These raids were intolerable for Israel in part because the country had chosen to create a relatively small standing army and to rely primarily on reserves in the event of war. This meant that Israel had a small force to fight in an emergency, that threats provoking the mobilization of army reserves could virtually paralyze the country, and that Israel would have to withstand an enemy’s initial thrust long enough to complete the mobilization of its forces.
Eisenhower was particularly upset by the timing of the Israeli attack on Egypt, which came just eight days before the presidential election. He believed Israel had purposely chosen the date in the hope of making it more difficult politically for him to oppose its actions because he would not want to upset Jewish voters. If this was indeed Israel’s motivation, Ben-Gurion made a serious miscalculation.
Israel, Great Britain, and France Mobilize
After it decided to go to war against Egypt, Israel mobilized more than 100,000 soldiers. Paratroopers landed in the Sinai, and Israeli forces quickly advanced unopposed toward the Suez Canal before halting in compliance with the demands of England and France. As expected, the Egyptians ignored the Anglo-French ultimatum to withdraw because they, the “victims,” were being asked to retreat from the Sinai to the west bank of the canal, whereas the Israelis were permitted to stay just 10 miles east of the canal.
On October 30, the United States sponsored a Security Council Resolution calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal, but England and France vetoed it. The following day, the two allies launched air operations, bombing Egyptian airfields near Suez.
Given the pretext to continue fighting, the Israeli forces routed the Egyptians. The Israel Defense Forces’ armored corps swept across the desert, capturing virtually the entire Sinai by November 5. That day, British and French paratroops landed near Port Said and amphibious ships dropped commandos onshore. British troops captured Port Said and advanced to within 25 miles of Suez City before the British government abruptly agreed to a cease-fire.
The British about-face was prompted by Soviet threats to use “every kind of modern destructive weapon” to stop the violence and the U.S. decision to make a much-needed $1 billion loan to Great Britain from the International Monetary Fund contingent on a cease-fire. The French tried to convince Britain to fight long enough to finish the job of capturing the canal, but succeeded only in delaying their acceptance of the cease-fire.
Israel Captures Gaza
Although Israel’s allies had failed to accomplish their goals, the Israelis were satisfied at having reached theirs in an operation that took only 100 hours. By the end of the fighting, Israel held the Gaza Strip and had advanced as far as Sharm al-Sheikh along the Red Sea. A total of 231 Israel soldiers died in the fighting. The British and French combined suffered 10 casualties. Egypt’s death toll was approximately 3,000.
Ike Puts His Foot Down—on Israel
Eisenhower was infuriated by the fact that Israel, France, and Great Britain had secretly planned the campaign to evict Egypt from the Suez Canal. Israel’s failure to inform the United States of its intentions, combined with ignoring American entreaties not to go to war, sparked tensions between the countries. The United States subsequently joined the Soviet Union in pressuring Israel to withdraw. This included a threat to discontinue all U.S. assistance, impose UN sanctions, and expel Israel from the United Nations.
* * *
Sage Sayings
Despite the present, temporary interests that Israel has in common with France and Britain, you ought not to forget that the strength of Israel and her future are bound up with the United States.
—Eisenhower’s message to Ben-Gurion, October 31, 1956
* * *
U.S. pressure resulted in an Israeli withdrawal from the areas it conquered without obtaining any concessions from the Egyptians. This sowed the seeds of the 1967 War (see Chapter 14).
Before evacuating Sharm al-Sheikh, the strategic point guarding the Straits of Tiran, Israel elicited a promise that the United States would maintain the freedom of navigation in the waterway—that is, the right of Israeli shipping to be unencumbered. In addition, Washington sponsored a UN resolution creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the territories vacated by the Israeli forces.
The war temporarily ended the activities of the fedayeen. However, they were renewed a few years later by a loose-knit group of terrorist organizations that became known as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the PLO (see Chapter 14).
United States’s Turn to Fight
Eisenhower’s opposition to the Israeli, British, and French campaign against Egypt was not based on any love for Nasser. The U.S. president was afraid their actions would tar the United States with the imperialist brush and harm the country’s relations with other Arab nations. He also feared that if he legitimated the use of force by his allies, the Soviets would take advantage and deploy its army to achieve the Communists’ ends in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Nasser Now a Threat
Still, after the Suez campaign, Eisenhower also recognized the danger Nasser posed to his grand Middle East design. The Egyptian leader had grown increasingly cozy with the Soviets because of their anti-imperialist stand, supply of arms and aid, and support of the Arabs against Israel.
The United States eventually concluded that its interests would be served by the overthrow of Nasser. Eisenhower hoped Saudi Arabia’s King Faud could become the leader of the Arab world. But after one meeting with the monarch, it was clear Faud was not up to challenging Nasser.
* * *
Ask the Sphinx
As it turned out, the Soviets invaded Hungary on November 4—the day before the British and French attacked Egypt. Ironically, while the United States was helpless to punish the Soviets, or force their withdrawal from Hungary, Eisenhower used his leverage to punish his allies and command their obedience in Suez.
* * *
Containing Communism
Lacking a viable alternative to Nasser and fearing the domino theory, the United States declared itself prepared to act unilaterally to provide economic and military aid, and, if necessary, troops to any country in the region that asked for protection from a Communist-backed regime. This policy became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.
As was the case with the Baghdad Pact, Arabs lined up on both sides of the doctrine—with pro-Western governments such as Lebanon and Jordan applauding it and the Nasser-led nationalists in Syria and elsewhere condemning it. Even in the more supportive countries, Nasser’s anti-Western, pan-Arab propaganda helped roil the public and destabilize the regimes.
* * *
Hieroglyphics
The Eisenhower administration’s rationale was that if one Arab country fell to the Communists, the rest might follow, like dominoes, hence, the domino theory. This notion was later used to justify U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
* * *
In early 1957, Jordan’s King Hussein appeared threatened by factions within the army who surrounded the palace with tanks in an effort to depose him. That attempt failed, but other coup attempts continued. Hussein put down this rebellion, but then was confronted by a wave of strikes and riots by Jordanians who supported Nasser’s pan-Arabism, objected to U.S. Middle East policy, and demanded the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador. Blaming the unrest on Communists, Eisenhower dispatched the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet to the region. Hussein put down the revolt, however, without any need of further U.S. action. (The British also responded to Hussein’s request for help by sending a paratroop force.)
A few months later, a similar crisis arose in Syria, prompting the dispatch of the U.S. Navy. Once again, the danger passed, but this time with a paradoxical result. The Syrians decided to form a union with Egypt—the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.)—to prevent the growth of communism in the country.
The Beach Boys Arrive
The United States became even more embroiled in Middle East affairs in 1958. The prevailing view that a Communist was h
iding under every foreign leader’s bed prompted Eisenhower to see Soviet conspiracies behind inter-and intra-Arab disputes.
In Lebanon, the country’s pro-Western Christian president, Camille Chamoun, wanted to amend the constitution to allow himself to stay in office. This created an uproar with Communists and the pan-Arabists backed by the new U.A.R., who were threatening the government. About the same time, the pro-Western government in Iraq was deposed, which led Chamoun to ask for U.S. protection. The Americans believed the Soviets were behind the unrest and saw the attacks on Chamoun as a Communist-inspired plot. But before any action was taken, the crisis subsided.
Just then, however, an Iraqi general, Abdul Karim Kassem, staged a coup against the pro-Western government in Baghdad and murdered the Iraqi prime minister, the king, and the rest of the royal family. Kassem allied himself with Nasser, and Lebanon’s Chamoun, feeling threatened, called on the United States for protection.
Eisenhower responded immediately, and on July 15, 1958, the Marines landed on the beaches of Beirut, where the Leathernecks found no opposition from the sunbathers there. During the three months they were in Lebanon, the Marines faced practically no resistance and helped calm the political atmosphere. An agreement was ultimately reached. Chamoun gave up the idea of extending his term, and a new power-sharing arrangement between the Muslims and Christians was devised.
The Least You Need to Know
Armistice agreements after the 1948 war didn’t lead to peace treaties because Nasser and the Arabs were spoiling for a new fight.
The combination of terrorism and Nasser’s decision to block Israel’s shipping lanes provoked Israel to fight.
Britain and France conspired with Israel to attack the Egyptians and seize the Suez Canal.
Israel surprised Egypt with its attack and captured the entire Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and the coast of the Red Sea.
After Eisenhower threatened to cut off aid and more, Israel gave up all the territory it won for U.S. assurances that its shipping lanes would be kept open.
Part 5
War and Peace
The chapters here span more than two decades—a time when the U.S.–Israel relationship evolved from one of a superpower and its client to a more mutual strategic alliance. This alliance does not prevent the outbreak of a series of wars that change the face of the region.
In 1967, Israel defeats the Arab armies in just six days and ends the war with territory captured from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Since then, negotiations have been based on the idea that Israel would withdraw from much of this territory in exchange for peace. Progress toward ending the conflict finally begins after the 1973 War as Egypt dramatically shifts its orientation away from the Soviet Union to the West and Anwar Sadat decides that he is prepared to make peace with Israel.
Although a breakthrough is achieved with Egypt, Israel’s other neighbors remain unwilling to recognize its right to exist. Palestinian terror attacks escalate from Lebanon, and, instead of widening the circle of peace, a new conflagration breaks out that leaves the PLO on the run again and Israeli forces in the unprecedented position of being bogged down in a war they can’t win.
Chapter 14
Six Days to Victory
In This Chapter
America finally arms Israel
Still courting Nasser
The PLO is born
Six days to rewrite Israel’s maps
Following the 1956 Suez campaign, Israel consistently expressed a desire to negotiate with its neighbors. In an address to the UN General Assembly on October 10, 1960, Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir challenged Arab leaders to meet with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to negotiate a peace settlement. Nasser answered on October 15, saying that Israel was trying to deceive world opinion. He reiterated that his country would never recognize the Jewish state.
Faced with this continued belligerence, the Israelis focused more of their energy on trying to end the longstanding arms embargo that Truman had first imposed in 1947.
HAWKs Fly East
The United States policy for denying American arms to Israel was based on the following arguments:
The country was strong enough to defend itself without U.S. arms; a view buttressed by Israel’s success during the Suez campaign.
Israel had access to arms from other sources, some of which were encouraged by the United States to supply Israel.
The United States did not want to appear to be starting an arms race in the Middle East.
The U.S. sales of arms to Israel would lead the Arabs to ask the Russians and Chinese for arms.
The United States did not want to risk a Middle East confrontation with the Soviet Union.
U.S. military aid to Israel would alienate the Arabs.
It was not until 1962 that Israel received its first major weapons system from the United States—when President Kennedy agreed to sell HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Israel. The state department opposed the sale, but Kennedy felt justified in going ahead after he failed to dissuade Egyptian president Nasser from escalating the already existing arms race, and after he learned that the Soviet Union had supplied Nasser with long-range bombers.
The HAWK sale was significant not only because it was the first major direct arms transfer from the United States to Israel, but also because that system required that Israeli soldiers be given extensive training in the United States and that spare parts be supplied to Israel. These were the first steps on a path that made Israel increasingly dependent on U.S. weapons.
Kennedy’s Peace Initiative
When Kennedy came to power, he believed the time was ripe to launch a new Middle East peace initiative and hoped to achieve a partial agreement on the refugee issue. He appointed Joseph Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment, to work with the parties in the region and try to formulate a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.
Although Israel expressed a willingness to negotiate, Ben-Gurion was concerned about the American plan, reportedly saying the threat from taking in the refugees was greater than that posed by the arms the Soviet Union was sending to Israel’s enemies. He feared Palestinians who returned to Israel would act as a fifth column, undermining the state from within.
The Arab states, meanwhile, adamantly refused to negotiate a separate settlement for the refugees. The issue, they argued, had to be part of a broader agreement that would force Israeli concessions on other matters. Furthermore, the Arab states remained unwilling to resettle any of the refugees in their own countries.
* * *
Sage Sayings
We will act promptly and decisively against any nation in the Middle East which attacks its neighbors. I propose that we make clear to both the Israelis and the Arabs our guarantee that we will act with whatever force and speed is necessary to halt any aggression by any nation.
—U.S. President John F. Kennedy
* * *
We Want to Go Home!
By 1962 more than one million Palestinians were receiving international aid, but more than half were no longer in camps, and a large proportion had at least partially integrated themselves into their host countries. Geographically, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians continued to live in what historically had been Palestine and to be under the rule of their fellow Arabs, but this was not what they wanted. The Palestinians were insistent that they be allowed to return to the homes they had lived in prior to 1948. In many cases, these houses no longer existed or were occupied by Jews.
Joseph Johnson spent roughly two years trying to sell some version of his plan with no success. Early in 1963 he gave up, though the state department later resurrected some of his ideas in the peace plan floated by Secretary of State William Rogers in 1969.
Flirting with Nasser
Although Kennedy was sympathetic to Israel’s needs and concerns, he continued his predecessor’s policy of cultivating the Arabs, and, like Eisenhower, he was particularly interested in wooing Nasser into the Western camp. In 1956, Kennedy had c
alled the Egyptian leader “the chief provocateur against the West,” but after becoming president, he repeated Eisenhower’s tactic of offering Nasser carrots—in this case, aid in the form of food—in hope of winning him over.
Nasser remained resistant to bribes, persuasion, or any other effort made by the United States to curry his favor. For example, Kennedy tried to deal directly with Nasser through a series of correspondences aimed at building mutual trust and a personal relationship. When Nasser leaked the first of these letters, Kennedy began to grow disillusioned.
In early tests of U.S. policy, such as UN resolutions condemning Israel for retaliatory raids, Kennedy had shown the kind of evenhandedness the Arabs demanded by voting against Israel. But this did nothing to change Nasser’s opinion of the United States. As it turned out, the key determinant in U.S.–Egyptian relations was not the conflict with Israel, but inter-Arab rivalries.
One test came with the breakup of the United Arab Republic. The U.A.R. had been formed in 1958, and Egypt had been the dominant partner from the outset. The Syrians were angered by a variety of policies forced upon them by Nasser, especially the socialization of what had been a largely free market economy (and one that allowed the Syrians a higher standard of living than the Egyptians).
The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict Page 24
