The need to implement Operation Alarich increased dramatically on July 10, when 180,000 Allied soldiers, along with 600 tanks and 14,000 other vehicles were landed on the southeast and southwest shores of Sicily. For the better part of a month, the mostly Italian defenders fought hard, though they were inexorably pushed back into the northeast corner of the island, around the city of Messina. There had never been any question of actually holding Sicily, the defenders’ mission was to buy as much time for the Axis forces on the Italian mainland to finish their preparation for the inevitable Allied invasion there. Beginning on August 11, the Italian navy was able to carry away more than 100,000 Italian soldiers from Messina while General Hube’s four German divisions held the perimeter around the port. Finally they too were extracted, leaving the Allies with what amounted to a strategic draw: they held the island, but they had not inflicted any significant losses of manpower or materiel on the Germans or the Italians; the Axis could look to that as a moral victory at least.
By the time Sicily was in Allied hands, however, Rommel had learned that he had lost his job as commander of Army Group B. “I hear the Führer has been advised not to give me command in Italy as I am adversely disposed towards Italians,” he wrote in his diary. “I imagine the Luftwaffe [meaning Göring and Kesselring] is behind this. So my move to Italy is again put right back.” Army Group B, he was told, was being reassigned to Salonika, in northern Greece, where Rommel would take command of the defensive operations should the Allies land in Greece or Crete.
What followed has to almost certainly be the shortest army command in history. According to Rommel’s diary, this is what happened:
23/7/43
Long discussion with the Führer. I am to report in detail and direct to him on conditions in Greece. Forces there, besides Eleventh Italian Army, include only one German armored division (1st Panzer Division) and three infantry divisions.
25/7/43
Left Wiener Neustadt 8:00 A.M. by air. Arrived Salonika 11:00 A.M.
Terrific heat.
5:00 P.M. Conference with Colonel General Loehr. Loehr described the situation as being dependent upon supplies. . . . General Gause also doesn’t take a very rosy view of the situation here.
9:30 P.M. General Warlimont phoned and reported that Eleventh Italian Army will be definitely under my command. I want to get the German divisions directly under my command by interpolating a German Corps H.Q. instead, as was suggested at the Führer’s H.Q., of having them under Italian command.
23.15 hours. A call from O.K.W. reversed everything. Duce in protective custody. I am recalled to the Führer’s H.Q. Situation in Italy obscure.253
There was considerable confusion at the O.K.W. and the Führerhaupt-quartier: for weeks there had been rumors of a plot to overthrow the Duce and replace him with Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who was far more accomplished at political intrigue than commanding armies in the field; once Mussolini was out of the way, a separate peace with the Allies would be secretly negotiated by the new government. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the director of the Abwehr, Germany’s intelligence agency, had discounted these rumors, which now turned out to be true, and thus Hitler and the O.K.W., despite their own suspicions, were caught off guard at the moment the coup actually took place. (Canaris, who was actively working in secret to accomplish Hitler’s destruction, obviously had his own reasons for downplaying reports of the plot against Mussolini.) But as some sort of betrayal by the Italians had long been accepted as a given, it was not the deed itself that surprised Hitler and his senior officers, only the timing of it.
The Italians continued to proclaim their undying loyalty to the Axis, but everyone on both sides knew better. As Rommel put it, “In spite of the King’s and Badoglio’s proclamations, we can expect Italy to get out of the war. . . .” It was an absolute imperative that the German divisions already posted in southern Italy, along with Hube’s four divisions in Sicily, not be cut off and isolated by the Italians, thus the orders to execute Operation Alarich went out almost immediately once it became clear what had happened in Rome. Rommel was given specific objectives, with the seizure of the railway tunnels and roadways through the Brenner Pass between Italy and Austria being the priority, but the exact manner in which they were to be achieved was left to his discretion. In his opinion, it was best if his troops were to act as if this were a “friendly” invasion—an idea not at all farfetched, especially in the Italian Tyrol, where the largely ethnic-German population greeted the Wehrmacht as liberators! Speed, however, was the overriding requirement for Alarich: the Italians must be given no time to realize what was actually taking place and move to stop it.254
Now the Italians were caught in a cleft stick of their own making: despite Mussolini’s dismissal, the Allies were in no hurry to make a separate peace with the new Italian regime, going so far as to announce that no apicans. proaches had been made by the Italians to either the British or the Americans. Addressing the House of Commons at the end of July, Prime Minister Churchill held forth with relish, saying, “My advice to the House of Commons and to the British nation and the Commonwealth and the empire and to our allies at this juncture . . . we should let the Italians . . . ‘stew in their own juice’ for a bit and hot up the fire to accelerate the process until we obtain from their Government, or whoever possesses the necessary authority, all the indispensable requirements we demand for carrying on the war against our prime and capital foe, which is not Italy but Germany.” In short, neither side would have the Italians: the Germans expected treachery from them and the Allies were not prepared to accept their surrender.255
While the Italians “stewed” they temporized, as all throughout August they played an elaborate, peacock-like dance with the Germans, attempting to work out something that resembled a compromise, one which would allow them to leave the war on their own terms but would not result in an actual German occupation—with all the accompanying police-state apparatus which would attend it—of their country. It was an impossible task, and in early September, events came to a head with an unexpected rapidity.
In addition to the planning for Operation Alarich, Rommel had also been given the orders for Fall Achse—Case Axis, a contingency plan for responding to an Italian surrender. “Axis” was the code word Hitler would issue for Rommel to immediately descend on the Italian armed forces in northern Italy, disarm them, and take them prisoner. Rommel expected that Axis would be triggered by a major British or American landing at La Spezia, the main fleet anchorage for the Italian navy, that would coincide with the announcement of an Italian surrender—in this scenario the Allies would be in position to attack across the Apennine Mountains and into the Po Valley, cutting off every German unit south of Bologna. As it happened, however, Montgomery was given overall command of the invasion force, and his innate caution compelled him to adopt a strategy which Rommel regarded as inexcusably stupid: multiple, poorly coordinated landings at the very southern end of the Italian peninsula, a plan which then made necessary a long, costly campaign up the length of the Italian boot.
When Rommel’s old nemesis, the Eighth Army, landed two divisions at Reggio di Calabria on September 3, he was ordered to report to Hitler the next morning, where he was told to anticipate Fall Achse being activated at any time. Some of the old magic that had once held Rommel in thrall remained, at least when Rommel was actually in Hitler’s presence: “The Führer gives the impression of being quietly confident. He wants to send me to see the King of Italy soon. He agrees to my Italian campaign plan, which envisages a defense along the actual coastline, despite Jodl’s objections.” Five days later, at 7:00 P.M., the news was broadcast on Allied radio stations that Italy had formally surrendered. By 8:00 P.M. the code word “Axis” was issued, effective immediately. “Now Italy’s treachery is official,” Rommel wrote to Lucie the following day. “We sure had them figured out right. So far our plans are running smoothly.” Rome was seized by German troops, while Rommel put down Communist-led uprisings in Milan and Turi
n.256
Rommel was taken “out of action,” as it were the night of September 9, when he was struck with acute appendicitis. Surgery was performed the next day, and on September 27 he was discharged as fit to return to active duty. There were disconcerting moments as he lay in his hospital bed in La Garda, where he had moved his headquarters in mid-August, particularly on the nights when he could hear the basso-profundo drone of Allied heavy bombers overhead. Wiener Neustadt was no longer immune to air attack, and Rommel had been frankly frightened by what the Royal Air Force and the American Eighth Air Force were doing to Germany’s cities—a firestorm created by a massive Royal Air Force incendiary raid had ravaged Hamburg in July, while wide swaths of Berlin were bombed- and burned-out after repeated visits by the British and American bomber commands. The vital Messerschmitt aircraft company had a sprawling works south of Vienna, not far from Wiener Neustadt; Rommel was not prepared to lose Lucie or Manfred to an errant bomb, so he instructed Lucie to begin moving their most valuable possessions out of their house, safekeeping them with friends and relatives who lived in rural areas, far from inviting targets. He also insisted that she begin looking for a new home, preferably back in Württemberg, near Ulm. She would, he knew, be stubborn about the whole idea, but in this instance, he was determined to be even more stubborn; within six weeks Lucie and Manfred were moving into a summer villa in Herrlingen, outside of Ulm, the property of a brewer’s widow who no longer used the house. His family once again reasonably safe, Rommel could turn his full attention to the military situation in Italy.257
While Rommel was hospitalized, Kesselring, who had overall command of the German forces in the south half of Italy, had been remarkably successful in keeping the Allies confined to their beachheads, much to the surprise of Rommel, who maintained that any attempt to hold Italy south of the Po Valley was doomed to failure. As Rommel saw it, any defensive line across the Italian peninsula was inherently vulnerable, as it could always be outflanked by sea. He found it incredible that none of the Allied generals were imaginative enough to see this. Kesselring, however, was confident that the Allies would never risk an amphibious operation outside the range of their tactical air support, hence a landing in northern Italy simply was not in the cards. Events would ultimately prove Kesselring right, much to Rommel’s consternation.
In the meantime, though, both men were called to Rastenburg, where they reported to Hitler on the afternoon of September 30 to present the results of Fall Achse. Three quarters of a million Italian soldiers had been interned, a third of them shipped to Germany to serve as prison labor. One million rifles, 2,000 artillery pieces, 400 tanks, and an undetermined number of aircraft in various states of serviceability had been seized, along with substantial stocks of ammunition and supplies—much of it materiel which the Italians had previously claimed was scarce or non-existent. Particularly galling for Rommel was the discovery in a cave near La Spezia of 38,000 barrels—1,650,000 gallons—of fuel, the same fuel which Comando Supremo had insisted was unavailable while Panzerarmee Afrika was sitting immobile and stranded at El Alamein. Finally offered proof that at least some of his suspicions of treachery were valid, Rommel never forgave the Italians.
The strain of the situation in Italy, coupled with a growing crisis in Russia in the wake of the abortive Kursk offensive (Operation Citadel) in July was taking its toll on Hitler. Rommel was disturbed to see the Führer bent with fatigue, his speech rambling and sometimes slurred, at times he would uncharacteristically stammer. While to Rommel the emperor was still clothed, his finery was becoming increasingly threadbare. Apparently satisfied with both field marshals’ reports on Axis, Hitler asked each in turn to make a case for their respective strategies. When they were finished, he told them, “Every day, every week, every month that we can hold up the enemy down in the south of Italy is vital to us. We must gain time, we must postpone the final reckoning. . . .” No final strategic decision was made, but both Rommel, commanding in the north, and Kesselring in the south, now understood what was expected of them—hold, hold everything, everywhere, to the last man and the last round. It was what Hitler had ordered in Russia, where until Stalingrad it had worked, and because Hitler had ordered it, and it had worked there, once, it would work everywhere, because Hitler decreed it to be so.258
Later, Rommel and Hitler would discuss the possibility of a counterattack in Italy, driving the Allies down the boot and into the sea. Privately Rommel thought this pure fantasy, but remained diplomatically non-committal in his replies to the Führer’s musings. Hitler indicated that Kesselring was going to be transferred to Norway, which would make Rommel de facto supreme commander in Italy, a position he had hungered after since first reporting to Hitler back in May. There was just one fly in the ointment, from Rommel’s perspective: the O.K.W. wanted Rommel to hold the line that Kesselring had already established, roughly a third of the way up the Italian peninsula. At this Rommel hesitated; before agreeing he wanted to inspect the line for himself, and he would have to have, he insisted, clear orders allowing him to conduct the defense of Italy as he saw fit. Though he did not say as much to Hitler, Rommel had already had enough of “no withdrawal, victory or death” strategic thinking. He wanted to keep Germany from losing the war—he had no interest in a götterdämmerung.
This was unwise, for Hitler was unaccustomed to being presented with terms and conditions; it was he who made offers, presented compromises—he would dictate, but not be dictated to. He gave Rommel a noncommittal response and then dismissed the field marshal. Rommel flew back to his headquarters near Lake Garda on October 19. That evening a call came from Jodl, who informed Rommel that the Führer’s order giving him overall command in Italy had been “set aside.” Rommel pressed for clarification, but Jodl said no more. Rommel was not to know that after leaving Hitler’s presence on October 17, Jodl, sensing Hitler’s anger at what he perceived to be Rommel’s imperious attitude, had suggested to the Führer that perhaps Rommel was not the best choice for supreme command in Italy. His cynical attitude toward the Italians would make it very difficult for him to work in cooperation with the new Fascist regime set up at Lake Garda.
Two months after he was deposed and arrested on the orders of King Victor Emmanuel, Mussolini had been liberated in a risky commando operation carried out by German paratroopers; less than two weeks later the former Duce announced the creation of the Italian Social Republic, essentially a Nazi puppet state, in northern Italy. Rommel, whose disdain for Mussolini had grown with every new revelation of Italian obstructionism during the North African campaign, would have been compelled to work with the Duce, a task which would have sorely taxed Rommel’s limited capacity for tact and diplomacy—such a situation would, in Jodl’s opinion, ultimately prove detrimental to Germany’s efforts to hold back the Allied advance in Italy. His ruffled feathers soothed, Hitler agreed and gave the Italian command to Kesselring instead.
A week would pass before Rommel could bring himself to tell Lucie the news:
26 October 1943
Dearest Lu,
The job was not confirmed. By all accounts the Führer changed his mind after all. In any case, he didn’t sign the order promulgating the appointment. Of course I know no more than that. Maybe I aroused no great hopes that the position would be held, maybe my delay in taking over command was the cause. There may again, of course, be entirely different reasons. So, for the moment, Kesselring remains. Perhaps I’ll be posted away. Anyway, I’ll take it as it comes.259
The tone of a man struggling to overcome a deep humiliation is very real in Rommel’s letter; the element of self-doubt there is extraordinary, if only because it is so unusual. Nevertheless, Rommel did feel humiliated by Hitler’s decision to give the Italian command to Kesselring. Certainly he regarded it as a personal rejection by someone whom he once deeply admired, however diminished that admiration had now become. The professional rejection, though, Rommel thought was profound, the error potentially catastrophic: he, Rommel, was the man to wh
om Hitler had confessed he should have listened when warned of the strategic realities of North Africa; it was Kesselring’s misplaced optimism that had accelerated the process by which Armeegruppe Afrika had been lost. If Rommel proved to be right and Kesselring wrong, Germany stood to lose yet another army, this one trapped in southern Italy. In the event, it was Kesselring who was proven right, for he had read the Allied commanders correctly and deduced that collectively they were overly cautious and lacking in the strategic imagination to undertake anything but a slow, grinding campaign up the length of the Italian peninsula. Banishing him to Norway would have been a waste of his abilities; instead he was able to redeem himself for his obstructiveness in Tunisia and prove to be something close to a defensive genius as he made the Allies fight for every yard they advanced northward in Italy.
(As events in Italy and France played out in late 1943 and early 1944, a reconciliation of sorts took place between Rommel and Kesselring, and a high degree of mutual respect, if not actual admiration, grew between the two. Rommel recognized a defensive genius at work in Italy when he saw one, while Kesselring, when at last fully confronted by the reality of the Allies’ massive material superiority, came to recognize just how brilliant an accomplishment was Rommel’s retreat from El Alamein into Tunisia.)
At first, Hitler attempted to mollify Rommel by allowing him to retain the staff he had assembled for “Army Group B,” on the pretext that it would serve as a sort of “fire brigade” ready to be posted anywhere in order to handle emergencies. This smacked of make-work to Rommel and at the same time it presented Dr. Göbbels’ Propaganda Ministry with a problem: having made something akin to the military equivalent of a matinee idol out of Rommel for the German people, how was it to be explained that their favorite general was now cooling his heels, waiting for a call which might never come? This was not as trivial a problem as it may seem: by the end of 1943 no one in Germany could deny that the war had taken an unexpected turn, and not for the better. The Stalingrad disaster, the loss of North Africa, the invasion and surrender of Italy, the Allied bomber offensive, all were taking their toll on the morale of the German people. They were far from beaten, and, listening to the determined drumming of the Propaganda Ministry, were confident that the British, Americans, and Russians were all suffering in equally great a degree. But civilian morale had to be sustained, and it was Germany’s martial heroes who provided that sustenance: Rommel was Germany’s avatar of victory, in much the same way Montgomery was becoming to the British, or Eisenhower, Patton, or Mac Arthur would be to the Americans. It just would not do to have a general who stood as high in the Volk’s esteem as did Rommel suddenly appear to have been banished to the sidelines.
Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel Page 55
