Ask the Sphinx
A key moment in the summit occurred when Arafat said that there had never been a Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. In doing so, Ambassador Dennis Ross said, he “denied the core of the Jewish faith.” This stunning remark indicated to the Americans and Israelis that Arafat was incapable of the psychological leap necessary—the one Anwar Sadat had made—to achieve peace with Israel.
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Clinton hoped to re-create the magic of Jimmy Carter’s successful summit that helped bring about peace between Israel and Egypt. In that case, however, Carter had two willing partners. Anwar Sadat had already demonstrated to Israel that he was prepared to make peace, and, when he accepted the compromises offered at Camp David, Begin agreed to give up the Sinai Peninsula. Clinton encountered a different situation. Arafat had done little in the seven years since Oslo to convince the Israelis he had given up his dream of destroying Israel. Nevertheless, Barak came prepared to offer the Palestinians independence and proposed a series of formulations to resolve the major issues. Arafat not only rejected all the American and Israeli ideas, he refused to offer any of his own. As a result, President Clinton’s press conference following the summit laid most of the blame for the summit’s failure on Arafat.
Sharon Visits the Temple Mount
On September 28, 2000, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon decided to visit the Temple Mount. Given the antipathy of Palestinians and Arabs in general toward the man they held responsible for the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla (see Chapter 19), the plan to visit the holy Muslim place was sure to be controversial. On the other hand, Jews also consider the area holy and were free to visit the area. Still, Sharon was only permitted to go after Israel’s interior minister had received assurances from the Palestinian Authority’s security chief that no problems would arise so long as Sharon did not enter the mosques.
Sharon did not attempt to enter any mosques, and his 34-minute visit to the Temple Mount was conducted during normal hours when the area is open to tourists. Sharon’s visit was later blamed by the Palestinians as the cause for an outbreak of Palestinian violence that was dubbed the “al-Aqsa intifada.” In fact, on the day of Sharon’s visit, no major incidents occurred. Later, the Palestinian Authority’s communication minister, Imad Falujii, admitted that the violence had been planned in July after the failure of the Camp David Summit. Ambassador Dennis Ross, the administration’s chief peace negotiator, said that Arafat had ordered the uprising because he knew that Clinton planned to offer new ideas for ending the conflict.
Blood and Tears
Violent confrontations soon began to take place throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Disproportionate numbers of Palestinians were killed as large numbers of rioters often confronted small contingents of Israeli soldiers who, fearing their lives were in danger, would sometimes use lethal force to repel the mobs, which often had people armed with rocks mixed with Palestinian policemen armed with guns. Palestinian terrorists frequently targeted Israeli civilians, and Palestinian bystanders were sometimes caught in the cross fire between soldiers and gunmen.
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Tut Tut!
The most dramatic incident of a bystander being killed was captured by television cameras during a shootout between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian gunmen in the Gaza Strip. Twelve-year-old Mohammed Aldura and his father took cover in the middle of the gun battle. The world watched with horror as Mohammed’s father Jamal tried to shield him. The boy was shot and killed and the father wounded. Israel was blamed for the boy’s death, but an independent investigation by German ARD Television said the footage of Aldura’s death was censored by the Palestinians to look as if he had been killed by the Israelis when, in fact, his death was caused by Palestinian gunfire.
* * *
The United States stepped in to negotiate a cease-fire in October 2000, but it didn’t hold and the violence continued to rage throughout the territories. On October 12, two Israeli soldiers were captured by the Palestinians in Ramallah and taken to the police station. There a mob attacked the station and lynched the two Israelis.
In an attempt to curb the escalating violence, a Middle East Peace Summit was held in mid-October at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, and was attended by Clinton and representatives of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, the United Nations, and the European Union. The principal outcome of the meeting was to create a fact-finding committee to investigate the causes of the violence and seek ways to prevent its recurrence. The committee was headed by former U.S. senator George Mitchell.
Back to Washington
The political situation became even more complicated when Israeli prime minister Barak decided to resign on December 10 to better position himself to run for reelection. As a consequence of this decision Barak would face Ariel Sharon in a one-on-one election only for prime minister with the incumbent parliament remaining in place.
Barak hoped he could ensure his own victory by demonstrating to the Israeli people that he could reach a deal with the Palestinians. This was accompanied by the desire of President Clinton to achieve a great foreign policy coup before leaving office. He desperately hoped to be the one to bring about Middle East peace, and have this achievement be his lasting legacy. Although the Palestinians were suffering and the death toll was climbing each day from clashes with Israeli soldiers, Arafat was the one participant who did not appear to feel any urgency about reaching an agreement—in part because his position as head of the Palestinian Authority was secure.
On December 19, the three leaders met at the White House, and Clinton offered a plan that Barak endorsed. The essential points were…
An Israeli withdrawal from 95 to 97 percent of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian areas would be contiguous (addressing a complaint voiced at Camp David that they’d been offered only “cantons”) with a land link between Gaza and the West Bank.
The dismantling of 63 Israeli settlements.
In exchange for the 3 to 5 percent annexation of the West Bank, Israel would increase the size of the Gaza territory by roughly a third.
Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capital of the new state.
Palestinian refugees would have the right of return to the Palestinian state and would receive reparations from a $30 billion international fund created to compensate them.
The Palestinians would maintain control over their holy places and would be given desalinization plants to ensure them adequate water.
Arafat was asked to acknowledge Israeli sovereignty over the parts of the Western Wall religiously significant to Jews (that is, not the entire Temple Mount), and to agree to three early warning stations in the Jordan Valley, which Israel would withdraw from after six years.
The Palestinian negotiators wanted to accept the deal, but Arafat rejected it. He could not countenance Israeli control over Jewish holy places, nor would he agree to the security arrangements; he wouldn’t even allow the Israelis to fly through Palestinian airspace. He rejected the refugee formula, too.
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Ask the Sphinx
The hell I am. I’m a colossal failure, and you made me one.
—President Clinton, three days before his term ended, in response to being told by Arafat that he was “a great man”
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The reason for Arafat’s rejection of the settlement, according to Ambassador Ross, was the critical clause in the agreement specifying that the agreement meant the end of the conflict. Arafat, whose life has been governed by that conflict, simply could not end it.
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Sage Sayings
For Israelis, the proof of Arafat’s true intentions could be found on the Palestinian Authority website, which showed a map that did not have a Palestinian state beside Israel, but one that replaced Israel. Similar maps appear in Palestinian textbooks for school children and in the logos of PLO groups such as Arafat’s Fatah. Arafat even wore his kaffiyeh in the shape of �
��Palestine.”
* * *
Clinton’s term in office soon ended, and with Barak’s premiership waning, he agreed to a meeting with the Palestinians in Taba, Egypt. That meeting ended with an optimistic joint communiqué being issued, but with no actual settlement or agreements.
Sharon the Phoenix
When the Israeli public learned what Barak had offered to the Palestinians, they were shocked and many were angry. The concessions he had made were unprecedented and considered dangerous by many. Although a majority of Israelis were prepared to withdraw from most of the territories and to accept a Palestinian state, Barak had come too close to returning to the indefensible pre-1967 border. His offer to allow the Palestinians to create a capital in Jerusalem and to have greater say over the Temple Mount was well beyond any compromises previously contemplated.
When Arafat rejected an offer that Israelis believed gave him virtually everything he said he wanted, they were outraged. Even the most dovish Israelis believed Arafat had missed a golden opportunity and demonstrated to them, at least, that no conceivable concessions could satisfy the Palestinians.
Israel Turns Right Again
The disenchantment with Barak was played out in the election of February 2001, in which Sharon criticized the concessions and, especially, the idea of dividing Jerusalem, and argued that he was the one who could bring Israel peace and security. Israeli voters agreed, electing him by a landslide over Barak.
The Palestinians were horrified by the Israeli election outcome, finding themselves now having to deal with their nemesis. On the other hand, some Palestinians believed that they would benefit from the election of someone widely viewed as a hard-liner because they expected Sharon to attract criticism as an obstacle to peace and to take draconian measures against the Palestinians that would bring opprobrium down on Israel.
The Palestinians were also hopeful that the new American administration would take a tougher approach with Israel. Clinton had been widely viewed as Israel’s best friend ever in the White House, and the expectation was that George W. Bush would adopt a more critical policy in line with that of his father, who had been considered among the least friendly presidents concerning Israel.
Mitchell Reports
Violence continued as anticipation grew over the expected release of the report of the Mitchell Commission. In late May 2001, the report was finally issued. The basic conclusion was that, contrary to Palestinian claims, the Sharon visit had not caused the violence. The committee also discounted Israeli claims that the intifada had been premeditated.
The main focus of the Mitchell Plan was on the future, and the recommendation was that the parties needed to end the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations. The confidence-building measures included a number of steps, such as the freezing of all settlement activity by Israel and the prevention of terrorist attacks by the Palestinians.
The Palestinians insisted on focusing only on the recommendation that Israel freeze settlements and ignored all those that required action on their part. The Bush administration made clear that they also hoped to see Israel curb settlements, but went along with the Israeli insistence that none of the confidence-building measures could be pursued until the violence ceased—a prerequisite that Mitchell had also set. For the next year, the administration would continue to cling to the position that the Mitchell Report provided a road map for a settlement, but the violence never abated to the point at which it could be implemented.
Human Bombs
Palestinian terrorists seemed determined to prove that Sharon could not stop them. Almost immediately after he took office, a series of horrific suicide bombings tested Sharon’s promise to provide security to his people. Sharon sent the army into the territories for counterstrikes, but they seemed to have little effect.
As the death toll continued to rise on both sides, President Bush sent CIA director George Tenet to the region to negotiate a cease-fire. He succeeded in June 2001, but the Palestinians almost immediately renewed their attacks.
* * *
Mysteries of the Desert
When the United States was attacked on September 11, Americans suddenly had a greater appreciation of what Israelis were facing on a daily basis. The attack also focused U.S. government attention on the global threat of terrorism to an unprecedented degree.
* * *
International pressure began to build on Sharon to resume negotiations. The argument was constantly made that the Palestinians needed some hope of achieving their political goals so they would not turn to violence, but Sharon maintained that the violence had to stop first and negotiating “under fire” would send the message that Israel could be forced by terror to make concessions. Still, he said he would go back to the negotiating table after seven days of quiet. This was widely viewed as demanding the impossible from the Palestinians, though Israelis pointed out that Arafat had promised in the Oslo agreements to deliver more than seven years of peace.
Sharon would not budge, and the violence did not end. Instead, it grew worse as more and more Palestinians were prepared to strap explosives to their bodies and blow themselves up, along with Israeli men, women, and children. On June 1, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber blew up a disco in Tel Aviv, killing 21 and injuring 120. Then, on August 9, a suicide bomber walked into a Sbarro pizzeria in downtown Jerusalem and murdered 15 people and injured 130.
It’s a Hit
The Palestinians had threatened Israeli officials, but had never assassinated one in Israel. That red line was crossed in September 2001, when PFLP gunmen murdered the Israeli tourism minister, Rehavam Ze’evi. Israel demanded that Arafat arrest and extradite the killers, but he refused. Israel responded by sending troops into six Palestinian cities in the West Bank with the aim of rooting out the terrorists, but U.S. pressure quickly forced a withdrawal.
You Go First
The two sides were locked in a struggle in which the Israelis insisted that no negotiations were possible without an end to violence and the Palestinians were equally insistent that the violence would not end until there were negotiations. President Bush hoped to break the logjam by making a speech at the United Nations on November 10, 2001, publicly expressing American support for the creation of a Palestinian state. The expectation was that the Palestinians would see this as a signal that they would get support in their ultimate demand for statehood if they would stop the violence and return to the bargaining table. To further assist progress toward that goal, Bush dispatched an envoy, Anthony Zinni, to work with the parties to end the violence so that talks could resume.
Zinni’s mission quickly proved a failure. A series of horrific terror attacks were carried out over the next several weeks—including two gunmen opening fire on a bus stop, which killed two and injured dozens more; suicide bombings in a pedestrian mall in Jerusalem and two others in Haifa; and a bomb and gunfire attack on a bus. After more than 30 Israelis died and several hundred were wounded, Israeli prime minister Sharon declared Arafat “irrelevant” and, on December 22, sent troops into his headquarters in Ramallah to confine him to his office. Sharon said that Arafat would remain isolated until Minister Ze’evi’s killers were arrested and extradited to Israel. Arafat refused and appealed to the international community to pressure Israel to end its siege.
Arafat’s Revolving Door
Under pressure from the United States, Arafat periodically took steps against the violence, condemning attacks and arresting low-level terrorists. The problem was that his condemnations were typically in English and couched in equivocations that accused Israel of terrorism, too. In Arabic, he would call for a jihad (and he meant “holy war”) against Israel and a million martyrs to liberate Jerusalem. The men he arrested were also released after a few weeks or months, and many subsequently committed acts of terror. Israel’s view was that Arafat either could stop the violence and chose not to, or had no control over militant Palestinians. In either case, they said it made no sense to negotiate with him since the result
was the same—violence.
Sharon’s view that Arafat could control the terror and actually directed it was given greater credence in early January 2002, when Israeli forces stopped a ship, the Karine-A, bound for the Palestinian Authority carrying 50 tons of weapons from Iran that were paid for by one of Arafat’s top aides. U.S. intelligence confirmed Israel’s information that Arafat was behind the smuggling operation, so when Arafat told Bush he wasn’t involved, the president knew he was being lied to and subsequently would not trust Arafat.
Even after the arms shipment, and a continuation of the terror attacks, the United States remained committed to trying to bring about a cease-fire. Zinni returned to the region, and the administration turned up the pressure on Sharon to give up his demand for seven days of quiet before negotiations. The U.S. argument was that the Palestinians needed to see that a process was in place that would give them hope for achieving their political objectives. Reluctantly, Sharon relented and said that he would resume negotiations with the Palestinians.
Less than two weeks later, however, a Palestinian suicide bomber from Hamas walked into a hotel in the coastal town of Netanya during the ritual meal known as a Seder, which is held during the Passover holiday. The attack left 28 people dead and more than 130 injured. The attack enraged the entire nation. It was not just the terrible casualty toll, but the fact that this crime had been perpetrated on a day of religious significance to the Jewish people. Even the most moderate Israelis, who had been urging an end to the siege on Arafat and the adoption of a more flexible negotiating position, called for a strong military response.
Israel’s Defensive Shield
Israeli tanks rolled into the major cities of the West Bank on March 28, surrounding them and imposing curfews in what was called “Operation Defensive Shield.” Sharon also went beyond his earlier castigation of Arafat as irrelevant and labeled him an enemy of Israel and surrounded his compound with tanks.
The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict Page 48
