Settling the Land
For the first few years after the Six-Day War (see Chapter 14), Israel had fully expected to return most of the West Bank in exchange for peace with Jordan. The ruling Labor Party built settlements in strategically key areas with the aim of minimizing the security threat to Israel after the rest of the territory was returned. When the Likud Party came to power, its ideological commitment to retaining the West Bank and preventing the emergence of a Palestinian state in the territory led to the expansion of settlement building beyond the areas required for the country’s security.
In 1977, approximately 5,000 Jews lived in the West Bank. By the start of 1981, the number had more than tripled. Begin’s government then launched an aggressive building program, offered incentives (such as lower mortgage rates) to people moving to the territories, and even supported the creation of Jewish towns adjacent to large Palestinian population centers.
Reagan Versus Begin
In many ways, the Reagan administration was a throwback to the days of Eisenhower. Reagan saw the world through the prism of the Cold War, and his Middle East policies were largely shaped by the desire to contain the Soviets.
In 1981, in an effort to counter the perceived Soviet threat, Reagan decided to sell the Saudis one of America’s most sophisticated aircraft, the Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS). This violated the tacit understanding that the United States would maintain Israel’s qualitative superiority over the Arabs (to compensate for the Israelis’ much smaller quantity of arms) and wouldn’t sell dangerous weapons to countries that had not made peace with Israel.
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Sage Sayings
It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy.
—Ronald Reagan, implicitly criticizing Israel for opposing the AWACS sale
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In perhaps the most intensive lobbying effort in the history of U.S.–Israel relations, the Israeli lobby in the United States succeeded in winning the support of a majority of Congress to oppose the sale. Reagan adopted a harsh tone in the debate, which was portrayed in the media as a battle of Reagan versus Begin.
Reagan used his bully pulpit to lobby members of the Senate, who ultimately would determine the fate of the Saudi arms sale (after the House overwhelmingly rejected it). He cast the argument in national security terms and used his famous charm, as well as threats of political punishment. Reagan was joined in the debate by the Arab lobby, which weighed in for the first time with a major lobbying campaign of its own, led by companies with substantial interests in Saudi Arabia, such as Boeing (which made the planes), Mobil, and United Technologies.
As is usually the case in foreign policy debates, the appeal to national security was a powerful argument. The sale was approved by a vote of 52 to 48. The following week, Reagan’s picture was on the cover of Time with the caption, “AWACS, He Does It Again.”
The administration did agree to place some limitations on the sale and to compensate Israel with additional arms, but the main impact of the transfers was to escalate the Middle East arms race. Although the Israelis did not fear an attack from Saudi Arabia, they were concerned by the fact that the Arab oil producers had so much wealth they could afford to outspend them on arms many times over and that many of these weapons might be put at the disposal of more radical regimes. As it turned out, the Saudis and other Gulf states did go on an arms-buying binge throughout the 1980s before their economies began to sour, but the AWACS was the last major U.S. arms sale to provoke any significant opposition from the Israeli lobby.
Shortly after the AWACS sale, moreover, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on “strategic cooperation.” This marked the true beginning of the U.S.–Israel military alliance, which would ultimately offset the sale of AWACS.
Iraq’s Reactor Goes Boom!
In the 1950s, Israel bought material for a nuclear power plant from the French that many believed was being used to create nuclear weapons at its secret facility in Dimona. Israeli officials steadfastly refused to confirm the existence of a nuclear arsenal and hid behind veiled statements that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
The Arabs were convinced Israel had the bomb. That provoked several other countries in the Middle East to try to build one of their own. Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations contributed to an Islamic bomb project based in Pakistan, which was seeking its own deterrent to counter India’s nuclear program. Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi made no secret of his desire to obtain a bomb but, for the moment, couldn’t find anyone willing to help him. One Arab leader was successful, however, in finding people to agree to help him develop nuclear weapons. That man was Saddam Hussein.
Supplies Have a French Accent
Ironically, it was the French who played the major role in helping Israel’s enemy pursue its goal. Hungry for business with the oil-rich autocracy, the French were happy to satisfy Saddam’s requests for nuclear technology. Other countries also contributed scientists and various components needed to complete the project.
Israel closely monitored the situation and sent secret agents from the Mossad, its intelligence agency, on a variety of missions aimed at sabotaging the Iraqi program. Although they had a measure of success in slowing Saddam down, they didn’t stop his steady progress toward building a bomb.
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Mysteries of the Desert
In April 1979, saboteurs broke into a warehouse in Toulon, France, and blew up a shipment of components for Iraq’s nuclear plant that were due to be sent the following week. Almost exactly a year later, the physicist in charge of Iraq’s nuclear program was assassinated. Both operations were believed to be the work of the Mossad. The French later sent replacement parts, the scientist was replaced, and the Iraqis inched closer to their goal.
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Kaboom! Goes the Iraqi Reactor
By the middle of 1981, Begin was convinced that Israel could not afford to wait for Saddam to accomplish his objective. Iraq already had aircraft that could carry nuclear weapons, and the suspicion was that his missiles could also handle nuclear warheads. The Israelis decided to attack the Osirak reactor, where the weapons program was based, before it went online and could pose a threat to the region.
At 3:55 P.M. on June 7, Israeli F-15 and F-16 jets took off from the Etzion Air Force Base in the south for the 680-mile trip. The route took them through Saudi and Jordanian air space, so the planes had to fly low to avoid detection. (They also flew in formations that made them look to radar like commercial aircraft.)
At 5:35 P.M., the pilots identified the glistening dome of the reactor. The Iraqis were caught by surprise and helplessly fired anti-aircraft batteries after the Israelis had dropped their bombs. It took only 1 minute and 20 seconds to destroy the reactor.
Immediately after the raid, Israel was universally criticized for its unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation. The United Nations passed a resolution condemning the Israelis, which the United States supported. Even Israel’s staunchest friends in the United States were angered, starting with the president, who ordered the suspension of a delivery of F-16s to Israel. However, a decade later, after the Gulf War, U.S. officials and the rest of the world learned how close Saddam had come to building nuclear weapons and how determined he was to achieve that goal (see Chapter 20).
Like the raid at Entebbe, the destruction of the Iraqi reactor gave Israelis a tremendous psychological boost. Once again, they had proven themselves to be resourceful, powerful, and daring. Begin also benefited politically. Polls had shown the Likud in danger of being trounced in the forthcoming election, but a combination of policies, culminating in the attack on Iraq, completely changed the party’s fortunes. When the election was held on June 30, Begin was reelected and his party gained several seats in the Knesset.
Reagan’s Patience Is Tested
A few months after destroying the Iraqi reactor, Begin took yet another action that infuriated the Reagan ad
ministration. The AWACS fight had ended, and although the Israelis lost that battle, they won a far greater prize with the signing of the strategic cooperation agreement. Less than three weeks after signing the agreement, Begin pushed a bill through the Knesset that applied Israeli law to the Golan Heights.
This decision again generated international reproach, including the requisite UN condemnation. Practically, the law had little impact on the ground and did not foreclose the possibility of a future territorial compromise. Politically, however, it made the Golan a major issue and contradicted Israel’s commitment not to unilaterally change the status of the territory.
The Sphinx Cries
While Begin was angering most of the global community, Sadat was basking in the glow of international adoration. Sadat’s bold peace moves and willingness to stand up to the whole Arab world made him immensely popular outside the Middle East, but the other Arab leaders treated him like a pariah. Within Egypt, he ruled with an iron fist, but he couldn’t quell all the dissatisfaction people felt for what they perceived as his traitorous behavior, particularly after the treaty with Israel failed to pay immediate benefits in terms of improving the country’s worsening economic crisis.
On October 6, 1981—exactly eight years to the day after launching the surprise attack against Israel—Sadat stood on a reviewing stand watching a parade commemorating the 1973 War. A group of Muslim extremists marching past opened fire and killed him. He was replaced by his vice president, Hosni Mubarak, who has served as Egyptian president ever since.
The death of Sadat was a devastating blow to U.S. policymakers who had made him the lynchpin of their Middle East peace efforts. The Israelis were terrified that one of their worst nightmares had come true: they had given away their defensive cushion in the Sinai in exchange for the promises of a dictator who was now gone, and they had no assurance that his successor would feel any obligation to fulfill Sadat’s treaty commitments.
Mubarak was a largely unknown quantity, and few people believed he would be more than a caretaker until a stronger leader emerged. Mubarak defied the early predictions, however, and solidified his power. Though lacking the vision and charisma of Sadat, he proved to be a steady pragmatist who reassured Israel that he would adhere to the peace treaty while also managing to end Egypt’s isolation in the Arab world. American policymakers looked to him for help in prodding other Arab leaders to follow Egypt’s example, but from his first day in office to the present, he has been more of an obstacle to advancing the peace process than a catalyst.
Mubarak has resolutely adhered to the terms of the peace treaty with Israel, but has done practically nothing to advance the relationship. He has consistently refused to meet with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem and has made no real effort to curb the anti-Semitism in the government-controlled press, which is one reason the Egyptian public has remained hostile toward Israel. To his credit, however, he hasn’t allowed any violent attacks against Israel from Egypt.
PLO Tyranny in Lebanon
Although Israel was nervous about the prospects of peace breaking down in the south, the more immediate threat came from the north. Israel long sought a peaceful border with Lebanon, but that country’s status as a haven for terrorist groups made peace impossible. In response to repeated incursions, Israeli forces had crossed into Lebanon in 1978 and overrun PLO terrorist bases in the southern part of that country, pushing the terrorists away from the border. The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) withdrew after two months, allowing UN forces to enter. But UN troops were unable to prevent terrorists from re-infiltrating the region and introducing new, more dangerous arms.
Israelis weren’t the only people to suffer from PLO terror. For Arab residents of south Lebanon, PLO rule was a nightmare. After the PLO was expelled from Jordan by King Hussein in 1970, many of its cadres went to Lebanon. The PLO seized whole areas of the country, where it brutalized the population and usurped Lebanese governmental authority.
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Mysteries of the Desert
In March 1978, PLO terrorists infiltrated Israel. After murdering an American tourist walking near an Israeli beach, they hijacked a civilian bus. When Israeli troops intercepted the bus, the terrorists opened fire. A total of 34 hostages died in the attack.
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The Terrorist Army
Violence escalated with a series of PLO attacks and Israeli reprisals. Finally, the United States helped broker a cease-fire agreement in July 1981. The PLO repeatedly violated the cease-fire over the ensuing 11 months. Israel charged that the PLO staged 270 terrorist actions in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and along the Lebanese and Jordanian borders. Twenty-nine Israelis died and more than 300 were injured in the attacks.
Meanwhile, a force of some 15,000 to 18,000 PLO members was encamped in scores of locations in Lebanon. About a third of them were foreign mercenaries, coming from such countries as Libya, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka, Chad, and Mozambique. Israel later discovered enough light arms and other weapons in Lebanon to equip several thousand soldiers. The PLO arsenal included mortars, Katyusha rockets, and an extensive anti-aircraft network. The PLO also brought hundreds of Russian-made T-34 tanks into the area. Syria, which permitted Lebanon to become a base for the PLO and other terrorist groups, brought surface-to-air missiles into that country, creating yet another danger for Israel.
Israeli strikes and commando raids were unable to stem the growth of the PLO army. The situation in Galilee became intolerable as the frequency of attacks forced thousands of residents to flee their homes or to spend large amounts of time in bomb shelters. Israel was not prepared to wait for more deadly attacks to be launched against its civilian population before acting against the terrorists.
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Sage Sayings
No sovereign state can tolerate indefinitely the buildup along its borders of a military force dedicated to its destruction and implementing its objectives by periodic shellings and raids.
—Henry Kissinger
* * *
The final provocation occurred in June 1982, when a Palestinian terrorist group led by Abu Nidal attempted to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov. The IDF subsequently attacked Lebanon on June 4–5, 1982. The PLO responded with a massive artillery and mortar attack on the Israeli population of Galilee. On June 6, the IDF moved 80,000 troops into Lebanon to drive out the terrorists in “Operation Peace for Galilee.”
Initially, the United States supported the limited aims of the invasion. “On Lebanon, it is clear that we and Israel both seek an end to the violence there, and a sovereign, independent Lebanon,” President Reagan said June 21, 1982. “We agree that Israel must not be subjected to violence from the north.”
The Syrians were not prepared to stand by and watch the Israelis march through Lebanon, especially after it became evident that the IDF and its Christian allies were in a position to cut off the Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley from those in Beirut. Syrian President Assad sent reinforcements into Lebanon, bringing his troop strength to 40,000.
Sharon Unleashed
After a clash between Syrian and Israeli forces on June 7 resulted in heavy losses for the IDF, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon convinced Begin that it would be necessary to take out Syrian anti-aircraft batteries in the Bekaa that were limiting Israeli Air Force operations.
Over the course of two days, Israeli bombers knocked out all the Syrian batteries. Syrian MiGs tried to intercept, but the Israelis shot down 22 of them. The following day, another 24 Syrian planes were downed. After several days of dogfights, the Syrians had lost almost 100 planes, whereas the Israeli planes all returned safely. The disaster in the Bekaa compelled Assad to keep his troops out of any future fighting.
The initial success of the Israeli operation led Israeli officials to broaden their objective—to expel the PLO from Lebanon and induce the country’s leaders to sign a peace treaty. Toward that end, the Israeli forces advanced on Beirut, an act that didn’t sit well with the United State
s and the rest of the international community. Begin said he was prepared to accept a cease-fire only if the PLO and Syrian troops departed Beirut. PLO leader Yasser Arafat, however, was determined to make his last stand in the Lebanese capital, and he counted on internal and external pressure on Begin to prevent the Israelis from besieging the city.
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Mysteries of the Desert
The air war over Lebanon was of particular interest to the U.S. Pentagon because it was the first combat between a new generation of front line Soviet and American fighter planes and also the first test of U.S. technology against some of the Soviets’ most sophisticated anti-aircraft batteries. The Israelis had made their own custom improvements to the U.S. equipment, and their pilots had displayed exceptional skill, but U.S. officials were still pleased by the outcome and its possible implications, should there be a U.S.–U.S.S.R. confrontation.
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The PLO’s Reluctant Retreat
By mid-June, Israeli troops had surrounded the 6,000–9,000 terrorists who had taken up positions amid the civilian population of West Beirut. To prevent civilian casualties, Israel agreed to a cease-fire to enable American Ambassador Philip Habib to mediate a peaceful PLO withdrawal from Lebanon.
The PLO violated the cease-fire numerous times with the purpose of inflicting casualties on Israel and provoking Israeli retaliation. For more than a month, the PLO tried to extract a political victory from its military defeat. Arafat declared his willingness “in principle” to leave Beirut, and then refused to go to any other country. He also tried to push the United States to recognize the PLO. Throughout the siege, the PLO hid behind innocent civilians, accurately calculating that if Israel were to attack, its actions would be universally condemned.
The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict Page 31
