treaty obligations very seriously and expected the same attitude from its co-signatories.
[This does not tally with the German version, which says that Molotov first mentioned a non-aggression pact on August 15. The date is important. It was four days after the
arrival of the Drax Mission about whose "seriousness" the Russians were now very doubtful. See W. R. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London, 1960), p. 521.]
By now the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks had, indeed, reached a deadlock, both on
"numerical reciprocity" and, more immediately, on the Polish issue; and when, on August 20, Hitler sent his famous telegram to Stalin asking him to receive Ribbentrop "on Tuesday, August 22 or, at the latest, on Wednesday, August 23 ", and saying that Ribbentrop would arrive with full powers for signing the non-aggression pact, "as well as the protocol", Stalin agreed.
It should, however, be remembered that, apart from the political soundings undertaken by the Germans in both Berlin and Moscow, there were also the trade negotiations which ran parallel with the political soundings, and had, of course, some bearing on them. Indeed, it was by announcing the Trade Agreement with Germany on August 21 that the Soviet
Government prepared the ground for the much more spectacular and, to many, almost
unbelievable announcement that was to come three days later. But the wording of the
Pravda editorial of August 21 accompanying the announcement of the Trade Agreement was significant enough to anyone who could read between the lines—and, in this case, it did not even require outstanding political acumen to do so.
Shirer is probably quite right in saying that it was on August 19 that Stalin made his choice, unless it was on the 20th, after the receipt of Hitler's personal telegram.
The best conclusion this writer can come to is that, as of August 14, when
Voroshilov demanded "an unequivocal answer" on the question of allowing Soviet troops to meet the Germans in Poland, the Kremlin still had an open mind as to
which side to join... At any rate, Stalin does not seem to have made his final decision until the afternoon of August 19.
[ Shirer, op. cit., p. 535.]
On the 19th, the Soviet press was, on the face of it, still violently anti-Nazi. It made it quite apparent that a German attack on Poland was now almost certainly a matter of days.
Thus, Pravda of August 19 still published a TASS message from Warsaw under the heading: "GERMAN PROVOCATIONS IN DANZIG", and a TASS message from
Berlin, under the heading: "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY":
The Völkischer Beobachter today prominently displayed comments in the Italian press to the effect that the tension between Germany and Poland "can no longer be settled by a mere settlement of the Danzig question". All German papers are trying to present Poland as an "aggressor", and as the creator of "an intolerable situation". Britain and France are being attacked with special violence. In its editorial, the Völkischer Beobachter says: "The problem of Danzig and the Corridor are ripe for a German solution." The papers are openly threatening war. "Every day that's wasted." says the Völkischer Beobachter, "increases the danger of war."
By the 21st, the emphasis in the TASS reports from Berlin had slightly shifted, but only slightly; the main suggestion was still that a German attack on Poland was imminent; but now it was also suggested that Poland would be crushed within a very short time:
Berlin, August 20. The threats against Poland today are even more violent. All the papers are screaming about the "Polish terror against Germans", and about "the crowding of Polish prisons by Germans". At the same time the German newspapers are writing about
"the military weakness of Poland" and her incapacity to withstand a German blow.
It was not, however, this seemingly routine story which attracted the reader's attention that day, but the front-page editorial on the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement.
It started from afar, as it were:
Even only a few years ago, Germany held first place in the Soviet Union's trade
turnover. In 1931 Soviet-German trade amounted to 1,100 million marks. In view of the strained political relations, there was a marked decline in this trade. Until 1935, Germany was still first in the Soviet Union's foreign trade, but by 1938 she was
down to fifth place, after Britain, the USA, Belgium and Holland. This loss of the Soviet market must have worried both German business circles and the German
Government. That is why, since the beginning of last year, negotiations were
conducted between the two countries, with certain intervals, on trade and credit
questions with a view to enlarging Soviet-German trade. Despite difficulties that arose in these negotiations in view of the tense political atmosphere, there was a marked improvement in recent months. Thanks to the desire of both sides to
improve commercial relations between the two countries, all matters of dispute have now been settled...
The editorial went on to say that a trade and credit agreement had been signed in Berlin on August 19 by Comrade Babarin, of the Soviet Trade Delegation, and Herr Schnurre. It was a satisfactory agreement: under it, Germany granted the USSR a credit of 200
million marks for purchases to be made in Germany during the next two years—mostly
machine tools and other industrial equipment. The Soviet Union would supply, during the same period, "various commodities" for 180 million marks. The great advantage of the German credit was that it was in the nature of a financial loan, and the Soviet Union could pay German firms in cash. The annual interest rate on this loan was five percent, which was cheaper than the interest on previous loans. Also, the loan would not be
repayable for seven and a half years.
This suggestion of peaceful German-Soviet trade relations for over seven years to come was sufficiently startling at a moment when the Germans were about to invade Poland.
But the conclusion of the article was even more startling: "This agreement should greatly stimulate trade between the USSR and Germany, and should become a turning point in the economic relations between the two countries. The new trade and credit agreement between the USSR and Germany, though born in an atmosphere of strained political
relations, is designed to clear this atmosphere. It can become an important step towards a further improvement in not only the economic relations but also the political relations between the USSR and Germany."
[Emphasis added.]
Clearly, the die was about to be cast. What also contributed to Stalin's decision to sign up with Germany was the situation in the Far East. In August 1939 the fierce battle of
Halkin Gol was being fought against the Japanese, and the Russians were afraid of
becoming involved in a two-front war—against Germany in Europe and against Japan in
Asia. A pact with Germany would almost automatically end the war with Japan, Hitler's ally.
Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23 came almost as a complete surprise to the Russian public, and if nobody openly declared himself deeply shocked and scandalised, it was simply because it was
"not done"—especially after the Purge years—to be openly shocked or scandalised by anything with which Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov were directly associated. It
is, nevertheless, obvious that, at heart, millions of Russians were deeply perplexed by what had happened, after their country had been in the vanguard of the "anti-Fascist struggle" ever since the Nazis had come to power.
[This is also confirmed by the recollections of so competent an observer as Wolfgang Leonhard, whose account is based on firsthand experience at the time within the
Comintern establishment: Child of the Revolution (London, 1957). At the same time, according to Jean Champenois, a leading French correspondent in Moscow, mere was
also widespread chuckling among many Russians about the punishment meted out to
England and France "after all their dirty tricks".]
The mental alibis to which many Russians—whether workers or intellectuals—resorted,
at least during the early stages of the Pact, were that Stalin and Molotov no doubt knew what they were doing; that they had, after all, kept the Soviet Union out of war (here was something corresponding roughly to the "cowardly relief and shame" reaction in the West at the time of Munich); and that the Pact, though distasteful, had been rendered inevitable by the attitude of France, Britain and Poland. Nor was it doubted that Stalin and Molotov must have had a great many reservations about the whole thing.
The reactions to the "deal" with Hitler were to undergo numerous changes during the twenty-two months the Pact was in force; but it seems clear that Stalin and Molotov were fully conscious of the mixed feelings with which the Pact was received in the country.
Throughout the Pact period, the Soviet press, for example, maintained a marked
aloofness vis-à-vis Nazi Germany. There were no favourable comments on any aspects of the Nazi régime at any time, and there was, strictly speaking, no reporting whatsoever on the German scene in the Soviet newspapers, beyond the reproduction of war
communiqués and some official utterances by Hitler, especially when these concerned
Soviet-German relations. Important news items, such as Stalin's toast during Ribbentrop's visit—"Since the German people love their Führer so much, let us drink the Führer's health"—were carefully kept out of the Russian press.
During the week preceding Ribbentrop's visit, Aviation Day had been celebrated on
August 18, and half the front page of Pravda that day was occupied by a drawing showing Stalin and Voroshilov surveying a boundless airfield with thousands of planes on it. "Great and touching is our airmen's love for Comrade Stalin", the editorial wrote, while, on page 2, a famous airman commented rapturously on "Comrade Stalin's
profound knowledge in aviation matters", and recalled some of the outstanding feats of Soviet aviation in recent years and their heroes—Chkalov, Gromov, Grizodubova,
Raskova and Osipenko. The same paper reported, on its foreign news page, "Jewish pogroms in Czechoslovakia" (TASS, Prague), and "Persecution of Poles in Germany"
(TASS, Warsaw).
On August 19, Pravda reported the Aviation Day meeting at Tushino Airfield, attended by a million people: here also was a picture of the Party and Army leaders present at the air display— Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Beria,
Shvernik, Malenkov, Bulganin, Shcherbakov, Shkiriatov, Budienny, Loktionov and
Mikhailov. On August 20 the place of honour was given to a "Letter from Prague", entitled: "The Czech People are Not Defeated." And then, on August 21, there appeared, as we have seen, the famous editorial on the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement, with its significant concluding paragraph, foreshadowing a political rapprochement between the two countries.
But on the following two days—August 22 and 23—there was still nothing of any
importance, except the usual seemingly anti-German news items like these: "Many Poles preparing to flee from Danzig", or "Mass Arrests in Memel. Gestapo arresting not only Poles, but also Lithuanians, Polish Press says."
On August 24 came the bombshell. Big front-page pictures in Pravda showing Molotov, Stalin, Ribbentrop, Gaus, Deputy Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office and its legal adviser, and an interpreter. The editorial on the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact argued along the following lines:
The Pact was consistent with the Soviet Union's policy. "We stand for peace and the consolidation of business relations with all countries." Recalling Rapallo and the Soviet-German Neutrality Agreement of 1926, it said: "Yesterday's agreement
follows in the footsteps of the 1926 agreement, except that it goes still further, since Art. 1 precludes any aggressive actions against the co-signatory either alone or with other Powers, while Art. 2 provides for neutrality in the event of an attack on either signatory by a third power." Art. 3 called for consultation on matters of common interest. Art. 4 was particularly important since it obliged the signatories not to take part in any grouping of Powers which might, directly, or indirectly, be aimed at the other signatory.
The editorial also highly commended Art. 5 providing for the peaceful and friendly
settlement of any disputes and for the creation of commissions in the event of more
serious conflicts, as well as Art. 6 which specified that the Pact was valid for ten years and was automatically renewable for five more years; here was a clear promise of a
lasting peace. The last paragraph concerned ratification "as quickly as possible".
Below the picture of the Kremlin meeting there was this announcement:
At 3.30 p.m. on August 23 a first conversation took place between... V. M. Molotov and the Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr von Ribbentrop. The conversation took
place in the presence of Comrade Stalin and the German Ambassador Count von
der Schulenburg. It lasted about three hours. After an interval the conversation was resumed at 10 p.m. and ended with the signing of the Non-Aggression Agreement of
which the text follows.
Another communiqué concerned the arrival in Moscow, at 1.30 p.m. on August 23, of
"the Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop" and the persons accompanying him, among them Herr Gaus, Baron von Dörnberg, Herr P. Schmidt, Prof.
G. Hoffmann, Herr K. Schnurre, etc. It also gave a long list of the personalities who had gone to the airfield to meet them, among them Deputy Foreign Commissar V. P.
Potemkin; Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade, M. S. Stepanov; Deputy Commissar of
the Interior, V. N. Merkulov; the Chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, etc. Present were also members of the German Embassy, with Ambassador von der Schulenburg at their
head, as well as the Italian Ambassador and Military Attaché. On the following day
Pravda briefly reported Ribbentrop's departure "at 1.25 p.m. on August 24". The same people who had come to meet him had also gone to see him off.
The editorial that day, however, dealt with nothing more exciting than the State purchases of vegetables.
For the next few days nothing more was said about the Soviet-German Pact and,
surprisingly, there were no reports of any "spontaneous" and "enthusiastic" mass meetings anywhere in Russia approving it. The foreign press reactions, as reported in the Soviet Press, seemed remarkably inconclusive, except for the London Star which was reported to have blamed Chamberlain for what had happened. On August 29, Pravda
quoted H. N. Brailsford, the veteran Labour journalist, as saying something similar.
Equally inconclusive were the various news items printed—about military preparations in Poland, Britain, and so on.
Yet there was a great deal of uneasiness in the country; this may be gauged from the publication, on August 27, of an interview with Voroshilov in which he explained why the talks with Britain and France had broken down.
The talks, he said, had stopped because of serious disagreements. The Soviet
Military Mission took the view that since the Soviet Union had no common frontier with the aggressor (sic), she could help Great Britain, France and Poland only if her troops could cross Polish territory in order to make contact with the aggressor
forces. The Poles said that they neither needed nor wanted Soviet help. Asked if
there was any truth in the Daily Herald report that, in case of war, the Soviet Union would occupy parts of Poland and also help the Poles with planes, munitions, etc., Voroshilov said No, adding: "We did not break off the talks with Britain and France because we had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany; on the
contrary, we signed this pact because, apart from anything else, the military talks with Britain and France had reached a complete deadlock."
The whole suggestion was that the Soviet Union was pr
epared to go to war with Nazi
Germany, but that she could not do so in view of the attitude of Britain, France and especially Poland.
During the next few days the news continued to be highly confusing—more about Polish
"defence measures", British "military preparations", about an appeal by the Slovak Premier, Mgr Tiso, asking Germany, on behalf of the Slovak population, to send troops to Slovakia, about German ships leaving American ports, and so on. On August 30 there
were only short news items about "General Mobilisation in Poland", and about Ambassador Nevile Henderson's meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop.
It was not till August 31—i.e. one day before the German invasion of Poland—that
Molotov made a statement on the Soviet-German Pact before the Supreme Soviet. If,
only four days before, Voroshilov spoke of the breakdown of the talks with Britain and France more in sorrow than in anger, Molotov started that day on his series of anti-French and anti-British speeches, with lasting co-existence with Nazi Germany as their keynote.
Since the 3rd Session of the Supreme Soviet, he said, the international situation had shown no turn for the better, either in Europe or in the Far East. The talks with Britain and France had gone on since April, i.e. for four months, and they had led to nothing.
Poland had made any agreement impossible, and, in her negative attitude, Poland had been supported by Britain. He then ridiculed the British and French military missions who had come to Moscow without any powers or credentials; the whole thing "wasn't serious". Then came his monumental defence of the Soviet-German Pact:
We all know that since the Nazis came to power, relations between the Soviet Union and Germany have been strained. But we need not dwell on these differences; they
are sufficiently familiar to you anyway, Comrades Deputies.
But, as Comrade Stalin said on March 10, "we are in favour of business relations with all nations"; and it seems that, in Germany, they understood Comrade Stalin's statement correctly, and drew the right conclusions.
Russia at war Page 8
