More German gas attacks in May achieved little: surprise was gone and the improvised gas mask proved effective. On 6 July the British smoke helmet, known as the ‘hypo helmet’, was issued. This was a flannelette hood that covered the head completely, being tucked into the neck of the tunic. It was impregnated with hyposulphite of soda and had eyepieces of mica, later of celluloid. This was hot and uncomfortable, and made the issuing and hearing of verbal orders difficult, but as the man breathed in through the impregnated cloth it conferred complete protection against chlorine. In November 1915 the hypo helmet was replaced by the P helmet, a similar hood, but with glass eyepieces (the celluloid had a tendency to mist up) and a mouthpiece outlet valve. In addition to the hyposulphite, phenate was added as a protection against phosgene, which it was thought that the Germans might use next – and in December 1915, they did.
While protective equipment was being made and issued to the troops, the question of whether or not to retaliate in kind was being discussed. The army in the field was in no doubt: gas had been used against them, and they wanted to use a similar – and if possible more effective – weapon against the Germans. At home the public and the government were divided. Some felt that it would be wrong to descend to the level of the enemy; others felt that as the law had been breached by one side, the gloves were now off.8 It took the Cabinet three weeks to make a decision, and this may have had as much to do with fears that the British chemical industry was not as advanced as that of Germany – if we could not beat them, why bother to make the effort? – as it had with the moral question.
After assurances by the British chemical industry and following representations by the army, the Cabinet agreed that gas could now be used by the British, and manufacture began. In May 1915 the formation of four Special Companies Royal Engineers was authorised. This organisation was commanded by the then Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Foulkes, DSO, RE and was responsible for the waging of chemical warfare. At the same time a Gas Defence Organisation was established, commanded by a doctor, Lieutenant Colonel S. L. Cummins, CMG, of the Royal Army Medical Corps, which was responsible for gas intelligence and the laboratory examination of all enemy chemical weapons. The Defence Organisation liaised closely with the Medical Branch at the War Office, which was responsible for the production of respirators and other protective equipment.
One of the first acts of General Sir Douglas Haig, who assumed command of the BEF in December 1915, was to ask, on 5 January 1916, for this organisation to be expanded into a Special Brigade, to consist of four battalions responsible for the discharge of gas by cylinder and for the deployment of smokescreens, and an additional four companies, each to be equipped with forty-eight Stokes four-inch mortars to fire gas shells, and four sections armed with flame-projectors. The men for the brigade were to come from volunteers already in France and by drafting suitably qualified men from England. By the end of May 1916, just in time to take part in the Somme offensive, the brigade was in being, with 208 officers and 5,306 men.
Prior to the expansion of the special companies into a brigade, the British employed chlorine gas for the first time at the Battle of Loos in September 1915. As at Ypres, the method of diffusion was by cylinders, and although in the south the gas was initially effective, in the north the wind changed and the gas blew back towards the attackers. Amongst British soldiers affected by their own gas when it blew back on them, there was widespread disillusionment as to the protective qualities of their issued smoke helmets. Many of those who reported to aid posts claiming to have been gassed had in fact been affected by exertion, fear, hysteria or a belief that the smell of the protective chemicals in which the flannel of their smoke helmets had been dipped was actually the smell of gas. On 19 October 1915 a Headquarters First Army order titled ‘Information Regarding Asphyxiating Gas’, classified secret and signed by the Major-General General Staff (Major-General Butler) said, inter alia:
A large number of men reported sick at the dressing stations and field ambulances purporting to be suffering from the effects of gas. Nearly all these men, however, were merely out of breath from running and were suffering from excitement and fright; they required no treatment and were discharged at once. A considerable proportion of them were recognised as habitual malingerers.
While it appears that the order may never have actually been issued, the thinking is clear.9
There was a major problem with the use of gas cylinders: it all depended on the wind. The Allies did have the advantage, as the wind tended to blow west to east about twice as often as it blew east to west. For this reason, while between 1915 and 1918 the Germans launched eleven gas attacks using cylinders, the British launched 150. Despite the advantage of the prevailing wind, to base offensive plans entirely around the weather, which was fickle anyway, was not the best way of waging war; and the greater the distance between the opposing trenches the less effective the gas was when it arrived at its destination. A better and more reliable method of delivering noxious vapours would be found.
In December 1915 the Germans, as predicted, used phosgene gas. Phosgene is a compound of carbon monoxide and chlorine and was more effective than chlorine because, although it too attacked the respiratory system, a dangerous dose was not easily detectable, and even if it was detected it did not necessarily cause discomfort to begin with. When the Germans did launch their first phosgene attack, at Ypres, the British were well prepared and had ample warning. Even so, 1,069 casualties were inflicted, of which 120 died. These deaths were largely caused by soldiers not donning their respirators quickly enough. The attack, however, achieved nothing.
The way was now clear for the British to retaliate with phosgene, but there were two problems: the Cabinet once again took a long time to decide that retaliation in kind was acceptable, and in any case phosgene was a by-product of the cloth-dyeing industry, which was thriving in Germany but had almost ceased in the United Kingdom. Eventually the Cabinet agreed to the use of phosgene, and the British found that the French manufactured ample supplies of it. An initial difficulty was that the production process was commercially secret; this was obviated by the British obtaining phosgene from the French in exchange for chlorine, with British cylinders being filled in a factory in Calais, until the British could obtain the licences to make phosgene for themselves. At first cylinders were filled with a mix of chlorine and phosgene in order to create sufficient pressure for the phosgene to diffuse, and this continued until a reliable phosgene shell was produced.
The first serious use of shells containing gas – a method of delivery that did not depend upon the wind – was by the Germans at Hill 60 in late April 1915. These initially contained a form of tear gas, an irritant but not a lethal one, followed up by a more toxic variant and finally by shells containing a form of phosgene (diphosgene) in mid-1916. Once the Germans had used shells containing gas, the way was open for the British to do the same. The British armaments industry was, however, having enough trouble providing high-explosive and shrapnel shells, and the first British gas shell contained only tear gas. After much badgering of the War Office by Sir Douglas Haig, and following the inevitable crisis of conscience in the Cabinet, a few so-called lethal British shells appeared at the end of 1916, containing a mixture of prussic acid and arsenious chloride. They were generally thought to be ineffective and of little use except to make the Germans put on their respirators.
The last major form of gas to be used on the Western Front was mustard gas, or dichlorethyl sulphide. This was first employed by the Germans at Ypres in July 1917, and was far more dangerous than anything used hitherto. Mustard gas was very difficult to detect, having no characteristic smell, but was highly toxic if inhaled in even small quantities, as well as having a blistering effect on the skin. It also caused conjunctivitis and (painful but usually temporary) blindness. An additional problem was that ground impregnated with mustard gas remained toxic long after the initial shelling had ceased. British respirators provided complete protection to the eyes and the re
spiratory system, but did not prevent the blistering effect on the skin. The only complete protection would have been to issue soldiers with a suit that completely covered the body, similar to the present-day nuclear, biological and chemical warfare suit (known irreverently as the ‘Noddy suit’), and while materials such as asbestos and oilskin were considered, the technology to produce an all-enveloping suit that would not unduly restrict movement did not exist in 1917.
This first attack by mustard gas was unexpected by the British, and for the first few days many soldiers failed to put on their respirators in time and died as a result. Once soldiers were warned, however, deaths were negligible, although there were large numbers of temporary casualties from the blistering effects of the gas. Although the results were painful, nearly all the men affected recovered and were able to return to duty within a few weeks. Among those caught without wearing respirators in a mustard-gas attack, one immediate reaction was to cover the eyes with a bandage soaked in water as a temporary relief for the pain: it was this that gave rise to the belief that huge numbers of men were blinded.
The British now began to manufacture mustard-gas shells, and although the French got in first, by September 1918 the British had large stocks of mustard-gas shells and the means of delivery. Had the war lasted another year, this gas, unlike its predecessors, might well have had a decisive affect on the war.
There were two reasons why the British, although never the first to use a particular type of gas, were better at using it than the Germans: British protection and British delivery. A smoke helmet, gas mask or respirator works on a simple principle: all the air breathed into a man’s lungs must come through a filter, which removes the toxic elements. Although the flannel-hood types of helmet were efficient and saved lives, when the Germans introduced a new type of gas the whole assembly had to be replaced. Far better would be a method of retaining the breathing apparatus but having an easily changed filter attached to it. As different types of gas came along, so filters to protect against them could be quickly developed and issued, and affixed to a man’s existing mask. The more gases that were likely to be encountered, the more filters would be needed; so there would come a point where the filter, if attached to or near the mouth or face, would not only be unwieldy and interfere with the wearer’s performance, but would be heavy enough to pull the mask away from his face. Hence the British produced the box respirator. The soldier wore a light mask that covered his mouth, nose and eyes, and this was attached by a flexible rubber tube to a canister containing the filters, the canister being carried in a canvas bag on the man’s chest. A considerable weight could be carried in this way, and the British respirator proved more than equal to anything the Germans or the wind could throw, fire or blow at it. If a new gas came along, a filter could be made to counter it and added to the filters already in the bag on the chest. The Germans, on the other hand, were very short of rubber, being prevented from importing it by the Royal Navy’s blockade, and were forced to have all their filters attached directly to the mask, with a severe limitation on the weight that could be carried. German filters had a shorter life than did those of the British, and the British would often fire smoke shells to force the Germans to don their masks, then fire various types of gas at them until the filters were no longer effective. Not a great number of Germans were killed, but such tactics did force them to withdraw from positions once they were no longer protected.
Gas shells for artillery were expensive, and as they had to be strong enough to withstand the pressures of being fired from an artillery piece, they were limited in the amount of gas they could hold. One British solution was the Livens projector, invented by Major W. H. Livens of the Royal Engineers. The projector was a simple metal tube about four feet in length and eight inches in diameter, closed and rounded at one end. It came with a detachable steel baseplate to prevent it being driven too far into the mud when fired. The tube was half buried in the ground, the elevation and direction being calculated to deliver the gas where desired. The projectile was of steel and contained thirty pounds of phosgene and a bursting charge of TNT. The propellant was cordite and range was determined by the amount of cordite used. The device was fired by an electrically initiated charge in the bottom of the projector. Used in massed batteries of twenty-five or so, with the wires to their propellent charges all connected to one firing device, the Livens projector could deliver a lot of gas quickly and at a high concentration in a specific area at up to a mile’s range. It was cheap, easy to operate and very effective for local use, as – in contrast to the cylinder-release method – there was no warning of the gas’s approach.
One striking British development, which might have had a major effect on the Western Front had it been ready before the Armistice in 1918, was not lethal at all. The idea was to use diphenyl chlorarsine in a smoke cloud whose particles would be so fine as to penetrate the German respirator. The chemical had no long-lasting deleterious affects but produced an intense irritation of the mouth, nose, eyes and throat, pains in the chest, difficulty in breathing, and vomiting. It rendered those exposed to it completely helpless for a limited period. The Germans had tried diphenyl chlorarsine, but gave up when it became apparent that their method of delivery – by artillery shell – did not produce a cloud whose particles were fine enough to penetrate the Allied respirators. The British discovered that a sufficiently fine cloud could be produced by heat distillation, rather than by an explosive bursting charge. They intended to use a derivative of the substance delivered by canisters placed on the parapet of their own trenches. Each canister had a heating element below the chemical, and the fuse would be lit when the wind was blowing in the right direction. The aim was to follow up such an attack with infantry, who could seize the opposing defence lines when their occupants were incapacitated. British box respirators were adapted by the addition of cheesecloth filters to stop the particles, and preparations were well in hand when the war came to an end.
Through better methods of protection, and through the development of ever more efficient means of delivering successively more noxious gases, the British rapidly became the leaders in gas warfare; the Germans never regained their early advantage. The British launched a total of 768 gas attacks between 1915 and 1918, using 88,000 cylinders, 197,000 Livens projector drums, 178,000 Stokes gas bombs, 5,700 tons of gas of various types and a huge quantity of artillery shells firing gas. The British were, however, sufficiently sensitive to public opinion at home and in the neutral countries to take care that they never initiated a new form of gas warfare. They predicted it, prepared for it and manufactured the chemicals for it, but they always waited until the Germans had used it first; then they replied in kind, nearly always with more devastating effect.
While there can be no doubt that gas came as a terrible shock initially, when the Allies had no conception of what it was or how to protect themselves against it, it never became more than a useful tactical expedient for either side. The wearing of gas masks was uncomfortable and inconvenient, and although gas did cause casualties it never conferred more than a temporary local advantage to the user. Throughout the course of the war the British lost 487,994 dead from all causes on the Western Front. Of these deaths 5,899, or 1.2 per cent of the total, were attributable to gas.10 In July 1917 the Germans shelled the Ypres salient with 50,000 rounds of mustard gas, the nastiest gas then available. Two and a half thousand soldiers were gassed, but only eighty-seven died. During the next three weeks a further 14,726 men were gassed, of whom 500 died, many as a result of failing to don their respirators in time. Despite the tales of the great numbers of men whose lives were cut short or subsequently ruined by their having been gassed, of the pensions awarded for injury caused by war service, only one in a hundred was to a gas victim, and only 0.12 per cent were for blindness from all causes. Although fatalities due to gas were far fewer than claimed at the time and since, an injured man causes more problems to his own side than does one who is dead. Bodies are relatively easily disposed o
f; injured men have to be evacuated, cared for, fed and housed. To have to deal with large numbers of men incapacitated, albeit temporarily, by gas was a very real administrative burden for both sides. In that the British inflicted more gas casualties than they sustained, gas warfare was to the Allied advantage overall, but gas was never a decisive weapon. The cynic might say that if it had really been any good, it would never have been banned.
If being killed or injured by an undetectable vapour that arrived with no warning was regarded as unpleasant, being roasted to death was seen as being even more so. As with gas, the Germans were the first to use flame as a weapon, firstly against the French at Malancourt in February 1915 and then against the British in July of the same year. The 8th Battalion the Rifle Brigade, a New Army battalion, arrived on the Western Front on 20 May 1915. At 0200 hours on 30 July the men moved into the front lines at Hooge, on the Ypres salient. Here the opposing lines were very close together, separated only by the Menin road, and at 0315 hours the battalion was subject to a German mortar attack, following which the German parapet suddenly erupted in gouts of flame and thick smoke directed at the Rifle Brigade. A number of men were burned, and many were later reported missing (probably burned). The battalion were driven out of their trenches and the position was not stabilised until late afternoon. Eight officers and 169 other ranks of the Rifle Brigade were killed that day, although how many by mortar fire, how many by flame and how many in the subsequent fighting is not clear. As to exactly what type of flame-projector was involved, sources are confused. The British official view was that portable devices were used, but the war diary of the battalion indicates that the flame was projected by means of pipes laid to the German parapet and fed from containers of a pressurised mix of oil and petrol that was ignited at the mouth of the pipe. As the Germans seem to have made no attempt to advance under cover of flame, it is likely that the apparatus was static, or at least not man-portable. The Germans eventually produced three types of Flammenwerfer: the small and medium varieties came as cylindrical devices strapped to a man’s back with the flame projected from a flexible nozzle, while the large variant was only portable in sections.
Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the Great War (Cassel Military) Page 19
