by J J Singh
There are, of course, our different political systems and inherent ideological contradictions too. One hopes that with a new generation of policymakers in place in both countries, and with their enhanced defence capabilities, including nuclear weapons, the likelihood of an armed conflict is quite remote. Today, India and China have increasingly become aware of their linked destinies as neighbours and are expected to contribute to the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust and cooperation in Asia and the world. Peace and stability are imperative if the countries are to raise the socio-economic conditions of millions of their people. Within the ambit of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership Agreement of 2005, greater importance is being given to relations with India by the new Chinese leadership. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s famous comment that there has been a ‘friendly relationship between our two nations for 99.9% of the period of over two millennia’ does convey a message.
Indeed, there has been rapid growth of bilateral trade and commerce, which has touched $84 billion in 2017, a phenomenal increase from $0.35 billion in 1992. The complementarities in trade and commerce between the two countries, as analysed by Binod Singh in his book India–China Relations: Future Perspectives are interesting. He writes, ‘China is perceived to be strong in manufacturing and infrastructure while India is perceived to be strong in services and information technology … The relative strengths and weaknesses of the two countries indicate a significant degree of convergence in their economies in the coming decades.’6 However, it is crucial that the imbalance in our trade with China is addressed to make it a win-win situation for both nations. In this regard, a strategic economic dialogue has commenced between the two countries. In the wake of being recognized as emerging powers, a greater sense of responsibility devolves on India and China to contribute to peace and stability in the region and in the world. Both nations must understand that there is ‘enough space for growth’, as emphasized by the prime ministers of both countries. The military capabilities of both countries have been enhanced manifold, although the Chinese have a definite edge over India at present. Besides, there is the intrinsic deterrence value of nuclear weapons and missiles, which have a longer reach and are suitably vectored. There is in consequence an equilibrium and strategic balance of sorts between India and China.
This scenario is far removed from the situation obtaining in the 1950s and ’60s. Looking at the possibility of an armed conflict in the Indo-Tibetan frontier zone, the challenge posed by the altitude and terrain obtaining in the region would inhibit deployment of their full might by either side. The difficulty of providing logistical support would also act as a restraining factor. History is witness to many monumental blunders committed by warring nations who forgot to factor in geography. Therefore, my reckoning is that war can no longer be a preferred option for either side. China is faced with the spectre of terrorism in the restive Uighur region of Xinjiang. Tackling the extreme radical Islamists with a heavy hand has not helped. A report by Simon Denyer in the Washington Post (September 2014) said: ‘China’s clumsy attempts to “liberate” Uighurs from the oppression of conservative Islam are only driving more people into the hands of the fundamentalists.’ And in recent times these extremists have begun to target civilians—Han Chinese in particular.
Radical Islam has spawned terror that has unified the world in its efforts to eradicate this scourge from the earth. This is another field in which China and India are working together; countering terror is one of the important themes in joint military training, and there is so much that one can learn from the other’s experiences. Among Indians, their perception of the Chinese oscillates between the aggressive and expansionist neighbour and the historically friendly one. It also depends on which segment of Indian society one belongs to. A young Indian professional, businessman or commoner carries little if any baggage of the past and would prefer to engage freely with our large neighbour, but on an equal footing and on a level playing field. Some strategic thinkers and individuals, particularly from the generation that experienced the war of 1962, still have a ‘stabbed-in-the-back’ feeling against China.
The various accords between the two nations cannot be taken lightly, of course, yet it does not mean that we can afford to lower our guard. There is still the need to continuously modernize and enhance the capabilities of our armed forces and intelligence agencies and build our infrastructure along the frontiers. Cyber and space are new dimensions that need to be addressed seriously, and the desired level of both offensive and defensive capabilities created. In fact, with our intrinsic IT acumen, India should be the leading country in the cyber domain, but we seem to be lagging behind. We need to take urgent action on this front.
Although India and China have differences in their systems of governance and their approach to regional and international issues, the predominant view of most Sinologists in India calls for ‘constructive engagement’ with China. As articulated by S. Bhattacharya, ‘Current Chinese perceptions of India are also dominated by an appreciation of the changes that have taken place in recent times and the desire to engage in closer contacts, especially in the economic field.’7 Bhattacharya says, ‘There is a growing realization in China that the sustained growth of India is indeed a reality that cannot be ignored. To some extent, the increasing geopolitical importance of India and the improvement in bilateral relations have spurred the need to have a new look on how they perceive India.’8
It is now being acknowledged that India’s GDP growth rate has overtaken China’s during 2016–17 and that India is one of the fastest-growing economies of the world today. India’s place among the leading nations of the world and in the Asian power structure is well merited. India’s strong stand against Chinese interference in Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese objection to the Dalai Lama’s visit to the state, and India’s non-participation in the inaugural ceremony of China’s OBOR initiative on the grounds of our sovereignty and territorial integrity, are telling statements. India has thereby conveyed to China that its dichotomous approach with regard to Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh is not appreciated, particularly when India has consistently endorsed China’s sovereignty over Tibet Autonomous Region and its one-China policy.
There is no hesitation in saying that when India and China shake hands, the impact is felt by the rest of the world. The major powers already have comprehensive engagement and ties with us, and those are being further enhanced. In addition, our relations with Africa and Latin America, besides within Asia of course, are being strengthened too. India and China should make our smaller neighbours believe that the two present an opportunity and not a threat to each other’s stability and growth, and that the same logic would equally apply to them. Wen Jiabao’s concluding remarks at the National Peoples Conference, published in Xinhua in March 2005, carried a quotation, the immortal Shanti mantra from the Upanishads: ‘May he protect us both together. May he nourish us both together. May we conjointly work with great energy. May our study be vigorous and effective. May we not hate anyone. Let there be peace, let there be peace, let there be peace.’9 He expressed similar sentiments during his visit to India in May 2005, to which he accorded the highest importance. In the words of our former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon, ‘Today India has few relationships which can match with China for its range, significance and the variety of emotions that it evokes in both countries.’ Though already articulated by me, I wish to reinforce my viewpoint with a quotation from the noted political scientist John Garver:
India also seems to be handicapped by a dearth of strategic thinking and real China experts. China, by contrast, has a tradition of strategic thought that is second to none in the world. It is arguably the major power best able to think strategically for long periods of time and mobilise the national resources and will needed to attain its postulated strategic objectives.10
Many Indian strategists have been predicting a war between China and India. First it was supposed to have happened after the B
eijing Olympics, then it was forecast to take place in 2012, and a few speak of 2020 now. Some of these analysts haven’t been to the high Himalayan regions on either side of the frontier zone or have merely undertaken whistle-stop tours in fair weather! To comprehend the true dimensions of fighting a war in this region, one has to see the conditions in these parts during the freezing winters when the snow, the blizzards, the high attitudes and permafrost conditions make life impossible; or during the monsoons when it rains for days on end and even small streams become raging torrents, washing away bridges and entire sections of roads. The challenge of geography in such areas can be devastating. Glibly talking of the two countries going to war is irresponsible and baseless, unless there is concrete evidence of a military build-up and concentration of forces.
India is the only country in the developing world with the potential to match China’s growth and capabilities. The India–China relationship can be extrapolated from the scenario of a fight between two tigers over territory. In such a fight both end up severely mauled and bloodied, as happened in the ruinous wars bettween Athens and Sparta that went on for decades before ending in 5 BC. No one is the winner, and both adversaries are likely to suffer the pain of their wounds for years, resulting in a zero-sum game. The emergence of two potential global players from Asia would definitely tilt the balance of power in favour of Asia; therefore there is the belief in some quarters that other world powers might be content to see China engaged in a race for dominance with another rising Asian state such as India, as it would help to maintain the balance of power internationally.
However, the greatest challenge for both India and China in the forseeable future is to raise the socio-economic condition of millions of their underprivileged citizens and to improve basic infrastructure in their remote interior areas. Therefore, a conflict between the two nations would not be in the national interests of either. Although the Great Himalayas are a formidable barrier, going in an arc from the north-west of India to its north-east, at some places there aren’t easily identifiable watersheds or the continuity of the mountain chain is broken, resulting in differences in perception as to where the border lies. This is particularly so where there are tri-junctions of the boundaries or major rivers cutting across from Tibet to the Indian plains and entering river basins; these are the precise areas that make boundary definition such a problem.
Hence, many of the disputed pockets are located where the McMahon Line crosses river valleys such as Namka Chu, Sumdorong Chu, Longju or Dichu (Walong sector). The most recent flare-up of 2017 was in the Doklam area, which is in the vicinity of the India–China–Bhutan trijunction. These differences need to be resolved peacefully by dialogue, until which time both countries must ensure that the status quo is maintained. Therefore, early resolution of the boundary dispute should be accorded the highest priority, without in any way impacting the other multidimensional engagements taking place between India and China. A solution to the boundary issue will have to be found not by experts or geographers but at the national political level. Before taking any decision regarding mutual adjustment and accommodation, the people of both countries need to be sensitized about the matter and be made aware of the reality on the ground.
The Chinese have, over the years, been changing the goalposts as far as their boundary claims are concerned. In 2011, Wen Jiabao was reported to have remarked that ‘it may not be possible to ever fully solve the boundary question’.11 Pending finalization of the boundary, the existing LAC could be termed as the working boundary and maintenance of peace along the border ensured. The clarification and subsequent demarcation of the LAC based on the actual situation on the ground must be accorded the highest priority in the interests of both countries. The current global security and economic situation demands that India and China consult and show greater inclination to work together and manage the differences that exist rather than adopt an antagonistic approach. Despite the major upheavals in international power equations since the end of the cold war, ‘Beijing has stuck to the belief that there are more opportunities than challenges for China in today’s international environment.’12 That is India’s position too. During the past three decades in particular, we have shown our ability to deal with difficult and seemingly intractable issues in a mature and pragmatic manner. Even the boundary and water issues are being handled with political sagacity and diplomatic finesse, though it would be unrealistic to expect quick results. Recently, India and China agreed to hold a bilateral dialogue on maritime issues. One must realize the impact of people-to-people contacts, which are rapidly increasing as a result of enhanced trade and tourism. For example, there are over 18,000 Indian students in China today, which is more than those studying in the UK and is unprecedented although not large enough. Of late many students are opting to learn Mandarin or other Chinese languages in universities and even schools. This congruence will grow in the years to come. It would be reasonable to assume that a similar situation exists in China, although there are fewer Chinese students in Indian universities than Indians in Chinese schools. Besides that there are 25,000 IT professionals presently working with Chinese companies in China.
Importantly, the underlying ‘trust deficit’ between the two countries needs to be addressed and the strategic cooperative partnership strengthened. China is very sensitive to the presence and activities of the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile in India. Although India has made it clear that the Dalai Lama will not be allowed to carry out any political activity from Indian soil, the Chinese suspect an Indian hand whenever there are disturbances in Tibet, as was the case in 2008–09.
During the visit of the Dalai Lama to Tawang in April 2017, the Chinese raised a massive hue and cry. It was purely a monastic visit, yet China warned India of consequences. The Chinese reaction was to invent and announce Chinese names for a few places in Arunachal Pradesh in an attempt to reinforce their claim to a large part of the state. India has learnt to stand firm in such matters. At a conference during March 2018 at Dharamsala, the Dalai Lama stated: ‘We Tibetans, for example, are not seeking independence’ and would like to have a ‘connection with China’ and ‘live with respect’. One hopes that such a statement would help to allay the apprehensions of the Chinese and mend the fence with them. In the near and mid-term future, I believe the way forward for both China and India is positive and constructive engagement in bilateral and multilateral issues, setting aside the boundary issue. As responsible emerging powers, both nations must endeavour to find common ground and play their role in the shaping of a new world order at forums such as the UN, G20, BRICS, SCO, ASEAN, BCIM and international financial organizations.
Till we acquire the financial and military muscle to be able to stand our ground, we should follow the Chinese example of a ‘peaceful rise’ to power instead of being unduly moralistic or getting bogged down by political one-upmanship. National interest must come first. Negotiations to find a mutually acceptable resolution to the boundary dispute must continue. At the same time the relationship between India and China, two great nations of Asia and proud inheritors of ancient civilizations, should not be held hostage to the outcome of the boundary negotiations. For such a relationship to be realized it is imperative that India enhances its comprehensive national power and reduces the present asymmetry between the two nations. Military strength gives us the ability to deter aggression and safeguard our core values as a nation. It is indispensable if we wish to be an economic giant and helps us to make diplomacy more effective.
In an emerging multipolar configuration, India, while ensuring its strategic autonomy, must engage with other major powers and play a meaningful role in the maintenance of an equilibrium and balance of power in the world. India with its resources, rising economic and military power and potential is being looked upon as a ‘swing’ nation that can contribute to the stability of a complex world. We must exploit this opportunity and enhance our stature and sphere of influence. India has engaged in strategic and mutually benefic
ial relationships with the US, Russia, China, Japan, UK, France, and other European nations. Going beyond the basic non-aligned structure of its foreign policy, India is displaying an increasingly mature and pragmatic approach while creating bonds with other important players on the world stage. It is part of many multilateral groupings such as BRICS, SCO, ASEAN, G20 and BIMSTEC. The ‘Quad’ of US, Japan, Australia and India has been revived and a meeting was held at the working level during the ASEAN meeting in 2017. This gives India enhanced leverage while dealing with China.
India is now in a happy situation and being courted by the P5 (five permanent members of the UNSC) and other nations. US president Barack Obama had remarked in 2010, ‘India is not a rising power, it is a world power.’ Current US president Donald Trump has put Pakistan in its place and made no bones about Pakistan having deceived, lied and conducted itself in a duplicitous manner with regard to promoting and aiding terror outfits. On the other hand, he has repeatedly stressed the importance of the growing strategic partnership with India, particularly in the domain of cooperation in defence matters, and the role this relationship will play in enabling strategic balance, stability and peace in South Asia.
Even though India–Russia relations are not at the same level as they were with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and ’70s, and Russia and China are growing closer, Russia is not likely ‘to take sides’ as far as India and China are concerned. This was emphasized by Sergei Karaganov, economic and foreign policy adviser to Russian president Vladimir Putin, who went on to articulate that Sino-Indian hostility was ‘an aberration’ and ‘thirty-forty years ago there was a deep distrust between Russia and China, including a territorial dispute. Now because of the wisdom of our peoples, the Russia–China border is peaceful.’13 Both India and China ought to take a cue from this example. Today, India is deservingly poised to achieve permanent membership of the UN Security Council and has overwhelming international support to sit at the high table.14
