Rommel, however, was in trouble. Ritchie refused to let himself be rattled by the Axis attack, and as soon as he had a reasonably clear picture of the situation, he began planning his response. His first counterattack began on May 28, and over the next five days he backed the Afrika Korps and the Ariete Division into a tactical and operational corner. Rommel’s situation became precarious. He was only intermittently in contact with the rest of his army, cut off from his supply lines, caught between two of the fortified boxes—Sidi Muftah to the west, Knightsbridge to the east—a near-impenetrable minefield to the south, and four British armored brigades pressing hard on the Afrika Korps. General Crüwell’s reconnaissance plane was shot down and Crüwell himself taken prisoner. By May 28, Rommel was almost undone by his own success: he had advanced too far too fast, and his supply lines had been cut behind him. Water was in critically short supply; his tanks were running on fumes, food and ammunition were nearly exhausted.
As sunset approached he decided the only course of action available was to concentrate the Afrika Korps in a central position, set up an all-round defensive perimeter, and then go look for the missing supply convoys himself. There were some 1,500 truckloads—almost 3,000 tons of supplies—sitting somewhere southwest of where he was standing; if he could find them, he could lead them through the minefield by following the same route he had taken earlier. He and his ADC, Leutnant Wilfred Armbruster, headed out into the desert in Rommel’s Sdkfz 250 command vehicle Greif (Griffin), in search of the missing convoys; they found them around 4:00 A.M. With Greif in the lead, the convoy headed northeast, now shepherded by tanks from the Ariete and Trieste Divisions, toward the Afrika Korps. At one point the column blundered into a British reconnaissance patrol, which opened fire, but Rommel quickly veered off into the night and broke contact; by mid-morning the entire convoy was safely within the Afrika Korps’ perimeter, bringing up enough fuel, ammunition, and rations for perhaps two days.
For the time being Rommel’s panzers were back in action, but he was far from being out of the woods. After a quick conference with Gause, Westphal, and Bayerlein, where it was quickly recognized that the expected attack by Crüwell to relieve the Afrika Korps was not going to materialize, Rommel decided to make a virtue out of necessity and repositioned his two panzer divisions so that his southern and western flanks were covered by the British minefields, reducing the frontage his troops would have to cover to only the northern and eastern perimeter. To do so, however, the Afrika Korps would have to overpower the 150th Infantry Brigade, which was holding the Sidi Muftah box, sitting almost squarely in the middle of the Afrika Korps. Rommel set up formidable lines of antitank guns around his outer perimeter to hold off any British attacks and turned his armor and artillery inward. German sappers worked ceaselessly on May 29 and 30 to clear a path through the minefield—on the other side, Italian sappers were doing the same. If they succeeded, the Afrika Korps would have a secure line of supply and the rest of the Italian armor could move up in support.
The greatest weakness, though, in Rommel’s current position was a lack of water—there had been no water bowsers in the supply convoy brought forward on May 29. This could well prove his downfall: when one of the prisoners captured in the Afrika Korps’ advance, Major Archer-Shee of the 10th Hussars, complained to Rommel about water rations for POWs, Rommel replied that the major and his men were getting exactly the same water ration as the German soldier—Rommel included—exactly a half-cup a day. When Archer-Shee then asserted that if the Germans could not properly provide for captured enemy soldiers as required by the various Hague Conventions, then Rommel should allow Archer-Shee and his men to return to the British lines. Rommel demurred, but after a moment said to the major, “I agree that we cannot go on like this. If we don’t get a convoy through tonight I shall have to ask General Ritchie for terms.” All that would be necessary to force his capitulation was one more good, hard push by Eighth Army.164
It never came. Neil Ritchie had been unable to develop the same degree of coordination and flexibility among the units of Eighth Army that Erwin Rommel had created for first the Afrika Korps and then Panzerarmee Afrika as a whole. There was never that near-intuitive sense of knowing what a superior officer wanted to have accomplished as well as what he needed to have done. None of Ritchie’s subordinates saw the opportunity which presented itself in Rommel’s predicament or realized that the moment had come when Eighth Army could deliver a knock-out punch.
Even so, Rommel was now firmly ensconced, even trapped by some definitions, in what quickly became known as der Hexenkessel—the Cauldron. This was his “back to the wall” moment in this battle, which would forever define him as a military commander.
It was this point that the Luftwaffe’s Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the Commander-in-Chief South, suddenly appeared at Rommel’s headquarters, flying into the Cauldron in his own Storch reconnaissance plane. His mission in North Africa, given to him personally by Hitler, was to see that Rommel got his supplies, something Kesselring’s predecessor, General-major Stefan Frölich, had been unable or unwilling to do. He was cheerful, eternally optimistic—some said overly optimistic—and widely known among his soldiers and airmen as “Uncle Albert” (it would be the Allies who would nickname him “Smiling Al” for his wide, ever-present grin). Most people accepted his constant air of bonhommie as genuine, though there were some who considered it to be a well-crafted act. Whatever the case may have been, his sudden appearance at the front had the potential to be both a disruption and distraction which Rommel most sorely did not need.
Instead, at the critical moment of the Afrika Korps’ attack, Kesselring voluntarily placed himself and his staff at Rommel’s disposal, despite being senior to Rommel, effectively replacing the missing Crüwell as commander of the Afrika Korps itself. He was appalled, though, by Rommel’s style of command—rushing from unit to unit, crisis to crisis, leading supply convoys, always trying to be “an der Spitze.” Kesselring demanded a personal meeting with Rommel, the two generals coming face-to-face at the headquarters of the Italian XX Corps. Kesselring, who had served in the infantry in the First World War and in the Reichswehr before being transferred to the nascent Luftwaffe in 1934 and thus no stranger to combat, told Rommel that the overall plan appeared sound, but demanded that Rommel get hold of himself, his army, and the battle: this charging to and fro across the battlefield was accomplishing nothing. Rommel, almost in spite of himself, had to agree: he never really warmed to Kesselring, believing him to be a bit too personally ambitious, but in this case, the Luftwaffe field marshal was right.
On May 31, the attack on 150th Brigade’s “box” at the center of the Cauldron began again, continuing into the next day. Despite being heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe, the defenders fought hard, often until their ammunition was exhausted, and what artillery they had was used to telling effect—that day General Gause, Rommel’s Chief of Staff, and Colonel Westphal, his operations officer, were both badly wounded by mortar shells. Rommel’s own description of the action is vivid:
The attack was launched on the morning of the 31st May. German and Italian units fought their way forward yard by yard against the toughest British resistance imaginable. The defense was conducted with considerable skill and as usual the British fought to the last round. . . . Nevertheless, by the time evening came we had penetrated a substantial distance into the British positions. On the following day the defenders were to receive their quietus. After heavy dive-bomber attacks, the infantry again surged forward against the British field positions. I went forward with them. . . .165
The panzer divisions were relentless, and late in the afternoon on June 1, Rommel began to sense that the British had reached the breaking point. He instructed the commander of a panzergrenadier battalion to wave white flags to indicate that the Germans were willing to accept the British soldiers’ surrender. Rommel was right—the British were through. Singly, then in pairs, then by squads and platoons, the 3,000 survivors of the 150th Br
igade put down their weapons, raised their hands, and stepped out of the foxholes and dugouts, exhausted, hungry, thirsty—many were wounded, some seriously. With the elimination of the defensive box at the heart of the Cauldron, a 5-mile wide gap had been torn in the Gazala Line, ready for Rommel’s two panzer divisions to go roaring through them on the way to Tobruk.
No one was roaring off anywhere just yet, however: 15th and 21st Panzer needed time to do basic maintenance on their tanks, repair minor damage, replenish their ammunition lockers, and top off their fuel tanks. This was all easier said than done, for the two corridors the Italians had painfully carved out of the minefields to the west of the Cauldron were still within range of several British artillery batteries, who kept up an intermittent, and occasionally heavy, fire that from time to time interrupted the movement of supplies into the Cauldron. It would be three or four days before the Afrika Korps was ready to roll again.
Believing that Rommel was contained and his losses significantly greater than in fact they were, Auchinleck imagined that his fangs were pulled, and pressed Ritchie to bring up the 5th Indian Division forward along the Via Balbia. Together with the 1st South African Division it could strike at the relatively immobile Italian infantry and possibly take Tmimi, even Mechili, completely severing the Axis supply line. Ritchie demurred, wanting to keep the 5th Division where it was. Here he made his first irrecoverable mistake of the battle, for, not realizing just how truly hard pressed was Rommel, his main concern at the moment was protecting Tobruk; instead of sending the 5th Division forward against the Afrika Korps, he set up more additional defensive boxes to cover the approaches to the fortress. It wasn’t until June 4 that Ritchie realized Rommel was not going to suddenly lunge out of the Cauldron toward Tobruk, so he authorized the long-overdue attack to begin the following morning. He had waited just that little bit too long, however, for Rommel had not been idle.
While Ritchie was hesitating, the Pavia and Brescia Divisions, on the far side of the western minefield, had succeeded in clearing two routes through the mines, and now, with a reasonably secure supply line, Rommel could meet the British attacks with confidence. Ritchie sent two armored divisions and two independent armored brigades into the attack: they all ran into well-concealed lines of German antitank guns. The handful of Flak 88s still with the Afrika Korps were sufficient to take out the attacking Grants and the few Matildas still in the field; the standard 50mm Pak 38s were more than a match for any Crusaders or Honeys that came forward. The British losses were heavy—114 out of 150 tanks committed to the attack were destroyed, and another 4,000 prisoners were taken. Adding insult to injury, one of Rommel’s counterattacks captured the tactical headquarters units of both British armored divisions. In the south, the garrison at Bir Hakim was grimly holding on, but the defenders’ courage and tenacity might well be for nought, as in the center, Ritchie was rapidly running out of troops.
(On the second day of the British attack, far away in Wiener Neustadt, Lucie Rommel was opening parcels sent from North Africa with the admonition “Not to be opened until 6 June.” This of course, was Lucie’s birthday, and Erwin, always the beau sabreur, had sent her a collection of bracelets, bangles, and earrings carefully and intricately wrought by Arab craftsmen in Libya. Lucie was, of course, thoroughly delighted.)
When Ritchie’s attacks faltered, Rommel counterattacked. The 21st Panzer and Ariete Divisions went east, the 15th Panzer north. Infantry, reconnaissance and artillery units were overrun, as well several headquarters detachments; command and control within Eighth Army began to break down. On June 6, the Trieste and Ariete Divisions, the 90th Light, and the reconnaissance elements of the 15th Panzer began a fresh attack on Bir Hakim; it would not relent until the Free French Brigade evacuated its positions the night of June 10. On June 12 the 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades once again tried conclusions with the 15th Panzer Division and came off decidedly second best, being pushed back 6 miles from their starting positions and forced to leave all of their damaged vehicles behind, where the Germans and Italians could recover and repair them, and return them to service under new management. The next day it was the turn of the 22nd Armoured Brigade: by the end of the day, British tank strength had been reduced from approximately 300 to fewer than 70. These two defeats decided the outcome of the battle of Gazala, or as Auchinleck later put it, “This unsuccessful counterstroke was probably the turning point of the whole battle.” The Knightsbridge box was abandoned by the Guards Brigade after nightfall, and the next morning Eighth Army began its withdrawal from the Gazala Line.166
IT WAS AT this point in the battle an incident occurred which shone a stark, revealing light on the character of Erwin Rommel, forever helping define the man for posterity. When the Afrika Korps overran the 150th Infantry Brigade, among a wealth of captured documents was found a copy of an order issued to the 4th Armoured Brigade, directing that no food or water be given to captured Axis soldiers until they had first been interrogated by British intelligence officers. This was a direct contravention of the Hague Conventions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, and it infuriated Rommel. He instructed his signals section to send a message in the clear, stating that all British prisoners of war in Axis custody would be deprived of food and water indefinitely, or until such time as Eighth Army’s order was rescinded. Within hours, a radio broadcast out of Cairo, also in the clear, announced that Eighth Army’s order had been withdrawn. Rommel was satisfied; there would be no recurrence of this or any similar incident for the remainder of his time in Africa. Both sides had up to this point fought a clean, almost exemplary, war: atrocities and brutality which were taken for granted in the Balkans or on the Russian Front had no place in Erwin Rommel’s war here in the Libyan desert, and he would not countenance their introduction. He recognized that slippery slope for what it was, and refused to take the first step down it—or allow his foes to do the same.
NOW IT WAS a race between the retreating Eighth Army and the Afrika Korps, as one hurried eastward before its line of retreat was blocked, and the other rushed north, trying to interpose itself across that line and prevent the enemy’s escape. Meanwhile, the 90th Light Division was making straight for Tobruk. Once again Rommel painted an unforgettable word picture of what transpired:
During the night of the 13th both divisions of the Afrika Korps were deployed . . . ready for an attack to the north. The Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions were to act as a screen for their eastern flank. The 90th Light Division moved off to the east to put itself in a position for a quick grab at the Tobruk approaches. Next morning [June 14] the German panzer divisions moved off and rolled northwards. Full speed was ordered, as British vehicles were now streaming east in their thousands. I rode with the tanks and constantly urged their commanders to keep the speed up. Suddenly we ran into a wide belt of mines. Ritchie had attempted to form a new defense front and had put in every tank he had. The advance halted and our vehicles were showered with British armour-piercing shells. I at once ordered the reconnaissance regiments to clear lanes through the minefields, a task which was made easier by the violent sandstorm which blew up towards midday. Meanwhile, I ordered our 170mm guns to open fire on the Via Balbia. The thunder of our guns mingled with the shock of demolitions. The British and South Africans were blowing up their ammunition dumps in the Gazala Line. Late in the afternoon, the 115th Rifle Regiment moved to the attack against Hill 187. In spite of violent counterfire from British tanks, artillery and antitank guns the attack steadily gained ground. Towards five o’clock the British fire, to which my own vehicle had also for some hours been exposed, slowly began to slacken. Enemy resistance crumbled and more and more British troops gave themselves up. Black dejection showed on their faces.167
The coastal highway, the Via Balbia, could only support the traffic of a single division, and, given its proximity, the use of the road went to the 1st South African Division. This created a dilemma for the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, however: it could either find another route eas
t to Egypt or wherever Eighth Army finally made its stand, or it could sit tight and wait to be taken prisoner in toto by the Italians. In the considered opinion of the division’s commanding officer, Major General William Havelock Ramsden, surrender was unacceptable; instead, the division attacked to the southwest, moving out during a duststorm that allowed it to brush by the Brescia and Pavia Divisions. Once past the Italians, the division turned due south, hopped into its lorries and headed into the desert for nearly 50 miles before turning east to eventually catch up to the rest of Eighth Army, which, on Ritchie’s orders, was now falling back all the way to Mersa Matruh in Egypt. Being badly understrength and depleted of equipment, the 50th Division would not take the field against the Afrika Korps again until November.
In Rommel’s first letter to Lucie after the breakout from the Cauldron, written on June 15, he makes no effort to disguise his satisfaction at Eighth Army’s debacle.
Dearest Lu,
Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel Page 41
