"Our views coincide," he concluded.
Then, turning to Hopkins's question what Russia would require that the USA could
deliver immediately, and, second, what would be her requirements on the basis of a long war, Stalin listed in the first category anti-aircraft guns of medium calibre, together with ammunition— altogether 20,000 pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, large and small. Second, he asked for large-size machine-guns for the defence of his cities.
Third, he said he needed a million rifles; "if the calibre was the same as the one used in the Red Army, then he had plenty of ammunition."
In the second category, he mentioned first, high-octane aviation gasolene, second, aluminium for the construction of aeroplanes and, third, the other items already
mentioned in the list already presented to our government in Washington.
And then came this striking remark from Stalin: "Give us antiaircraft guns and the aluminium and we can fight for three or four years."
After a long meeting with Molotov, which was chiefly devoted to a somewhat
inconclusive discussion about Japan, Molotov suggesting, in the course of it, that the United States give Japan "a warning" against attacking Russia, Hopkins had a second meeting with Stalin.
Since the outbreak of the war, Stalin said, the number of German divisions at the Russian front had been increased from 175 to 232, and he thought Germany could mobilise 300.
Russia had only 180 divisions at the beginning, but had 240 now, and could mobilise 350.
Stalin stated that he can mobilise that many by the time the spring offensive begins in May 1942... He is anxious to have as many of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because the troops then learn that Germans can be killed and are
not supermen... He wants to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the great campaign next spring.
He made much of "insurgent troops" [i.e. partisans] fighting behind the enemy lines, and claimed that there had been no mass surrenders of troops on either side.
He thought the Germans would soon have to go on the defensive themselves, but
nevertheless, admitted that while the Russians had a large number of tanks and
motorised divisions, none of diem were a match for the German Panzer divisions.
All the same, he believed that the large Russian tanks were better than any German tanks...
The Red Army, he said, had now 4,000 large tanks, 8,000 medium tanks and 12,000
light tanks; the Germans had a total of 30,000 tanks.
His tank production now was only 1,000 per month, he said, and Russia would be short of steel.
He urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. Later he said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the United States. He also wished to purchase as many tanks as possible to be ready for the spring campaign. He said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter—the tank losses were very great on both sides, but Germany could produce more tanks per month
this winter than Russia. He would like to send a tank expert to the United States and would give the United States his tank designs.
[ Sherwood, op cit., pp. 337-8.]
"He gave", Hopkins goes on, "a much more glowing account of Russia's aircraft position, and said that the German claims of Russian air losses were 'absurd'." Nevertheless, "he expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America, and left me the impression that there would soon be a shortage of pilots."
Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not underrate the German Army. Their
organisation was of the very best, and they had large reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel... The German Army is [therefore] capable of taking part in a winter
campaign in Russia. He thought, however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after September 1, when the heavy rains would begin.
After October 1 the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the
defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the winter months
would be in front of Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad, probably not more than 100 km.
away from where it was now. He... thought the Germans were "tired", and had no stomach for an offensive. .. Though Germany could bring up forty divisions, making 275 divisions in all, these divisions probably could not get there before the hard weather set in.
[Ibid., p. 340.]
At this second meeting, Stalin again insisted that the Red Army's first need was antiaircraft guns—"vast quantities of these to give protection to its lines of communications; secondly, aluminium for the construction of aeroplanes; thirdly, machine-guns and
rifles."
As regards the ports of entry, he thought Archangel "difficult, but not impossible" since icebreakers could keep the port free all winter; Vladivostok he thought dangerous, as Japan could cut it off at any time, and the roads and railroads of Persia "inadequate".
"He [Stalin] expressed repeatedly his confidence that the Russian lines would hold within 200 km. of their present position ... and indicated that the front would be solidified not later than October 1."
It is clear from what Hopkins told Stalin that he was not entirely convinced that the Russians would survive the autumn:
"I was mindful of the importance that no (economic) conference be held in Moscow until we knew the outcome of the battle now in progress. .. This battle was still in the balance. Hence my suggestion that we hold this conference at as late a date as
possible. Then we would know whether there was to be a front and approximately
the location of the front during the coming winter months."
Nevertheless, basing himself on Stalin's belief that the front would be "solidified not later than October 1" Hopkins recommended to the US Government that such a conference (the future Stalin-Beaverbrook-Harriman conference) be held between October 1 and
October 15.
In conclusion, Stalin said that he thought German morale pretty low, and that the
Germans would be demoralised still further by an announcement that the United States was going to join in the war against Hitler.
Stalin [Hopkins continued] said it was inevitable that we [the USA] would finally come to grips with Hitler on some battlefield. The might of Germany was [still] so great that, even though Russia might defend herself, it would be very difficult for Britain and Russia combined to crush the German military machine... He believed
the war would be bitter and perhaps long ... and he wanted me to tell the President that he would welcome American troops on any part of the Russian front under the
complete command of the American Army... Finally, he asked me to tell the
President that, while he was confident that the Russian Army could withstand the
German Army, the problem of supply by the next spring would be a serious one and
that he needed our help.
In a remarkable article on his meetings with Stalin, Hopkins later wrote:
... He welcomed me with a few swift Russian words. He shook my hand briefly,
firmly, courteously. He smiled warmly. There was no waste of word, gesture or
mannerism. It was like talking to a perfectly co-ordinated machine, an intelligent machine... The questions he asked were clear, concise, direct... His answers were ready, unequivocal, spoken as if the man had had them on his tongue for years... If he is always as I heard him, he never wastes a syllable. If he wants to soften an abrupt answer... he does it with that quick managed smile—a smile that can be cold but friendly, austere but warm. He curries no favour with you. He seems to have no doubts. He assures you that Russia will stand against the onslaught of the German Army. He takes it for granted that you have no doubts, either... He laughs often
enough, but it's a short laugh, somewhat sardonic perhaps. There is no small talk in him. His humour is keen, penetrating.
[Sherwood, op. cit., p. 345.]
Although Hopkins had, obviously, come with instructions which forbade him to assume
that the Russians would not be beaten before the winter had set in, Stalin not only enormously impressed him as a person, but also convinced him that the Russians would hold the Germans, and were preparing for a very long war. "A man," Sherwood wrote of the Hopkins-Stalin meetings, "who feared immediate defeat would not have put
aluminium so high on the list of priorities. .. The very nature of Stalin's requests proved that he was viewing the war on a long-range basis."
And Sherwood added:
Hopkins later expressed extreme irritation with the military observers in Moscow
when they cabled darkly pessimistic reports that could be based on nothing but
mere guesswork coloured by prejudice.
[Sherwood, op. cit., p. 345.]
This Hopkins account of his meetings with Stalin is invaluable. It is, in fact, the only detailed first-hand account there is of Stalin at the height of the German invasion. Several points are worth noting. Anxious to obtain American aid, Stalin painted a more
favourable picture than was warranted by the progress of the war at the end of July 1941.
He carefully avoided any suggestion of the Red Army's acute shortage of tanks and
aircraft. He knew that he could hardly expect anything at once and therefore stressed himself the desirability of building up the Soviet air force and armour in readiness for a spring campaign in 1942. He quite deliberately created the impression of planning for a long-term war. But he was not "currying favours"; he took it for granted that it was in both Britain's and America's interests to help Russia.
He went, of course, seriously wrong in assuming that the Germans would not advance
more than 125 miles, that the Russians would keep not only Moscow and Leningrad, but also Kiev, and that the front would become stabilised by the beginning of September, or the beginning of October at the latest. Was there not an element of bluff in his apparent optimism?
It was on the basis of Hopkins's reasonably optimistic forecast that the Stalin-
Beaverbrook-Harriman conference was to meet on September 29, a day before the "final"
German offensive began against Moscow.
The assurance given to Hopkins that Kiev would be held may well have accounted in part for Stalin's determination to hold on to the capital of the Ukraine; a decision which had, as we know, disastrous results.
One may well wonder, all the same, whether Stalin was not much more nervous about the general situation than would appear from Hopkins's account. The most striking
suggestion that Stalin made to Hopkins was that he would "welcome American troops on any part of the Russian front under the complete command of the American Army". More alarmist still were to be some of Stalin's dispatches to Churchill after the greater part of the Ukraine had been overrun by the Germans. Thus, on September 3 he wrote:
The position of the Soviet troops has considerably deteriorated in such vital areas as the Ukraine and Leningrad. The relative stabilisation of the front, achieved some three weeks ago, has been upset by the arrival of thirty to thirty-four German
infantry divisions and enormous numbers of tanks and aircraft... The Germans are
looking on the threat in the west as a bluff... They think they can well beat their enemies one at a time—first the Russians and then the British.
The loss of Krivoi Rog, etc., (he went on) has resulted in a lessening of our defence capacity and has confronted the Soviet Union with mortal danger... The only way out of this more than unfavourable situation is to open a second front this year
somewhere in the Balkans or in France... and simultaneously to supply the Soviet
Union with 30,000 tons of aluminium by the beginning of October and a minimum
monthly aid of 400 aeroplanes and 500 tanks (small or medium).
Without these two kinds of aid the Soviet Union will be either defeated or weakened to the extent that it will lose for a long time its ability to help its allies by active operations at the front against Hitlerism.
[Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-5, vol. I, p. 21 (Moscow, 1957), to be later referred to as Stalin-Churchill Correspondence or Stalin-Roosevelt Correspondence.]
And, ten days later, on September 13, Stalin again wrote to Churchill, saying that if the opening of a second front was not feasible at present, then—
it seems to me that Britain could safely land twenty-five to thirty divisions at
Archangel or ship them to the southern areas of the USSR via Iran for military cooperation with the Soviet troops on Soviet soil in the same way it was done during the last war in France. That would be a great help.
[Ibid., p. 24.]
The suggestion that British troops should come to help Russia on Russian soil, as well as the warning that Russia might be defeated betrayed real anxiety on Stalin's part;
nevertheless, he concluded his message to Churchill on a characteristic note of bravado.
In reply to a British proposal that if, as a result of the situation at Leningrad, the Baltic Fleet were lost, the British should, after the war, make up for these Russian losses, Stalin remarked:
The Soviet Government... appreciates the British Government's readiness to
compensate for part of the damage... There can be little doubt that, if necessary, the Soviet people will actually destroy the ships at Leningrad. But responsibility for the damage would be borne not by Britain but by Germany. I think, therefore, that
Germany will have to make good the damage after the war.
[Ibid., p. 25.]
The most direct example of Anglo-Soviet co-operation in 1941 was the joint occupation of Iran. After previous consultations with the British Government, the Soviet
Government informed the Iranian Government that it would "introduce Soviet troops into Iran in connexion with the widespread anti-Soviet activity of German agents in that
country". The troops would be "introduced" in virtue of Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Agreement of 1921 which provided for such an occupation in the event of a third party threatening the independence of Iran and the security of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Note recalled that, since the German invasion of Russia, the Soviet Government had
already sent three warnings to the Iranian Government but without any effect.
It was also on August 25 that the British Ambassador in Iran, Sir Reader Bullard,
informed the Iranian Government of the entry of British troops into Iran. This joint occupation had the double purpose of preventing Germany from using Iran as a base of operations against both Russia and the Iranian oilfields, and of opening a supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Since the Allies, and, in particular, Churchill, considered both the other routes—via Vladivostok or via the Russian Arctic—highly
precarious, this project was held to be of vital importance as an alternative. The joint operation went off remarkably smoothly; a new Iranian Government was set up, and
before long, the pro-German Rezah Shah abdicated, to end his days in exile in
Johannesburg, where he died in 1944.
British and Russian forces met in amity, and Teheran was jointly occupied on
September 17, the Shah having abdicated on the previous day in favour of his gifted twenty-two-year-old son. On September 20 the new Shah, under allied advice,
restored the Constitutional Monarchy... Most of our forces withdrew from the
country, leaving only detachments to guard the communications, and Teheran was
evacuated by both British and Russian troops on October 18.
[Churchill, op. cit., p. 432. Later, when Iran became the great route for supplies to Russia, numerous Russian, British and American troops were to be seen in Teheran once more.
For a time after the e
vacuation of the Polish "Anders" army from Russia, the Poles were also very active at Teheran. The Russians, whom I was able to observe there at the end of 1943, made a point of being extremely "correct" in their behaviour, and drunkenness, not uncommon among the British and Americans, was strictly prohibited and
severely punished. The Russians at that time did also engage in a good deal of
propaganda in Persia, notably by opening a large hospital in Teheran. With the support of various public welfare schemes they encouraged a separatist movement in Persian
Azerbaijan. In 1946, under American pressure, they had to abandon these political
schemes and had to withdraw their troops.]
*
The Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission arrived in Moscow on September 28. Several
meetings were held under the chairmanship of Molotov, and on two occasions
Beaverbrook and Harriman had long conversations with Stalin. Beaverbrook was a strong
"help-Russia" man, and the economic conference was a prelude to the granting of a first lend-lease loan of a billion dollars by the USA to the USSR. It was decided to ship a wide variety of arms, raw materials and machinery in considerable quantities to the Soviet Union, while in return certain Russian raw materials were to be delivered to the USA and Britain. The closing speeches of the conference by Beaverbrook, Harriman and Molotov were extremely cordial. Molotov stressed "the great political importance of the conference, which had foiled the Hitlerites' intention to destroy their enemies one by one, demonstrating to the world that a mighty front of freedom-loving peoples had been
created, led by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA." The final communiqué said that Britain and America were going to supply "practically everything that Russia had asked for". As I noted in Moscow on October 4:
The conference is over, and is being acclaimed on all sides as a huge success.
Impressed by the remarkable speed with which the conference got through its work, people aire perhaps apt to forget the limited scope of the talks and the limited
possibilities of delivering the stuff to Russia... The Russian papers are making a big display of the success of the conference, of the "united anti-Hitler front" by three of the greatest industrial powers in the world, et cetera. People reading the papers in tram-cars appear to be pleased, though I don't think they are overwhelmed. They
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