This impulsive decision was the last gasp of the patrimonial spirit, a reflex that showed how deeply this mentality was still embedded in the Russian monarchy. The order of succession was clearly established: according to Russian constitutional law, the crown automatically descended to the reigning tsar’s eldest son, even if he was a minor and unable to rule.128 Nicholas had no authority to abdicate on his son’s behalf and appoint Michael successor: “The Russian throne [was] not the emperor’s private property nor his patrimony [votchina] to dispose of according to his own free will.”129 The choice of Michael was doubly irregular in that Michael, having taken for his wife a commoner who was twice married and once divorced, had disqualified himself from the succession in any event.
Shulgin and Guchkov arrived in Pskov at 9:45 p.m. and were immediately taken to the Imperial train. Both were unshaven and dressed in rumpled clothes: Shulgin is said to have looked like a convict.130 In the presence of Ruzskii, Count Fredericks, and General Naryshkin, who kept notes, Guchkov presented a somber account of the situation in the capital. Avoiding Nicholas’s eyes, his own fixed on the table before him, he stressed the danger of unrest spilling to the frontline troops and the futility of dispatching punitive expeditions. He insisted that the mutiny was spontaneous: Khabalov’s assistant told him that the troops joined the rebels immediately. According to Ruzskii, Nicholas was shattered when told that his own Guard unit participated in the mutiny: after that, he barely listened to Guchkov.131 Guchkov went on to say that the Petrograd crowds were passionately anti-monarchist, blaming the Crown for Russia’s recent misfortunes. This called for a drastic change in the manner in which the government was run. The Provisional Committee had been constituted to restore order, especially in the armed forces, but this move had to be accompanied by further changes. The difficulty of having Nicholas keep the throne lay not only in the animosity of the populace toward him and his wife but also in its fear of retribution: “All the workers and soldiers who had taken part in the disorders,” Guchkov said, “are convinced that the retention [vodvorenie] of the old dynasty means punishment, for which reason a complete change is necessary.”132 Guchkov concluded that the best solution would be for Nicholas to abdicate in favor of his son and appoint Michael Regent: such was the opinion of the Provisional Committee. This step, if promptly taken, could save Russia and the dynasty.
Shulgin, who kept his eyes on Nicholas as his colleague was speaking, says that the Tsar displayed no emotion. When Guchkov finished, he responded, “calmly, as if it were an everyday matter,” that he had made up his mind earlier in the day to lay down the crown in favor of his son, “but now, having thought the situation over, I have decided that in view of [my son’s illness] I must abdicate simultaneously for him also, since I cannot be separated from him.”133 The crown would pass to Michael. This news left Guchkov and Shulgin speechless. When they recovered from the shock, the legal question was raised: was such procedure legitimate? Since no lawyers were present, it was held in abeyance. Shulgin and Guchkov expressed the opinion that quite apart from the legality of the matter, the assumption of the throne by the young Alexis would have a much better effect on the public: “A beautiful myth could have been created around this innocent and pure child,” Guchkov thought to himself, “his charm would have helped to calm the anger of the masses.”134
But Nicholas would not yield. He retired to his private car, where he remained for twenty minutes, in the course of which he revised the abdication manifesto so as to designate Michael his successor. At Guchkov and Shulgin’s request he inserted a phrase asking his brother to take an oath to work in “union” with the legislature. The time was 11:50 p.m., but Nicholas had the document read 3:05 p.m., when he had made the original decision, to avoid giving the impression he had surrendered the throne under the Duma’s pressure.
H
EADQUARTERS
Copies to all Commanders
To the Chief of Staff
In the days of the great struggle against the external enemy, who has striven for nearly three years to enslave our homeland, the Lord God has willed to subject Russia to yet another heavy trial. The popular disturbances which have broken out threaten to have a calamitous effect on the further conduct of the hard-fought war. The fate of Russia, the honor of our heroic army, the welfare of the people, the whole future of our beloved Fatherland demand that the war be brought at all costs to a victorious conclusion. The cruel foe exerts his last efforts and the time is near when our valiant army, together with our glorious allies, will decisively overcome him. In these decisive days in Russia’s life,
WE
have deemed it our duty in conscience to
OUR
nation to draw closer together and to unite all the national forces for the speediest attainment of victory. In agreement with the State Duma,
WE
have acknowledged it as beneficial to renounce the throne of the Russian state and lay down Supreme authority. Not wishing to separate
OURSELVES
from
OUR
beloved
SON, WE
hand over
OUR
succession to
OUR
Brother, the Grand Duke M
ICHAEL
A
LEK-SANDROVICH
, and give Him
OUR BLESSING
to ascend the throne of the Russian State. We command
OUR
Brother to conduct the affairs of state in complete and inviolate union with the representatives of the nation in the legislative institutions on such principles as they will establish, and to swear to this an inviolate oath. In the name of
OUR
deeply beloved homeland,
WE
call on all true sons of the Fatherland to fulfill their sacred duty to It by obeying the Tsar in the difficult moment of national trials and to help
HIM
, together with the representatives of the people, lead the Russian State to victory, prosperity, and glory. May the Lord God help Russia.
Pskov, 2 March 1917
15 hours 5 minutes Nicholas
[Correct]
The Minister of the Imperial Household,
Vladimir Borisovich, Count Fredericks
135
Two features of this historic document, which ended the three-hundred-year-old reign of the Romanovs, call for comment. One is that the abdication instrument was addressed, not to the Duma and its Provisional Committee, the de facto government of Russia, but to the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Alekseev. Apparently, in Nicholas’s eyes the army command was the one remaining bearer of sovereignty. The second feature, which would be repeated in Nicholas’s farewell address to the armed forces on March 7, was his acknowledgment that Russia was now a constitutional monarchy in the full sense of the word: the abdication instrument provided for the Duma to determine the new constitutional order and the role of the Crown in it.
While a copy of the abdication manifesto was being drawn up for the Duma deputies to take to Petrograd, Nicholas at their request wrote by hand two instructions to the Senate. In one, he appointed Prince Lvov Chairman of the Council of Ministers: this had the effect of legitimizing the Provisional Committee. According to Guchkov, after agreeing to Lvov’s appointment, Nicholas asked what service rank he held. When Guchkov responded that he did not know, Nicholas smiled;136 he found it difficult to conceive that a private person, without status on the Table of Ranks, could chair the cabinet. In the other instruction, he appointed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich his successor as Commander in Chief.137 Although the actual time was midnight, both documents were dated 2 p.m., in order to precede the abdication.
This done, Nicholas told Shulgin that he intended to spend several days at headquarters, then visit his mother in Kiev, following which he would rejoin the family at Tsarskoe Selo, staying there until the children had recovered from measles.* The three documents were dispatched to Mogi
lev by courier for immediate release. Then the Imperial train departed for the same destination. In his diary, Nicholas wrote: “Left Pskov at 1 a.m. with oppressive feelings about events. All around treason and cowardice and deception.” The next day, en route to headquarters, he read “a great deal about Julius Caesar.”
The news of Nicholas’s abdication spread quickly, reaching Tsarskoe Selo in the afternoon of the following day. Alexandra at first refused to believe it: she said that she could not imagine her husband acting in such a hurry. When, in the evening, the rumors were confirmed, she explained that “the Emperor had preferred to abdicate the crown rather than to break the oath which he had made at his coronation to maintain and transfer to his heir the autocracy such as he had inherited from his father.” Then she cried.138
In the context of the political situation of the time, Nicholas’s abdication was anticlimactic, since he had been effectively deposed a few days earlier by Petrograd mobs. But in the broader context of Russian political life, it was an act of the utmost significance. For one, Russia’s political and military officials swore the oath of loyalty to the person of the Tsar. By abdicating, Nicholas absolved them from their oath and their duties. Until and unless Michael assumed the throne, therefore, Russian bureaucrats and officers were left to shift for themselves, without a sovereign authority to obey. Second, since the masses of the Russian population were accustomed to identify the person of the monarch with the state and the government, the withdrawal of the monarch spelled to them the dissolution of the Empire.
Shulgin and Guchkov left for Petrograd, at 3:00 a.m. Before departing, they cabled the contents of the three Imperial documents to the government. The abdication manifesto threw the cabinet into disarray: no one had expected Nicholas to abdicate in favor of his brother. The Provisional Committee, fearing that the release of the manifesto as signed by Nicholas would set off even more violent riots, decided, for the time being, to withhold publication.
The committee spent what was left of the night heatedly debating what to do next. The chief protagonists were Miliukov and Kerensky. Miliukov argued on grounds he had often spelled out, that it was essential to retain the monarchy in some form. Kerensky dissented: whatever the merits of Miliukov’s historic and constitutional argument, in view of the mood of the populace such a course was unfeasible. The cabinet sided with Kerensky. It was agreed as soon as possible to arrange a meeting with Michael to persuade him to renounce the crown. Rodzianko conveyed the news to Alekseev and Ruzskii, requesting them for the time being to keep Nicholas’s abdication manifesto confidential.139
Under different circumstances, Michael might have made a suitable candidate for the role of a constitutional tsar. Born in 1878, from 1899 to 1904 he was the heir apparent. He disqualified himself in 1912 from any future role in this capacity by marrying in Vienna a divorcée without the Tsar’s permission. For this action, his person and property were placed under guardianship; he was prohibited from returning to Russia and dismissed from the army. Nicholas later relented, readmitted him to the country, and allowed his wife, N. S. Vulfert, to assume the title of Countess Brasova. During the war, Michael served in the Caucasus as commander of the Savage Division and the Second Caucasian Corps. He was a gentle, modest person, not much interested in politics, as weak and irresolute as his elder brother. Though he was in Petrograd during the February Revolution, he proved quite useless to the Duma leaders, who sought his help in restoring order.
46. Grand Duke Michael.
At 6 a.m. the Provisional Committee telephoned Michael at the residence of his friend Prince Putianin, where he happened to be staying. He was told of Nicholas’s decision to pass to him the throne and requested to meet with the cabinet. Michael was both surprised and annoyed with his brother for having placed such responsibilities on him without prior consultation. The encounter between Michael and the cabinet was delayed until later in the morning, apparently because the ministers wanted to hear Shulgin and Guchkov’s report on their mission to Pskov. The two, however, were delayed and reached the Putianin residence just as the meeting was about to begin.140
Speaking for the majority of the cabinet, Rodzianko told Michael that if he accepted the crown a violent rising would erupt in a matter of hours and, following it, a civil war. The government, without reliable troops at its disposal, could promise nothing. The question of the monarchy was, therefore, best left to the Constituent Assembly to determine. Kerensky spoke in the same vein. Miliukov presented the dissenting opinion, which only Guchkov supported. Refusal to accept the crown would spell the ruin of Russia, he said in a voice hoarse from days of incessant speaking, and continued:
The strong authority required to reestablish order calls for support from a symbol of authority to which the masses are accustomed. Without a monarch, the Provisional Government alone becomes an unseaworthy vessel [
utlaia ladia
] liable to sink in the ocean of mass unrest. Under these conditions, the country is threatened with the complete loss of the sense of statehood.
141
Kerensky broke in:
P. N. Miliukov is wrong. By accepting the throne you will not save Russia! Quite the contrary. I know the mood of the masses … the monarchy now is powerfully resented … The question will cause bloody discord. I beg of you, in the name of Russia, to make this sacrifice.
142
In an attempt to reconcile the opposing parties and save something of the monarchic principle, Guchkov proposed that Michael assume the title of Regent.143
Around 1:00 p.m., Michael, who had listened to these disagreements with growing impatience, expressed a wish to retire for a private talk with Rodzianko. Everyone assented, but Kerensky wanted assurances that the Grand Duke would not communicate with his wife, who had a reputation as a political intriguer. Smiling, Michael assured Kerensky that his wife was at their residence at Gatchina. According to Rodzianko, the main question which Michael posed to him when they were alone was whether the Duma could guarantee his personal safety: Rodzianko’s negative answer decided the issue.144
When he returned Michael told the ministers that he had made the unalterable decision to abide by the will of the government majority and refuse the crown unless and until the Constituent Assembly were to offer it to him. Then he burst into tears. Kerensky exclaimed: “Your Highness! You are a most noble person. From now on, I shall say this everywhere!”145
Two jurists, Vladimir Nabokov and Boris Nolde, were sent for to draft Michael’s manifesto renouncing the crown. They spent the afternoon on the task, with occasional assistance from the Grand Duke, who insisted that they stress his desire to abide by the will of the Constituent Assembly. At 6 p.m. the handwritten document was submitted for his signature:
A heavy burden has been placed on Me by the will of My Brother, who has handed Me the Imperial Throne at a time of unprecedented war and popular disturbances.
Inspired by the same thought that permeates the nation, that the well-being of our Fatherland is the supreme good, I have taken the firm decision to accept Sovereign Authority only in the event that such will be the desire of our great nation, which, by means of a national referendum, through its representatives in the Constituent Assembly, is to determine the form of government and the new constitution of the Russian State.
For this reason, calling on the Lord to give us His blessing, I request all Russian citizens to submit to the Provisional Government, created on the initiative of the State Duma and endowed with full authority until such time as the Constituent Assembly, convened with the greatest possible speed on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret vote, shall, with its decision concerning the form of government, give expression to the people’s will.
146
Michael signed the document and handed it to Rodzianko, who embraced him and called him the “noblest of men.”
The following day, March 4, the two abdication manifestos—the one from Nicholas in his and his son’s name, the other from Michael—we
re published on the same broadsheet. According to eyewitnesses, their appearance was joyfully welcomed by the population.147
Was Miliukov right? Could Michael have saved the country from bloodshed and anarchy had he followed his counsel rather than that of the majority? This is doubtful. The argument that the Russian masses understood statehood only in association with the person of the Tsar was indubitably valid. But this theoretical consideration had been temporarily eclipsed by the mood of the masses, their sense of having been betrayed by the monarchy, to which no one had contributed more than Miliukov himself with his November 1, 1916, Duma speech. Russia would be again ready for the monarchy only after a year of anarchy and Bolshevik terror.
Like the rest of the Imperial family, Michael now withdrew into private life.
The intellectuals who formed Russia’s government had been preparing themselves for this task for many years. It is quite incorrect to say, therefore, as does Kerensky in one version of his memoirs, that the Provisional Government found itself “unexpectedly” at the helm;148 its members had been clamoring for, indeed demanding, the power to form a cabinet since 1905. Nearly all of them belonged to the Progressive Bloc, and their names had appeared on various unofficial cabinet lists published in Russian newspapers for years. They were familiar to the educated public as the leading opponents of the tsarist regime, and they assumed power almost as if by natural right.
But as Nicholas had noted, none had any administrative experience. Such political expertise as they possessed they had gained in the Duma: politics to them meant battling the Imperial bureaucracy in and out of the halls of Taurida, debating legislative proposals, and in a crisis appealing to the masses. Academics, lawyers, and businessmen, they were qualified to grapple with broad issues of public policy, and in a stable parliamentary democracy they might have acquitted themselves well. But a government, of course, does not merely legislate—first and foremost, it administers: “Administrer, c’est gouverner,” Mirabeau is quoted as having said, “gouverner, c’est régner; tout se réduit là.” Of this principle, they understood nothing, having been accustomed all their lives to leaving the ordinary, day-to-day running of the country to the despised bureaucracy. Indeed, in their zeal to do everything differently, they purposefully did the opposite: just as tsarism sought to reduce politics to administration, they wanted to eliminate administration from politics. The attention of the First Provisional Government centered on rectifying the abuses of the old regime, mainly by means of legislative acts, unhampered by the veto of the Tsar and the upper chamber. Throughout its existence, it showed far more zeal in destroying the legacy of the past than in building something to replace it. It never created a set of new institutions to supplant those which had collapsed either of their own weight or under its assault.
The Russian Revolution Page 50
