Alexander reformed his forces and advanced upon Pellium, this time not to be denied. Cleitus, evidently seeing the impossibility of his situation, with no likelihood of a relief column to assist, set fire to the city and abandoned it, seeking refuge with Glaucias in the mountains.
The Pellium campaign gives us our first opportunity to examine Alexander’s abilities in the art of siegecraft, and in a number of ways he was found wanting. Alexander committed a serious tactical error in not taking with him sufficient provisions to allow him to conduct the siege; this was compounded by the fact that he allowed himself to become surrounded by the Dardanians and the Taulantians. Later, at the Hydaspes, Alexander seems to be aware of the advancing reinforcements and forces a decisive battle before they arrived; here at Pellium, Alexander shows no such awareness at all. This was likely a serious lack of scouting, but could equally be an indication that the wooded and mountainous terrain was extremely difficult terrain, directly resulting in the advancing enemy not being spotted by any scouts that Alexander had employed. I suspect that a combination of both can be blamed. We also see Alexander taking a dreadful and unnecessary risk with Philotas’ foraging detachment: if it had been Alexander’s intention to retreat, then he could have done so without delay by the deception device that he eventually chose; foraging was not required. This act seems to indicate that Alexander still intended to besiege the city, even though he was surrounded. These mistakes aside, Alexander’s fighting withdrawal was masterful and controlled, and his tactic of withdrawing to a safe distance to trick the Illyrians into thinking he had left the region entirely was equally brilliant. Whilst Alexander essentially failed to capture the city, its destruction, along with the utter defeat of the Illyrian tribes, sent a message to others in the Balkans of the consequences of resistance to the new king. It is significant that Alexander never again throughout the whole of his career had any trouble from this historically-difficult and hostile region. Alexander’s Balkan campaign as a whole clearly demonstrated the vast gulf that had developed between the military capabilities of the new Macedonia and her neighbours.
Any doubts that the siege of Pellium had raised about Alexander’s abilities as a siege commander were to be quickly and completely erased by his capture of one of Greece’s greatest cities: Thebes.
Thebes
Arrian provides us with the only full account of the outbreak of the Theban revolt; although Diodorus’ account of the events of the siege are more detailed, and rather less favourable to Alexander.52 Arrian tells us that a group of Theban citizens had allowed back into the city, under cover of night, a number of individuals that had been exiled by Philip after the Macedonian victory at Chaeronaea in 338.53 These former exiles then murdered two members of the Macedonian garrison, named Amyntas and Timolaus. After this vicious act, they presented themselves to the assembly and incited the Thebans to revolt against the Macedonians by the apparently liberal use of such emotive words as ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’. They were further convinced that Alexander had in fact died during the Balkan campaign, as it had lasted for around four months, and no communication had been heard from the new king during that time. Demosthenes may also have produced a former Macedonian soldier who apparently swore to being an eye witness to Alexander’s death. The assembly, perhaps against its better judgement, allowed itself to be swayed by the emotive language, and they began to lay siege to the Cadmea, which had held a Macedonian garrison since the allied Greek defeat at Chaeronea.
Arrian’s story is entirely plausible; Philip did exile or execute large numbers of his Theban political enemies after Chaeronea, replacing them with a ruling body of 300 pro-Macedonian former exiles who had been invited back to their city.54 The now-returning exiles were a necessary ingredient in order for the revolt to proceed; the first stages of the revolt are a virtual copy of the Theban revolt of 379.55
Once news of the events in Greece reached Alexander, he reacted in typical and decisive style. He immediately set off south through the passes of Eordaea and into Upper Macedonia, continuing south into the Haliacmon region and then on into Thessaly via the Peneus Valley. After seven days of forced marching he paused briefly at Pelinna, and then marched the remaining distance to Boeotia in a further five days.56 The march to Thebes was conducted with terrifying speed; 390km in only thirteen days, one of which the army was resting. Thirty kilometres per day is an astonishing enough speed for an army in the ancient world to achieve, but when we consider the mountainous terrain that had to be traversed in order to reach Thebes in thirteen days, it is a truly staggering achievement. The need to reach Thebes at such speed was not overwhelming; the real reason for the march was that Alexander feared that the rebellion would spread to the rest of Greece. Alexander needed a show of force that would cow the other city-states into submission before they ever got to the point of revolt.
Alexander’s arrival certainly caught the Thebans by surprise. He was at Onchestus, a three-hour march from Thebes, apparently before they even knew of his approach (and the city was under siege before the Athenians learnt he was south of Thermopylae); but they were certainly not unprepared. As soon as the oligarchic government set up by Philip had been overthrown, and the new democracy had voted for war, the Thebans had set about surrounding the Cadmea with deep trenches and heavy stockades so that neither reinforcements nor supply could reach the besieged Macedonian garrison.57 The Thebans also sent an appeal for help to the Arcadians, Argives and Eleians, again no doubt citing Greek freedom as their rallying cry. The members of the Arcadian league even went so far as to organize a relief force, but ordered it to wait at the Isthmus of Corinth, assisting neither Thebes nor Macedon. There was also a minor rebellion in Elis where the pro-Macedonian faction was expelled and the government, presumably as well as its policy, was altered as a result.58 We also know of a major debate in Athens where Demosthenes, a long-time opponent of Philip (and apparently now in receipt of Persian gold), along with Lycurgus, urged the demos to declare war on Alexander and send military aid to Thebes.59 Athens did vote to support Thebes, but no troops were ever sent; in hindsight a very wise decision on the part of Athens given the ultimate fate of Thebes.
It would seem that Alexander’s fear of the Theban revolt spreading to the rest of Greece was not without foundation. His lightning march was well timed; it had utterly destroyed any hope that there would be a united and widespread Greek revolt. All Alexander had to do was make a statement to the Greek world that Macedonia was still the superpower of Greece; all that had changed with the death of Philip was the name of the king.
Alexander arrived at Thebes to find his garrison hard pressed and surrounded by a double stockade, exactly the same device he was to use against the city of Sangala in India in 326. Alexander approached the city from the north and initially made camp there. The Thebans were certainly outnumbered by the Macedonians, but were in a strong defensive position, and to bolster their numbers they had enlisted slaves and metics to help man the walls.60 Despite the potential for widespread resistance, Alexander was in a surprisingly-forgiving mood; he began the siege by offering the Thebans a ‘period of grace, in case they should repent of their bad decisions and send an embassy to him’.61 It is possible that Alexander reasoned that if the Thebans genuinely believed that he was dead, and given that he had no heir, then the League of Corinth treaty would be effectively nullified and thus their rising would be legally justified. It is far more likely, however, that Alexander was simply taking the opportunity to rest his troops and construct siege engines before the assault began. Given Alexander’s need to send a message to the Greek world about resistance, a successful siege was a far more attractive and decisive outcome than a diplomatic resolution.
The former exiles realized that if they were to accept Alexander’s terms, they would almost certainly be put to death and they argued in the assembly that the walls of Thebes were strong and that their hoplites and cavalry were the finest in Greece. They further argued that the Macedonian garrison on t
he Cadmea was isolated by troops inside Thebes, and by the newly-constructed double stockade around it. It seems likely that they also pointed out the possibility of a relief column from Athens or the Arcadian League, even though in reality both were unlikely. The former rebels evidently spoke persuasively and the assembly voted to reject Alexander’s proposed terms.
The Thebans’ answer to Alexander’s offer of clemency was a sortie that was easily repulsed by the Macedonians.62 Alexander then circled around the city and made camp to the south, opposite the Eleutherae Gate, at the closest point to the Cadmea, straddling the road to Athens. Given what had occurred at Pellium we might have expected Alexander to have been more cautious and keep friendly territory to his back rather than risking an attack from Thebes to the north and some other unspecified Greek force from the south. Throughout his career, however, Alexander can seldom be accused of caution. At Thebes he reasoned that the most advantageous strategic position was to camp as close to his garrison in the Cadmea as possible. The moving of Alexander’s camp essentially changed the Macedonian posture, it was evident that they were preparing to attack against the most vulnerable section of the walls; yet still Alexander did not actually launch an attack. Arrian tells us that Alexander was still keen to win Theban friendship,63 but this almost certainly comes from Ptolemy,64 who made every effort to exonerate Alexander from any responsibility for the city’s destruction. The reality of the situation is probably that Alexander was still resting his troops and constructing siege engines, given that a siege train could not possible have maintained his 30km-per-day rate of march from Pellium.
During the three-day delay before Alexander began the assault, the Thebans answered Alexander’s continued offers of clemency by having a herald stand upon the battlements and proclaim that the Theban assembly would allow the commencement of negotiations once Alexander surrendered Antipater and Philotas to Thebes. The herald further proclaimed that ‘all who wished to liberate Greece [were] to range themselves on their side’.65 It is difficult to see exactly what the Thebans were attempting to achieve by the herald’s message, but they only succeeded in enraging Alexander, with terrible consequences for their city-state.
The surviving sources differ as to exactly what occurred during the final assault upon the city, but it seems clear that Alexander had divided his forces and detached small units to various points around the city’s perimeter. The Thebans had concentrated the finest of their troops on the double palisade between the Cadmea and the Macedonian camp, with the walls around the rest of the city being manned by slaves and metics.
Diodorus presents a picture of Alexander, at the sound of the salpinx, ordering a general assault to begin against the city. The Macedonians were almost irresistible, but the Thebans were apparently superior in strength and, with tremendous effort, held the Macedonians at bay. The battle wore on and Alexander saw that the Macedonians were becoming weary, perhaps not having fully recovered from the thirteen-day march from Pellium; at this point Alexander entered the fray with the hypaspists who had been held in reserve. The Thebans still fought on bravely, Alexander’s presence not having the impact he expected. Alexander then noticed an unguarded postern gate and hurriedly detached Perdiccas and a large body of men to force an entry; this they did, and once they were inside the city the Theban resistance crumbled and the city was lost.66
Arrian’s version, coming from Ptolemy, has a very different character. He tells us that Perdiccas and his taxis were camped close to the palisade and that he began the assault himself without waiting for orders from Alexander. Perhaps he had seen a glaring weakness in the defences of the palisade, perhaps he had received some form of signal from the defenders in the Cadmea, or perhaps this was the result of drunken revelling. Either way, Perdiccas quickly forced his way inside the palisade, but the defenders recovered rapidly and were in the process of cutting him off from the main camp. Upon seeing this, Amyntas joined the fray, closely followed by Alexander ordering a general assault. Perdiccas was wounded during the initial stages of the assault on the second palisade and took no further part in the siege. The troops of his taxis fought on, however, with support from Alexander and a unit of archers. The Theban defenders fought desperately for their survival and became boxed up on the ‘sunken road which runs down by the Heracleum’. At the word of command, the Thebans stopped their retreat and turned to face the Macedonians and succeeded in driving them back some distance; during this action the commander of Alexander’s Cretan archers, Eurybotas, was killed along with seventy of his men. Alexander countered with an infantry assault in close order; the rout gave way to panic and ultimately violent slaughter. The Theban last stand near the Ampheum was brave but futile. The terror that followed was, apparently, driven more by the traditional enemies of Thebes, the Phocians, Plataeans and men from various other Boeotian towns, than by the Macedonians.67 In every account, Thebes was razed to the ground and the survivors sold into slavery.
Macedonian losses were significant: 500 dead. But Theban losses far worse: 7,000 dead and 30,000 sold into slavery. The sale brought much-needed revenue into the Macedonian treasury, some 440 talents; each Theban being worth on average 88 drachmae.68
The two versions both have the same end result, the destruction of Thebes, but occur along very different lines. Arrian, following Ptolemy, was clearly attempting to remove any blame for the city’s destruction from Alexander; understandable given the sometimes apologetic nature of his history coupled with the revulsion that it caused in the rest of Greece. His account is not as anti-Perdiccas as some have argued however. Perdiccas and Ptolemy were later rivals and it is all to easy to put the blame upon Perdiccas’ shoulders, but Arrian states quite clearly that Perdiccas was wounded during the assault on the second palisade and took no further part in the battle. He can, therefore, not be blamed for the atrocities that were committed later.69 Arrian’s account is so obviously apologetic, however, that I believe Diodorus to be the more reliable on this occasion. The siege began with Alexander ordering a general assault, and Perdiccas only broke through after receiving orders to attack an unguarded postern gate.
Historians have argued for centuries on the question of the destruction of Thebes, and what Alexander hoped to achieve. It can be argued that he desired to cause such fear amongst the southern Greek states that they would not dare to repeat the mistake of Thebes in openly rebelling against Macedonian control. Historians who would argue for this hypothesis would also likely argue that Alexander hoped that with one excessively-violent act he would prevent his being delayed in Greece by having to put down many minor rebellions. Alexander was certainly keen to continue the invasion of Persia that his father had tentatively begun in 336. It is true that the destruction of Thebes did cow the Greeks into cooperation for some years, and that the members of the League of Corinth generally ignored the revolt of Agis the Spartan in 331 (the Peloponnese was not part of the League and was therefore outside of Alexander’s empire). It would also be true to argue that Alexander seemed desperately short of money during the early part of his reign, and the 440 talents were a very welcome boost to his empty coffers. The mistake usually made when considering the fate of Thebes, I believe, is to assume premeditation. It is a truism in the ancient world that ‘to the victor goes the spoils’; after almost every city fell, women would have been brutalized, slaughter and looting would have been endemic and was almost impossible for any commander to stop, so it is not surprising that in that environment fires could be started as part of the general looting. The Macedonians were also taking out their frustrations on Thebes after a difficult Balkan campaign, and the failure to loot Pellium, followed by a difficult forced march into central Greece. This would have been magnified by the presence, as noted above, of a number of troops from cities that were traditionally the hated enemy of Thebes; decades of rivalry and repression would have also bubbled to the surface.
Whilst I would argue that the destruction of Thebes was probably accidental and not the result of poli
cy on the part of Alexander, he may not have been altogether disappointed by the result. He got his psychological impact on the remaining Greek city states, received a much-needed cash injection (or perhaps ‘fiscal stimulus’ as we might say these days) whilst remaining relatively free of direct blame, essentially a win-win situation for the young king. Whilst the Greeks were cowed by the act, they certainly appeared to blame Alexander for the destruction of Thebes; the act, deliberate or otherwise, meant that Alexander would never be truly accepted by the Greeks, particularly the Athenians. He had proved himself to be a barbarian by perpetrating such an act, although I would note again that the Athenians did not join Agis’ revolt in 331. The fear of a repeat of the fate of Thebes was still strong even five years after the event.
Alexander did not delay long in Greece after Thebes; he was impatient to begin his conquest of Persia. The great host gathered together in Macedonia and was divided between those who were part of the army of invasion, and those that were left behind with Antipater to garrison Greece and quell any rebellion. In terms of Macedonians, the numbers were close to identical; likely six taxeis of Pezhetairoi and three of hypaspists in each element, 12,000 Macedonian heavy infantry in total. Alexander probably also left behind 1,800 Companion Cavalry, the same number he took with him into Persia. The major part of the army of invasion that was different from the garrison of Greece was the allied contingent. Alexander took thousands of men from Thrace and the Balkans. This was a deliberate policy to reduce the numbers of young men in these regions and therefore to further reduce the likelihood of rebellion. This was a foreshadowing of the later Roman policy regarding their auxiliary legions.
The Sieges of Alexander the Great Page 7
