by John Prados
OTHER BOOKS BY JOHN PRADOS
The U.S. Special Forces: What Everyone Needs to Know
A Streetcar Named Pleiku: Vietnam 1965, A Turning Point (longform e-book)
Operation Vulture: America’s Dien Bien Phu (e-book)
The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power
Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun
In Country: Remembering the Vietnam War (written and edited)
Rethinking National Security (longform e-book)
Normandy Crucible: The Decisive Battle That Shaped World War II in Europe
How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History
William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster
Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975
Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA
Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War
Inside the Pentagon Papers (written and edited with Margaret Pratt Porter)
The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President (written and edited)
Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby
America Confronts Terrorism (written and edited)
The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War
Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf
Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of U.S. Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II
The Hidden History of the Vietnam War
Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (with Ray W. Stubbe)
Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush
Pentagon Games
The Sky Would Fall: The Secret U.S. Bombing Mission to Vietnam, 1954
The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Strategic Forces
NAL CALIBER
Published by New American Library,
an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC
375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014
This book is an original publication of New American Library.
Copyright © John Prados, 2016
Maps by Jason Petho
Penguin Random House supports copyright. Copyright fuels creativity, encourages diverse voices, promotes free speech, and creates a vibrant culture. Thank you for buying an authorized edition of this book and for complying with copyright laws by not reproducing, scanning, or distributing any part of it in any form without permission. You are supporting writers and allowing Penguin Random House to continue to publish books for every reader.
NAL Caliber and the NAL Caliber colophon are trademarks of Penguin Random House LLC.
For more information about Penguin Random House, visit penguin.com.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA:
Names: Prados, John, author.
Title: Storm over Leyte: the Philippine invasion and the destruction of the
Japanese Navy/John Prados.
Description: New York, New York: New American Library, [2016]
Identifiers: LCCN 2015047067 (print) | LCCN 2015047122 (ebook) | ISBN
9780451473615 | ISBN 9780698185760 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Philippines—Leyte Island. |
Leyte Gulf, Battle of, Philippines, 1944. | Leyte Island (Philippines)—History, Military.
Classification: LCC D767.4.P73 2016 (print) | LCC D767.4 (ebook) |
DDC 940.54/25995—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015047067
PUBLISHER’S NOTE
While the author has made every effort to provide accurate telephone numbers and Internet addresses at the time of publication, neither the publisher nor the author assumes any responsibility for errors, or for changes that occur after publication. Further, publisher does not have any control over and does not assume any responsibility for author or third-party Web sites or their content.
Version_1
For Natasha,
who pursues her goal
with such determination
Despair is the price one pays for setting . . . an impossible aim.
—Graham Greene, The Heart of the Matter
CONTENTS
OTHER BOOKS BY JOHN PRADOS
TITLE PAGE
COPYRIGHT
DEDICATION
EPIGRAPH
MAP SYMBOL KEY
MAP LIST
INTRODUCTION
PROLOGUE
CHAPTER 1. ALL IN
CHAPTER 2. THE LOWDOWN
CHAPTER 3. BREAKTHROUGH AND EXPLOITATION
CHAPTER 4. BEST-LAID PLANS
CHAPTER 5. DESTROY THE INVADING ENEMY
CHAPTER 6. MACARTHUR RETURNS, SHO UNLEASHED
CHAPTER 7. “WITH CONFIDENCE IN HEAVENLY GUIDANCE, THE ENTIRE FORCE WILL ATTACK!”
CHAPTER 8. THE FIRST TEAM VERSUS THE RISING SUN
CHAPTER 9. TALLYHO . . . CARRIERS!
CHAPTER 10. “CLOSE AND ATTACK ENEMY CARRIERS!”
CHAPTER 11. SEA FIGHTS AND SHIPWRECKS
PHOTOGRAPHS
ABBREVIATIONS
ENDNOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
MAP LIST
WESTERN PACIFIC
PHILIPPINES
HALSEY FLEET TAIWAN AIR BATTLE
APPROACH TO CONTACT
JAPANESE SUBMARINE FEARS
SIBUYAN SEA BATTLE
SURIGAO STRAIT BATTLE
BATTLE OF CAPE ENGAÑO
SAMAR 1 (TWO PARTS)
TORPEDO ATTACK
SAMAR 2 (TWO PARTS)
BLOCKADE OF JAPAN (TWO PARTS)
INTRODUCTION
The Battle of Leyte Gulf figures among the most important events of the Pacific campaign in World War II. As a turning point it marked a key passage of the war. As a crushing blow to Japanese power it brought an escalation of violence that led to some of the bloodiest confrontations of the war. Though Leyte Gulf is among the more studied clashes of the fight, it still offers space for fruitful exploration. In Islands of Destiny, my last Pacific excursion, the intention was to show that, among Pacific turning points, the South Pacific campaign outshone the Battle of Midway as the more decisive development. Storm over Leyte extends that story to the moment of the American return to the Philippine Islands and the carnage it triggered.
This account begins with the extraordinary conference President Franklin Delano Roosevelt convened at Pearl Harbor in July 1944. Histories of the period have minimized or even ignored this event, a virtual summit of the Allied proconsuls in the Pacific, Douglas A. MacArthur and Chester W. Nimitz, conjoined with their top leader, FDR. Where histories cover this event they often treat it as a photo op or political stunt from a man about to run for his fourth term as president of the United States. As you will see from the narrative, I believe the meeting at Pearl Harbor is far more important than that, both in the immediate sense and in its longer-term consequences. I will argue that President Roosevelt worked to resolve a real strategic problem, and that the course he charted, taking the side of one of the summit’s participants, set up the most momentous military headache of the Pacific war. The question of using the atomic bomb on Japan versus invading the Japanese Home Islands has been prominent in recent writing on the Pacific. Here I argue that the Pearl Harbor conference and the Philippine campaign that
started at Leyte Gulf led directly to that horrible dilemma.
Storm over Leyte continues the enterprise I began several books ago of reinterpreting the standard military history of World War II in the light of contributions made by intelligence on both sides. I believe that our knowledge of intelligence in the war, developed late and only gradually released by the keepers of the secrets—even though broad outlines of the story were revealed quite early—has reached the point where our conventional knowledge of these events can be seamlessly reworked into a comprehensive history that offers full scope to all contributing elements. I did that for the South Pacific in Islands of Destiny. This tome continues the endeavor.
One thing from World War II that this book demonstrates and that merits celebration is the citizen soldier. The incredible exploits of U.S. naval, air, and ground forces before and during the Philippine invasion were the exploits of ordinary people. In this era of an entirely professional military it is too easy to lose sight of the fact that private citizens proved fully capable of learning everything necessary, as well as exercising competent military judgment, in a modern, technologically advanced conflict. I believe that elements of techno-obscurantism and plain arrogance have crept into the mind-sets of a disturbingly large slice of our serving professionals. The record of Leyte Gulf supplies a useful corrective—brilliant military results were posted by armed services overwhelmingly comprised of civilian volunteers and draftees. In the twenty-first century we may argue the desirability of national service, but events such as Leyte Gulf put beyond question that a citizen force can be as capable as a professional one.
An endeavor that continues between these covers is my attempt to give full play to both sides, the Allied and the Japanese. It is true that histories have been improving on this count in recent years. It is also the case that Leyte Gulf, because of the destruction of the Imperial Navy that occurred there, has been covered in ways that lend more weight to the Japanese viewpoint. I nevertheless believe the literature leaves room for improvement. Following Islands of Destiny, I think that what the Imperial Navy took away from the South Pacific was a realization of the need for detailed combat planning and high coordination between planning and battle preparations. In Storm over Leyte I make that case by showing in detail the evolution of the Japanese plan and preparations. Commencing their chronologies with the Leyte battle itself, or the preliminaries just ahead of it, existing accounts treat the planning in isolation and fail to capture what the Imperial Navy attempted to do. In my view a full appreciation of the dimensions of the enterprise needs to start with Tokyo’s anguish over the Marianas campaign, and that is what I do here.
This is big-picture military history. It contains numerous stories of individuals’ bravery or misfortune, but my stance in the memory-versus-history debate is on the history side. That is how I was trained and the kind of history I prefer to read. In my view the purpose of individuals’ stories is to enhance and illuminate the narrative. Their purpose is not to be the narrative. That said, some of the characters here are people we’ve met before, in Islands of Destiny, and here we continue their stories, plus add new ones. However, make no mistake—the characters populate the story, not the other way around. It is distressing to see readers complain, despite warnings like this one, that the book is short on personal narratives. A primary focus on memory impedes the search for larger meaning.
• • •
THE FOCUS HERE on intelligence opened the door to a huge array of information that was unknown or poorly understood. That carried us a considerable way toward providing a fresh view of this crucial battle. Readers will also recognize my agreement—or occasional differences—with such historians as Samuel Eliot Morison, Evan Thomas, Paul S. Dull, Richard Frank, Ron Spector, and others. I want to make special mention of John Toland, whose research on the Pacific war, deposited at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, remains an important resource. Another historian whose work should be mentioned is Elmer B. Potter, a naval biographer. His oeuvre includes full-scale profiles of several of the key leaders of the U.S. Navy. Largely forgotten today is Edwin P. Hoyt, a popular historian who had friends at Leyte Gulf. He set himself to study the battle repeatedly from angles ranging from the demise of single ships (Princeton, Gambier Bay) to the heroics of the pilots of the carrier Lexington, plus other points in between.
The work of Gordon W. Prange, with his associates Donald M. Goldstein and Katharine V. Dillon, becomes less valuable for the period after Pearl Harbor–Midway, although they have contributed a study of the Japanese aviator Fuchida Mitsuo. What Goldstein and Dillon have given us that is of tremendous value is a translation of the diary of Imperial Navy admiral Ugaki Matome. Having said that, I should add that another translation of the Ugaki diary, while not of literary quality, is available. This one, done for John Toland and in his papers, fills in many places where Goldstein and Dillon chose to condense material for publication. A careful study of the Ugaki material indicates, as I argue here, that the diarist gave free rein to his predilections and prejudices. There has been a tendency to rely too much on the Ugaki diary primarily because it furnishes the widest-ranging contemporary source we have for the Japanese side. On Leyte Gulf, at least, I shall argue that Admiral Ugaki is not a reliable guide.
Any modern treatment of the Japanese side must acknowledge the contributions of social media, in this case the CombinedFleet.com Web site, mastered by Anthony Tully. A tribe of new historians clustered around that resource site are assiduously adding a new dimension to the information available about our former enemies. A fine example of their work is the book on the Battle of the Surigao Strait by Tully, who previously had collaborated with Jon Parshall on a history of the Midway action. Readers will see instances where I take Tully’s side and some where we differ. I nevertheless credit Tully with advancing our record tremendously.
My debts to others are wide and deep. At the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) I relied upon John E. Taylor until his death in 2008. I still know no one with so comprehensive a view of the sources, both archival and published. This book continues to benefit from records I consulted upon his advice. Also of key assistance at NARA were Richard A. von Doenhoff, whose knowledge of the naval records was remarkable, and Judy Thorne. The National Security Agency records group at NARA yielded a plethora of information, as you will see. Elizabeth Mays of the Navy Department Library, Linda O’Doughda of the U.S. Naval Institute, and Edward Finney Jr. of the Naval Historical Center all provided valuable help. I am indebted to Michael Walker, John Hodges, Kathleen Lloyd, and Gina Akers of the Naval Operational Archives. These archives held not only U.S. Navy records but also copies of important oral histories compiled both by the U.S. Naval Institute and by the National Security Agency, as well as the papers of Samuel Eliot Morison. The Naval Operational Archives have fallen on hard times of late, with the deterioration of both facilities and records, tight budgets, and what has been reported as the pilfering of the Morison papers. There are additional problems pertaining to the transfer of Navy records to NARA in the context of changing policies on who may use the Naval Operational Archives and what records it will continue to house. Overall the outlook seems to be bleak, since the movement of records to NARA takes them out of circulation for an indefinite period.
At the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum I was assisted by Susan Y. Elter, John C. Ferris, and Robert Parks. The Roosevelt Library held invaluable resources. I am delighted to take note of the library’s progress in putting source material online. Many of the documents I traveled to Hyde Park to examine physically are now available electronically. This is a boon for all researchers. The Roosevelt Map Room files are not yet completely online, but the set should become fully available in the near future.
Many of those who helped me with this research have passed away or moved on to new projects. John Taylor is an example of the first. John Ferris, who has become an intellige
nce historian in his own right, can stand in for the second. I am deeply grateful that our respective trajectories carried us close to each other at key points for my research. Thank you all.
Ellen Pinzur read and edited the manuscript and made many excellent suggestions. She has been most valuable as a first reader. I am especially grateful for the editing work of Brent Howard and Christina Brower. They saved the manuscript from much silliness. Jason Petho once again ably executed the maps I wanted to illustrate the text. And Michael Congdon held my hand throughout the process. These persons, individually and together, have contributed much to what is good about this book. I alone am responsible for its faults and omissions.
—John Prados
Washington, DC
January 2016
PROLOGUE
The Allied juggernaut had momentum. The battles were bloody, fierce. On Saipan, where U.S. Marines and Army troops clawed their way across the Central Pacific, desperate Japanese defenders hurled themselves into the most vicious suicide attack of the war. In New Guinea, where the Australian-American forces of General Douglas A. MacArthur had mastered the strategy of bypassing the enemy’s strongholds wherever possible, the Southwest Pacific Command had jumped from the big island on to other targets, leaving Japanese garrisons behind to starve, bereft of the supplies denied them by Allied naval power. That summer of 1944, the question was increasingly one of what to do next.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt chose this moment to powwow with his theater commanders at Pearl Harbor. He had considered the move carefully. In mid-May, FDR quietly asked his Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Admiral William D. Leahy, to arrange the trip, with the president to travel to Seattle, then Alaska and Hawaii. As it turned out, Roosevelt left a little earlier and reversed the order of his destinations, but that hardly mattered. They departed Washington by special train on July 13, with a brief stopover at his New York estate, Hyde Park.
