Fiscal needs also drove the government to encourage industrial expansion as a means of broadening its tax base. Here, too, foreign capital flowed readily, for European investors believed that Russia, with its huge population and inexhaustible resources, needed only capital and technical know-how to become another United States.64 Between 1892 and 1914, foreigners placed in Russian enterprises an estimated 2.2 billion rubles ($1.1 billion), which represented approximately one-half of the capital invested in these enterprises during the period.65 The largest share (about one-third) of these investments went into mining, mainly petroleum and coal; the metalworking, electrical, and chemical industries as well as real estate also benefited. French capital accounted for 32.6 percent of that money, English for 22.6 percent, German for 19.7 percent, and Belgian for 14.3 percent.66 Witte estimated in 1900 that approximately one-half of all Russian industrial and commercial capital was of foreign origin.*
Such heavy foreign involvement in the economy led conservative and radical opponents of Witte alike to claim that he had transformed Russia into a “colony of Europe.” The charge had little merit. As Witte liked to point out, foreign capital went exclusively for productive purposes† —that is, enhancing Russia’s productive capacity and therefore her wealth. It was in large measure owing to the growth of the non-agrarian sectors of the economy, made possible by the infusion of foreign capital, that the revenues of the Treasury between 1892 and 1903 more than doubled (from 970 million to 2 billion).67 It has also been pointed out that foreign investors did not simply “milk” the Russian economy by repatriating their profits, but reinvested them, which had a cumulatively beneficial effect.* In this connection, it is often ignored that the economic development of the United States also benefited greatly from foreign investments. European investments in the United States in mid-1914 are estimated to have been $6.7 billion.† twice the capital invested by Europeans in Russia. “In considerable measure the funds for the national expansion and development [of the United States],” writes an economic historian, “had been obtained from abroad.”68 And yet the role of foreign capital is rarely mentioned in American histories and never led to charges that it had made the United States a “colony” of Europe.
The opening phase of the Industrial Revolution in Russia got underway around 1890 with a rapid spurt in industrial production. Some Western European economists have calculated that during the decade of the 1890s Russian industrial productivity increased by 126 percent, which was twice the rate of the German and triple that of the American growth.69 Even allowing that Russia started from a much lower base, the rise was impressive, as the following figures indicate:
G
ROWTH OF
R
USSIAN
I
NDUSTRIAL
P
RODUCTION
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Between 1890 and 1900, the value of Russian industrial output more than doubled (from 1.5 billion to 3.4 billion rubles).‡
In 1900, Imperial Russia was the world’s largest producer of petroleum, her annual output exceeding that of all the other countries combined. It is generally agreed by economic historians that on the eve of World War I, by which time the value of her industrial production had risen to 5.7 billion rubles, Russia had the fifth-largest economy in the world, which was impressive even if, proportionate to her population, her industrial productivity and income remained low. Thus, in 1910, Russia’s per capita consumption of coal was 4 percent of the American, and of iron, 6.25 percent.*
As the conservatives feared, Russia’s reliance on foreign capital had political consequences, intensifying the pressures on the Imperial Government to come to terms with its own society—that is, to liberalize. Investors everywhere have little tolerance for political instability and civil unrest, and when threatened with them, either withhold capital or demand a risk premium. Every internal crisis, especially if attended by popular disturbances, led to the fall in the price of Russian state obligations, forcing the government to pay higher interest. In consequence of the Revolution of 1905, Russian bonds floated in Europe the next two years had to be heavily discounted. Foreign investors preferred that the Imperial Government operate in a lawful manner and with public support institutionalized in a parliament. Thus by reaching out to the parliamentary democracies for capital, Russia became susceptible to influences promoting parliamentary forms of government. Quite naturally, the Ministry of Finance, the main agent in these fiscal operations, became a spokesman for liberal ideals. It did not quite dare to raise the slogans of constitutionalism and parliamentarism, but it did press for curtailing bureaucratic and police arbitrariness, respect for law, and extending equality to the ethnic minorities, especially the Jews, who were a major force in international banking.
Thus the requirements of the Treasury drove the Russian Government in the opposite direction from that demanded by its ideology of autocratic patrimonialism and urged on it by conservative bureaucrats. A government whose philosophy and practices were under the spell of patrimonial absolutism had no alternative but to pursue economic policies that undermined such absolutism.
The Russian army was, first and foremost, the guarantor of the country’s status as a great power. Witte had the following to say on the subject:
In truth, what is it that has essentially upheld Russian statehood? Not only primarily but exclusively the army. Who has created the Russian Empire, transforming the semi-Asiatic Muscovite tsardom into the most influential, most dominant, grandest European power? Only the power of the army’s bayonet. The world bowed not to our culture, not to our bureaucratized church, not to our wealth and prosperity. It bowed to our might …
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The military establishment was to an even greater extent than the bureaucracy the personal service of the autocrat, if only because the Tsars took a very personal interest in the armed forces and favored them over the bureaucracy, whose interference and pressures often annoyed the Court.72 All the trappings and symbols of the military, beginning with the oath sworn by officers and soldiers, were filled with the patrimonial spirit:
In the military oath, which had to be renewed upon the death of every sovereign, inasmuch as it was sworn to the person [of the ruler], the Emperor appears solely as the Autocrat, without the Fatherland being mentioned. It was the mission of the military to safeguard “the interests of His Imperial Majesty” and “all the rights and privileges that belong to the Supreme Autocracy, Power and Authority of His Imperial Majesty.” The swearer of the oath committed himself to defend these prerogatives whether they already existed or were still to be acquired or even claimed—i.e., “present and future.” [In the oath] the state was treated simply as the Emperor’s command [
Machtbereich]:
it was mentioned only once along with the Emperor, moreover in a context that assumed their identity of interests …
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With a standing army of 2.6 million men, Russia had the largest military establishment in the world: it was nearly equal to the combined armies on active service of Germany and Austria-Hungary (1.9 and 1.1 million, respectively). Its size can be accounted for by two factors.
One was slowness of mobilization. Great distances aggravated by an inadequate railroad network meant that in the event of war Russia required much more time than her potential enemies, Germany and Austria-Hungary, to bring her forces to full combat strength: in the early years of the century, Russia’s mobilization was expected to take seven times as long as Germany’s.*
The other, no less weighty consideration had to do with internal security. Since the early eighteenth century, the Russian army was regularly employed in quelling popular disorders. Professional officers intensely disliked such work, considering it demeaning, but the regime had no choice in the matter since the police and gendarmes were inadequate to the task. During periods of widespread civil disturbances, the army was regularly employed for this purpose: in 1903, one-third of the infantry and two-thirds of the cavalry stationed in E
uropean Russia engaged in repressive action.† Furthermore, the government frequently appointed officers as governors-general in areas prone to violence. The government welcomed retired officers in the civil service, offering them equivalent chin and precedence over regular bureaucrats. While the security police concentrated on preventing sedition, the military was the monarchy’s main instrument of repression.
To ensure the loyalty of the armed forces, the authorities distributed non-Slavic inductees in such a manner that at least 75 percent of the troops in every unit were “Russians”—i.e., Great Russians, Ukrainians, or Belorussians. In the officer corps, the proportion of the East Slavic component was maintained at 80–85 percent.74
The officer corps, 42,000 men strong in 1900, was a professional body in many ways isolated from society at large.75 This is not to say that it was “feudal” or aristocratic, as it is often pictured. The military reforms carried out after the Crimean War had as one of their objectives opening the ranks of the officer corps to commoners; to this end, education was given as much weight in promotion as social origin. At the end of the century, only one-half of the officers on active duty were hereditary nobles,76 a high proportion of them sons of officers and bureaucrats. Even so, there remained a certain distinction between officers of high social standing, often serving in elite Guard Regiments, and the rest—a distinction which was to play a not insignificant role in the Revolution and Civil War.
A commission required a course of training in a military school. These were of two kinds. The more prestigious Military Academies (Voennye Uchilishcha) enrolled graduates of secondary schools, usually Cadet Schools, who planned on becoming professional officers. They were taught by civilian instructors on the model of the so-called Realgimnaziia, which followed a liberal arts curriculum. Upon completion of their studies, graduates received commissions. The Iunker Academies (Iunkerskie Uchilishcha) had nothing in common with Prussian Junkers, enrolling mostly students of plebeian origin who, as a rule, had not completed secondary schooling, either for lack of money or because they could not cope with the classical-language requirements of Russian gymnasia. They admitted pupils of all social estates and religious affiliations except for Jews.* The program of study in these institutions was shorter (two years), and their graduates still had to undergo a stint as warrant officers before becoming eligible for a commission. The majority of the officers on active duty in 1900—two-thirds by one estimate, three-quarters by another—were products of the Iunker Academies; in October 1917 they would prove themselves the staunchest defenders of democracy. The upper grades of the service, however, were reserved for alumni of the Military Academies.
The military uniform carried little prestige in Russia. Salaries were too low to permit officers who had no independent means to aspire to a gentleman’s life: with a monthly wage of 41.25 rubles, an infantry second lieutenant earned not much more than a skilled worker. Officers of field rank could barely make ends meet or even feed themselves properly.77 Foreign observers were struck by the lack of a sense of “honor” among Russian officers and their willingness to tolerate abuse from superiors.
The most prestigious service was with the Guard Regiments, commissions in which required social standing as well as independent income.78 Nearly all the officers serving in the Guards were hereditary nobles: their system of cooptation kept out undesirables. Guard officers billeted in comfortable quarters in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Warsaw enjoyed certain privileges, among them accelerated promotion. These, however, were gradually whittled down, and abolished by the time World War I broke out.
The uppermost elite of the late Imperial Army was made up of alumni of the Military Academies, especially the two-and-a-half-year course of studies at the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff, which prepared specialists for high command posts. Admission was open to officers with three years of active duty who passed with distinction an appropriate examination: only one in thirty applicants qualified. Social origin made no difference: here “the son of an emancipated serf served … together with members of the Imperial family.”* The 1,232 graduates of the General Staff School—Genshtabisty—on active duty in 1904 developed a strong esprit de corps, helping each other and maintaining a solid front against outsiders. The brightest among them were assigned to the General Staff, which had responsibility for developing strategic policy. The rest took command posts. Their preponderance among officers of general rank was striking: although constituting between 5 and 10 percent of the officers on active duty, they commanded, in 1912, 62 percent of the army corps, 68 percent of the infantry divisions, 77 percent of the cavalry divisions, and 25 percent of the regiments. All seven of the last Ministers of War were alumni of the General Staff Academy.79
General Anton Denikin, the leader in 1918–19 of the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army, claimed that relations between officers and enlisted men in the Imperial Army were as good as if not better than similar relations in the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, and the treatment of the troops less brutal.80 Contemporary evidence, however, does not support this claim. The Russian authorities insisted on observing very strict rank distinctions, subjecting soldiers to treatment that reminded some observers of serfdom. The men were addressed by officers in the second person singular, received an allowance of three or four rubles a year (one-hundredth of the pay of the most junior officer), and in some military districts were subjected to various indignities such as having to walk on the shady side of the street or to ride on streetcar platforms.81 The resentments which these discriminatory rules bred were a major cause of the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison in February 1917.
For the historian of the Revolution, the most important aspect of the late Imperial Army was its politics. Students of the subject agree that the Russian officer class was largely apolitical: not only did it not involve itself in politics, it showed no interest in it.† In officers’ clubs, political talk was considered in poor taste. Officers looked down on civilians, whom they nicknamed shpaki, most of all on politicians. Moreover they felt they could not uphold their oath to the Tsar if they became embroiled in partisan politics. Taught to regard loyalty to the powers that be as the supreme virtue, they were exceedingly ill prepared to cope with the conflicts that erupted in 1917. As long as the struggle for power was undecided, they stood on the sidelines. Once the Bolsheviks took over, many went into their service, since they were now “the authority” (vlast’), which they had been trained to obey. The specter of Russian Bonapartism, which so frightened Russian revolutionaries, was a figment of the imagination of intellectuals raised on the history of the French Revolution.
14. Dancing class at Smolnyi Institute, c. 1910.
After 1905 there emerged in the military a group of patriotic officers whose loyalty extended beyond the throne. Like the liberal bureaucrats, they saw themselves as serving the nation rather than the Crown. They were regarded with great suspicion.
The fourth instrument of tsarist authority, the gentry or dvorianstvo, was an eroding asset.*
Like the bureaucracy, the Russian gentry descended from a medieval service class which had performed for the princes a great variety of missions, principally military duty.82 Their service was lifelong and compensated mainly by income from fiefs, worked by serfs, who technically remained the Crown’s property. They were not a nobility in the true sense of the word because they had no corporate rights: such benefits as they enjoyed were perquisites of service. The dvoriane rose to a privileged position in the late eighteenth century when the monarchy, eager to divert their attention from politics, admitted them into partnership. In return for the gentry conceding the Tsars complete control over the sphere of high politics, they were given title to their estates as well as de facto ownership of the serfs (then about one-half of the population) and granted a corporate charter of rights, which included release from the obligation of bearing state service. The Golden Age of the dvoriane was between 1730 and 1825. Even then, the vast majority lived in poverty: only one-third had
landed estates with serfs and of that number only a minority had enough land and serfs to live in any style.83 Many rural gentry were hard to distinguish from their peasants.
The decline of the Russian gentry began in 1825, as a consequence of the Decembrist Revolt in which young members of the most distinguished noble families took up arms against the monarchy in the name of constitutional and republican ideals. Stung by this “betrayal,” Nicholas I increasingly came to rely on the professional bureaucracy. The economic death knell of the dvorianstvo rang in 1861 when the monarchy, overruling gentry opposition, emancipated the serfs. For although the number of gentry who owned serfs was not very large and most of those who did had too few to live off their labor, the monopoly on serf ownership was the most important advantage which that class had enjoyed. After 1861 the gentry retained certain valuable benefits (e.g., assured admission into the civil and military service), but even so it began to lose status as a privileged social estate.
This was a highly deplorable trend to most Russian conservatives, for whom the survival of Russia depended on a strong monarchy and on the support of privileged and prosperous landed gentry. In the closing three decades of the nineteenth century, much was written on this subject: this literature represented the last gasp of gentry conservatism, a doomed effort to revive the age of Catherine the Great.84 The argument held that the landed gentry were the principal bearers of culture in the countryside. They could not be replaced by the bureaucracy because the latter had no roots in the land and merely “bivouacked” there: indeed, the bureaucracy itself was becoming radicalized due to the government’s preference for officials with higher education over those with proper social credentials. The decline of the gentry inevitably paved the way for the triumph of the radical intelligentsia who, working as rural teachers and professional staff of the zemstva, incited the peasantry instead of enlightening it. Such conservatives criticized the Great Reforms of Alexander II for diluting social distinctions. Their plea was for a return to the tradition of partnership between Crown and gentry.
The Russian Revolution Page 14
