Despite the bitter fight over AWACS, the suspension of arms sales, and the strains with Begin, Ronald Reagan is considered the most pro-Israel U.S. president in history. This is because he had a sincere emotional attachment to Israel, built the strategic alliance, helped save Ethiopia’s Jews, and strengthened the overall ties between the two countries.
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Many Left Behind
At the end of Operation Sheba, Israeli officials believed that all the Ethiopian Jews had been evacuated from the refugee camps in Sudan. In fact, a handful were left in the camps, and it was later learned that thousands remained in Ethiopia. Most of the Jews eventually made their way to Israel, but controversy surrounded several thousand Ethiopians known as Falash Mura, who claimed Jewish origins, but were considered by the Israeli authorities to be Christians. The Israeli government ultimately agreed to bring the Falash Mura to Israel, and that process is proceeding slowly today.
The Palestinians Rise Up
The influx of Jews from Ethiopia and elsewhere only inflamed the Palestinians, who continued to express their nearly century-old fears of being dispossessed.
On December 6, 1987, an Israeli was stabbed to death while shopping in Gaza. One day later, four residents of the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza were killed in a traffic accident. Rumors that the four had been killed by Israelis as a deliberate act of revenge began to spread among the Palestinians. Mass rioting broke out in Jabalya on the morning of December 9, in which a 17-year-old youth was killed by an Israeli soldier after throwing a Molotov cocktail at an army patrol. This soon sparked a wave of unrest that engulfed the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem. The violence came to be known as the intifada, which literally means “shaking off” and metaphorically “uprising” in Arabic.
Incensed by Rumors and the PLO
The intifada was violent from the start. During the first four years of the uprising, more than 3,600 Molotov cocktail attacks, 100 hand-grenade attacks, and 600 assaults with guns or explosives were reported by the Israel Defense Forces. The violence was directed at soldiers and civilians alike. During this period, 16 Israeli civilians and 11 soldiers were killed by Palestinians in the territories; more than 1,400 Israeli civilians and 1,700 Israeli soldiers were injured.
The PLO played a lead role in orchestrating the insurrection. The PLO-dominated Unified Leadership of the Intifada (UNLI), for example, frequently issued leaflets dictating which days violence was to be escalated and who was to be its target. The PLO’s leadership of the uprising was challenged by the fundamentalist Islamic organization Hamas, a violently anti-Semitic group that rejects any peace negotiations with Israel.
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Hieroglyphics
Hamas is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, a fundamentalist group that rejects all discussion of peace with Israel, including the current Israeli-PLO negotiations. It is responsible for many terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and Palestinian “collaborators” with Israel. Hamas states in its covenant that “the Day of Judgment will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees.” Recent evidence has indicated that Hamas carries out substantial fundraising and organizational work in the United States.
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Brother Against Brother
Jews were not the only victims of the violence. In fact, as the intifada waned around the time of the Gulf War in 1991, the number of Arabs killed for political and other reasons in the intrafada (the term coined to describe the murder of Palestinians by their fellow Palestinians during the intifada) by Palestinian death squads exceeded the number killed in clashes with Israeli troops. Yasser Arafat defended the killing of Arabs deemed to be “collaborating with Israel.” More than 1,200 Arabs were killed during the intifada, more than 500 of those were murdered by their fellow Palestinians.
Eventually, the reign of terror became so serious that some Palestinians expressed public concern about the disorder. The PLO began to call for an end to the violence, but murders by its members and rivals continued.
America Recognizes the PLO
The escalating violence in the West Bank stimulated another flurry of U.S. diplomatic activity. In 1988, after years of prodding, PLO leader Yasser Arafat announced that he was renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel, leading Secretary of State George Shultz to declare that the PLO had met all U.S. conditions to begin a dialog with the United States. Up to this point, the United States had gone along with Israeli opposition to any formal contacts between American and PLO officials. (Many informal discussions had taken place.)
Israel and its supporters were unhappy with Shultz’s decision, but could do little after Arafat had said what were viewed as the magic words to satisfy U.S. conditions. Because Reagan was going to leave office soon anyway, the Israeli lobby was helpless to exact any political punishment at the ballot box because Reagan didn’t need their votes. Moreover, Shultz got his successor off the hook by bequeathing him an existing relationship with the PLO.
Shamir’s Four Points
The 1988 U.S. election of George Bush was accompanied by the usual ferment in the state department to initiate a new effort to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, the intifada was provoking increased pressure on the government of Begin’s successor, Yitzhak Shamir, to offer a peace initiative. He did so in April 1989. His four-point plan called for the reaffirmation of the Camp David Accords, negotiations and cooperation with the Arab countries, a multinational effort to solve the Arab refugee problem, and free democratic elections.
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Tut Tut!
The PLO squandered the opportunity Shultz offered by continuing terrorist attacks. In May 1990, the PLO attacked the beaches near Tel Aviv, aiming to raid hotels and the U.S. Embassy. This was the final straw for the Bush administration, which suspended its dialog with the PLO and refocused its attention on efforts to persuade Palestinians in the territories to talk directly with the Israelis rather than through the PLO.
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Israel specified that it reserved responsibility for “security, foreign affairs, and all matters concerning Israeli citizens” who live in the territories.
Although he was widely criticized for opposing any peace settlement, Shamir’s plan actually represented the genesis of the peace process that is continuing today. Progress on this plan stalled, however, when it became clear that no agreement could be reached on the modalities of elections and that Shamir’s policy of building more settlements was provoking opposition from the Arabs and the Bush administration. Still, the principle of an interim period during which elected Palestinians would run most of their affairs remained at the heart of both the Israeli and American positions.
The Bush administration continued to push for movement on the Palestinian-Israeli front, but officials soon became distracted by a new conflict that had nothing to do with what the Arabs consistently maintained was the crux of all the problems in the Middle East. This time, the threat to regional stability and U.S. interests was emanating from Baghdad.
The Least You Need to Know
Reagan offers a compromise plan that satisfies neither Israel nor the Arabs.
U.S. forces are drawn into the Lebanese quagmire to keep the peace but instead become sitting ducks.
The Palestinians begin what will be a four-year uprising, the intifada, against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The United States finally recognizes the PLO, setting the stage for eventual negotiations between Israel and the terrorist organization.
Chapter 20
Saddam Crosses the Line
In This Chapter
Kuwait is overrun
Bush leads a coalition to war
Israelis don gas masks
Saddam is bowed but unbroken
The inconclusive way that the Iran-Iraq War ended gave the United States and other Western and Middle Eastern nations a false sense that the dictators in those tw
o countries had been humbled. The general assumption was that both countries were psychologically exhausted and that their military resources were so depleted it would take years to rebuild the capability to threaten the region.
The conventional wisdom was wrong, however, because both Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein remained committed to expanding their influence and immediately embarked on crash programs to restore their military might.
Bush Plays Along
The United States believed for some time that its interests in the Middle East could best be served by cultivating Iraq because Iraq possessed the largest and most powerful Arab military force, it had substantial oil reserves, and it served as a counterbalance to Iran in the region. To carry out this policy, the Reagan administration engaged in a covert program to aid Iraq’s war effort against Iran. Starting in 1984, for example, Reagan authorized the CIA to share intelligence with Baghdad.
Reagan’s successor, George Bush, encouraged friendly Arab regimes—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait—to transfer U.S.–supplied arms to Iraq. In October 1989, Bush signed a National Security Directive that “the President wished to improve relations with Iraq.”
Believing the Unbelievable
Saddam Hussein believed that his campaign against Iran helped protect the Gulf states from Khomeini. Well, maybe he didn’t really believe it, but that’s one way he justified demanding $30 billion from the Gulf Cooperation Council in February 1990 to cover what he said was their share of the war’s costs. When the council refused to pay, Saddam became more belligerent.
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Ask the Sphinx
Khomeini died in June 1989. He was immediately succeeded as Iran’s supreme leader by Iranian president Hojatolislam Said Ali Khamenei (Khomeini never had an official political post), who, in turn, was replaced a few weeks later by Khomeini’s longtime colleague Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Although less extreme than Khomeini, Rafsanjani maintained the foreign policy course set by him, including hostility toward the United States.
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In May, Saddam claimed that oil overproduction by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates amounted to “economic warfare” against Iraq. Later he accused Kuwait of stealing oil from an oil field along their shared border.
The United States was concerned about the developments in the Gulf but was led to believe that Saddam’s threats were all bluster. In July 1990, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, reported that Hussein would not use force against Kuwait. Later, the Egyptian president gave Bush the same assurance.
Despite these promises, Iraq massed nearly 30,000 elite troops on Kuwait’s border in an effort to coerce the emirate to reduce oil production. Kuwait had provided $10 billion in “loans” to Iraq during its war with Iran, but Saddam was now accusing that country of participating in an “imperialist-Zionist plan” to reduce oil prices.
Oil Slips Through Saddam’s Fingers
On August 2, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The emir fled, and his army was quickly overpowered. It took only 24 hours for Iraq to take control of the small sheikdom.
In these first days of the invasion, Saddam made a critical decision that might have changed history. His troops were also massed along the Saudi border—in position to quickly capture the largely undefended Saudi oil fields. Because Iraq owns 10 percent of the world’s oil reserves and had captured the 10 percent controlled by Kuwait, had Saddam grabbed the 25 percent in Saudi territory, he would have been in a position to control nearly half the world’s oil.
At the time, the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia was too small and unprepared to have prevented Iraq from seizing the oil fields. The Saudis had consistently refused to allow the United States to base a large force in the country because of the fear this would give the appearance of weakness, dependence on the Americans, and reliance on Western infidels—all of which the royal Saudi family feared might provoke a rebellion.
The United States Gets Ready to Defend the Saudis
Instead of launching an attack, however, Saddam kept his troops on the Iraqi side of the border. This threat was sufficient to galvanize the United States and to force the Saudis to overcome their reluctance to allow American troops onto their soil. The Saudis formally requested U.S. assistance on August 7, and the cavalry began to arrive two days later.
Despite what Bush would say at the time or afterward, it was the threat to the Saudis that motivated the United States to go to war in the Gulf. The stated objective was to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, but the United States had no strategic or moral reason to restore the emir of Kuwait, whose regime Senator Pat Moynihan called one of the most anti-Semitic and anti-democratic on earth.
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Ask the Sphinx
In August 1990, in an effort to win Iranian support for its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq released all its Iranian prisoners of war and settled other issues unresolved since the Iran-Iraq war. Diplomatic relations were restored the following month. During the Gulf War, more than 120 Iraqi fighter planes flew to Iranian bases for sanctuary, but the Iranians gave no indication that they would return them.
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A Line in the Sand
On August 6, the United Nations imposed a trade embargo on Iraq. Three days later, it condemned Iraq’s aggression and called for an immediate withdrawal. On August 12, a naval blockade was imposed by the United States to stop all shipments of Iraqi oil. Because Iraq is almost entirely landlocked, it’s very susceptible to quarantine. Roughly 60 percent of the country’s imports arrived by sea, and almost 90 percent of those came via the Red Sea. After the embargo was imposed, Iraq relied heavily on goods smuggled in from Jordan.
Still, Saddam paid little attention to the United Nations or threats from the United States. He announced that he was annexing Kuwait and making it the country’s nineteenth province.
The United States responded by launching Operation Desert Shield under the command of General Norman Schwarzkopf. The operation’s two objectives were…
To get U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia to ensure that they could defend the kingdom in the event that Iraqi forces pushed beyond Kuwait.
To establish a sufficient force to deter Iraq from attacking the Saudis.
By October, the United States had mobilized sufficient force in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to shift the emphasis from a defensive to an offensive posture.
Buildup to War
During the five-month troop buildup of Desert Shield, before it escalated into Desert Storm, U.S. forces had the opportunity to train, test their equipment, and adapt to the harsh desert environment.
Besides the weather, troops had to learn to respect Saudi sensitivities. Soldiers were told to hide crosses and Stars of David, refrain from overt displays of religion, and they were prohibited from drinking alcohol. The Pentagon also gave them an extensive list of subjects they were not permitted to discuss, including just about anything related to Israel.
Among those who had to adapt to these conditions were more than 35,000 women—the largest number of servicewomen ever to be deployed in a U.S. war. (During the fighting, 15 women were killed—5 by enemy fire—and 2 were taken prisoner. As a result of the performance of women in the Gulf War, Congress repealed a law prohibiting women aviators from flying combat missions.)
The United States also initiated the largest mobilization of reserve forces since the Korean War and the first major mobilization since the Berlin Crisis of 1961–62. Ultimately, the Army activated more than 145,000 National Guard and reserve personnel. Smaller numbers were called up by the Navy, Marines, and Air Force.
Developing a Coalition
Despite the military might of the United States, Bush was unwilling to fight Iraq alone. He was convinced that the United Nations had made it clear that driving Iraq from Kuwait was an international position, not just an American one, and he wanted to have the broadest support possible. By building a coalition of forces, he could mute opposition to war in the United States, and in the Middle East, where Arab leaders w
ere hypersensitive to Western interference in their affairs.
First, however, he had to overcome Arab insistence that they settle the issue themselves. Led by Egypt, various Arab countries attempted to cajole Saddam into withdrawing, but without success. The most Saddam would do was offer to withdraw after being given control of parts of Kuwait—something unacceptable to the United States. This then gave the Arab states the domestic cover they needed to join the Western-led coalition.
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Tut Tut!
Egypt’s willingness to send troops to fight beside the Americans sent an important signal to other Arabs that it was alright to join the coalition. Egyptians see themselves as the rightful leaders of the Arab world and resented Iraq’s pretensions to claim the mantle. They were also furious that Saddam had earlier misled Egyptian president Mubarak, who had then reassured the United States that Iraq would not attack Kuwait.
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Another key supporter was the Soviet Union. The Soviets had been longtime allies of Saddam and persuaded Bush to let them try to resolve the crisis. They failed, too. Although they did not join the coalition that fought the war, the Soviets did not oppose the UN resolutions concerning the conflict.
Jordan Stands Alone
The coalition consisted of Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. One country that did not join the coalition was Jordan. King Hussein was regarded as one of America’s closest allies, but his country was economically dependent on Iraq, and Saddam was not only his closest ally, but an intimidating presence on his border. Throughout 1990, cooperation between the two countries grew.
The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict Page 33
