Which brings up the much-debated “Plan Orient,” or “Great Plan,” an invasion of the Middle East by a greatly reinforced Axis army in North Africa and the eventual meeting in the Turkish Caucasus Mountains with Axis forces advancing southward out of the Soviet union. Long the armchair-strategist’s ultimate “what if” fantasy, the basic concept has been cobbled together from various disconnected writings, musings and daydreams by Rommel, the Kriegsmarine’s Grossadmiral Erich Räder, and the Luftwaffe’s Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring, all of whom, at one time or another, entertained something of the basic idea. Rommel, in fact, would go so far as to produce a detailed memorandum in the summer of 1942 outlining in practical terms how such a strategy could be implemented. It was a textbook example of the “perfect plan” which presumes that every operational requirement will be met, every proposed action will be successful, and every consequence of the disruption of existing strategic dispositions it would create would be minimal. It was also predicated on over-optimistic logistic projections, which, given that in the summer of 1941 Germany and Italy were already finding it near-impossible to keep the existing forces in North Africa adequately supplied, further mitigated against it. It was not an impossible plan, but it was a highly impractical one; worse, when Rommel submitted it to Hitler, it came a year too late: by the summer of 1942, the global strategic balance had already shifted against the Axis and the window of opportunity for implementing anything that resembled “Plan Orient” had long closed.
But such was the degree of the British disarray in the wake of Battleaxe that had even one more panzer division been to hand for Rommel on the Egyptian frontier, he would have been able to give the task of containing the Tobruk garrison to the Italians and turned all of his German units eastward to tumble the British out of Egypt and functionally deny the British Empire access to the Mediterranean. Admittedly, the presence of another armored division in the Afrika Korps would have created monumental headaches for his quartermasters, as well as the supply and shipping services in Rome, but given the consequences, it would have been a short-term difficulty, hardly insuperable.
As it was, Rommel and Auchinleck were now in a race. Rommel was striving to take Tobruk and be able to redeploy all of his divisions to the Egyptian frontier before Auchinleck could complete reinforcing, reequipping and reorganizing the British forces. Auchinleck had to complete this undertaking and launch a new offensive to relieve Tobruk and drive the Germans and Italians back across Cyrenaica before the Tobruk garrison’s position became untenable.
None of his urgency made itself felt in Rommel’s letters to Lucie that summer. It’s easy to see Rommel regarding his correspondence with his wife as a welcome diversion, a distraction, as it were, from the demands and responsibilities of command allowing a few moments each day to turn his focus to domestic matters—his health, his new-found fondness for a fly swatter, or the progress of Manfred’s education. They were a small, welcome slice of normality amidst the sometimes surreal environs of war.
28 June 1941
Dearest Lu:
You need not worry yourself anymore about my health. I’m doing fine. Our place is much healthier, lying 600 feet above sea level. Besides, I’ve got the advantage of my four walls. Aldinger was sick for a few days, but he’s getting better. There’s a lot of work.
July 5 1941
I usually spend a lot of time traveling; yesterday I was away for eight hours. You can hardly imagine what thirst one gets up after such a journey. . . .
I was glad to hear Manfred is now getting on in mathematics. It’s all a matter of the method of teaching, I’m also very pleased about his other successes in school.
I’m managing, by dint of keeping the place dark and “shooting a lot of them down,” to keep my office fairly clear of mosquitoes. I’m even having an occasional bang while writing. . . .136
For now, confident that the troops defending the Egyptian frontier, especially those at Halfaya Pass under the command of the fierce and capable Vater Bach, could keep the British off his back, Rommel focused on Tobruk, with an emphasis on training the Italian infantry, on whom would fall the larger burden of any attack on the fortress, in assault tactics. The defenders did their best to disrupt the German and Italian preparations, but there were indications that the Australians inside the Tobruk perimeter were running out of steam, as it were. On August 2, two companies of Australian infantry, supported by 60 field guns, attacked Italian positions along the perimeter; both sides took heavy casualties, but the Italians, bearing out the validity of what their comrades had done up in Halfaya Pass during Battleaxe, held firm and drove the Australians back.
This was the last effort the Australians would make to retake the positions they had lost three months previously. By the middle of September, the 9th Australian Division was being methodically withdrawn from Tobruk, evacuating at night aboard Royal Navy destroyers sent out from Alexandria. Relieving them was the British 70th Infantry Division, the 32nd Tank Brigade, and the Polish Carpathian Brigade; at the same time that the new troops were arriving, supplies were also being run into Tobruk. Thus the “Siege of Tobruk” was never really a siege at all, in that the defenders were never completely cut off from resupply and reinforcement, but there were limits on just how many men and tons of supplies the British could move at any one time. They were forced to use destroyers because regular transports were too slow to be able to get in and out of Tobruk during the hours of darkness: despite the best efforts of the Desert Air Force, any British transport caught in or near Tobruk in daylight was at the mercy of the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica—the wrecks littering Tobruk’s harbor were mute testimony to the Axis bombers’ accuracy.
Axis preparations for the assault on the fortress were proceeding apace, although there were concerns that the supply buildup, especially the artillery ammunition, was taking too long and would impose delays. Rommel was never able to shake his conviction, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the Italians were not doing enough to keep adequate supplies flowing to North Africa, and every time the British sank another supply ship, his suspicions of Italian treachery were renewed. (Rommel, of course, had no more idea of the existence of Ultra than did any other senior German officer—or Adolf Hitler, himself for that matter.) Relations with the Italian High Command remained prickly at best, never more so than after July 12, when the affable and generally cooperative General Gariboldi was replaced by the difficult, autocratic and foul-tempered General Ettore Bastico; Rommel soon had his measure, christening him “Bombastico.” The little Italian general immediately sought to put the German upstart in his place: like most Italians in North Africa, he resented the Afrika Korps’ presence. It was a standing insult, a constant reminder that Italy’s fortunes in Libya had to be rescued by her German ally, and even though Libya was an Italian colony, the Italian Army was relegated to playing a supporting role to Rommel and his panzers. Rommel was dismissive of Bastico, confident that he would, in turn, soon be put in his place, as Rommel would be meeting personally with the Führer in Berlin and the Duce in Rome at the end of the month.
Rommel flew to Germany on July 28, spent two precious days with Lucie and Manfred at Weiner Neustadt, then drove to East Prussia to meet with Hitler at the Führerhauptquartier known as Wolfsschanze—the Wolf’s Lair. There Hitler assured Rommel that the German naval forces—U-boats and motor torpedo boats—blockading Tobruk would be reinforced, while the Luftwaffe would be specifically instructed to give their utmost cooperation during the assault on Tobruk, and that strenuous efforts were underway to increase the shipping tonnage available in the Mediterranean to increase the flow of supplies to North Africa. There would be no additional German units for the Afrika Korps, however; when Hitler showed him the situation map of the Eastern Front, where German mechanized columns were ranging far behind Soviet lines and encircling entire Soviet armies, Rommel immediately understood that the Afrika Korps would remain low on the Wehrmacht’s list of priorities for a long time to come.
Nonetheless, Rommel left the Wolfsschanze feeling revitalized, as he always did after spending time in the Führer’s presence. Nearly two more years would have to pass before the power of Hitler’s charm finally wore thin enough for Rommel to see through it.
After spending another three days with his wife and son, Rommel met with Mussolini and General Ugo Cavallero, the Italian Chief of Staff, in Rome on August 6, there to brief them on the planned assault on Tobruk. Instead of the expected cooperation, he was initially met with more obstructionism, inexplicable to Rommel, as it was an Italian fortress which was to be liberated. Cavallero began bemoaning the state of the transport and supply services, suggesting that the attack on Tobruk would have to be postponed indefinitely, as it seemed unlikely that the requisite tonnage of artillery shells would ever reach the perimeter around the fortress. Rommel would have none of it: with classic Teutonic exactitude, he described the tactical situation around Tobruk, along with that of the defenses at Sollum and the Egyptian frontier. Then he shamelessly played on the role of the Italian gunners in defending Halfaya Pass during Battleaxe (he didn’t even have to exaggerate), leaving Mussolini mightily impressed and full of assurances that the necessary supplies and ammunition would reach North Africa, no matter what the effort required.
Rommel returned to North Africa on August 8. Before his departure, he noticed a yellowish pallor developing in his eyes and skin—he was in the early stages of jaundice. Saying nothing lest army surgeons in Rome forbid his return to Africa, he flew back to Bardia aboard a transport that seemed to be plagued by engine troubles. When he heard that particular aircraft crashed on the next leg of his flight, he wrote to Lucie, expressing sorrow at the death of the crew, and remarking with a curious fatalism, “It just goes to show how quickly death can come to you.”
Once back in North Africa, it was impossible to hide the symptoms of jaundice, and the Afrika Korps’ surgeons prescribed a strict, bland diet and rest. He obeyed the first instruction and defied the second. There was too much to do for the panzergruppe commander to spend his days lolling around in bed! He would pay a price for his obstinacy, however: his normally robust constitution weakened, he fell victim through most of August, September, and October to the same sort of gastric disorders that afflicted most of the Germans in North Africa at one time or another, but which he had so far been able to avoid.
28 August 1941
Dearest Lu,
. . . As to my health, I’m feeling absolutely right. Everything’s working again. I’m getting on famously with my new Chief of Staff [Gause]—which is of tremendous importance to me. Unfortunately the bugs are still about—four in the last twenty-four hours. But I hope to win that campaign too.
6 October 1941
Unable to write yesterday, my stomach struck work again. We had a fowl the evening before last which must have come from Ramses II’s chicken run. For all the six hours’ cooking it had, it was like leather and my stomach just couldn’t take it.
7 October 1941
My stomach is completely back in order and I’m rushing around in a fine fettle. What do you think of my leave plans? I should be able to get away to Rome for a week at the beginning of November. I have a lot of business to clear up there. I’ll have to come back for the battle, of course, and we must hope that supplies work all right, so that we can really get down to it. . . .137
In early autumn Rommel’s intelligence officer, Major Friedrich von Mellenthin, along with the Abwehr (the German intelligence service) in Berlin, began picking up bits and pieces of information, mainly from radio intercepts, that indicated Auchinleck’s organization and planning for the next British offensive in North Africa was beginning to coalesce. By mid-September, Rommel was beginning to sense that time was running out, and that some sort of preemptive action by the Afrika Korps was necessary. Operation Sommernachtstraum (“Summer Night’s Dream”) was the result. On September 14, he personally led the 21st Panzer Division out of Sidi Omar, first southeast, then east, hoping to find—and destroy—the British forward supply dumps which he was certain were being established in preparation for the attack. After an advance of 60 miles, the strike fell on empty air—forewarned of Rommel’s intentions, whether by Ultra or some other means is unknown, Auchinleck simply pulled his forces back far enough that had the Germans advanced far enough to come into contact, they would have run out of fuel. Frustrated and disappointed, Rommel ordered the 21st Panzer to return to Sidi Omar; it was just as the division began its withdrawal that bombers from the Desert Air Force suddenly appeared. There are no exact records of the losses, but several tanks and trucks were hit, including Rommel’s beloved Mammut, and some were destroyed outright. The British strike had been carefully staged and coordinated, including the “loss” of “secret” documents which would, upon careful examination, indicate to Rommel’s intelligence staff that the expected British attack would not be ready until December. So convincing were these planted documents that Rommel would actually be on his way back from Rome, where he had gone on November 1 to spend two weeks of leave with Lucie when the British attack was sprung.
Rommel and Auchinleck’s race now entered its home stretch.
Rommel hoped to be able to begin the assault on Tobruk on or around November 24; as always, the exact date was contingent on the supply situation. The start date for Auchinleck’s attack on the Afrika Korps was more firmly set for November 18, although it was always possible that some slippage might creep in and delay it; Auchinleck was sufficiently savvy to keep his planning flexible enough to allow for such an eventuality. In any case, the British attack would be preceded in October and November by a series of commando attacks at widely scattered places and times all along the Libyan coast, their purpose being to create dispersion and confusion, along with striking at a few targets of high strategic value.
On October 28, 1941 Rommel held one last full rehearsal exercise for the assault on Tobruk. In most respects, Rommel’s plan of attack was an echo of the last such effort, made back in mid-May. The fundamental differences would be that the preparatory barrage would be of considerably heavier weight and longer duration, and there would be several days of aerial bombardment preceding the actual assault as well. The attacking infantry would this time be throughly briefed on the extent and location of the defensive emplacements—there would be no blindly attacking and hoping for the best results. Not surprisingly, General Bastico was skeptical: he regarded Rommel’s determination to take Tobruk with suspicion, thinking it an unhealthy obsession, but then anything involving action against the enemy was, to Bastico, unhealthy and suspect.
No sooner was the exercise concluded than Rommel was dashing off yet another letter, this one to Manfred; Lucie, of course, would be in Rome by the time this arrived in Wiener Neustadt. Nonetheless, writing to his family had become an ingrained part of his daily routine—he almost invariably included some apologetic remark to Lucie when he missed a day—so wherever there was pen, paper, and a postman, Rommel was.
28 October 1941
Dearest Manfred,
We had the Ghibli again today. Sometimes the dust clouds were so thick you could only see two to three yards. It seems to be better today.
It’s only a few days now before I take off to fly across the water. I’m very pleased to be seeing Mummy again in Rome and am only sorry that you, young man, can’t be with us. It couldn’t be helped. I’m certain to get some leave this winter and then we’ll have a good prowl round together. There’s not much hunting here where I am now. Some of the officers have shot cheetahs, which have their homes in the stony wadis. Occasionally one comes across a bustard, a fox, a jackal, or even a gazelle. The camel-thorn bushes are now growing faintly green and have tiny flowers. Last night the British bombarded us from the sea. Dive-bombers and torpedo bombers have sunk one or two of their cruisers and we’ve had peace since.138
In September, the British forces in the Western Desert had once again undergone a reorganization, being elevated from XIII Corps into t
he newly minted Eighth Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham. XIII Corps, under the command of Lietenant General Reade Godwin-Austen, was now merely a component of the new army, joined by the just-created XXX Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Willoughby Norrie. Eighth Army would be a far stronger opponent than Rommel’s panzergruppe had faced in June. XXX Corps fielded one armored division, one infantry division, and one independent infantry brigade; XIII Corps comprised two infantry divisions and a brigade of tanks; one infantry division served as the army reserve. The Tobruk garrison—the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, 70th Infantry Division and Polish Carpathian Brigade—also came under the operational command of Eighth Army. In armored strength, the critical factor in desert warfare after adequate water and gasoline, Eighth Army had 770 tanks in its order of battle. Just over half that number were the new Crusader tanks that had been blooded (in every sense of the word) in Battleaxe and which would lend their name to the upcoming offensive; 220 of them were the heavily armored but slow Matildas; the rest were the new but highly popular Honeys.
Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel Page 36
