Throughout my tenure as DCI, under two administrations, I had a weekly private meeting with the national security advisor. Looking back on the notes from those sessions now, I find that in almost every meeting terrorism was high on the agenda but never more so than in the spring and summer of 2001.
For my regularly scheduled meeting with Condi Rice on May 30, I brought along John McLaughlin, Cofer Black, and one of Cofer’s top assistants, Rich B. (Rich can’t be further identified here.) Joining Condi were Dick Clarke and Mary McCarthy.
Rich ran through the mounting warning signs of a coming attack. They were truly frightening. Among other things, we told Condi that a notorious al-Qa’ida operative named Abu Zubaydah was working on attack plans.
Some intelligence suggested that those plans were ready to be executed; others suggested they would not be ready for six months. The primary target appeared to be in Israel, but other U.S. assets around the world were at risk.
Condi asked us about taking the offensive against al-Qa’ida. Cofer told her about our efforts to work with other intelligence services, penetrate terrorist organizations, and the like.
“How bad do you think it is?” Condi asked. Cofer told her that during the millennium the terrorist threat situation was an “eight on a ten scale.” Right now, he said, we were about at a “seven.” Clarke told her that adequate warning notices had been issued to appropriate U.S. entities.
The FAA issued warning notices, embassy security was tightened around the world, military installations in the Middle East went on higher alert levels. We were asked to brief other Cabinet members. We returned to CIA headquarters with the hope that our message had been received.
Information about Zubaydah kept popping up in various bits of intelligence. In June 2001 we were informed by the British that Abu Zubaydah was planning suicide car bomb attacks against U.S. military targets in Saudi Arabia by the end of the month. We learned via the FBI’s debriefing of the would-be millennial bomber Ahmad Ressam, for example, that Abu Zubaydah had requested high-quality Canadian passports for smuggling operatives into the United States. As part of his bargaining for a reduced sentence, Ressam told the FBI that Zubaydah was considering attacks in several U.S. cities. Ressam provided no details on specific venues, but he did say that Zubaydah was in it for the long haul—that he was willing to spend a year or more in preparation if that would lead to a successful attack.
(When we captured Zubaydah in Pakistan in March 2002, some media accounts suggested that he was not such an important player. Those accounts are dead wrong. Worse yet, it has been suggested that the Bush administration exaggerated his importance in their comments to the media—again dead wrong. I believe to this day that Abu Zubaydah was an important player in al-Qa’ida operations.)
Threat information continued to pour in, almost from every nook and cranny of the planet. Some examples of what my top people and I were confronted with on a daily basis throughout the months leading up to 9/11:
Yemeni terrorists were planning an attack in Jordan.
A group of Pakistanis was planning to bomb the American community in Jeddah, possibly the U.S. or British schools there.
The FARC, a terrorist group in Colombia, reportedly was planning to car-bomb several sites in Bogotá, including the U.S. embassy and a mall frequented by embassy employees.
Hizbollah was readying large-scale terrorist operations in Southeast Asia.
An extremist group was planning an attack against the U.S. embassy in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen.
Four Saudi nationals were heading from the United Arab Emirates to Kuwait to attack U.S. interests.
Three suspects arrested in Malaysia in May for attempted robbery had cased U.S. facilities and U.S. Navy vessels in preparation for an attack.
An Algerian-based terrorist cell responsible for planning an attack against the U.S. embassy in Rome or the Vatican was broken up by the Italians in July and its members deported.
Meanwhile, the leading al-Qa’ida operatives involved in the Cole bombing were in Afghanistan planning new attacks against the United States.
As for Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former Egyptian Islamic Jihadist leader who had become Bin Ladin’s top deputy, it was almost impossible to turn around without finding him entwined in murderous intrigues, planning to renew terrorist operations throughout Europe. Al-Qa’ida was assessing advanced operations for a major attack in Israel against U.S and Israeli targets, to be led by Zawahiri. Zawahiri, we learned, was coordinating terrorists in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.
Still other intelligence assessments painted a picture of a plot to kidnap Americans in India, Turkey, and Indonesia. That was said to be the work of a renegade Egyptian extremist figure, Rifat Taha Mousa, then living in Damascus. Mousa was so despised throughout most of the Muslim world that he had even been expelled from Iran. Syria had allowed him in after several other Arab countries also handed him his walking papers, then arrested him on a tip we provided. Mousa had put out numerous fatwas against the United States in the several months prior to his arrest. He was also close to the Blind Sheikh, Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was linked to the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center. In addition, Mousa had shared a podium with Bin Ladin and Zawahiri in Afghanistan during the summer of 2000. We had a photograph of him seated right between the two of them. Talk about a Toxic Trio.
In June we learned that several Arab terrorist camps were closing in Afghanistan. Al Jazeera reported (erroneously, as it turned out) that Bin Ladin was leaving the country, fearing an American strike against him. The Arab satellite channel MBC broadcast an interview with Bin Ladin and his key lieutenants in which he said there will be a “big surprise” in the coming weeks and a “hard hit against U.S. and Israeli interests.” MBC also reported that Bin Ladin’s forces were in a state of high alert. Other reports told of imminent suicide attacks in the Gulf. Al-Qa’ida operatives were leaving Saudi Arabia to return to Afghanistan, which was a concern to us because, as we learned in the aftermath of the Cole attack and East Africa bombings, those responsible had beaten feet just before the attacks occurred. In Afghanistan, Arabs were said to be anticipating as many as eight celebrations. Operatives were being told to await important news within days. Zawahiri was warning colleagues in Yemen to anticipate a crackdown and urging them to flee. To our great frustration, the Saudis, who probably held more keys to unlocking the inner workings of al-Qa’ida than any other liaison service, were slow-rolling us on the feedback we kept requesting. Finally, at our request, Dick Cheney called the Saudi crown prince to break the logjam.
On June 28, 2001—I remember the date exactly and the event vividly—Cofer Black and I sat down for a briefing on the state of the global terrorism threat. Cofer had again brought along Rich B. It was Rich who did most of the talking. We now had more than ten specific pieces of intelligence about impending attacks, he said. The NSA and CTC analysts who had been watching Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida over the years believed that the intelligence was both unprecedented and virtually 100 percent reliable. Over the last three to five months we had been witness to never-before-seen efforts by Ayman al-Zawahiri to prepare terrorist operations. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the mastermind of the Cole attack, had disappeared. A key Afghan camp commander was reportedly weeping with joy because he believed he could see his trainees in heaven. All around the Muslim world, important operatives were disappearing while others were preparing for martyrdom. Rich’s June 28 briefing concluded with a PowerPoint slide saying, “Based on a review of all source reporting, we believe that Usama Bin Ladin will launch a significant terrorist attack against the U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks.” Five days later, on July 3, we learned as a result of intelligence that Bin Ladin had promised colleagues that an attack was near.
As the threat reporting intensified, so did our efforts overseas. By late June, in cooperation with foreign partners, we had launched disruption efforts in nearly two dozen countries. Almost twenty of our best unilateral extremist terrorist pen
etrations around the world had been told to gather as much information as possible on the impending attacks. Either leaders of our counterterrorist team or I had been in direct contact with eighteen chiefs of foreign intelligence services, seeking their assistance. We talked about specific demarches to the Pakistanis, to close down the Pakistani-Afghan border, and their border with Iran, the preferred transit choice of al-Qa’ida operatives exiting Afghanistan on their way to the Gulf. A worldwide cable to our stations and bases urged immediate action to run down all extremist leads. In the United States, we were working diligently with the FBI to secure and exploit as many terrorist communications as possible. That meant going through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court, which considers government requests to authorize surveillance of suspected foreign agents inside the United States. The FISA Court was tremendously helpful, yet it was becoming increasingly evident by early July of 2001 that further legislative improvements were needed because the existing statutes did not give us the flexibility we needed to get on top of a savvy and increasingly sophisticated terrorist network.
American embassies closed upon our recommendation or beefed up their protection. Navy ships left Middle Eastern ports and headed out to sea. Again, I can’t say what didn’t happen as a result of those warnings and the high level of alert we were broadcasting, but I’m convinced that the summer and fall of 2001 would have been even more catastrophic—and the bloodshed far more widely spread—had we sat on, ignored, or soft-pedaled what we were hearing.
On July 5, several senior CTC officers went to the Justice Department to brief Attorney General John Ashcroft about our concerns. They told him that we believed that a significant terrorist attack was imminent and that preparations for an attack were in the late stages or already completed. We continued to believe, however, that an attack was more likely to be conducted overseas. At the end of the briefing the attorney general turned to some FBI personnel and pointed at CIA officers present. “Why are they telling me this?” he asked. “Why am I not hearing this from you?” CIA briefers thought this was an odd reaction.
By July 10, Cofer Black, Rich B., and their counterterrorism team had put this flurry of reporting into a consolidated, strategic assessment. That afternoon, Cofer asked to see me. The briefing he gave me literally made my hair stand on end. When he was through, I picked up the big white secure phone on the left side of my desk—the one with a direct line to Condi Rice—and told her that I needed to see her immediately to provide an update on the al-Qa’ida threat. I can recall no other time in my seven years as DCI that I sought such an urgent meeting at the White House. Condi made the time immediately, and Cofer, Rich, and I made the fifteen-minute ride to the White House.
When we arrived in Condi’s office, Dick Clarke and Steve Hadley were waiting for us. Rather than sit on the couch as we usually did for our weekly meetings, I asked if we could arrange ourselves around Condi’s conference table so everyone could follow the briefing charts. I thought the more formal setting and stiff-backed chairs were appropriate for what was about to be said. Rich handed out the briefing packages and took it from there. His opening line got everyone’s attention, in part because it left no room for misunderstanding: “There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months!”
A specific day was impossible to pick: “We know from past attacks that UBL is not beholden to attacks on particular dates,” Rich explained. “Bin Ladin warned of an impending attack in May of 1998, but the attacks against the embassies were not carried out until August. UBL will attack when he believes the attack will be successful.” The signs, though, were unmistakable. Key Chechen Islamic terrorist leader Ibn Kattab has promised some “very big news” to his troops, Rich said. A chart displayed seven specific pieces of intelligence gathered over the past twenty-four hours, all of them predicting an imminent attack. Among the items: Islamic extremists were traveling to Afghanistan in greater numbers, and there had been significant departures of extremist families from Yemen. Other signs pointed to new threats against U.S. interests in Lebanon, Morocco, and Mauritania.
Rich’s next chart contained what in the business we call a “gisting,” a summation of the more chilling statements we had in our possession through intelligence:
A mid-June statement from UBL to trainees that there will be an attack in the near future.
Information that talked about moving toward decisive acts.
Late June information that cited a “big event” that was forthcoming.
Two separate bits of information collected only a few days before our meeting in which people were predicting a stunning turn of events in the weeks ahead.
The attack will be “spectacular,” Rich told Condi and the others, and it will be designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities and interests. “Attack preparations have been made,” he said. “Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible, and they will occur with little or no warning. Al-Qa’ida is waiting us out and looking for vulnerability.”
Rich went on to summarize our efforts to disrupt specific targets tied to Bin Ladin. Our intent, he explained, was not just to startle or stop specific bad guys. We wanted the targets to spread the word that Bin Ladin’s plans had been compromised. Our hope was that we might cause him at least to delay the attacks, but that could never be anything more than a stalling action. At the end of this graph, underlined, were these words: “Disruption only delays a terrorist attack. It does not halt a terrorist threat.”
As we had arranged, Rich swung from that point into arguing that consideration should be given immediately to moving from a defensive to an offensive posture vis-à-vis al-Qa’ida and Bin Ladin. “We have disrupted or delayed the current attack, but the UBL threat will continue to exist,” he said. “UBL’s goal is the destruction of the United States. We must consider a proactive instead of a reactive approach to UBL. Attacking him again with cruise missiles after this new terrorist attack will only play to his strategy. We must take the battle to UBL in Afghanistan. We must take advantage of increasing dissatisfaction of some Afghan tribes with the Taliban. We must take advantage of the Afghan armed opposition.”
At the end of the briefing, Condi turned to Clarke and said, “Dick, do you agree? Is this true?” Clarke put his elbows on his knees and his head fell into his hands and he gave an exasperated yes.
Condi looked at Cofer and asked, “What should we do?”
Cofer responded, “This country needs to go on a war footing now.”
“Then what can we do to get on the offensive now?” Condi asked. I can’t recall if it was Cofer or I who answered that question. “We need to re-create the authorities that we had previously submitted in March,” one of us said. I reminded Condi again that, before the authorities could be okayed, the president needed to align his policy with the new reality, and she assured me that this would happen. It was just the outcome I had expected and hoped for when we left Langley for the White House maybe an hour earlier, but the tragedy is that all this could have been taking place four months earlier, if our initial request for expanded authorities hadn’t been so abruptly tabled.
As we were leaving Condi’s office, Rich and Cofer congratulated each other. At last, they felt, we had gotten the full attention of the administration.
When press accounts of the July 10, 2001, meeting surfaced in the fall of 2006, some 9/11 Commission officials said that we had never told them about the meeting. Transcripts of my classified testimony in early 2004 showed that I did discuss the meeting with the commission. Why they failed to mention it in their final report is a mystery to me.
Initially some administration officials suggested that the briefing might not have occurred but they later amended their comments to say that while it had taken place, it contained no new or urgent information. Obviously they had not reviewed the briefing slides, especially the one regarding seven pieces of intelligence collected in the previous twenty-four hours that predicted imminent terrorist attacks.
Rich had assured the group gathered in Condi’s office that day that the NSA strongly discounted the possibility of disinformation. “Throughout the Arab world,” he said, “UBL’s threats are known to the public. There will be a loss of face, funds, and popularity if UBL’s attacks are not carried out.” Everyone, though, still wasn’t convinced. Sometime shortly afterward, Steve Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, came to see me and asked if I had considered the possibility that al-Qa’ida’s threats were just a grand deception, a clever ploy to tie up our resources and expend our energies on a phantom enemy that lacked both the power and the will to carry the battle to us.
“No,” I said to Steve, “this is not a deception, and, no, I do not need a second opinion. I have been living with this for four years. This is real.” I told Steve that it would be a tremendous mistake to dismiss what our experience told us was inevitable. “We are going to get hit,” I said. “It’s only a matter of time.” Steve wasn’t alone. Paul Wolfowitz was raising the same question. To Steve’s credit, after 9/11 he went out of his way to tell me he had been wrong.
We had hoped that the July 10 meeting would finally get us on track, or at least had pointed us in the right direction. Three days later, a meeting of the Deputies Committee was held to discuss the covert-action authorities we had initially requested back in March. But the bureaucracy moved slowly. The authorities granted on September 17, 2001, were substantially the same as the ones we had requested in March.
More intel kept coming in. On July 13 we received intelligence about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was wanted by the Jordanians for his involvement in the millennial plots (and who would go on to mastermind untold numbers of kidnappings, beheadings, and bombings in Iraq before being killed in a U.S. bombing raid in June 2006). Zarqawi, we learned, wanted to arrange a meeting in Iran for apparent operational planning.
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA Page 17
