Aetius Attila’s Nemesis

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Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 12

by Ian Hughes


  For cavalry, the Notitia lists four Equites Palatina units and eight Equites Comitatenses units. Again, at theoretical full strength this would give a mounted arm of 7,200 men, whilst the two-thirds estimate would give 4,800 men.

  Although in theory these forces could have been supplemented by taking limitanei from the frontiers and using them in the field army, in this period the move would have been risky, as weakening the frontiers could have invited yet further attacks from across the Rhine.

  It is possible that Aetius also had with him some foederati, but if so the nature and numbers of these troops is completely unknown. Finally, he would almost certainly have maintained a small force of bucellarii for his personal use. Again the composition and numbers are unknown, but it is reasonable to assume that he would have had a small bodyguard of Huns, provided by Rua but paid for by Aetius himself.

  The total force that Aetius could command can, therefore, be assumed to muster between 35,200 and 52,800, although it should be acknowledged that illness, injury, the need to deploy troops away from the main field army as garrisons, plus the need to leave an administrative core at the unit’s base, will have further reduced the numbers available.1 As a result, it can be assumed that Aetius could command troops numbering around 20,000–30,000 foot and 3,200–4,000 horse, an average of approximately 29,000 men. However, as noted above, it is possible that the number was much less, as some of the units may now have been part of the praesental army in Italy, whilst others may only have existed on paper.

  When Aetius succeeded to the command the troops were most probably stationed at various points around Gaul. Immediately upon his appointment in Italy it is most likely that the only troops Aetius had control of were a small number of Huns retained for his personal service after the dismissal of the main body. These would form the core of his personal bucellarii. It is highly unlikely that he would have been given troops from the army of Italy as this would be needed to guarantee the newly won position of emperor for Valentinian III and, in any case, would not be given to the recently defeated leader of a rebellion in case he decided to renew the conflict. Furthermore, a large part of the army that had won the civil war was from the East and would ultimately have to return home. Finally, before he could take control of the Gallic army, Aetius would need intelligence on recent events in Gaul prior to departing from Italy to gather his army in person.

  Map 4. Aetius in Gaul

  Conditions in Gaul

  The barbarians above the Rhine, assaulting everything at their pleasure, reduced both the inhabitants of Britain and some of the Celtic peoples to defecting from Roman rule and living their own lives disassociated from the Roman law. Accordingly the Britons took up arms and, with no consideration of the danger to themselves, freed their own cities from barbarian threat; likewise all of Armorica and other Gallic provinces followed the Britons’ lead: they freed themselves, ejected the Roman magistrates, and set up home rule at their own discretion.

  Zosimus 6.5

  Gaul and Spain were demolished and utterly destroyed by the barbarian nations of the Vandals, Sueves, and Alans.

  Narratio de imperatoribus domus Valentinianae et Theodosiane

  The greatest difficulty facing Aetius when he became the commander of the army in Gaul was the confusion prevalent in the West. The rebellion in Britain and the constant usurpations in Gaul and Spain, coupled with the invasions of the Vandals, Alans and Sueves and the later arrival of the Goths, had all overwhelmed large areas of Gaul. Where the barbarians had not actually plundered the countryside, the army’s lack of ability to maintain order had allowed several areas of Gaul, such as Armorica in the north, to become practically self-governing under the aristocrats who had remained in the area. However, the departure of the Vandals, Alans and Sueves to Spain and the settlement of the Goths in Aquitania allowed time for the restoration of order. The campaigns of Constantius III (d. 321) had no doubt ensured that in most areas, and especially in the south around Arles, peace was restored.

  Yet conditions had not been restored to those that had existed prior to 406. The seat of government was now permanently in Arles rather than Trier, and the post of Praefectus praetorio Galliarum was now firmly in the hands of the aristocracy of southern Gaul. Whereas before 406 it had tended to be in the hands of Italian senators – probably individuals who had large land-holdings in the south of Gaul – it was now held by Exuperantius and possibly Amatius after him.2

  Furthermore, although the Gallic upper classes could still hold imperial office in the traditional manner, there were distinct problems in Gaul. One was that with the movement of the capital to the south and the withdrawal of the imperial court to Ravenna there was a lack of opportunities for men of ambition. The resultant lack of economic and political power resulted in the beginning of a steady decline in traditional education, such as rhetoric, for all but the highest echelons of society.

  Coupled with this was the lack of enthusiasm of all but a few to enter imperial service. In imperial service the hours were long and except possibly at the very top levels the financial rewards were not seen as being equal to the workload imposed. As a result, instead of serving the empire, those of more modest means began to transfer their ambition to the church, another piece of evidence for the gradual fragmentation and transferral of loyalties in the West.3

  This may seem surprising, in that the church was an imperial institution and had intentionally copied imperial forms of administration. Yet the influx of influential members of the higher and lower aristocracy resulted in the church growing ever greater in prestige. As imperial power withdrew, the removal of traditional sources of patronage and influence resulted in the church becoming the local expression of imperial government. As a result, the local bishops soon came to be ranked higher than other imperial representatives: for example, the Bishop of Arles soon began to wield social and political power far beyond his status as a bishop.4

  The hierarchical ties to the emperor broke. The local loyalties that had earlier focused upon the hierarchy’s ties to the imperial person were transferred to the local bishop, who became the trusted spokesman at court.5 Rather than focusing upon the empire or the province, all ranks of the local Christian community began to give their loyalties to the much smaller division of the diocese. As a result, bishops became increasingly more autocratic.

  The process had been given a major boost by a scandal in the late fourth century. In 390 Bishop Ambrose of Milan had excommunicated Emperor Theodosius I after Theodosius had ordered a massacre of civilians in Thessalonica. Theodosius had been forced to undergo several months of public penance before being allowed back into the church. The episode had major implications. The impression given was that bishops could have authority over the emperor himself. (It should be remembered that in this period the Pope was revered as being senior, but had not yet been acknowledged as the infallible ‘God’s representative on earth’ of the Middle Ages.) In theory, any bishop could use Ambrose’s actions as a model in his dealings with the emperor, although it must be noted that later emperors were less likely to pay attention than the pious Theodosius and not all bishops were as forceful as Ambrose. Yet the benchmark had been set: in some instances the church was mightier than the emperor.

  The imperial government was aware of these developments. The inauguration of a new ‘Council of the Seven Gauls’ can be interpreted as a major political statement by the government. Although the settlement of the Goths in Aquitania could easily be seen as the break up of Gaul into non-Roman ‘kingdoms’, the Council was to represent the whole of Gaul and was a declaration that the whole of Gaul, including both the areas settled by the Goths as well as the north, was still part of the empire, with the Goths as a small people within it.6

  The usurpation of John in 424 had resulted in yet another civil war in the West when it really needed time to recuperate and restore itself. The news that the army of the magister militum praesentalis, and possibly units of the army of Gaul, was being withdrawn to def
end Italy meant that some outlying areas of northern Gaul, especially Armorica, continued their drift away from the empire, seeing no benefit in paying high taxes to an empire that was totally incapable of fulfilling its duties with regard to protection.

  There was one further development that was to affect seriously Aetius’ time as commander in Gaul. Economically and politically, the provinces of Gaul were becoming increasingly divided between the north and the south. In the south, Arles (Arelate) was being developed until it could be described as Gallula Roma Arelas (‘Arelas, small Gallic version of Rome’) by Ausonius.7 The town had become important largely thanks to its river harbour, which was mainly concerned with the transport of the annona, receiving goods from the Mediterranean and sending them on to Trier and the rest of Gaul. With the settlement of the Praetorian Prefect of Gaul in the city, Arles became even more important than previously, in the fifth century rebuilding the walls for greater protection, probably against the combined threat of the Goths in Gaul and of the Vandals in Spain. The government was also under pressure from the Senate to keep the south of Gaul inviolate and safe, who had large landholdings in the area. Economically, militarily and politically, southern Gaul was seen as vital to the welfare of the empire.

  In the north of Gaul, however, and especially north of the Loire, things were different. Under constant threat of invasion, the landowners of large estates had withdrawn and landholding had reverted to small, peasant plots, possibly under the control of local aristocrats. The removal of the court and large sections of the army caused a loss of income that resulted in a reduction in the import of, for example, fine pottery from southern Gaul, northern Italy and Spain.8 As the distinctive services of the empire withdrew, so the forces of self-government grew. The north was to become a centre of resistance to Roman rule in Gaul.

  Despite this, even in the north the aristocracy spent much of its time and resources on the building of religious centres. As a result, the towns of Gaul were ‘transformed largely from centres of Roman civilization to the cores around which the Christian religion flourished and kept alive some of the imperial values and structures’.9

  However, for Aetius, the immediate problem was that John’s policies in Gaul had resulted in the death of the newly appointed Praetorian Prefect Exuperantius and possibly of Gaudentius, Aetius’ father, both of whom had been killed by the troops.10 It was clear that the imperial and personal policies of John and his predecessors had done much to alienate the population of Gaul from imperial rule. As he took up his post of magister militum per Gallias Aetius was faced with the need to counter the growing sense of disunity in Gaul. He was also faced with the Goths under their king, Theoderic.

  The Goths

  Although there is a tendency amongst modern historians to call the Visigothic territories in Gaul a kingdom from the moment of their settlement in 418–419, this is a mistake.11 The designation ‘kingdom’ has unavoidable associations, bringing to mind the more settled monarchies of the early to high medieval period. The reality in fifth-century Gaul was far different. The title kingdom is also one given in hindsight, built largely upon the claim to the title rex Gothorum by Alaric and his successors.12 Yet there are two problems with this interpretation. The first is that the title of rex was not Germanic. It was of Roman origin and was used in an attempt by Roman writers to identify the military and political leaders of the barbarians. Alaric was possibly the first Germanic leader to use the title himself, employing it as a political tool to place pressure on the court at Ravenna. The actual date at which Gothic leaders stopped using the title as a political tool and began to use it as a firm claim to total dominion over their fellow Goths is unknown. Secondly, although the Visigothic leaders were using the title ‘rex’, they accepted that the more powerful Germanic title of ‘thiudans’ was still only to be borne by the reigning emperor in Ravenna.13

  Furthermore, it is unclear what, if any, difference there was between the earlier settlement of the Goths in 382 and the later settlement of 419. Although it can be claimed that the main difference was that the later settlement had a leader who claimed the title rex, the lack of information concerning the settlement of 382 means that there remains the possibility that this settlement, too, recognised the dominance of a single Gothic leader. Yet the earlier Gothic settlement is not referred to as a kingdom.

  Apart from this, the two settlements may be more similar than expected: in the east the Goths had been allocated a specific territory but their dependence upon Roman generosity remained and there were distinct limits on their freedom; in the west, in the new ‘proto-kingdom’, they were settled in a specific territory and there was a similar limit to Visigothic power, since they were excluded from the Mediterranean and the Romans maintained full control of the land routes to Spain.14

  The similarities are not surprising, since in both cases the Roman victories that achieved the treaties were almost identical: the Goths had achieved ‘unbelievable’ triumphs – the Battle of Adrianople in 378 and the Sack of Rome in 410 – before being blockaded into submission. It is likely that in both cases the Goths were settled according to the principles of receptio and the provision of recruits for the army.15 As in the east, there was thus no guarantee – and probably little hope – that the Goths would establish their own rule and break free from the domination of Rome.

  The history of the Goths from the rise to power of Alaric in 396 to their settlement only twenty-two years later in 418 shows that, far from being an unitary force under a settled king, the Goths were in fact a conglomeration of forces and tribes who had agreed to follow the lead of Alaric and his successors.16 At any time of their choosing, the Visigothic aristocracy always retained the right to leave the main body and strike out on their own, either to move out of the empire or to join with imperial forces in the hope of employment and promotion. Naturally, the men that owed allegiance to the aristocracy would follow their leaders in whichever way they chose to go.

  It would be unrealistic to assume that the Visigothic aristocracy gave up this right the moment that the Romans allowed them to settle in Gaul. It is far more likely that they continued to act in an independent manner. Even a century later powerful Gothic nobles caused intense dynastic instability. Not only that, but the Goths were not the only component of the new kingdom. At some later point during the Gothic siege of Bazas their Alan allies had a change of heart and defected to the Romans defending the town.17 If the Gothic nobles and allies could defect later in their history, the possibility would be especially the case immediately after the settlement in Gaul.

  Yet the seeds were quickly sown for the growth in power of the Gothic king. The fact that the Romans had granted the Goths land in the three provinces meant that, in effect, the Gothic aristocracy assumed the role of the now-vacant Roman aristocracy. The only way that the Goths could control their new lands was by the use of Roman administrative systems. The result was that the Gothic aristocracy immediately began to settle in the towns. Theoderic himself settled in Toulouse and all Roman political exchanges with the Goths was via the new Gothic ‘capital’. The role of Theoderic as the sole leader of the Goths was important to the Romans, as it made dealing with them easier for the imperial government. Theoderic was treated as the sole leader, but in return he was expected to control all of the Goths and maintain his part of the treaty with Rome.

  The fact that the Romans tended to channel their diplomacy through Theoderic resulted in Toulouse becoming effectively the capital of the Visigothic protokingdom. The increased political power of the king no doubt contributed to an increase in internal political control.18 Furthermore, it is likely that from this time onwards Theoderic established a ‘standing army’. He was able to use this army to defend himself from internal rebellions, as well as protecting his people from external threats.19

  However, those aristocrats who had been given land away from the capital no doubt ignored the commands of the new king in distant Toulouse whenever it suited them. In effect, rather than
being the anointed king, it is better to see Theoderic as an individual who has continually to prove himself in order to retain control of his most powerful subjects. Only by exerting his full power and demonstrating that he was in control would he ensure that the majority of the aristocracy would look to him for guidance. Otherwise, they would continue in the old traditions of independence.

  In this context, the outbreak of a Roman civil war was of inestimable value to Theoderic. As a recently created king, his hold on power was likely to be relatively tenuous. After all, two of his immediate predecessors had been killed by disaffected factions that remained within Theoderic’s following. In order to avoid this happening to himself, Theoderic needed to demonstrate that he had the ability to support those who followed him.

  Consequently, as the conflict between John and Valentinian began, Theoderic attempted to augment and demonstrate his strength. It is possible that he sent forces to capture many small towns, especially those at strategic points. However, only one city is mentioned directly in our sources. At the time when Aetius was appointed to the command in Gaul, Theoderic and the Goths were busy laying siege to Arelate (Arles).20

  The Visigothic siege of Arles, the capital of Gaul and the seat of the newly founded Council of the Seven Provinces, is usually interpreted as an attempt by Theoderic to extend Visigothic influence to the Mediterranean.21 However, this is almost certainly too simplistic an interpretation. The decision to lay siege to Arles was probably the combination of many factors. One of these is that the deaths of Gaudentius and Exuperantius demonstrate that Gaul was not going to support John. By promoting his actions as those of a loyal representative of the ‘true’ imperial government, Theodoric could join the Gallic forces in besieging the agents of the usurper. After all, Theoderic’s treaty was with the members of the Theodosian dynasty, and he may have been able to claim that he was simply fulfilling his obligation by attacking disloyal elements.

 

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