by J J Singh
The internecine warfare between the Chinese loyalist pro-monarchy forces and the revolutionary Nationalist army soldiers, and the several mutinies reported amongst the restive Chinese soldiery, made the task of the Tibetan avengers easier. The Chinese were on the run, and there was an exodus of them from central and western Tibet. This was the moment the cautious Dalai Lama was waiting for, and he decided to return to Tibet. The Grand Lama and his entourage left Kalimpong for Lhasa in June 1912, the day having been fixed by Tibetan astrologers. He was seen off by Charles Bell and his wife. The Dalai Lama entered Tibet through Chumbi Valley and proceeded slowly but surely, via Phari Dzong and Gyantse to Lhasa. Halting at various monasteries and dzongs en route, he finally repaired to the Samding monastery on the banks of the turquoise-blue Yamdruk Yatso, a vast lake south of the Tsangpo river. Known as ‘Abode of the Abbess’, this monastery was about 112 kilometres short of Lhasa. Even when apprised of the Revolution in China and its fallout in the frontier regions and outer periphery of the Chinese sphere of influence, such as Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, he made cautious moves as far as returning to Lhasa was concerned. Taking no chances, the great survivor that the thirteenth Dalai Lama was, he decided to go no further till the last of the Chinese soldiery had been evicted from the capital of Tibet.
At Samding the Dalai Lama was joined by the ubiquitous Dorjieff. In order to avoid the embarrassment of associating with Dorjieff again and perhaps incurring the ire of the British because of Dorjieff’s Russian connection, the Dalai Lama sent him on a mission to Mongolia, armed with the authority to build strong bonds with the newly independent Outer Mongolia.
By the end of 1912, the ‘turn’ of the Tibetans had come. With practically no outsiders left, Tibet had truly and effectively become an independent state. And so it remained for the next four decades. So much had changed in this eventful decade!
‘In January 1913 the Dalai Lama finally returned to Lhasa. Tibet was free of the Chinese for the first time since 1720.’8
Towards the end of 1911, while it appeared that the Chinese hold over Tibet had climaxed, the uprising in China against the rule of the Manchu dynasty began, and the whole scenario changed dramatically. This historical development took the world by surprise; not just the Tibetans, who were reluctantly reconciling themselves to the overlordship of the Chinese Manchu Empire, but also, and even more so, the Chinese Amban and its army under General Chung Ying. The October Revolution in China eventually overthrew the Ch’ing emperor, who had to abdicate in February 1912, making way for Yuan Shih-k’ai as president of the new Republic of China. With mainland China in turmoil, the Chinese hold on Tibet palpably loosened. The Chinese military garrisons in the important towns of Tibet, such as Shigatse, Gyantse, Yatung and in the capital Lhasa, began to feel the heat. The insecure and restive soldiery began to display signs of indiscipline, insubordination and low morale. Reports of rampant looting and arson by Chinese soldiers began to circulate. The situation was worsened by the arrival of those stragglers that remained of the Chinese forces operating in the Pomed and Zayul areas. Tibetan resistance against Chinese authority also began to increase by the day. Skirmishes in the countryside and open clashes in the towns between the two sides had become a daily occurrence. The Tibetans effectively blocked Chinese efforts to withdraw eastwards to the mainland. Roads and telegraph communications were disrupted. News about the situation in Tibet trickled down to Sikkim via Chumbi valley and dispersed all across the world, including to China proper.
During the Dalai Lama’s sojourn in the Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas from 1910 to 1912, the British were able to befriend him. And their previously sour relationship transformed into an entirely new equation. The British attitude of indifference and nonchalance towards the Dalai Lama underwent a change of heart. The rapid erosion of Chinese authority in Tibet presented an opportunity that lent itself to exploitation by both the British and the Tibetans. Whereas the Tibetans sought the support of the British to throw away the Chinese yoke forever, the British found the situation conducive to enhancement of their influence in Tibet; they charted a road map for a greater share of trade for themselves by establishing marts at Yatung, Shigatse and Gyantse, besides Lhasa.
To assuage the anger and alienation among the Tibetans caused by their ruthless and ham-handed suppression by Chao Erh-feng’s army and the insensitive Chinese administrators during the invasion of Tibet in 1910–11 and the conquest of the Marches earlier, Yuan Shih-k’ai endeavoured to repair the damage. He made a proclamation apologizing for the misdemeanours and transgressions of the Chi’ing empire in Tibet. He declared that regions like Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet would be given the status of Chinese provinces, and he also offered to discuss greater autonomy for them. He went on to attempt to smoothen ruffled feathers by revoking the deposition of the Dalai Lama by the previous regime and restoring his position. He also conferred ceremonial titles on the Grand Lama and bestowed him generous gifts.
The Dalai Lama refused to get taken in by this stratagem of the Chinese president. Refusing to accept any honorific titles conferred by Peking, he unequivocally conveyed to them that the relationship that existed traditionally between Tibet and China was best described as one of priest and patron, in which the subordinate or superior status of one or the other was never an issue. Richardson, in his masterful account, History of Tibet, said:
… he wanted no rank from Peking and had resumed the temporal and spiritual government of his country. That message of the Dalai Lama is regarded by the Tibetans to be a formal declaration of their independence; nevertheless, the Chinese, trying to be clever and blandly ignoring inconvenient facts, issued a decree on 28 October 1912 attributing to the Dalai Lama sentiments about ‘affection for the Motherland’, which he had never expressed, purporting to restore him to his former position (emphasis added).9
As early as October 1912, encouraged by the developments in neighbouring Mongolia, the Tsongdu (Tibetan National Assembly), supposedly with the approval of the Grand Lama, or at least in line with his thinking, is reported to have written to Lord Hardinge that ‘the country [Tibet] had broken off its relations with Peking and would like all Chinese troops to be withdrawn (emphasis added)’. Parshotam Mehra has commented in his well-researched account of those times that it is questionable whether this communication could be construed ‘as a declaration of Tibet’s independence’ as it lacked ‘the trimmings that go with a formal proclamation’.10 Besides, in the absence of the seal of the temporal head of the state, as the Dalai Lama had yet to reach Lhasa, the letter did not carry the required level of authority. At the same time, the Assembly’s note to Hardinge was a telling commentary of the situation then prevailing in Tibet and cannot be dismissed. Referring to the Dalai Lama’s refusal to accept the titles conferred on him by the president of the Republic of China, Charles Bell wrote, ‘Thus the God-king made clear his declaration of Tibetan independence.’11 The Dalai Lama had declined the offer while he was still en route to Lhasa.
In consonance with Yuan Shih-k’ai’s pet theme of a united China—a family of five races: the Chinese, the Manchu, the Mongol, the Mahommedan and the Tibetan—he apologized to the Dalai Lama for the ‘excesses’ committed by Chinese troops in Tibet.
Finally, with the ignominious departure of General Chung Ying from Chumbi Valley to India over the Nathu La, along with his ‘motley remnant of a half-starved and demoralised bodyguard’, on 14 April 1913, the Chinese presence and authority in Tibet was erased.12 This situation continued till the communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army ‘liberated’ Tibet in 1951.
The Dalai Lama entered the portals of Lhasa in January 1913, amidst great fanfare. Without losing time, the astute Lama commenced the process of reconsolidation of his temporal and spiritual authority, which had been usurped gradually by the Chinese from 1905 to 1911. As a formal proclamation of Tibet’s independence, the Grand Lama made this announcement from the hallowed precincts of the Potala Palace in January 1913:
I, the
Dalai Lama, most omniscient possessor of the Buddhist faith, whose title was conferred by the Lord Buddha’s command from the glorious land of India, speaks to you as follows: (select excerpts)
I am speaking to all classes of Tibetan people. Lord Buddha, from the glorious country of India, prophesied that the reincarnations of Avalokiteswara, through successive rulers from the early religious kings to the present day, would look after the welfare of Tibet.
During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, and the Ch’ing dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China co-operated on the basis of benefactor and priest relationship. A few years ago the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavoured to colonise our territory … Meanwhile the Manchu Empire collapsed … Now, the Chinese intention of colonising Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a rainbow in the sky. Having once again achieved for ourselves a period of happiness and peace, I have now allotted to all of you the following duties to be carried out without negligence…’13
Interestingly, just before this proclamation was made, Tibet and Mongolia signed a treaty by which both countries jointly renounced Chinese overlordship, declared themselves as sovereign states and enshrined their desire to strengthen the ties of friendship and religion already existing between them. ‘The Dalai Lama, as Sovereign of Tibet, approved the formation of an independent Mongolian state, while the Jetsun Dampa Hutuktu acknowledged Tibet as an independent and sovereign state.’14 They also undertook to come to each other’s aid to overcome internal and external dangers.
Those who collaborated with the Chinese regime during the two exiles of the Dalai Lama were brutally tortured and put to the sword, and they included some high officials and lamas, particularly those from the seditious and pro-Chinese Drepung and Tengeling monasteries.
PART IV
BRITAIN WAKES UP
9
Tibet Policy of the British
Alarmed by the Chinese army probes into the tribal territories on the southern Himalayan slopes, particularly during the period 1910 to 1912, the British decided to review their ‘hands off’ policy on Tibet with a greater sense of urgency. They also warned the Chinese against interference in Tibet’s internal affairs and their positioning of a large military force in Tibet, in contravention of the existing treaties. President Yuan Shih-k’ai was urged to withdraw his proclamation of 27 April 1912 declaring Tibet as an integral part of China, to be made into a province similar to other provinces of China proper. The Chinese government had also specified that all important administrative issues pertaining to Tibet would be dealt with by the central authority at Peking, contrary to the repeated assurances given by the president that it would not be so. In light of China’s aggressive designs in the Marches, and also as far as the rest of Tibet was concerned, the British held out the threats of not recognizing the new Chinese republic and of closing the most convenient and secure land-cum-sea route (to Tibet) through India to the Chinese. The British also felt the need to unambiguously define the status of Tibet vis-à-vis China—both the frontiers of Tibet and the Sino-Tibetan boundary itself. Lastly, they wanted to iron out the contentious trade-related matters between Tibet and India. There had clearly emerged an urgent need to have a written agreement to resolve these issues.
The British were thus compelled to give effect to a new China policy relating to Tibet. Showing that they meant business, the first major step they took was to close the land route to Lhasa via Calcutta, Darjeeling/Kalimpong and the Chumbi Valley in 1910, denying to the Chinese the quickest and most secure access to central Tibet. Thereafter they remonstrated with the Chinese for the armed repression and excesses by their army in the region of the Marches and for their violation of the agreements regarding intervention in the internal matters of Tibet. Realization had dawned on Whitehall that the frontier between Tibet and China needed to be defined and the Chinese cautioned against transgressing that line with their army, particularly any force intended to reinforce or rescue the besieged Chinese troops in and around Lhasa or elsewhere in central Tibet as a consequence of the 1911 Revolution. Taking advantage of the rapidly weakening position of the Chinese forces and officials in Tibet, the British policy on Tibet took on a bolder tint. The timing was propitious, as Russia was also engaged in propping up the Mongolians, and the British government could take a few liberties. Britain found it ‘essential’ that Tibet, ‘while retaining her position as an autonomous State under the suzerainty of China, should in reality be placed in a position of absolute dependence on the Indian government, and that there should be set up an effective machinery for keeping out the Chinese on the one hand and the Russians on the other’.1
Accordingly, serious parleys involving John Jordan, the British minister in Peking, the Chinese president Yuan Shih-k’ai and the Chinese foreign minister took place in 1912. These led to the presentation of a memorandum to the Chinese government on 17 August 1912, seeking a meeting to resolve the issues under consideration, pending which British recognition of the Chinese regime would be withheld, followed by direct negotiations between Britain and Tibet. The Russian initiatives in Outer Mongolia indirectly paved the way for a similar approach by the British. This approach was strongly advocated by the Indian government, but Whitehall kept pussyfooting for one reason or the other and failed to exploit the situation to its full potential.
The Chinese found themselves in a most unenviable position as a newborn republic in 1912. Their greatest challenge was to stabilize the internal security situation, what with many a regional leader displaying his unbridled ambitions and wanting to break away. The Tibetans, their army and the monk-led laity exacted a heavy toll of the Chinese soldiers and officials. The army of the Manchu Empire was in utter disarray, and its ill-paid, ill-fed, mutinous soldiery began to defy their officers and even murdered some of them. As mentioned earlier, fratricide and factional infighting between the pro- and anti-Revolution forces was reported from many areas. This was particularly true in the case of the remote and far-flung areas in the Marches, in Pomed and central Tibet, including Lhasa. The beheading of Chao Erh-feng by the upstart, young and ambitious Yin Chang-heng, a one-time protégé of Chao Erh-feng, had a disastrous effect on the discipline of the imperial Chinese army. Many unscrupulous and opportunistic leaders like Generals Yin and Chung Ying changed their allegiance and joined the ranks of the republican army. Perhaps destiny had in store a much worse fate for both these protagonists. Born into a poor family near Chengtu (later known as Chengdu), Yin’s spectacular rise from the ‘lowest stratum of society’ to a position of great power was mainly ascribed to Chao Erh-feng’s fostering care. This fact ‘makes his subsequent treachery to and murder of his patron peculiarly revolting’.2
The outburst of the latent anger of the Tibetans and their intrinsic hatred for the Chinese resulted in uncontrolled acts of vengeance by them against the Chinese, and to violence and bloodshed across all of Tibet. By the end of 1912, there remained no vestige of Chinese authority in the whole of Tibet. Except for General Chung Ying and his close guard, who were confined to the Trapchi barracks, and the yamen, the residence of the Chinese Amban, in Lhasa, the rest of the Chinese army were either killed or had surrendered their arms in exchange for safe passage to the mainland. Also, the Chinese forces in Tibet were completely isolated, and their direct communications with the mainland cut off. The only link available to them for receiving mail, orders, pay, rations or even reinforcements was through India and the Chumbi Valley. The Chinese lifeline in Tibet was at the mercy of the British, who did not fail to capitalize on it.
The major challenge for the Chinese republic was to rein in the outlying dependencies like Tibet, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Manchuria. Great Britain, Russia and Japan were stoking the fire for greater autonomy for and independence of the regions within their spheres of interest. There could not be more testing times for Chinese diplomacy, and it is to their credit that they endeavoured to hold their ground, although they had
to give in many a time and make the best of a bad bargain. All the same, their efforts weren’t always in vain, as procrastination and protracted discussions that did not culminate in any conclusions became their ploy.
Despite their constraints, the British could not remain idle bystanders while, until 1911, China went about aggressively assimilating Tibet, introducing administrative reforms as if it were another of its provinces. The Chinese unleashed an obstructionist regime that had effectively undermined trade between British India and Tibet, in contravention of the agreements signed in 1904, 1906 and 1908. Unabashedly, the Chinese forces had continued to expand their presence to the extremes of Tibet’s frontiers. At this point, China became brazen enough to press its claims of suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan. Although Britain had formally accepted Chinese ‘suzerain rights’ in Tibet, it was under no circumstances going to acquiesce to the Chinese taking over of the internal administration of Tibet, in violation of Article I of the Convention of 27 April 1906, or to the presence of a large number of Chinese troops in Tibet. Accordingly, a strong message was sent to Yuan Shih-K’ai, conveying Whitehall’s rejection of the Chinese definition of Tibet’s ‘political status’ and its displeasure at the overpowering and meddlesome conduct of Chinese officers in Tibet. In the Military Report on Tibet of 1910 (declassified) prepared by the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, this was made abundantly clear:
… while they (British government) have formally recognised the ‘suzerain rights’ of China in Tibet, have never recognised and are not prepared to recognise the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Tibet which should remain, as contemplated in the treaties, in the hands of the Tibetan authorities, subject to the right of Great Britain and China, under Article I of the Convention of 27th April 1906.3
