By the Skin of my Teeth: The Memoirs of an RAF Mustang Pilot in World War II and of Flying Sabres with USAF in Korea

by Colin Downes

  The advent of jets into the RAF brought about a change of calibration of airspeed from mph to the nautical knots, together with a Mach number indicator to represent the percentage of the speed of sound at that altitude. Range became measured in nautical miles instead of statute miles with 1 nautical mile equal to 1.15 statute miles. The next development of the Meteor was a two-seat trainer version that made the conversion of pilots from propeller driven aircraft to jets at the OTUs much easier and with fewer accidents. Both the Vampire and the Meteor were eventually produced in a trainer version. The Meteor VII retained the basic airframe of the Meteor IV with the same tail design and a lengthened nose section to incorporate the two-seat tandem cockpit. It was lighter in weight than the Meteor IV with a better rate of climb, and as such was preferred by some pilots for aerobatics displays. The side-by-side seating arrangement in the Vampire trainer, although preferred by some instructors, resulted in more weight with reduced performance and visibility.

  The most significant improvements in the Meteor came with the arrival of the Meteor Mk VIII, which became the definitive model of the Meteor with a redesigned tail to overcome control difficulties at high Mach numbers. A lengthened nose section compensated for the increased weight and additional fuel tankage. It retained the short-span wings that improved the rate of roll and the handling became greatly improved at high speeds. The aircraft with up rated Derwent 8 engines of 3,600 lb static thrust had a service ceiling of 44,000 feet, a rate of climb of 7,000 ft/min and a range of 700 nautical miles. Whereas the Meteor IV had difficulty reaching a speed close to Mach 0.8 with heavy controls and wing drop, the Meteor VIII could be persuaded to reach Mach 0.82 before shaking and snaking with a heavy nose-up stick force. The air brakes were very effective with a rapid deceleration, and when first experienced it felt like running into a giant sponge. The general control with the new tail was a great improvement on the Meteor IV. The aircraft incorporated an improved air conditioning system that reduced windscreen and canopy misting and icing. A big improvement from the pilot’s peace of mind in the Meteor MK VIII was the installation of a Martin-Baker ejection seat, aided by an improved cockpit canopy. It was the first RAF aircraft to be so equipped and by these means the Meteor VIII, although not a ‘pilot’s’ airplane in the sense of the Vampire, became a comfortable aircraft to fly with well-balanced flying controls and effective trim controls up to a height of 30,000 – 35,000 feet. Above this height as the speed built above Mach 0.78 the controls became progressively heavier, and in particular the ailerons, with reduced trim control, had the tendency to drop a wing. However, even in a dive from high altitude the drag factor of the airframe design was such that the compressibility effect of loss of control approaching sonic speed was not too apparent and a reduction of engine power was sufficient to stabilize the aircraft.

  To pilots accustomed to the noise of propeller driven fighters, the relatively quiet and vibration free flight of a jet fighter was not only impressive, but the take-off and climb performance of the Meteor when first experienced was breath-taking. A major drawback was the voracious thirst of the centrifugal turbojets that limited the flight duration to less than one hour and this quickly led to the addition of an external ventral slipper tank of 105 (Imp.) gallons added to an internal fuel capacity of 330 (Imp.) gallons. Although simple to operate the turbojets required close attention during start-up while feeding the high pressure fuel supply to the engine so as not to flood the turbine, known as a wet-start, and not to exceed the maximum jet pipe temperature of around 500°C. Slow adjustment of the throttle controlled jet pipe resonance which could cause turbine blade failure which, if it occurred at high RPM, could result in a catastrophic engine fire. The simplification of the engine controls reduced the workload of the pilot considerably with the absence of fuel mixture and propeller pitch controls, and the absence of a propeller eliminated the torque-induced swing on take-off.

  As a counter to this simplification was the fact that events occurred more quickly in jets than with propeller driven aircraft, requiring an accelerated rate of scan to monitor both engine and flight instrumentation. An additional welcomed factor was the tricycle undercarriage allowing unrestricted forward view over the nose, and which also allowed the full application of the brakes on landing without the risk of the tail rising with a nose-over. The ability to apply maximum braking created a problem of aquaplaning on wet runways and the danger of sliding out of control when the main wheels locked-up. This was corrected by squeezing the brake until detecting lock-up, releasing and squeezing again. This problem was solved by one of the brake modifications that followed with the arrival of the Meteor VIII into service with the installation of the French designed Dunlop Maxaret braking system that allowed the brakes to release automatically when the wheels locked-up. Anti-skid brakes became standard on all military aircraft and civil airliners long before the device appeared on motor-cars as the adaptive braking system or ABS. The use of an anti-skid device on the brakes greatly increased the pressure that could be applied to the brakes without manipulation by the pilot thus greatly reducing the landing distance on wet runways. It also allowed an effective braking technique at high runway speed when the elevator could still apply a tail moment down force on the main wheels to enable the tyres to bite into the water on the runway.

  One of the problems associated with turbine engines was the fracture or loss of a turbine blade that could chew up the turbine resulting in an engine fire and failure. A minor ‘panic’ encountered in the early jets was a flame-out of the engine caused by a compressor stall which in turn was caused by harsh use of the throttles, particularly during dog-fights at high altitude. Unlike the DH Goblin engine in the Vampire that possessed no re-light facility, thereby leaving the pilot with a choice between either a forced-landing or baling-out of the aircraft, the RR Derwent could be restarted in flight. The procedure for a re-start was to glide the aircraft to below 15,000 feet at a speed not in excess of 160 knots to prevent the wind milling turbine speeding up, then careful use of the high pressure fuel control and throttle usually resulted in a re-light of the engine. Single-engine flying was straightforward provided the speed was not reduced to below 160 knots until committed to the landing, and provided the selection of the wheels and flaps were not made with the air brake out. This produced a phenomenon known as ‘phantom diver’ where the Meteor rolled out of control with insufficient altitude in which to recover, and several Meteor pilots met their deaths by this error. The final turn for the landing was carried out at 140 knots and full flap selected. A half throttle engine setting of not less than 7,000 rpm was maintained to the touch-down point at around 100 knots. In this manner, should an overshoot be required, the engine rpm could be rapidly increased without a compressor stall, bearing in mind that most of the thrust from the engine did not occur until the throttle was opened above 90 per cent of the rpm range. It was, therefore, advisable not to attempt a power-off approach as the turbine could not respond quickly enough to prevent the aircraft stalling if the airspeed became too low.

  The Meteor VIII could be considered the definitive Meteor in regard to flying and performance and it became the RAF’s principal interceptor equipping fifty-nine RAF squadrons. Various additional versions of the Meteor such as the two-seat all-weather Mk XII and Mk XIV were produced. The interceptor Meteor VIII followed the progression of most RAF interceptor fighters, in eventually converting to the ground attack role, as was the case during the Korean War with Australia’s No. 77 RAAF Squadron. The Meteor IX was basically a Meteor VIII fitted with cameras in a fighter reconnaissance role. The Meteor under a licensed manufacture by Avions Fairey in Belgium and Fokker in the Netherlands provided the aircraft for their respective air forces. In addition to Australia, the Meteor also saw service in the Argentine, Brazil, Chile and Equador. The RAF’s principal fighter became somewhat of an archaic aircraft during the period of the transonic fighters in the early fifties with such interceptor fighters as the North American F-86 Sabre, the Russi
an Mig-15 and the French Dassault Mystere, until replaced by the Hawker Hunter in 1954.

  Aerobatics in the Meteor were exhilarating after flying propeller aircraft owing to the power available to cover a large area of sky without the need to regain speed and height in a sequence of manoeuvres. Stalling the aircraft was quite straightforward but deliberate spinning was avoided. Conventional aerobatics presented no specific problems, and with the great thrust available it was possible to do outside loops or ‘bunts’. Unless one had the arms of a gorilla, to get the necessary forward push on the stick for this manoeuvre I found it necessary to push as hard as possible on the stick with the right arm while pulling with the left arm holding the instrument panel. This particular manoeuvre became a popular inclusion for an aerobatics display but I did not particularly enjoy it for the negative G force required was considerable. With ones eyeballs out on organ stops, all the accumulated dust, dirt and rubbish down in the cockpit and fuselage, including an occasional dropped tool, floated around the canopy like goldfish in a bowl. It did at least recover the odd spanner dropped by a careless rigger but I suppose it was the novelty of a manoeuvre that is now a standard item by modern light aerobatics aircraft with their high power to weight ratio and increased airframe stressing. During one Farnborough Air Show Jan Jurakowski, Gloster’s Polish chief test pilot, who later became Avro Canada’s chief test pilot for the ill-fated Arrow supersonic interceptor, demonstrated his famous cartwheel manoeuvre on the Meteor VIII. Several of us tried to emulate Jura without success. We assumed we could fly the Meteor through the cartwheel when approaching the stall in a vertical climb by applying full power to the outboard engine while closing the inboard engine to idle. Several pilots, including myself, in attempting the manoeuvre finished up in a spin and as a result Fighter Command banned the manoeuvre. What we failed to realize, or appreciate, was that Jura’s Meteor VIII was not to the same configuration as the Meteor VIIIs in Fighter Command. The manoeuvre could only be performed with the external stores attached at the wing tips that Jurakowski was demonstrating for the first time. The added weight of the rocket projectiles mounted on the wing tips provided the necessary momentum for a flywheel effect as the Meteor pivoted around its axis to complete the cartwheel. Jan Jurakowski as an exceptional test and demonstration pilot, as well as a brilliant engineer, had calculated this in demonstrating his unique manoeuvre in the Meteor: but then Jura was special; as a test pilot, as an engineer, and as a person.

  The Martin Baker ejection seat underwent many design changes and modifications before it became the efficient means of survival that it is today. In the process it saved many lives on many types of aircraft with air forces around the world. Initially when it first arrived on the Meteor VIII it was a relatively straightforward design where on firing the seat a single charge propelled the seat up a rail and out of the cockpit, thereafter it was up to the pilot to release himself from the seat and to pull the parachute ripcord. Among the many things that could go wrong was not sitting up straight in the seat resulting in spine injuries. Then there was the question of jettisoning the cockpit canopy before ejection, otherwise the seat fired through the hood, inflicting head and face injuries, and crash helmets for RAF pilots did not appear until several years later. Another form of injury was caused by not retracting the legs and feet resulting in serious injuries to both. When the seat was clear of the aircraft it would tumble, disorienting the pilot attempting to release himself from the seat and achieve sufficient separation from the seat before opening his parachute. Lastly, there was the danger of anoxia at high altitude that required a free fall from the rarefied air and sub-zero temperatures to a safe height for a parachute descent.

  James Martin attempted to take care of the correct cockpit posture before ejection by making the pilot pull a blind over his face to fire the seat, thus keeping his back and head in line and to bring the arms into the body to avoid flailing, as well as offering some protection to the face and head. The only drawback occurred during very high positive G forces when the pilot had difficulty raising his arms sufficiently to pull the blind. The US ejection seat fired from the seat pan provided an advantage under high G conditions and later versions incorporated restraining strap modifications to ensure the correct body alignment on ejection. However, back and leg injuries still occurred because the single charge of explosive in the ejection gun was very violent. This was resolved by making the initial charge softer and as the seat moved up the rail a stronger second charge sent the seat clear of the aircraft and the tailplane. Leg and foot injuries were reduced by incorporating thigh shields to the seat and leg straps to pull the legs against the seat as it started to rise. Injuries sustained while shattering the canopy on the way out were reduced by incorporating miniature detonating cords along the canopy that exploded the hood into small pieces as the seat started to move. To enable a stabilized and safe free fall before the automatic disengagement from the seat and the automatic opening of the parachute, the seat incorporated a rocket to deploy a drogue that stabilized the seat into the correct attitude for the release of the pilot, with an automatic barometric release mechanism to allow the seat to fall free to 15,000 feet before releasing the pilot and automatically opening the parachute. Finally to prevent anoxia, a small emergency oxygen bottle carried with the dinghy pack operated a supply of oxygen into the pilot’s face mask until he reached a lower safe altitude. These modifications took several years to materialize and incorporate, by which time higher aircraft performance made it necessary for the pilot and navigator to be able to eject at zero airspeed and zero altitude. This was achieved by incorporating rocket propulsion in the place of an ejection gun to take the seated pilot or navigator to a sufficient height for his safe release from the seat and the safe deployment of the parachute.

  An early modification to the Meteor VIII ejection seat resulted in my first incident on the squadron. The modification was the provision of an emergency oxygen bottle for safe ejection at high altitude. The bottle was placed in front of the dinghy pack in the seat pan. This resulted in no known problems until one day during a Fighter Command exercise the squadron scrambled to intercept a mock raid by aircraft from RAF squadrons based in Germany. The squadron aircraft were parked on a concrete servicing area in front of the squadron dispersal and to expedite our take-off, instead of our normal take-off towards the south against the prevailing wind, which entailed a lengthy amount of taxiing around the airfield perimeter track, we taxied rapidly across the rough grass of the airfield to the south end of the runway. I was leading the flight of four aircraft and, turning onto the runway, opened up to full power. About halfway along the runway I attempted to rotate the aircraft to lift off the runway but I found I could not move the stick far enough back to raise the nose. My first impression was that the elevator control was jammed, but on reaching down I found the emergency oxygen bottle jammed between the seat and the control stick. With the weight of the dinghy and parachute pack plus myself strapped tightly into the seat, I could not move the oxygen bottle. As I struggled with it my R/T connection to my helmet disconnected and when I called on my R/T to announce my intention to abort my take-off my wingman did not hear the call and, despite my hand signals to indicate cutting engines, he still attempted to stay with me as I closed both throttles and the high and low pressure fuel cocks shutting down both engines. To my surprise I saw my wingman Dougal Dallison, a New Zealander, still with me but he quickly overtook me before we reached the end of the runway. I was then behind him as we left the runway at speed and crossing a wide grass strip headed for the boundary fence and hedge. I pulled in behind him and followed him through the gap he cut through the fence and hedge. We continued into a wheat field and I stopped about one third into the field, but my faithful wingman continued until he stopped just short of a wood. Both my engines had stopped with the turbines just windmilling and so my engines injected nothing while travelling across the field and there was no damage to my aircraft. However, my number two sustained some damage
going through the boundary fence and hedge, and as his engines were still running they ingested quite a lot of wheat together with one partridge. The fortunate aspect of the incident was the fact that in taking-off towards the north, instead of towards the south as was normal practice, we were able to take advantage of the only overshoot area available off the runway. Our normal direction of take-off allowed no overshoot area before crossing the main Bromley to Westerham road and crashing into houses bordering the road in Biggin Hill village with probable fatal results. Further incidents resulting from rough taxiing across the grass were prevented by the building of concrete readiness platforms at the ends of the runway for the aircraft on readiness, with a telephone connection to sector control to enable the aircraft to respond rapidly to the order to scramble. Ironically, both aircraft sustained some damage as the salvage crews endeavoured to get the aircraft back on the airfield. As far as I can recall, my previous windscreen incident on a Meteor VIII and the emergency oxygen bottle incident were the only such incidents recorded in Fighter Command and must constitute the only pioneer contribution on my part for safety modifications to the Meteor. The modification to the seat pan placed a lip on the front of the seat to prevent any possibility of the bottle vibrating out of its housing during rough taxiing.