The cause of this perpetuity of coming-to-be, as we have often said, is circular motion: for that is the only motion which is continuous. [337a] That, too, is why all the other things—the things, I mean, which are reciprocally transformed in virtue of their ‘passions’ and their ‘powers of action’, e. g. the ‘simple’ bodies—imitate circular motion. For when Water is transformed into Air, Air into Fire, (5) and the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be ‘has completed the circle’, because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous.
These considerations serve at the same time to explain what is to some people a baffling problem—viz. why the ‘simple’ bodies, since each of them is travelling towards its own place, have not become dissevered from one another in the infinite lapse of time. (10) The reason is their reciprocal transformation. For, had each of them persisted in its own place instead of being transformed by its neighbour, they would have got dissevered long ago. They are transformed, however, owing to the motion with its dual character:68 and because they are transformed, none of them is able to persist in any place allotted to it by the Order.69
It is clear from what has been said (i) that coming-to-be and passing-away actually occur, (15) (ii) what causes them, and (iii) what subject undergoes them. But (a) if there is to be movement (as we have explained elsewhere, in an earlier work70) there must be something which initiates it; if there is to be movement always, there must always be something which initiates it; if the movement is to be continuous, (20) what initiates it must be single, unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of ‘alteration’; and if the circular71 movements are more than one, their initiating causes must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a single ‘originative source’. Further (b) since time is continuous, movement must be continuous, inasmuch as there can be no time without movement. Time, therefore, is a ‘number’72 of some continuous movement—a ‘number’, (25) therefore, of the circular movement, as was established in the discussions at the beginning.73 But (c) is movement continuous because of the continuity of that which is moved, or because that in which the movement occurs (I mean, e. g., the place or the quality) is continuous? The answer must clearly be ‘because that which is moved is continuous’. (For how can the quality be continuous except in virtue of the continuity of the thing to which it belongs? But if the continuity of ‘that in which’ contributes to make the movement continuous, (30) this is true only of ‘the place in which’; for that has ‘magnitude’ in a sense.) But (d) amongst continuous bodies which are moved, only that which is moved in a circle is ‘continuous’ in such a way that it preserves its continuity with itself throughout the movement. The conclusion therefore is that this is what produces continuous movement, viz. the body which is being moved in a circle; and its movement makes time continuous.
11 Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or ‘alteration’ or any kind of change whatever) we observe ‘consecutiveness’, (35) i. e. this coming-to-be after that without any interval. [337b] Hence we must investigate whether, amongst the consecutive members, there is any whose future being is necessary; or whether, on the contrary, every one of them may fail to come-to-be. For that some of them may fail to occur, is clear. (a) We need only appeal to the distinction between the statements ‘x will be’ and ‘x is about to …’, which depends upon this fact. For if it be true to say of x that it ‘will be’, it must at some time be true to say of it that ‘it is’: whereas, (5) though it be true to say of x now that ‘it is about to occur’, it is quite possible for it not to come-to-be—thus a man might not walk, though he is now ‘about to’ walk. And (b) since (to appeal to a general principle) amongst the things which ‘are’ some are capable also of ‘not-being’, it is clear that the same ambiguous character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words, their coming-to-be will not be necessary.
Then are all the things that come-to-be of this contingent character? Or, (10) on the contrary, is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there, in fact, a distinction in the field of ‘coming-to-be’ corresponding to the distinction, within the field of ‘being’, between things that cannot possibly ‘not-be’ and things that can ‘not-be’? For instance, is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be, i. e. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur?
Assuming that the antecedent must have come-to-be if the consequent is to be (e. g. that foundations must have come-to-be if there is to be a house: clay, (15) if there are to be foundations), is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be, must a house come-to-be? The answer seems to be that the necessary nexus no longer holds, unless it is ‘necessary’ for the consequent (as well as for the antecedent)74 to come-to-be—‘necessary’ absolutely. If that be the case, however, ‘a house must come-to-be if foundations have come-to-be’, as well as vice versa. For the antecedent was assumed to be so related to the consequent that, if the latter is to be, the antecedent must have come-to-be before it. If, (20) therefore, it is necessary that the consequent should come-to-be, the antecedent also must have come-to-be: and if the antecedent has come-to-be, then the consequent also must come-to-be—not, however, because of the antecedent, but because the future being of the consequent was assumed as necessary. Hence, in any sequence, when the being of the consequent is necessary, the nexus is reciprocal—in other words, when the antecedent has come-to-be the consequent must always come-to-be too. (25)
Now (i) if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum ‘downwards’,75 the coming-to-be of any determinate ‘this’ amongst the later members of the sequence will not be absolutely, but only conditionally, necessary. For it will always be necessary that some other76 member shall have come-to-be before ‘this’ as the presupposed condition of the necessity that ‘this’ should come-to-be: consequently, since what is ‘infinite’ has no ‘originative source’, neither will there be in the infinite sequence any ‘primary’ member which will make it ‘necessary’ for the remaining members to come-to-be. (30)
Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth, even in regard to the members of a limited sequence, that it is ‘absolutely necessary’ for any one of them to come-to-be. We cannot truly say, e. g., that ‘it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid’: for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that, when foundations have been laid, a thing which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is to be ‘necessary’, (35) it must be ‘always’ in its coming-to-be. For what is ‘of necessity’ coincides with what is ‘always’, since that which ‘must be’ cannot possibly ‘not-be’. [338a] Hence a thing is eternal if its ‘being’ is necessary: and if it is eternal, its ‘being’ is necessary. And if, therefore, the ‘coming-to-be’ of a thing is necessary, its ‘coming-to-be’ is eternal; and if eternal, necessary.
It follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, (5) must be cyclical—i. e. must return upon itself. For coming-to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited, it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal, because there could not be any ‘originative source’ whatever in an infinite rectilinear sequence, whether its members be taken ‘downwards’ (as future events) or ‘upwards’ (as past events). Yet coming-to-be must have an ‘originative source’
ch we are speaking, is mediated by two, or by many, members. (15)
It is in circular movement; therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the ‘absolutely necessary’ is to be found. In other words, if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is ‘necessary’ that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is ‘necessary’, their coming-to-be is cyclical.
The result we have reached is logically concordant with the eternity of circular motion, i. e. the eternity of the revolution of the heavens (a fact which approved itself on other and independent evidence),77 since precisely those movements which belong to, and depend upon, this eternal revolution ‘come-to-be’ of necessity, and of necessity ‘will be’. [338b] For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. Thus, from the being of the ‘upper revolution’ it follows that the sun revolves in this determinate manner; and since the sun revolves thus, the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle, i. e. return upon themselves; and since they come-to-be-cyclically, (5) so in their turn do the things whose coming-to-be the seasons initiate.
Then why do some things manifestly come-to-be in this cyclical fashion (as, e. g., showers and air, so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and, conversely, there must be a cloud if it is to rain), while men and animals do not ‘return upon themselves’ so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (for though your coming-to-be presupposes your father’s, (10) his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours) ? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence?
In discussing this new problem, we must begin by inquiring whether all things ‘return upon themselves’ in a uniform manner; or whether, on the contrary, though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same, in other sequences it is the same only in species.78 In consequence of this distinction, it is evident that those things, whose ‘substance’—that which is undergoing the process—is imperishable, will be numerically, as well as specifically, (15) the same in their recurrence: for the character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose ‘substance’ is perishable (not imperishable) must ‘return upon themselves’ in the sense that what recurs, though specifically the same, is not the same numerically. That is why, when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water, the Air is the same ‘specifically’, not ‘numerically’: and if these too recur numerically the same,79 at any rate this does not happen with things whose ‘substance’ comes-to-be—whose ‘substance’ is such that it is essentially capable of not-being.
* * *
1 Cf. below, 332a 20–6.
2 Cf. Timaeus 51 A.
3 Cf. Timaeus 49 D–50 C.
4 i. e. each of the things that are ‘fashioned of gold’.
5 Cf. Timaeus 53 C ff.
6 Cf. Timaeus, e. g. 49 A, 52 D.
7 Cf. Physics i. 6–9.
8 i. e. notwithstanding the sketch Aristotle has just given.
9 sc. in this connexion: the tangible qualities are the only qualities which characterize all perceptible bodies.
10 sc. the other non-tangible perceptible contrarieties.
11 ‘in contact’ with the vessel which contains it.
12 The fine, owing to the subtlety (= the smallness) of its particles, leaves no corner of its containing receptacle unfilled.
13 Cf. above, 329b 30–2.
14 sc. by foreign moisture: Cf. below, a 22.
15 i. e. the ‘dry’ which is contrasted with the damp: the ‘dried’.
16 i. e. the ‘moist’ which is contrasted with the solidified: the ‘liquefiable’.
17 The reference is probably neither to 314b 15–26 nor to 329a 35, but to de Caelo 304b 23 ff.
18 Aristotle has shown that, by the conversion of a single quality in each case, Fire is transformed into Air, Air into Water, Water into Earth, and Earth into Fire. This is a cycle of transformations. Moreover, the ‘elements’ have been taken in their natural consecutive series, according to their order in the Cosmos.
19 sc. alternatively.
20 sc. alternatively.
21 If the ‘elements’ are taken in their natural order, Water (e. g.) is ‘consecutive’ to Earth, and Air to Water. Water is moist and cold. It shares its ‘cold’ with Earth and its ‘moist’ with Air: its ‘moist’ is contrary to Earth’s ‘dry’, and its ‘cold’ is contrary to Air’s ‘hot’.
22 If, e. g., Fire plus Air are to be transformed into Water or into Earth, it is not enough that a single quality should be eliminated from each of the generating pair: for this would leave either two ‘hots’ or a ‘dry’ and a ‘moist’ (Cf. 331b 26–33). Either Fire’s ‘dry’ or Air’s ‘moist’ must be eliminated: and, in addition, the ‘hot’ of one must be eliminated and the ‘hot’ of the other be converted into ‘cold’.
23 If Air is to ‘alter’ into (e. g.) Fire, we must assume a pair of contrasted differentiating qualities, and assign one to Fire and the other to Air.
24 i. e. Air becoming Fire by being heated.
25 i. e. bare of all qualities.
26 sc. Earth, Air, Fire, and Water.
27 i. e. all the ‘simple’ bodies there are.
28 Cf. Timaeus 54 b-d.
29 Cf. above, 331a 12–20.
30 Cf. above, 331a 22 ff.
31 i. e. mathematically ‘possible.’
32 Cf. above, II. 2 and 3.
33 i. e. at either end, or in the middle, of the ‘natural series’ of the ‘elements’.
34 sc. belonging to AW.
35 Cf. above, 332b 12–13.
36 i. e. so that the ‘elements’ are genuinely or irreducibly ‘many’.
37 i. e. we are comparing the amounts of cooling energy possessed by one pint of Water and ten pints of Air respectively.
38 i. e. only ‘similarity’. Empedocles might have said the ‘elements’ were all analogous or similar without inconsistency: but he asserts that they are equal, i. e. quantitatively comparable (and therefore, ultimately, transformable).
39 sc. as the thing of less amount with which it is being compared.
40 i. e. that they are compounds produced by the consilience of their constituents in a certain proportion.
41 i. e. according to Empedocles himself.
42 i. e. according to Empedocles’ own statements.
43 i. e. though Strife initiated the disintegration of the Sphere.
44 sc. a first cause of motion in general.
45 Cf. de Anima, i. 4 and 5.
46 sc. in the only manner which was taken into account in the formulation of the problem at 334b 6–7.
47 Cf. above, I. 7.
48 sc. these extremes, the completely-hot and the completely-cold.
49 i. e. the ‘mean’ is a stretch, not a point.
50 i. e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water).
51 i. e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire).
52 Plants are nourished naturally by water impregnated with earth and artificially by water mixed with manure, which is a kind of earth.
53 Cf. Plato, Phaedo 96 A–99 C.
54 Cf. Plato, Phaedo 100 B–101 E.
55 sc. than the Forms.
56 Cf. Physics ii. 3–9.
57 Cf. above, 335a 32–b 7.
58 Cf. Physics viii. 7–9.
59 i. e. the sun, as will appear presently.
60 Cf. Physics 260a 26–261a 26.
61 Cf, above, 317b 33 ff.
62 Cf. de Caelo 270b 32–271a 33.
63 Cf. de Caelo 288a 13–27; Physics 228b 15–229a 6.
64 i. e. the annual movement of the sun in the ecliptic or zodiac circle.
65 i. e. the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outermost sphere, which (on Aristotle’s theory) is the equator of the universe and is in the same plane as the terrestrial equator.
66 Cf. above, 318a 9 ff.
67 Cf. e. g. Metaph. 1
017a 7 ff.
68 The sun’s annual movement, by which it alternately approaches and retreats, causes the alternate ascent and descent of Water, Air, and Fire. They are thus brought into contact, with the result that their constitutive contrary qualities act and suffer action reciprocally, and the ‘simple’ bodies themselves are transformed.
69 Cf. above, 336b 12.
70 Physics 255b 31–260a 10. Cf. also Metaph. 1072a 19–1074b 14.
71 i. e. the supposed continuous movements which, qua continuous, must be circular.
72 i. e. time is that which is numerable in continuous movement: Cf. Physics 219b 1–8.
73 sc. at the beginning of Aristotle’s ‘Philosophy of Nature’: cf. Physics 217b 29–224a 17.
74 Cf. above, b 14–15: the coming-to-be of the antecedent was conditionally necessary, i. e. necessarily presupposed in the being of the consequent.
75 i. e. so that effect will succeed effect endlessly.
76 i. e. some other still later member of the sequence.
77 Cf. Physics viii. 7–9.
78 i. e. in some cycles the same individual eternally recurs: in others the same species or specific form is eternally represented in the succession of its perishing individual embodiments.
79 As, e. g., a follower of Empedocles would maintain.
De Anima
Translated by J. A. Smith
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 75
