What do I mean specifically? During the first Gulf war, our commanders complained about the disparate intelligence they received from separate civilian and military channels. In response to this, a major revolution in American intelligence occurred after that war, stimulated by a brilliant paper authored by President George H. W. Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and by its chairman, Adm. Bobby Inman.
During the subsequent wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, we did not over-centralize the Washington power structure. Rather, we decentralized access to intelligence by pushing its analysis and exploitation as close as possible to the war fighter—whether in the foxhole or in the cockpit. Not only did we convey this data to the field in nanoseconds, but we also allowed our deployed forces to reach back into giant databases to pull the data they believed they needed to do their jobs. Military men and women far away from Washington actually know best what they need most, and today they have the ability to reach in and get it.
Today we are in possession of an enormous amount of data about how al-Qa’ida trains its members, operates, and thinks about the United States as a target. This is all rooted in what we have learned about them around the world through speedy and agile intelligence operations in concert with our foreign partners. Yet how much of this data is available on a daily basis, on one communications backbone, to the people who can do something about it? In reality, very little. It is simply not good enough to warn local police departments of imminent threats. We need to arm them with our knowledge of terrorists and their tactics. This can be done without compromising sensitive sources or methods. Technology today allows us to insert data with varying layers of access for those with a need to know. While some classified data will always be essential, the majority of the knowledge we impart should be unclassified. Without this information, the people most familiar with our cities and local communities have little, if any, basis to plan, allocate resources, and train and retain the right kind of people. The solution to the terrorist threat we face has little to do with structure. It is all about data.
My personal concern is that the head of the intelligence community, now known as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), may be too distant from the people he is supposed to lead and may be divorced from the reality of risk taking and running operations. Still, the legislation that created the position of DNI is now law. For the good of the country, we must ensure that the DNI and American intelligence succeeds.
The current DNI, Mike McConnell, is an enormously capable former senior intelligence officer. His years in the private sector will give him useful experience to build the collaborative enterprise that American intelligence must become. His principal tasks will be to enable the constituencies that report to him to perform better without having a vast staff to micromanage every operation, collection decision, or piece of analysis.
He will understand that common policies with strong central management with regard to enabling the free flow of data, training and retaining intelligence professionals, enacting security protocols, setting priorities, and measuring achievement all can have a liberating effect on the intelligence community. As a former director of NSA, and chief intelligence officer to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he also understands that decentralization, the collection and processing of data, and analysis of that data as early as possible to get close to the beneficiaries of the intelligence, are essential elements of success.
Domestically, he will quickly understand that this decentralized model—in particular the linking of data and analysts, whether from the FBI or the intelligence community, to state and local police officers or to the private sector—is an essential element of deterring future terrorist attacks against the United States.
We as a country chose not to create a domestic intelligence service separate and apart from the FBI. In fact, little serious consideration was ever given to the proposal. At the time I left office, a time of crisis, it would have been difficult to create yet another wholly new entity on top of everything else we were establishing. Yet, the potential benefit of a domestic intelligence service should be debated. The answer to that debate should not be based on whether such a service detracts from the FBI but rather on whether the country would, over the long term, be safer and whether such a service, separate and apart from traditional investigatory and police work, could exist within our framework of laws and individual rights. At the very least, a dispassionate examination of the idea should be considered now, and not in the aftermath of another terrorist attack.
Whatever the challenges that face us, one of the most frequent questions I am asked is: “As a result of the steps that have been taken, are we safer today than we were on 9/11?”
The answer is yes, we are safer, but much danger still remains. We must not fool the American people into believing that reorganizing the structure of American intelligence has created an impenetrable shield. It has not. And much more work still needs to be done. My fear is that we have lost our sense of urgency.
One final lesson learned during my time as DCI over two administrations is that, despite what conspiracy theorists and political operatives would have you believe, people from both parties, with vastly different approaches, try to do what they think is right for our country. It is a great disservice when partisans on both sides of the aisle suggest that their opponents are willfully putting American lives at risk and playing into the hands of the enemy. As I said at the outset of this book, their methods can and should be debated, but not their motives.
My time as DCI ended with more than a Medal of Freedom hung around my neck. Not everything laid on my shoulders was welcomed or, I’d like to think, deserved. But certainly some of it was.
I rest easy knowing that I was in the arena and that I tried my damnedest to protect my country. Some people described me in the days prior to 9/11 as “running around with my hair on fire.” If so, it was not because I was excitable but because we saw a threat and tried to do something about it. The work of American intelligence officers is a critical and largely thankless task. They share the dangers and uncertainties that are shouldered by our military. The country has many entirely appropriate and needed ways to thank our armed forces—but precious few to do the same for the men and women of the intelligence community. There are no parades to honor veteran spies or bands to welcome them home. Yet intelligence professionals willingly and enthusiastically embark on their important missions knowing that self-satisfaction for having fought the good fight will have to suffice in lieu of public thanks.
There is a tradition at CIA where fallen officers are memorialized with a marble star carved into the wall of our lobby. By the time I left, there were a total of eighty-three stars. Each May we hosted a memorial service, where we would read aloud the names of fallen officers and tell some of their stories, sometimes in the presence of family members who did not know of their exploits. It was a way to bridge the past and the future, a way to teach our young officers about the meaning of service.
Eleven officers were taken from us during my time as director. I felt each of their deaths personally. Some, such as Mike Spann and Helge Boes, died in Afghanistan, on the front line of the war against terrorism. Others cannot be mentioned. Their lives, and deaths, must remain secret. But those of us who became part of the Agency family will always remember them.
Whenever the CIA’s engraver, Tim Johnston, had to carve a new star, I would slip out of my office for a moment and watch him at work. The most valued gift I received during my tenure was a small marble star, presented to me by Tim. I still keep it on my desk.
When I was in office, I tried my best to represent the American people in thanking our intelligence professionals for what they do for all of us. Being the chief defender and spokesman for a secret organization was challenging—and I bear more than a few scars—yet I also experienced great moments of quiet joy with colleagues who took enormous risks on behalf of America and its allies. Considering it all, would I make that long journey again? Absolute
ly—in a heartbeat.
GLOSSARY
Aardwolf—Code name for a comprehensive written assessment of a situation submitted by a senior CIA field representative to Agency headquarters.
Alec Station—A “virtual station” set up within CIA’s Counterterrorist Center in 1996 to focus specifically on al-Qa’ida. Originally designed TFL, for Terrorist Financial Links, it became known informally as the Bin Ladin Station.
al-Qa’ida—Arabic for “the base”; the umbrella name for Usama bin Ladin’s Sunni Islamist group dedicated to driving Westerners out of the Gulf region and establishing a Muslim caliphate.
Ba’ath Party—The Arab nationalist secular political party that ruled Iraq from 1968 to 2003.
BND—The Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service); the external intelligence agency of the German government.
The Bubble—CIA’s auditorium.
BW—Biological weapons; the use of bacteria, viruses, toxins, etc. as weapons.
Case officer—A member of CIA’s clandestine service who recruits and directs foreign agents.
CBW—Chemical and biological weapons.
CENTCOM—The U.S. Central Command; the organization responsible for U.S. military operations in Northeast Africa and Southwest and Central Asia.
CIA—Central Intelligence Agency.
Covert action—An operation conducted in a way to conceal the role of the U.S. government behind those actions.
CPA—Coalition Provisional Authority; a government entity, under the direction of L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer, established in Iraq in April 2003 to provide transition to an Iraqi government. Disestablished on June 28, 2004.
CPD—Counterproliferation Division; the part of CIA’s Directorate of Operations concerned with trying to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
CTC—Counterterrorist Center; a portion of CIA made up of analysts and operators, which conducts operations against terrorists worldwide.
CW—Chemical weapons.
DC—Deputies Committee; NSC committee generally made up of the second ranking person from the NSC, State and Defense departments, CIA, etc.
DCI—Director of Central Intelligence; the head of the U.S. intelligence community and CIA. Position established in 1947 and disestablished in 2005 with the creation of the position of the director of national intelligence.
DDCI—Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
DDI—Deputy Director (of Central Intelligence) for intelligence; head of the analytic arm of CIA.
DDO—Deputy Director (of Central Intelligence) for operations; head of the intelligence-collection arm of the CIA. Now called the National Clandestine Service.
DDS&T—Deputy Director (of Central Intelligence) for science and technology.
DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense’s intelligence organization, providing foreign military intelligence to the warfighter.
EIJ—Egyptian Islamic Jihad; a terrorist group whose origins date back to the 1970s. Under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, EIJ essentially merged with al-Qa’ida in the late 1990s.
EXDIR—Executive Director of Central Intelligence; third ranking official in CIA.
Finding—A legal document, signed by the president, granting specific authorities to the CIA and the intelligence community to conduct covert actions.
FISA—Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; a 1978 law laying out specific authorities and procedures for the collection of physical and electronic intelligence regarding foreign intelligence.
FSB—The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation; the domestic successor to the KGB in Russia.
GRC—Global Response Center; a watch center within CIA where overseas operations are monitored.
HPSCI—House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
HVD—High-value detainee.
INA—Iraqi National Accord; an Iraqi political party founded in 1991 to provide opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime.
INC—Iraqi National Congress; an umbrella organization of Iraqi opposition groups set up in the early 1990s under the leadership of Ahmed Chalabi.
In-Q-Tel—A nonprofit organization, funded by CIA, to seek information technology solutions to the Agency’s most critical needs.
INR—The Bureau of Intelligence and Research; a member of the intelligence community. A small organization within the Department of State providing intelligence analysis.
IRGC—Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Formed in 1979 as a military force loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRGC has become a large military organization focused on special operations.
ISG—Iraq Survey Group; a unit established in Iraq in 2003 to investigate whether Iraq had WMD stockpiles and programs.
JI—Jemaah Islamiya; a Southeast Asian Islamic militant group with close ties to al-Qa’ida.
JSOC—Joint Special Operations Command; a U.S. military organization charged with planning special operations missions.
KDP—Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq. One of the two major Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the KDP was founded in the 1940s and is led by Massoud Barzani, an influential Kurdish politician.
KGB—Soviet “Committee for State Security”; the Soviet Union’s premier intelligence service and CIA’s main rival during the cold war.
MOIS—Ministry of Information and Security; Iranian intelligence service.
Mossad—Israeli Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations; counterpart to CIA in Israel.
NALT—Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team; small CIA units deployed to Northern Afghanistan both before and after 9/11 to coordinate with members of the Afghan Northern Alliance.
NCTC—National Counterterrorist Center; established in August 2004 to serve as the primary organization in the U.S. government for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism and to conduct strategic operational planning.
NGA—National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; provides exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on Earth. (Formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency).
NIC—National Intelligence Council; the intelligence community’s center for mid-term to long-term strategic thinking.
NIE—National Intelligence Estimate. Produced by the NIC, the NIE is the intelligence community’s most authoritative written judgment concerning national security issues. It contain the coordinated judgments of the intelligence community regarding the likely course of future events.
NILE—Northern Iraq Liaison Element; small CIA teams that operated in Northern Iraq prior to the start of the 2003 war.
NIMA—National Imagery and Mapping Agency. (See NGA.)
Northern Alliance—Also known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan; an umbrella organization of Mujahideen who fought the communist and later Taliban governments in Afghanistan.
NSA—National Security Agency; U.S. cryptologic organization; coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information.
NSC—National Security Council; the president’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and Cabinet officials. The NSC also serves as the president’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.
ORHA—Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. Established just prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ORHA was replaced by CPA.
OVP—Office of the Vice President.
PC—Principals Committee; NSC committee made up of the national security advisor, secretaries of State and Defense, DCI, etc. In the Bush administration, the vice president also attended.
PDB—President’s Daily Brief; compilation of intelligence presented to the president each day.
Predator
—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) used for surveillance and, post-9/11, capable of delivering Hellfire missiles on targets.
PUK—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. One of the two major Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the PUK was founded in the 1970s and is led by Jalal Talabani, an influential Kurdish politician and the current president of Iraq.
Red Cell—A group of CIA analysts established immediately following 9/11 to provide “out-of-the-box” and contrarian analysis.
Rendition—The practice of moving terrorists and other criminals from one foreign country to another, where they may be wanted by law enforcement officials, and interrogated.
Silberman-Robb Commission—Informal name of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Silberman-Robb issued its report in March 2005.
SSCI—Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA Page 53
