La at an elevation of 4,267 metres, and from there took a sharp drop of about 1,500 metres to the Chumbi Valley over a distance of a few kilometres. There was no track in certain stretches. The movement of bodies of men across these steep slopes has been graphically described by Lieutenant Colonel Austine Waddel, Army Medical Corps, who was a member of the mission:

  Diving down this slope, we got out of the wind almost immediately, and then sliding and slipping down the loose shoot of frost-splintered rocks which here formed our track, along with the heavily-laden coolies who stumbled foot-sore and weary and bruised by the rocks, we passed a small frozen lake of green ice; thence descended some 2000 feet more, and across frozen side-torrents, now solid ice, till we reached the black pine-forest.7

  Brigadier Macdonald’s force entered Chumbi Valley proper on 13 December and, surprisingly, met with no resistance during the initial phase of the expedition. There was no sign of the Tibetan regular army. This was probably because the large Tibetan contingent, assembled as a show of force opposite the British mission at Khamba Dzong, continued to remain there, tricked into believing that a larger British force was likely to ingress along the same route and proceed to Shigatse, and thence to Lhasa. It was a master stroke of British strategy that the Younghusband expedition chose to advance along the shortest and most direct approach to Lhasa through the Chumbi Valley while the mission at Khamba Dzong kept the Tibetans engaged there. The mission was to remain peaceful; it had specific instructions against use of force until the Tibetans commenced hostilities.

  The force established their first camp in Tibet at the base of a hill in a pine forest at a place called Langram. Learning of their presence, an assortment of Chinese and Tibetan officials, along with the Tibetan governor of Chumbi Valley, came up and met Younghusband. They protested the intrusion. Not succeeding in persuading Younghusband to agree to fall back to India with his force, and unable to match the military capability of the invading force, they quietly went their way.8 Next day, the mission advanced further, establishing a firm base beyond Yatung, naming it ‘New Chumbi’. After a few days, Macdonald’s force advanced even further and secured Phari Dzong—an important fortress village—on 18 December 1903. Their occupation of the fort, with its dominating location, caused a great deal of consternation among the Tibetan Dzongpons, Chinese officials, the monks and the people. This act was contrary to Younghusband’s earlier assurance to the Tibetans and adversely impacted the credibility of the firangis among the people here.9

  The next phase of the invasion involved the advance to Gyantse across the Tang La (5,060 metres) on the ridge that divides Chumbi Valley from the Tibetan plateau. As a matter of fact, Chumbi Valley and the Amo (also known as Mo) Chu which flows through it are on the southern slopes of the Himalayas. This river flows southwards along the Sikkim–Bhutan border to eventually join the Teesta in the plains of north Bengal. Geographically, this tract of land blends naturally with the cis-Himalayan states of Sikkim and Bhutan rather than with the Tibetan plateau, offering a strategic advantage to the side that controls it. With this in mind, Younghusband and Curzon had intended to keep it under occupation on a long-term basis even after Younghusband’s mission was accomplished. It is my view that imperial Britain neither gave due consideration to this intent at that juncture nor pursued it further because of its ramifications on their relations with China, Russia and other nations. Basically, India’s security interests were often overlooked and were subordinate to those of the British Empire. Imagine Chumbi Valley being in India’s posession till 1979!

  Towering over the area to the east of the Tang La is the majestic peak of Chomolhari, ‘Mountain of the Goddess Lady’, its height at 7,314 metres. The ridge that connects this mountain with another 7,000-metre peak to the west of the Tang La makes it the natural divide.

  Macdonald received reports of a concentration of Tibetan armed soldiers numbering approximately 3,000 at a place known as Guru, which lay midway between Yatung and Gyantse. The Tibetans had laid out a stockade comprising a stone fortification blocking the road to Shigatse in the proximity of Guru. On the spur of the hill to the west of the stockade were stone sangars and other elementary fortifications that were coordinated with the road block. To the east of this position was a low-lying area with a lake, which made it difficult for the British mission to outflank the defensive position astride the road.

  On 31 March 1904, the advancing British forces were confronted by a group of Tibetan officers a few kilometres out of Guru and told to stop and return. Later, these forces were joined by a Tibetan general and some others, including a Depon and a lama. Some of the Tibetan soldiers were carrying Russian-made rifles. After a futile discussion with them, the British told the Tibetans that their mission would continue its advance to Gyantse, and that though it was intended to maintain peace, force would be used if deemed required. On reaching the wall and the fortifications blocking the road, Brigadier Macdonald gave orders to his force to physically evict the Tibetans from their positions and disarm them.

  As the burly Sikh soldiers proceeded to take away their weapons, the Tibetans resisted violently, leading to scuffles between them. During this melee, a shot was fired by a Tibetan general, severely wounding a Sikh soldier; and this act started the battle. Both sides began discharging their weapons. This was an unequal fight in which the Tibetans suffered very heavy casualties. The British troops were equipped with better rifles, and their Maxim machine guns and artillery guns decided the outcome within minutes. In fact, the British soldiers appear to have used excessive force and, inexplicably, continued to engage even when the Tibetans, having thrown down their arms, were fleeing. A comparison of the casualties on the two sides speaks for itself. There were about 600 killed (including the Drepon), 300 wounded and 200-odd prisoners from among the Tibetans, against only thirteen wounded on the British side. The battle could be described as a mindless and unjustified mass slaughter by the British, and this subsequently continued to haunt the leadership of the Younghusband expedition. However, it is to the credit of the British force that many wounded Tibetan soldiers were evacuated and provided medical care and treatment by the British doctors and nursing assistants. Nonetheless, the British had overstepped their bounds. An indicting account of this engagement is given below:

  The Tibetans were mown down by the Maxim guns as they fled. ‘I got so sick of the slaughter that I ceased fire, though the general’s order was to make as big a bag as possible,’ wrote Lieutenant Arthur Hadow, commander of the Maxim guns detachment. ‘I ho
pe I shall never again have to shoot down men walking away.’10

  Thereafter, the victorious force marched into Guru and secured it. Guru was being held by a small force of Tibetans, who capitulated without much resistance. The mission’s advance to Gyantse from here involved a few skirmishes and clearing actions in which the Tibetans hardly gave a fight, except at the great gorge of ‘Red Idol’ at Dzam-tang on 10 April, where too the Tibetans were outfought and had to withdraw with heavy losses. Again, the one-sided nature of the engagement is borne out by the casualty count on the two sides—three wounded on the British side, against 150 killed and wounded and over 100 prisoners, many of them monks, on the Tibetan side. The next day, the British force neared Gyantse. Its fort, or Dzong, loomed large on the horizon. It was no doubt strategically located on a dominating height astride the east–west highway connecting Lhasa with Shigatse. These are the two largest and monastically most important towns of Tibet, both in the prosperous U-Tsang region. Gyantse had to be secured for gaining control over all movement in the Tsangpo Valley before the British could move towards the capital town of Lhasa.

  Figure 4: The imposing Dzong of Gyantse

  Brigadier Macdonald ordered his force to camp about a little over 3 kilometres short of the fort. He then dispatched an emissary with a note asking the Tibetans to surrender and hand over the fort. After a suspenseful night, the next morning, on 12 April, goes Waddell’s account, Macdonald’s force was getting into position to storm the fort when ‘a small party of officials rode out from the fort, led by General Ma under his crimson umbrella with the Jongpon and their minions. The Chinese general reported that all the Tibetan troops had been withdrawn.’11

  Soon the British force advanced into the Dzong and secured it. The British flag was flying over the highest rampart of the fort. Gyantse was in British hands as the Tibetan garrison had indeed abandoned the Dzong. However, the mission decided not to occupy the Dzong for tactical and logistical reasons, and instead chose a large country house and farmland of the noble Changlo family nearby as its headquarters. Since the country house was close to a river, water would be easily available here. Thus ended the second phase of the mission.

  As planned at the outset, Colonel Younghusband decided to hold discussions with the Tibetan and Chinese representatives at Gyantse to address the issues the mission had set out to resolve. Meanwhile, satisfied with the overall security situation prevailing in Gyantse, Brigadier Macdonald decided to leave a force of about 600 of all ranks as escort for the mission headquarters at Changlo Manor and fall back with the rest of the force to ‘New Chumbi’. Thereby, he conjectured, he would be better able to protect the 240-kilometre line of communication up to Gyantse by establishing more posts and also considerably reduce his logistic burden by having a smaller force deployed at Gyantse. This proved to be a miscalculation, as later events demonstrated.

  Brigadier Macdonald departed from Gyantse on 19 April with the major part of the force. The Changlo post was strengthened by a wall and other fortifications and the field of fire cleared on all sides. The town and the countryside appeared peaceful, and things seemed back to normal. As time passed, the negotiations between Younghusband and the Tibetans and Chinese continued but did not make much headway. A degree of complacency had crept into the mission headquarters at Changlo Manor. In one of his despatches in April, Younghusband conveyed to his superiors at Calcutta that ‘on the 12th April all resistance in this part of Tibet is ended’, and added, ‘neither General, nor soldiers nor people have wished to fight’.12 Taking advantage of the situation, the Tibetan army gradually re-established their control over the fort. They were also emboldened by the return of the larger part of the British force with Brigadier Macdonald to Chumbi Valley. An impression had also gained ground that the aggressors did not have any intention of proceeding beyond to Lhasa. In view of all this, the lamas not only planned to attack the isolated and apparently vulnerable Changlo position but also to disrupt the tenuous line of communication from Chumbi to Gyantse. They also urged the Tibetans to rise against the invaders.

  Younghusband now received intelligence reports that the Tibetan army was concentrating a force at Karo La, a high-altitude pass about 48 kilometres to the east of Gyantse along the road to Lhasa. A mounted infantry surveillance detachment that came under fire near the pass on 1 May reported the presence of about 3,000 Tibetan soldiers. After consultations with Younghusband, Lieutenant Colonel Brander moved out on 3 May with about two-thirds of the force with two guns and the Maxim machine guns to clear the Karo La. When Brigadier Macdonald learnt of this plan, he tried his best to stop it. Unfortunately, by the time his wire reached Younghusband, Colonel Brander had already set off on his mission. Unknown to them, every step being taken by the British mission at Changlo was being carefully monitored by the Tibetans.

  That something was amiss became evident from the eerie calm that pervaded in the town on 4 May. Premonition that something dangerous was imminent now hung thick in the air, and desertion by the local servants and even the patients from the hospital that was established near the mission forewarned the British garrison of the storm that was about to hit them. Taking cognizance of these developments, Younghusband wisely summoned the governor of the town, the Dzongpon, and detained him like a hostage in the camp. Early next morning the Tibetans attacked the Changlo position. Despite the warning signs, surprise was still achieved to some extent by the attackers. However, the Tibetans did not press home their attack into the walled enclosure of Changlo Manor even though they had great numerical advantage. Once again, the British Indian Army’s superior leadership, training, weapons and valour turned the tables in their favour. After a bitter and hard-fought battle, the Tibetan attack was repulsed with heavy losses to them (120 killed and forty wounded). There were only four casualties on the British side, none of them fatal. In the meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Brander and his force, having routed the Tibetans from Karo La, once again with heavy losses to the opposing side, rejoined the force at Changlo Manor.

  During the next month and a half, there circulated reports of a concentration of the Tibetan army from various regions in the vicinity of Gyantse advancing towards Changlo to beleaguer the comparatively small and isolated British force there. Meanwhile, the fortifications in the Dzong were being strengthened. There were skirmishes and raids by both sides every other day. Firing by the Tibetans from the Dzong by artillery and other weapons and from localities in the neighbourhood of Changlo Manor continued unabated. The British force retaliated for effect and remained on high alert, particularly during the hours of darkness. The lamas were sparing no effort to mobilize the masses against the foreign occupants, going from village to village and telling them it was a religious war.

  At the same time, Younghusband continued his efforts to enter into a meaningful dialogue and negotiations with Tibetan and Chinese officials, but to no avail. Exhausting all means of resolving the issues he had come to settle, he sent an ultimatum to the Tibetans that unless negotiators of appropriate stature and authority arrived at Gyantse for talks by 25 June, the British mission would start their advance to Lhasa. They now received word through an intermediary, Tongsa Penlop, the regent and wielder of supreme temporal power over the whole of Bhutan,13 that the Dalai Lama was deputing two peace delegates for talks. One of them was already at Gyantse, while the other, Shape Ta Lama (the Lama Member of Council), was on his way, along with the Grand Lama’s chief secretary, Lopu Tsang.

  Accordingly, an armistice was agreed on for a few days. On 26 June, before the talks, Brigadier Macdonald returned to Gyantse at the head of additional troops and reinforcements, including guns, and the British forces captured and cleared the Tibetan strongholds of Naini and Tse Chen monastery, establishing a cordon around the town. The talks were held on 3 July but proved to be abortive once again as the Tibetan delegates did not have sufficient authority to take major decisions. The Tibetans were now asked to vacate the Dzong within two days and if they didn’t, they were told,
there would be consequences. When this period ended, the British force launched an attack on the Dzong on 5 July, and by 6 p.m. the next day the fort was finally captured after overcoming stout resistance from the defenders. Lieutenant J.D. Grant of the 8th Gurkhas received the only Victoria Cross awarded for this campaign for displaying conspicuous gallantry during this action. Havildar Pun of the 8th Gurkhas was awarded the highest decoration an Indian soldier could get—the Indian Order of Merit Class I.

  Earlier, on 27 May, Younghusband had sent a detailed report to the secretary to the Government of India, including in it a review of the current situation in the Gyantse area, an assessment of the intention of the Tibetans, and his recommendations for the future course of action and British policy on Tibet. The recommendations made by him, some of them watered down by the home government in Britain, did find a place in the memorandum of 1904 signed on 7 September at Lhasa.

  4

  Tibet on Its Knees

  ‘Om mani padme hum’1

  (An adaptation of Thangka painting)

  Having seen through the game the Tibetans had been playing so far, the British government gave the go-ahead to Colonel Younghusband to take his expedition to Lhasa and compel the Tibetans to sit at the negotiating table and resolve issues relating to the political status of Tibet, the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim and Indo-Tibetan trade. Brigadier Macdonald had anticipated the requirement of additional troops and artillery for this next phase of the mission. Therefore, as soon as the reinforcements of one and a half battalion of infantry and eight guns with supporting elements arrived at Chumbi, they were moved forward to Gyantse. The advance of the force to Lhasa was planned by Brigadier Macdonald, leaving behind sufficient troops for defence of the garrison at Gyantse. He had catered for the crossing of the Tsangpo, even providing for the possibility that the Tibetans might dismantle the boats or ferries plying there. The track beyond Gyantse had not been set foot on by any Britisher, except for Manning, who had travelled this route over a hundred years prior.2