Contacts between IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts were laid out in an internal chronology provided to us and through interviews with IAEA and Iranian officials who were involved. Additional analysis of the Iranian enrichment program came from a twenty-page internal assessment by a senior IAEA expert, which was provided to us.
The visits to Kalaye Electric Company were described by IAEA officials and Western diplomats who were either part of the inspection team or were later given detailed briefings about the inspections.
CHAPTER 26. SPY GAMES
Israel’s views about Iran’s nuclear program and its campaign to leak news about it came from interviews with several high-ranking Israeli military, intelligence, and foreign ministry officials, all of which were conducted under rules that prohibited disclosing their identities. Additional information was from “Israel Casts Wary Eye on Iran,” broadcast by CBS-TV on September 29, 2004.
The story of the aluminum tubes was recounted in numerous newspaper and magazine articles. The quotation from Houston Wood was from an interview he gave to CBS-TV, which was broadcast February 4, 2004, on 60 Minutes II. Baute described his analysis of the Niger claim in an interview.
John Bolton’s attitude toward ElBaradei and international organizations in general was from Sonni Efron, “Critics say blunt-spoken weapons expert has exaggerated,” Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2003. Bolton also was interviewed in late 2003.
The American decision to provide limited intelligence on Iran, including the satellite photos of Kalaye, to the IAEA was described in interviews with two American diplomats in Vienna and confirmed by IAEA officials.
Khan’s response to the disclosure about Natanz was from a Western diplomat who was involved in the interrogation of Tahir, and the destruction of some documents was confirmed by an IAEA official.
The eavesdropping on ElBaradei was disclosed by Dafna Linzer, “IAEA Leader’s Phone Tapped; U.S. Pores Over Transcript to Try to Oust Nuclear Chief,” Washington Post, December 12, 2004. Mark Gwozdecky’s comment came in an interview. El Baradei’s comments to Der Spiegel appeared under the heading, “Al Qaeda also Wants the Bomb,” February 12, 2005.
CHAPTER 27. THE DROWNING MAN
The CIA observation of the shipment to Libya was described by a former senior CIA official in an interview. Meyer’s progress and the arrival of the two Arabs came from the court files in Pretoria. The existence of power supplies from Turkey and other equipment in Libya was from IAEA reports following Libya’s abandonment of its nuclear program and from interviews with IAEA officials who spent time in Libya. Tahir’s role as paymaster for the network was described by two international investigators.
The Butler report examined the negotiations with Libya, as did numerous newspaper and magazine articles, which detailed the talks and the seizure of the BBC China. Among the articles used were Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls,” Washington Post, 26 October 2004; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Libya’s Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered,” ISIS, March 1, 2004; Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, “The Man Who Sold the Bomb,” Time, February 14, 2005; Dafna Linzer and Craig Timberg, “S. African’s Arrest Seen as Key to Nuclear Black Market,” Washington Post, September 4, 2004; Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband, “Turks and South Africans Helped Libya’s Secret Nuclear Arms Project,” Financial Times, June 10, 2004; and Frederick Lamy, “Export controls violations and illicit trafficking by Swiss companies and individuals in the case of A. Q. Khan network,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, August 19, 2004.
Seif Gadhafi’s quotation was from a report by Allan Urry, “Britain ‘knew about nuclear network,’ ” BBC-TV, August 17, 2004. Additional background information on the talks and the eventual resolution came from Peter Beaumont, Kamal Ahmed and Martin Bright, “The meeting that brought Libya in from the cold,” Observer, December 21, 2003; and Douglas Frantz and Josh Meyer, “The Deal to Disarm Kadafi,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2005. Additional information about negotiations over Lockerbie, and insights into the Libyan rationale for relinquishing its nuclear program, was drawn from Flynt Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,” New York Times, January 23, 2004.
The quotation from John McLaughlin about Stephen Kappes was from Mark Mazzetti, “A Storied Operative Returns to the CIA,” New York Times, May 30, 2006. Additional biographical information about Kappes and his role in the Libyan negotiations came from Walter Pincus, “Kappes Is Expected to Boost CIA Morale,” Washington Post, June 19, 2006. Information from these and other articles was augmented by interviews with British and American officials who were involved in the negotiations with Libya and who all spoke on condition of anonymity. The encounters between Musharraf and Bush and Tenet were described by Musharraf in In the Line of Fire and Tenet in At the Center of the Storm.
The progress of the BBC China was from an account given by a former American intelligence official who was involved in monitoring the ship, and from an officer of the German company that owned the vessel.
The trip by Kappes and Mark Allen to Libya after the seizure of the ship was from the interview with the former American intelligence official and from an interview with a senior British counterproliferation official, both of whom were involved in the Libyan negotiations. Senator John W. Warner, Republican from Virginia and then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, cited Kappes’s role in negotiating with Libyans and attributed the “drowning man” quote to him on the Senate floor on May 10, 2006.
The scene and negotiations at the Traveler’s Club were described in interviews by two participants as well as in Beaumont, Ahmed and Bright, “The meeting that brought Libya in from the cold,” and Frantz and Meyer, “The Deal to Disarm Kadafi.” The delay in Gadhafi’s announcement because of the soccer match was recounted by the British official in an interview.
CHAPTER 28. CHECKBOOK PROLIFERATION
The special meeting on Libya with the British intelligence agents called by ElBaradei and the responses of various IAEA officials were described in interviews with many people at the agency, including Heinonen and Goldschmidt. Bolton’s opposition to involving the IAEA was told to us by one of his former associates at the State Department, John Wolf.
The IAEA trip to Libya in December was described in detail by several officials who participated and in internal and public IAEA documents; additional details were from Louis Charbonneau, “UN Inspectors Visit Libya Nuclear Weapons Sites,” Reuters, December 28, 2003. Heinonen told us about the encounter with Karim. Two of the participants in the IAEA inspection told us about Mohammad Matuq Mohammad’s unveiling of the Chinese warhead plans and the reaction of the IAEA officials.
One of the leaders of the joint American and British team in Libya provided a detailed rundown of the operation, from start to finish, in a series of interviews. Much of his information was corroborated by IAEA officials and Western diplomats also involved in dismantling the Libyan nuclear program. The IAEA officials also provided information about their inspections there. The contents of the two shopping bags were described by two Western officials who were involved in the Libyan episode. The identities of our sources are protected here because of sensitivity of the information.
Melissa Fleming told us about her encounter with the Libyan scientist in an interview.
The incident with the C-17 cargo plane and other details of the final loading of the equipment were provided by one of the American officials involved, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Donald Mahley provided an extensive rundown of the dismantling of the Libyan nuclear equipment in the November 2004 issue of The Arena, a publication of the Chemical & Biological Arms Control Institute. He offered an interesting conclusion: “It is relatively easy, even in a country where the bulk of the territory is open desert, to conceal elements of a WMD program if there is national dedication to do so.”
The quotation from the senior State Department advisor regarding how little the Americans really knew about Khan�
�s sales to Libya was obtained by Josh Meyer of the Los Angeles Times as part of his joint reporting with Frantz for the newspaper. Details of the equipment shipped to Oak Ridge were from Frank Munger, “Libyan nuke materials displayed; Energy czar on hand as journalists briefed about content in Oak Ridge,” Knoxville News-Sentinel, March 16, 2004.
The estimate of the weight of the Chinese warhead and whether it would fit atop a Scud missile was provided to us by Jeffrey Lewis, a proliferation expert who runs the excellent Web site www.armscontrolwonk.com.
CHAPTER 29. NUCLEAR WAL-MART
The reconstruction of the IAEA investigation after the Libyan disclosure was assembled from a variety of sources, which included IAEA and American officials, Western diplomats, and public and confidential documents from the IAEA. Most of the interviews were conducted on background, so the identities of the sources are concealed. Additional information came from a BBC-TV interview with ElBaradei by Mark Urban, which was broadcast on March 3, 2004; and Paul Kerr, “IAEA Says Iran Failed to Disclose Key Nuclear Activities,” Arms Control Today, March 2004.
Bolton’s anger over the IAEA draft was described by an American diplomat in Vienna. The quotation from Hussein Haniff was from an interview.
Western diplomats and international investigators familiar with the debriefings of Tahir and Tinner told us how the two men tried to cover their tracks following the seizure of the BBC China. Wisser’s reaction was from Meyer’s statement to South African authorities, which is contained in the court files there.
Musharraf’s deliberations were recounted in his memoir, In the Line of Fire, and in interviews with two of his close aides, who were involved in the talks. Pakistani newspapers also provided accounts of the arrests of KRL scientists. Hamid Mir told us about his last encounter with Khan in an interview. Khan’s comment about making the missiles and bomb was from an interview with him broadcast January 23, 2004, on GEO, a private television network in Pakistan.
Musharraf’s claim that no military or government officials helped Khan and that he would not submit to an outside inquiry or allow UN intervention in Pakistan’s nuclear program was from a transcript of his session with journalists provided to us by a Pakistani reporter, who requested anonymity. Zahid Malik was interviewed in Islamabad. The former Pakistani military officer who said the military knew about Khan’s activities spoke in an interview after being promised anonymity.
The interrogation in which Khan telephoned his daughter, Dina, and told her in code to destroy the documents he had given her was described by a retired Pakistani military official who participated in the session, and it was confirmed by a second former Pakistani official who was briefed on the episode. Dina’s version was contained in a statement that she issued in 2006 from London. The close friend of Khan’s who said he saw the 100-page document spoke to us on condition of anonymity.
CHAPTER 30. WHO’S NEXT?
The matrix constructed by the IAEA investigators was provided to us. Much of the information in this chapter was drawn from that and other internal documents as well as interviews with IAEA and American officials and with other diplomats in Vienna. The missing equipment was first disclosed by Frantz, “Vital Nuclear Parts Missing,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2005.
The first word of the CIA contact with Heinonen came from an IAEA official; it was later confirmed and expanded upon by the former senior CIA official who assigned the agent to call him. Details of the meeting and the subsequent talks with the Tinners were provided by Western diplomats involved in the operation. The most alarming aspect of the talks, that Urs Tinner had made electronic copies of the nuclear warhead plans, was confirmed by two senior international investigators; the copies have never surfaced.
Mohammed Khilewi’s assertions were first reported by Marie Colvin, “How an Insider Lifted the Veil on Saudi Plot for ‘Islamic Bomb,’ ” Sunday Times of London, July 24, 1994. A thorough rundown of the assertions and references to other articles was prepared by the Federation of American Scientists and is available on their Web site www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm.
Richard Russell talked about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions in an interview.
The interrogation of Tahir in Malaysia was described by a participant. Additional information was obtained from a written summary of the session.
The lack of American cooperation with Swiss authorities investigating the Tinners was highlighted in an article posted on a Swiss government Web site on May 29, 2006, “US frustrates Swiss nuclear probe.” The article quoted congressional testimony about the American refusal a week earlier by David Albright; it is available at www.swissinfo.org/eng/front/detail/US_frustrates_Swiss_nuclear_probe.html. The Americans later cooperated somewhat, according to Balz Bruppacher, “U.S. assists Swiss probe of family accused of aiding Libyan nuclear program,” Associated Press, November 28, 2006.
Heinonen reflected on the outcome of his investigation in an interview.
Susan Rice’s comments about the weak response to the North Korean nuclear test were from Matthew B. Stannard, “Sanctions on North Korea unlikely to sway Iran, experts say,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 19, 2006.
EPILOGUE
The Doomsday Clock can be found, along with a host of valuable articles and data, at the Web site of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a nonprofit publication that leads the way in covering proliferation issues: www.thebulletin.org. The movement of the clock was described by Jeremy Manier, “Doomsday Clock to start new era: Scientists update 60-year-old monitor of nuclear threats to include new worries,” Chicago Tribune, January 17, 2007.
We obtained a copy of the classified report by Britain’s MI5 about the number of businesses and individuals engaged in proliferation.
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The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets...And How We Could Have Stopped Him Page 47
