They flew Yak-1's, which they said they liked.
Tulasne, whom I met at lunch on June 17 at General Petit's (the French Military Attaché), said that things were still very quiet in the Briansk sector (where the French had their base), but that "it" might start at any moment. The Russians were busy raiding German communications with 200 bombers and 200 fighters at a time; they were using Russian
bombers during the day, and American bombers at night; the Germans had hardly any
night fighters here, so busy were they over Germany.
The French, he said, were eating the same food as the Russians, and had got to like kasha and cabbage soup; but they seldom got fresh meat, and usually American spam or
galantine, which was a bore. The more recent French arrivals were finding living
conditions rather primitive, but were quite happy otherwise. The village girls were "very friendly".
The story of the Normandie Squadron was to become one of the proudest French exploits during World War II, and one of the most tragic. In the battles of the Kursk-Orel area in the summer of 1943 about two-thirds of the first batch of the Normandie Squadron were killed, among them Lefevre and Tulasne. Later, others came to take their place, and their last battles were to be fought in East Prussia where, supplied with the best Russian fighters, the Yak-3, they wrought terrible havoc on the now tottering Luftwaffe, once bringing down nearly 100 in three days. The vicomte was born under a lucky star, and, together with three others, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and
ultimately safely returned to France. But Tulasne was the man whom the veterans of the Normandie Squadron remembered best.
The fearful losses in the Normandie Squadron give one some idea of the losses suffered by the Russian air force generally.
Partly because of the growing Great-Russian nationalism, and partly perhaps to impress the Western Allies (who had been so pleased with the dissolution of the Comintern)
Stalin decided in June 1943 in favour of a new National Anthem to replace the
International. At the end of the month, members of the Central Committee listened to some of the first attempts, but were not satisfied; it was not till the beginning of 1944 that the Party anthem (with new "nationalist" words) was adopted as the national anthem, and the International became the party anthem!
These manifestations of friendliness to the Allies—all with an eye on a Big-Three peace
—were partly offset by an innovation of a different order. To show, as it were, that Marxist consciousness was still alive, and that there was no "ideological NEP", there appeared in June, ostensibly under the auspices of Trud and the Soviet trade unions, a new journal called War and the Working Class. This declared in its very first issue that its main object was to show up crypto-Fascist elements abroad, who were unfavourable to
the Soviet concept of a Big-Three Peace. "It would be ridiculous to deny," it said, "that certain difficulties exist in the relations between the different members of the anti-Hitler coalition," and it went hammer-and-tongs for the American isolationists, for the English
"Cliveden Set" and other "Munichites". These "semi-allies of Hitler" tended nowadays to do their dirty work through the medium of "certain Polish circles who had learned nothing". It then spoke favourably of a "Directorate of the principal powers" which would
"render account" to the wider international organisation of all the nations. The Russian conception of a United Nations Organisation "directed" by the Great Powers— or rather, by the Big Three—was beginning to take shape.
What with air-raids on Gorki and air-raid warnings in Moscow, there was a distinct
feeling of nervousness in Moscow during June and the beginning of July. The feeling that more loss of life was in store was nicely reflected in this genuine story a Russian told me about the charwoman in his office. On hearing somebody say that the Second Front was absolutely necessary, she exclaimed: "God forbid! As if one Front wasn't enough! " She had two sons in the Army.
On July 6 it was officially announced that the German offensive had started in a very big way just where it had been expected—in the Kursk salient, between Belgorod and the
Orel Bulge.
Chapter VIII KURSK: HITLER LOSES HIS LAST CHANCE OF
TURNING THE TIDE
Already in February, after Stalingrad, Hitler had declared that it was essential for the German Army "to make up in summer what had been lost in winter." This was not easy since the Germans and their allies had lost well over half a million men, perhaps as many as 700,000. Despite the "total mobilisation" introduced in Germany, only about half the losses could be replaced by the beginning of the summer fighting, according to German sources. Hitler's prestige had suffered severely from Stalingrad, and the recapture of Kharkov had not made up for it. The rout of the Germans in North Africa and the
prospect of an early invasion of Italy, with unpredictable (or perhaps all-too-predictable) political consequences, had added to Hitler's discomfiture. The war in Russia could
scarcely be won any longer, but what Hitler badly needed was a spectacular victory—
something similar to the Russian victory at Stalingrad. The "Kursk salient" between Orel in the north and Belgorod in the south (a salient which the Russians had captured in the previous winter) seemed the most obvious place for inflicting a sensational defeat on the Russians.
The Russians looked upon the Kursk salient as their springboard for the reconquest of the Orel and Briansk country to the north-west, and of the Ukraine to the south-west, and there were enormous Russian troop concentrations in it. Ever since March the Russians had been fortifying the salient with thousands of miles of trenches, thousands of gun emplacements, et cetera, and the defence in depth along the north, west and south sides of the salient extended as much as sixty-five miles.
In the spring of 1943, according to German sources, Hitler was determined for both
political and economic reasons to hold a front running from the Gulf of Finland down to the Sea of Azov, and to inflict a resounding defeat on the Russians with his "Operation Citadel" in the Kursk salient. To trap vast numbers of Russians there would greatly change the whole strategic position in the Germans' favour, and might even make a new offensive against Moscow possible.
As the Germans now tell the story:
The Kursk salient seemed particularly favourable for such an attack. A
simultaneous German offensive from north and south would trap powerful Russian
forces. It was also to be hoped that the operational reserves the enemy would throw into the fray could be smashed. Moreover, the liquidation of this salient would
greatly shorten the front... True, there were some who argued even then that the
enemy would expect the German attack precisely in this area and... that there was therefore the danger of losing more German forces than destroying Russian forces...
But Hitler would not be convinced, and thought Operation Citadel would succeed,
provided it was undertaken soon.
[Philippi and Heim, op. cit., pp. 209-10.]
But the operation was delayed owing to unfavourable terrain conditions and also to the slowness with which the German divisions were being replenished. In the circumstances General Model, commanding the German troops north of the salient declared that the
operation could not succeed without strong reinforcements by heavy modern tanks,
superior to anything the Russians had. The attack was therefore postponed once again till the middle of June, and meantime numerous new Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand
mobile guns were rushed from armaments works in Germany straight to the front. But
there were further hesitations and delays caused, among other things, by Hitler's fear that Italy was on the point of dropping out of the war. When he had satisfied himself that Mussolini was not giving up, Hitler decided to stick to his original plan.
The Kursk victory, he declared, would fire the
imagination of the world.
Meanwhile the Russians under Zhukov and Vasilevsky had not wasted their time, and
nothing suited them better than that the Germans should attack them where they were
strongest of all. The extent of the Russian concentration of armaments in the main battle area may be judged from the fact that, in less than three months, some 500,000 railway wagons loaded with every kind of equipment had been brought from inside Russia to the Kursk salient.
The Germans had accumulated 2,000 tanks round the salient (according to the Russians, over 3,000), more than half of them in the southern sector commanded by General Hoth, and nearly 2,000 planes.
To quote Philippi and Heim:
With such heavy German concentrations, Hitler looked forward to the battle with
great confidence. He was sure that the northern and southern striking force would break through and close the ring east of Kursk. But, contrary to expectations, it took only a very short time to realise that the offensive was a failure, even though our troops exerted themselves to the utmost. Our attacking forces, though
penetrating into the deep Russian defences, were suffering very severe losses, and on July 7 the Russians threw in increasingly heavy tank forces. The German 4th
Panzer Army had to fight particularly heavy tank battles, in which the most it could hope to do was not to be driven back. Serious doubts grew as to the success of
Operation Citadel. Hitler nevertheless ordered on July 10 the offensive to continue.
That was the day on which the Western Allies landed in Sicily, and he needed his
"Kursk victory" more than ever.
In reality, after the initial tactical successes, the Battle of Kursk had long before come to a standstill, and on July 12 the Russian command suddenly struck out
towards Orel, in the rear of the German 9th Army [at the north side of the Kursk
salient]... On July 13 Hitler reluctantly ordered Operation Citadel to be
discontinued. This decision was further prompted by the Italians' failure to defend Sicily, and the possibility of having to send German reinforcements to Italy.
[Ibid., p. 212.]
In four days the Germans succeeded in no more than denting the Kursk salient—by some ten miles along a front of about twelve miles in the north, and by some thirty miles along a thirty mile front in the south. About 100 miles still separated the two German forces when the battle came to a standstill.
Nearly the entire German panzer force had been used up to an irreplaceable extent, and the initiative was finally lost by the Germans and taken over by the Red Army. Despite very heavy losses they had also suffered in the Battle of Kursk, the Russian command was now still able to launch its summer offensive along a very broad front, with superior forces.
There was tremendous tension in Moscow when it was first learned that the German
offensive had begun. The news was contained in an article, redolent of nationalism, in Red Star.
Our fathers and our forebears made every sacrifice to save their Russia, their
homeland. Our people will never forget Minin and Pozharsky, Suvorov and
Kutuzov, and the Russian Partisans of 1812. We are proud to think that the blood of our glorious ancestors is flowing in our veins, and we shall be worthy of them...
What was being fought in the very heart of Russia, in Turgeniev country, was a modern kind of Battle of Kulikovo on the outcome of which so much depended.
[ In which Prince Dimitri Donskoi routed the Tartars in 1380.]
On the very first day of the battle two things were clear: that Germany had thrown
tremendous forces into the battle and that they were suffering losses on an unprecedented scale, and were not getting much in return. The communiqué of the first day's fighting read:
Since this morning our troops have been fighting stubborn battles against the large advancing forces of enemy infantry and tanks in the Orel, Kursk and Belgorod
sectors. The enemy forces are supported by large numbers of aircraft. All the
attacks were repelled with heavy losses to the enemy, and only in some places did small German units succeed in penetrating slightly into our defence lines.
Preliminary reports show that our troops ... have crippled or destroyed 586 enemy tanks... 203 enemy planes have been shot down. The fighting is continuing.
It was the 586 tanks which captured the country's imagination; there had never been
anything like it in one day. The feeling it produced was like that in London at the height of the Battle of Britain when it was announced that 280 German planes had been shot
down in one day.
On July 6 the communiqué again spoke of a slight Russian withdrawal, and the number
of tanks was now 433, and of planes, 111. On the 7th, it was 520 tanks and again 111
planes. On the 8th, the Russians were already counter-attacking, and the German losses for the day were put at 304 tanks and 161 planes.
By the 9th, the four days of anxiety came to an end; not that the anxiety was ever acute after those first 586 tanks. "The Tigers are Burning" was the title of a report from the front, and there appeared statements by bewildered German prisoners on "the carnage among the German troops, the like of which they had never seen".
"Our medical staff were unable to cope with all the wounded. One medical orderly told me that the dressing station was like a slaughterhouse to look at", a German corporal in the Belgorod area was quoted as saying.
On July 15 the Russian communiqué announced that the Russian counter-offensive
against Orel had begun, and that, in three days since the break-through in several parts of the Orel salient, the Soviet troops had advanced between fifteen and thirty miles.
On the 24th there was a Stalin Order to Generals Rokossovsky, Vatutin and Popov
announcing the "final liquidation of the German summer offensive" and the recapture of all the territory the Germans had gained since July 5. It recalled that in the Orel-Kursk and the Belgorod areas the Germans had concentrated a total of thirty-seven divisions—
seventeen tank, two motorised and eighteen infantry— but they had not taken the
Russians by surprise and had failed completely in their design to cut through to Kursk.
The legend that in summer the Germans always advanced had been dispelled once and
for all. The German losses were put at 70,000 killed, 2,900 tanks, 195 mobile guns, 844
field guns, 1,392 planes and over 5,000 motor vehicles.
What was being emphasised in all front reports was the extraordinary sureness of touch the Russians had shown in this battle. No doubt some of these figures were exaggerated, but even if the Germans lost 2,000 and not 3,000 tanks (and after the war they admitted that their tank forces at Kursk had been virtually frittered away), it was good enough. But it was easy to imagine that if 70,000 Germans were killed in the Kursk fighting, the Russian losses must have been very high, too. Examples of extraordinary courage and
endurance by the Russians were reported—for instance of soldiers staying put in their trenches while the heavy German tanks were sweeping across them, and then firing at
them from behind.
Altogether, it was reckoned that some 6,000 tanks and 4,000 planes were involved in the Battle of Kursk on the two sides. It was a concentrated carnage within a small area more terrible than had yet been seen. When, a few weeks later, I travelled through the fair Ukrainian countryside from Volchansk to Valuiki and then to Belgorod and Kharkov, I
could see how the area to the north of Belgorod (where the Germans had penetrated some thirty miles into the Kursk salient) had been turned into a hideous desert, in which even every tree and bush had been smashed by shell-fire. Hundreds of burned-out tanks and wrecked planes were still littering the battlefield, and even several miles away from it the air was filled with the stench of thousands of only half-buried Russian and German
corpses.
But for those who survived these were great days in Russia. What might be called the era of the Victory Salutes opened on August 5, 1943, following the special Stalin
announcement that Orel and Belgorod had been liberated.
The deep voice of Levitan, Moscow Radio's star announcer, now uttered for the first time phrases which were to become like sweet and familiar music during the next two years: Order by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to Col.-Gen. Popov, Col.-Gen.
Sokolovsky, Army General Rokossovsky, Army General Vatutin, Col.-Gen. Konev...
Today, August 5, the troops of the Briansk Front, in co-operation with the troops of the Western and Central Fronts captured, as a result of bitter fighting, the city of Orel.
Today also the troops of the Steppe and Voronezh Fronts broke the enemy's
resistance and captured the town of Belgorod.
After naming the units which were the first to break into these two cities, and saying that they would now be named "Orel regiments" and "Belgorod regiments", there came, for the first time, an announcement like this:
Tonight at twenty-four o'clock, on August 5, the capital of our country, Moscow,
will salute the valiant troops that liberated Orel and Belgorod with twelve artillery salvoes from 120 guns. I express my thanks to all the troops that took part in the offensive... Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom of our country.
Death to the German invaders.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Marshal of the Soviet Union,
STALIN.
With only some slight variations in the wording this was to become the consecrated text which Russia was to hear over the radio more than three hundred times before the final victory over Germany and Japan.
Yes, the era of the Victory Salutes had begun.
On the next day, August 6, the communiqué said that the troops that had captured Orel were pursuing the enemy to the west and had captured Kromy and seventy other
localities, while, in the south, a large-scale offensive was successfully developing towards Kharkov.
Russia at war Page 77
