In fact, however, fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple, but blended. The ‘simple’ bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the ‘simple’ body corresponding to fire is ‘such-as-fire’, (25) not fire: that which corresponds to air is ‘such-as-air’: and so on with the rest of them. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold. For freezing and boiling are excesses of heat and cold respectively. Assuming, therefore, that ice is a freezing of moist and cold, fire analogously will be a boiling of dry and hot: a fact, by the way, (30) which explains why nothing comes-to-be either out of ice or out of fire.
The ‘simple’ bodies, since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the ‘limit’, while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the ‘centre’. [331a] Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary, are intermediates and more like blends. And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for the qualities constituting Water and Earth are contrary to those that constitute Fire and Air. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized par excellence by a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold, (5) Water by cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry.
4 It has been established before17 that the coming-to-be of the ‘simple’ bodies is reciprocal. At the same time, it is manifest, even on the evidence of perception, that they do come-to-be: for otherwise there would not have been ‘alteration’, (10) since ‘alteration’ is change in respect to the qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain (i) what is the manner of their reciprocal transformation, and (ii) whether every one of them can come-to-be out of every one—or whether some can do so, but not others.
Now it is evident that all of them are by nature such as to change into one another: for coming-to-be is a change into contraries and out of contraries, (15) and the ‘elements’ all involve a contrariety in their mutual relations because their distinctive qualities are contrary. For in some of them both qualities are contrary—e. g. in Fire and Water, the first of these being dry and hot, and the second moist and cold: while in others one of the qualities (though only one) is contrary—e. g. in Air and Water, the first being moist and hot, and the second moist and cold. It is evident, therefore, if we consider them in general, (20) that every one is by nature such as to come-to-be out of every one; and when we come to consider them severally, it is not difficult to see the manner in which their transformation is effected. For, though all will result from all, both the speed and the facility of their conversion will differ in degree.
Thus (i) the process of conversion will be quick between those which have interchangeable ‘complementary factors’, (25) but slow between those which have none. The reason is that it is easier for a single thing to change than for many. Air, e. g., will result from Fire if a single quality changes: for Fire, as we saw, is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air if the hot be overcome by the cold: for Air, (30) as we saw, is hot and moist while Water is cold and moist, so that, if the hot changes, there will be Water. So too, in the same manner, Earth will result from Water and Fire from Earth, since the two ‘elements’ in both these couples have interchangeable ‘complementary factors’. For Water is moist and cold while Earth is cold and dry—so that, if the moist be overcome, (35) there will be Earth: and again, since Fire is dry and hot while Earth is cold and dry, Fire will result from Earth, if the cold pass-away. [331b]
It is evident, therefore, that the coming-to-be of the ‘simple’ bodies will be cyclical; and that this cyclical method of transformation is the easiest, because the consecutive ‘elements’ contain interchangeable ‘complementary factors’.18 On the other hand (ii) the transformation of Fire into Water and of Air into Earth, and again of Water and Earth into Fire and Air respectively, (5) though possible, is more difficult because it involves the change of more qualities. For if Fire is to result from Water, both the cold and the moist must pass-away: and again, both the cold and the dry must pass-away if Air is to result from Earth. So, too, if Water and Earth are to result from Fire and Air respectively—both qualities must change. (10)
This second method of coming-to-be, then, takes a longer time. But (iii) if one quality in each of two ‘elements’ pass-away, the transformation, though easier, is not reciprocal. Still, from Fire plus Water there will result Earth and19 Air, and from Air plus Earth, Fire and20 Water. For there will be Air, when the cold of the Water and the dry of the Fire have passed-away (since the hot of the latter and the moist of the former are left): whereas, (15) when the hot of the Fire and the moist of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, owing to the survival of the dry of the Fire and the cold of the Water. So, too in the same way, Fire and Water will result from Air plus Earth. (20) For there will be Water, when the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth have passed-away (since the moist of the former and the cold of the latter are left): whereas, when the moist of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, owing to the survival of the hot of the Air and the dry of the Earth—qualities essentially constitutive of Fire. Moreover, (25) this mode of Fire’s coming-to-be is confirmed by perception. For flame is par excellence Fire: but flame is burning smoke, and smoke consists of Air and Earth.
No transformation, however, into any of the ‘simple’ bodies can result from the passing-away of one elementary quality in each of two ‘elements’ when they are taken in their consecutive order, (30) because either identical or contrary qualities are left in the pair: but no ‘simple’ body can be formed either out of identical, or out of contrary, qualities. Thus no ‘simple’ body would result, if the dry of Fire and the moist of Air were to pass-away: for the hot is left in both. On the other hand, if the hot pass-away out of both, the contraries—dry and moist—are left. A similar result will occur in all the others too: for all the consecutive ‘elements’ contain one identical, and one contrary, (35) quality.21 Hence, too, it clearly follows that, when one of the consecutive ‘elements’ is transformed into one, the coming-to-be is effected by the passing-away of a single quality: whereas, when two of them are transformed into a third, more than one quality must have passed-away.22
[332a] We have stated that all the ‘elements’ come-to-be out of any one of them; and we have explained the manner in which their mutual conversion takes place.
5 Let us nevertheless supplement our theory by the following speculations concerning them.
If Water, Air, and the like are a ‘matter’ of which the natural bodies consist, (5) as some thinkers in fact believe, these ‘elements’ must be either one, or two, or more. Now they cannot all of them be one—they cannot, e. g., all be Air or Water or Fire or Earth—because ‘Change is into contraries’. For if they all were Air, then (assuming Air to persist) there will be ‘alteration’ instead of coming-to-be. Besides, nobody supposes a single ‘element’ to persist, as the basis of all, in such a way that it is Water as well as Air (or any other ‘element’) at the same time. (10) So there will be a certain contrariety, i. e. a differentiating quality:23 and the other member of this contrariety, e. g. heat, will belong to some other ‘element’, e. g. to Fire. But Fire will certainly not be ‘hot Air’. For a change of that kind24 (a) is ‘alteration’, and (b) is not what is observed. Moreover (c) if Air is again to result out of the Fire, it will do so by the conversion of the hot into its contrary: this contrary, (15) therefore, will belong to Air, and Air will be a cold something: hence it is impossible for Fire to be ‘hot Air’, since in that case the same thing will be simultaneously hot and cold. Both Fire and Air, therefore, will be something else which is the same; i. e. there will be some ‘matter’, other than either, comm
on to both.
The same argument applies to all the ‘elements’, proving that there is no single one of them out of which they all originate. (20) But neither is there, beside these four, some other body from which they originate—a something intermediate, e. g., between Air and Water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water), or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the supposed ‘intermediate’ will be Air and Fire when a pair of contrasted qualities is added to it: but, since one of every two contrary qualities is a ‘privation’, the ‘intermediate’ never can exist—as some thinkers assert the ‘Boundless’ or the ‘Environing’ exists—in isolation.25 (25) It is, therefore, equally and indifferently any one of the ‘elements’, or else it is nothing.
Since, then, there is nothing—at least, nothing perceptible—prior to these,26 they must be all.27 That being so, either they must always persist and not be transformable into one another: or they must undergo transformation—either all of them, (30) or some only (as Plato wrote in the Timaeus).28 Now it has been proved before29 that they must undergo reciprocal transformation. It has also been proved30 that the speed with which they come-to-be, one out of another, is not uniform—since the process of reciprocal transformation is relatively quick between the ‘elements’ with a ‘complementary factor’, but relatively slow between those which possess no such factor. Assuming, then, that the contrariety, in respect to which they are transformed, (35) is one, the ‘elements’ will inevitably be two: for it is ‘matter’ that is the ‘mean’ between the two contraries, and matter is imperceptible and inseparable from them. [332b] Since, however, the ‘elements’ are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties must at the least be two. But the contrarieties being two, the ‘elements’ must be four (as they evidently are) and cannot be three: for the ‘couplings’ are four, since, though six are possible,31 the two in which the qualities are contrary to one another cannot occur. (5)
These subjects have been discussed before:32 but the following arguments will make it clear that, since the ‘elements’ are transformed into one another, it is impossible for any one of them——whether it be at the end or in the middle33—to be an ‘originative source’ of the rest. There can be no such ‘originative element’ at the ends: for all of them would then be Fire or Earth, and this theory amounts to the assertion that all things are made of Fire or Earth. (10) Nor can a ‘middle-element’ be such an ‘originative source’—as some thinkers suppose that Air is transformed both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the ‘end-elements’ are not further transformed into one another. For the process must come to a stop, and cannot continue ad infinitum in a straight line in either direction, since otherwise an infinite number of contrarieties would attach to the single ‘element’. (15) Let E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air, and F for Fire. Then (i) since A is transformed into F and W, there will be a contrariety belonging to A F. Let these contraries be whiteness and blackness. Again (ii) since A is transformed into W, there will be another contrariety34: for W is not the same as F. Let this second contrariety be dryness and moistness, (20) D being dryness and M moistness. Now if, when A is transformed into W, the ‘white’ persists, Water will be moist and white: but if it does not persist, Water will be black since change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black. Let it then be the first. On similar grounds, therefore, D (dryness) will also belong to F. Consequently F (Fire) as well as Air will be able to be transformed into Water: for it has qualities contrary to those of Water, (25) since Fire was first taken to be black and then to be dry, while Water was moist and then showed itself white. Thus it is evident that all the ‘elements’ will be able to be transformed out of one another; and that, in the instances we have taken, E (Earth) also will contain the remaining two ‘complementary factors’, viz. the black and the moist (for these have not yet been coupled). (30)
We have dealt with this last topic before the thesis we set out to prove.35 That thesis—viz. that the process cannot continue ad infinitum—will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (which is represented by F) is not to revert, but is to be transformed in turn into some other ‘element’ (e. g. into Q), a new contrariety, other than those mentioned, will belong to Fire and Q: for it has been assumed that Q is not the same as any of the four, (35) E W A and F. [333a] Let K, then, belong to F and Y to Q. Then K will belong to all four, E W A and F: for they are transformed into one another. This last point, however, we may admit, has not yet been proved: but at any rate it is clear that if Q is to be transformed in turn into yet another ‘element’, yet another contrariety will belong not only to Q but also to F (Fire). (5) And, similarly, every addition of a new ‘element’ will carry with it the attachment of a new contrariety to the preceding ‘elements’. Consequently, if the ‘elements’ are infinitely many, there will also belong to the single ‘element’ an infinite number of contrarieties. But if that be so, it will be impossible to define any ‘element’: impossible also for any to come-to-be. For if one is to result from another, it will have to pass through such a vast number of contrarieties—and indeed even more than any determinate number. (10) Consequently (i) into some ‘elements’ transformation will never be effected—viz. if the intermediates are infinite in number, as they must be if the ‘elements’ are infinitely many: further (ii) there will not even be a transformation of Air into Fire, if the contrarieties are infinitely many: moreover (iii) all the ‘elements’ become one. For all the contrarieties of the ‘elements’ above F must belong to those below F, and vice versa: hence they will all be one. (15)
6 As for those who agree with Empedocles that the ‘elements’ of body are more than one, so that they are not transformed into one another36—one may well wonder in what sense it is open to them to maintain that the ‘elements’ are comparable. (20) Yet Empedocles says ‘For these are all not only equal …’
If (i) it is meant that they are comparable in their amount, all the ‘comparables’ must possess an identical something whereby they are measured. If, e. g., one pint of Water yields ten of Air, both are measured by the same unit; and therefore both were from the first an identical something. On the other hand, suppose (ii) they are not ‘comparable in their amount’ in the sense that so-much of the one yields so-much of the other, but comparable in ‘power of action’ (a pint of Water, (25) e. g., having a power of cooling equal to that of ten pints of Air); even so, they are ‘comparable in their amount’, though not qua ‘amount’ but qua ‘so-much power’.37 There is also (iii) a third possibility. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure of their amount, they might be compared as terms in a ‘correspondence’: e. g., ‘as x is hot, so correspondingly y is white’. (30) But ‘correspondence’, though it means equality in the quantum, means similarity38 in a quale. Thus it is manifestly absurd that the ‘simple’ bodies, though they are not transformable, are comparable not merely as ‘corresponding’, but by a measure of their powers; i. e. that so-much Fire is comparable with many-times-that-amount of Air, as being ‘equally’ or ‘similarly’ hot. For the same thing, if it be greater in amount, will, since it belongs to the same kind,39 have its ratio correspondingly increased. (35)
A further objection to the theory of Empedocles is that it makes even growth impossible, unless it be increase by addition. [333b] For his Fire increases by Fire: ‘And Earth increases its own frame and Ether increases Ether.’ These, however, are cases of addition: but it is not by addition that growing things are believed to increase. And it is far more difficult for him to account for the coming-to-be which occurs in nature. (5) For the things which come-to-be by natural process all exhibit, in their coming-to-be, a uniformity either absolute or highly regular: while any exceptions—any results which are in accordance neither with the invariable nor with the general rule—are products of chance and luck. Then what is the cause determining that man comes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) comes-to-be from wheat, either invariab
ly or generally? Are we to say ‘Bone comes-to-be if the “elements” be put together in such-and-such a manner’? For, according to his own statements, (10) nothing comes-to-be from their ‘fortuitous consilience’, but only from their ‘consilience’ in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this proportional consilience? Presumably not Fire or Earth. But neither is it Love and Strife: for the former is a cause of ‘association’ only, and the latter only of ‘dissociation’. No: the cause in question is the essential nature of each thing—not merely (to quote his words) ‘a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled’. And chance, not proportion, (15) ‘is the name given to these occurrences’: for things can be ‘mingled’ fortuitously.
The cause, therefore, of the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence to nature is that they are in such-and-such a determinate condition:40 and it is this which constitutes the ‘nature’ of each thing—a ‘nature’ about which he says nothing. What he says, therefore, is no explanation of ‘nature’. Moreover, it is this which is both ‘the excellence’ of each thing and its ‘good’: whereas he assigns the whole credit to the ‘mingling’. (And yet the ‘elements’ at all events are ‘dissociated’ not by Strife, (20) but by Love: since the ‘elements’ are by nature prior to the Deity, and they too are Deities.)
Again, his account of motion is vague. For it is not an adequate explanation to say that ‘Love and Strife set things moving’, unless the very nature of Love is a movement of this kind and the very nature of Strife a movement of that kind. He ought, then, either to have defined or to have postulated these characteristic movements, (25) or to have demonstrated them—whether strictly or laxly or in some other fashion. Moreover, since (a) the ‘simple’ bodies appear to move ‘naturally’ as well as by compulsion, i. e. in a manner contrary to nature (fire, e. g., appears to move upwards without compulsion, though it appears to move by compulsion downwards); and since (b) what is ‘natural’ is contrary to that which is due to compulsion, and movement by compulsion actually occurs;41 it follows that ‘natural movement’ can also occur in fact. Is this, then, the movement that Love sets going? No: for, on the contrary, (30) the ‘natural movement’ moves Earth downwards and resembles ‘dissociation’, and Strife rather than Love is its cause—so that in general, too, Love rather than Strife would seem to be contrary to nature. And unless Love or Strife is actually setting them in motion, the ‘simple’ bodies themselves have absolutely no movement or rest. (35) But this is paradoxical: and what is more, they do in fact obviously move.42 [334a] For though Strife ‘dissociated’,43 it was not by Strife that the ‘Ether’ was borne upwards. On the contrary, sometimes he attributes its movement to something like chance (‘For thus, as it ran, it happened to meet them then, though often otherwise’), while at other times he says it is the nature of Fire to be borne upwards, but ‘the Ether’ (to quote his words) ‘sank down upon the Earth with long roots’. (5) With such statements, too, he combines the assertion that the Order of the World is the same now, in the reign of Strife, as it was formerly in the reign of Love. What, then, is the ‘first mover’ of the ‘elements’? What causes their motion? Presumably not Love and Strife: on the contrary, these are causes of a particular motion, if at least we assume that ‘first mover’ to be an ‘originative source’.44
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