*On this, see Maurice Samuel, Blood Accusation (New York, 1966). It is testimony, however, of the independence of the Russian judiciary of the time that notwithstanding immense pressure brought on it by the bureaucracy and the Church, the court acquitted Beilis. The role of anti-Semitism in late Imperial politics is dealt with in Heinz-Dietrich Loewe’s Antisemitismus und Reaktionäre Utopie (Hamburg, 1978), which lays stress on the identification of Jews with international capital, and Hans Rogger’s Jewish Policies and Right-wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley, Calif., 1986).
*Exempt from his authority were the governors-general placed in charge of selected areas and accountable directly to the Tsar. In 1900, there were seven of them: one in Moscow, three in the troublesome western provinces (Warsaw, Vilno, and Kiev), and three in remote Siberia (Irkutsk, the Steppe, and the Amur River region). Combining civil with military authority, they resembled viceroys.
*S. Iu. Vitte, Vospominaniia, III (Moscow, 1960), 107. In 1905 Witte refused the post of Minister of the Interior because he did not want to become a policeman.
* IM, No. 2–3 (1935), 133. Von Laue cites Witte to the effect that “a modern body politic cannot be great without a well-developed national industry”: Theodore H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York-London, 1963), 262.
*Bertrand Gille, Histoire Economique et Sociale de la Russie (Paris, 1949), 163–65. According to Geoffrey Drage [Russian Affairs (New York-London, 1904) 287], in 1900, 60.5 percent of the Russian railroad network was state property.
† In September-November 1891, as the news of the crop failures spread abroad, the price of 4 percent Russian bonds dropped from 97.5 to 87, raising the return from 4.1 percent to 4.6 percent: René Girault, Emprunts Russes et Investissements Français en Russie, 1887–1914 (Paris, 1973), 197.
* IM, No. 2–3 (1935), 135. John P. McKay [Pioneers for Profit (Chicago, 1970), 37] believes that in 1914 “foreigners held at least two-fifths of the total of nominal capital of corporations operating in Russia.”
† Vitte, Vospominaniia, II, 501. Although basically correct, this claim is an exaggeration, since the Extraordinary Budget, based on foreign borrowings, also paid a good part of the defense expenditures. It was also used for debt servicing.
*McKay, Pioneers, 383–86. McKay stresses, in addition to capital investments, the great contribution made by foreigners in bringing to Russia advanced industrial technology: Ibid., 38283.
†Edward C. Kirkland, A History of American Economic Life, 3rd ed. (New York, 1951), 541. Other historians estimate that in 1914 Europeans held between $4.5 and $5.5 billion in U.S. bonds: William J. Shultz and M. R. Caine, Financial Development of the United States (New York, 1937), 502.
‡Leo Pasvolsky and Harold G. Moulton, Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction (New York, 1924), 112. To these figures must be added the value of products turned out by cottage industries (kustarnaiapromyshlennost’), which Pasvolsky estimates at approximately 50 percent of the above: Ibid., 113.
*Based on statistics in Jürgen Nötzold, Wirtschaftspolitische Alternativen der Entwicklung Russlands in der Ära Witte und Stolypian (Berlin, 1966), 110.
*See below, Chapter 6.
†P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii (Moscow, 1973), 34. Zaionchkovskii provides a table showing Russian army involvement in suppressing disorders between 1883 and 1903 (Ibid., 35). The subject is treated at length in William C. Fuller’s Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914 (Princeton, N.J., 1985).
*In 1886 the Russian army had at most twelve Jewish officers: Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia, 201–2.
*Matitiahu Mayzel in Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, XVI, No. 3/4 (1975), 300–1. According to Zaionchkovskii (Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia, 320n.–321n.), the number of nobles attending the Academy at the turn of the century was very small.
†This was in contrast to the Japanese army, which paid great attention to ideological indoctrination: Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths (Princeton, N.J., 1985). Russian soldiers received no indoctrination: A. I. Denikin, Staraia armiia (Paris, 1929), 50–51.
*According to the 1897 Census there were in the Empire 1,220,000 hereditary dvoriane (of both sexes), of them 641,500 native speakers of “Russian” (i.e. Great Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian): N. A. Troinitskii, ed., Pervaia Vseobshchaia Perepis’ Naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g.: Obshchii Svod, II (St. Petersburg, 1905), 374. Dvoriane thus constituted nearly 1 percent of the population.
*One desiatina equals 2.7 acres or 1.1 hectares.
3
Rural Russia
In the early 1900s, Russia was overwhelmingly rural. The peasantry constituted four-fifths of her inhabitants by legal status and three-quarters by occupation: the same proportion as in France on the eve of her revolution. Agriculture was far and away the largest source of national wealth. Russia’s exports consisted primarily of foodstuffs. The small industrial working class issued directly from the village and maintained close links with it. In terms of her social and economic structure, therefore, Imperial Russia resembled more an Asiatic country like China than Western Europe, though she considered herself a part of Europe, in whose politics she actively participated as one of the great powers.
To an extent inconceivable either in the West or in countries untouched by Westernization, Russia’s rural population was a world unto itself. Its relationship to the officialdom and the educated class was in all respects but the racial like that of the natives of Africa or Asia to their colonial rulers. The peasantry was hardly affected by the Westernization which had transformed Russia’s elite into Europeans, and in its culture remained loyal to Muscovite Russia. Russian peasants spoke their own dialect, followed their own logic, pursued their own interests, and viewed their betters as aliens to whom they had to pay taxes and deliver recruits but with whom they had nothing in common. The Russian peasant of 1900 owed loyalty only to his village and canton; at most he was conscious of some vague allegiance to his province. His sense of national identity was confined to respect for the Tsar and suspicion of foreigners.
Under assault from the Westernized intelligentsia, the monarchy came to regard the peasant as the bearer of “true” Russianness and it went to great lengths to protect him from the corrupting influence of the city. It institutionalized the cultural isolation of the peasantry by tying it to the village commune and subjecting it to special laws and taxes. It offered peasants few educational opportunities, and such little schooling as it provided it preferred to entrust to the clergy. It placed obstacles to the entry of outsiders into villages and forbade Jews to settle in them. At the turn of the century, the conservative establishment saw in the alliance of the Crown and the village the cornerstone of the country’s stability. As events were to show, this was a profound misconception. As conservative as the muzhik indeed was, his world outlook, his values, and his interests made him exceedingly volatile. Unlikely to initiate a revolution, he was certain to respond to urban disorders with a revolution of his own.
The life of the Russian peasantry revolved around three institutions: the household (dvor), the village (derevnia or selo), and the commune (mir or obshchina). All three were distinguished by a low degree of continuity, structural fluidity, poorly developed hierarchies, and the prevalence of personal rather than functional relations. In these respects, Russian rural conditions differed sharply from those found in Western societies and certain Oriental ones (notably Japan’s), a fact which was to have profound consequences for Russia’s political development.
The peasant household was the basic unit of rural Russia. In 1900, the Empire had 22 million such households, 12 million in European Russia. The typical Great Russian dvor was a joint family, with the parents living under the same roof with their sons, married and unmarried, and their respective families, as well as unmarried daughters. This kind of family structure was encouraged by Russia’s climatic conditions, under which
the brevity of the agricultural season (four to six months) called for coordinated seasonal work by many hands in brief bursts of intense effort. Statistical evidence indicates that the larger the household, the more efficiently it functioned and the richer it was likely to be: a large dvor cultivated more land, owned more livestock, and earned more money per head. Small households, with one or two adults, either merged with others or died.1 At the turn of the century, the largest number of Russian rural households (40.2 percent) had between six and ten members.2 Despite their proven economic advantages, the proportion of large households kept on declining: to escape quarrels common in joint families, many peasant couples preferred to leave and set up their own households. The disintegration of large joint family households would accelerate in the twentieth century for economic reasons which will be described in due course.
Although the typical household was based on kinship relations and its members were most commonly connected by blood or marriage, the determining criterion was economic—namely, work. The dvor owed its cohesion to the fact that it engaged in disciplined field work under the direction of a headman. A son who left the village to make his living elsewhere ceased to be a member of the household and forfeited his claim to its property. Conversely, strangers (e.g., sons-in-law, stepsons, and adopted children) admitted into the household as regular workers acquired the rights of family members.3 Occasionally, households were formed entirely on such a voluntary basis by peasants who were not related either by blood or marriage.
15. Russian peasants: late nineteenth century.
The Russian peasant household was organized on a simple authoritarian model, under which full authority over the members and their belongings was entrusted to one person, known as bol’shak or khoziain. This family patriarch was usually the father, but the post could also be assigned, by common consent, to another adult male. The elder’s functions were many: he assigned farm and household duties, he disposed of property, he adjudicated domestic disputes, and he represented the household in its dealings with the outside world. Customary peasant law endowed him with unquestioned authority over his dvor: in many ways, he was heir to the authority of the serf owner. Since the Emancipation Edict of 1861, the bol’shak was also authorized by the government to turn over members of his household to administrative organs for punishment. He was the paterfamilias in the most archaic sense of the word, a replica in miniature of the Tsar.
The political and economic attitudes of Russian peasants had been formed in the first five hundred years of the current millennium, when no government inhibited their movement across the Eurasian plain and land was available in unlimited quantities. The collective memory of this era lay at the root of the peasantry’s primitive anarchism. It also determined the practices of inheritance followed by Russian peasants into modern times. It has been observed that in regions of the world where land is in short supply, landowners, both nobles and peasants, are likely to practice primogeniture, under which the bulk of the property is left to the eldest son. Where it is available in abundance, the tendency is to adopt “partible” inheritance, dividing the land and other belongings equally among the male heirs.* Even after agricultural land had become scarce, Russians continued to adhere to the old practices. Until 1917–18, when inheritance was outlawed, Russian landlords and peasants divided their properties in equal shares among male descendants. So entrenched was the custom that the monarchy’s attempts, launched under Peter I, to have the upper class keep its estates intact by bequeathing them to a single heir proved unenforceable.
The muzhik held most of his land as a communal allotment (nadel) to which he held no title: when the household died out or moved away, it reverted to the commune. But any land held by the peasant in private property outside the commune, as well as all his movable wealth (money, implements, livestock, seed grain, etc.), customary law allowed his heirs to distribute among themselves.
The practice of partible inheritance had profound effects on Russian rural conditions and, indeed, on many other seemingly unrelated aspects of Russian life. For as has been pointed out, the
transmission
mortis causa
[by reason of death] is not only the means by which the reproduction of the social system is carried out … it is also the way in which interpersonal relationships are structured.
4
After the passing of its head, the household’s belongings were divided, whereupon the household dissolved and the brothers parted to set up households of their own. As a result, the dvor did not outlast the life span of its head, which made this basic institution of the Russian countryside exceedingly transient. In every generation—that is, three or four times a century—households throughout Russia broke apart and subdivided, much as do amoebas or other rudimentary biological organisms. Russian rural life perpetuated itself by a ceaseless process of fission, which inhibited the development of higher, more complex forms of social and economic organization. One dvor begat other dvory, which, in turn, multiplied in the same manner, like producing like and nothing new and different being given an opportunity to emerge.
The consequences of this custom become apparent when examined in the light of societies where the peasantry practiced indivisibility of property. Primogeniture makes possible a high degree of rural stability and gives the state a firm base of support in rural institutions. A Japanese sociologist thus compares the situation in Chinese and Indian villages, where primogeniture was unknown, with that in his own country, where it was prevalent:
Because the principle of primogeniture succession held in Japan, the ruling stratum of a village tended to be comparatively stable over the generations. This stability was lacking in China and India.… The Chinese rule of equal sharing [of inheritance] prevents the maintenance of family status, and the status changes from generation to generation. As a result, the village power center shifts, the leaders’ authority wanes, and no village-wide domination or status-subordination develops.… In Japan, lineally determined familism permeates the entire village structure; the main, or parent, house can easily perpetuate itself through the family inheritance system, and thereby acquire traditional authority. The family, clan, and village function together and promote unity. Thus, in Japanese rural society, the main-branch family, parent-child, or master-servant relationship influences to some degree all aspects of village social life.
5
The observations here made about China apply to Russia: in both cases rural institutions were underdeveloped and ephemeral.
Several features of the peasant dvor call for emphasis. The household allowed no room for individuality: it was a collective which submerged the individual in the group. Second, given that the will of the bol’shak was absolute and his orders binding, life in the dvor accustomed the peasant to authoritarian government and the absence of norms (laws) to regulate personal relations. Third, the household made no allowance for private property: all belongings were held in common. Male members acquired outright ownership of the household’s movable property only at its dissolution, at which time it once again turned into the collective property of the new household. Finally, there was no continuity between households, and consequently neither pride in ancestry nor family status in the village, such as characterized Western European and Japanese rural societies. In sum, the Great Russian peasant, living in his natural environment, had no opportunity to acquire a sense of individual identity, respect for law and property, or social status in the village—qualities indispensable for the evolution of more advanced forms of political and economic organization. Enlightened Russian statesmen became painfully aware of this reality in the early years of the twentieth century and tried to do something to integrate the peasant into society at large, but it was late.
Russian peasants lived in villages, called derevni, after derevo, meaning wood, of which they were constructed. Large villages were known as sela. Individual farmsteads (khutora) located on their land were practically unknown in central Russia: they exist
ed mainly in the western and southern provinces of the Empire which had been under Polish rule until the eighteenth century. The number of households per village varied greatly from region to region, depending on natural conditions, of which the availability of water was the most important. In the north, where water was abundant, the villages tended to be small; they increased in size as one proceeded southward. In the central industrial regions of European Russia villages averaged 34.8 households, and in the central black-earth region, 103.5.6 Whereas in the case of individual households size meant prosperity, in the case of villages the opposite held true: smaller villages were likely to be better off. The explanation lies in the practice of strip farming. For reasons which will be spelled out below, Russian communes divided the land into narrow strips, scattered at varying distances from the village. In a large village, peasants had to waste a great deal of time moving with their equipment from strip to strip, often many kilometers apart, which presented special difficulties at harvest time. When villages grew too large to cultivate the land efficiently, the inhabitants either “hived off” to form new ones or else abandoned agriculture and turned to industrial occupations.
16. Village assembly.
At the turn of the century, central Russia consisted of tens of thousands of such villages, usually five to ten kilometers apart.
Compared with rural settlements in other parts of the world, the Russian village was loosely structured and fluid, with few institutions to provide continuity. It was the household rather than the village that served as the building block of Russian rural society. The principal village official, the starosta, was chosen, often against his will, at the insistence of the bureaucracy, which wanted a village representative with whom to deal. Since he could be removed by the same bureaucrats, he represented not so much the population as the government.7
The Russian Revolution Page 16
