The Bolshevik high command—Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky—appears to have decided on involving the party in these riots around midday on July 3—that is, as the troops of the Machine Gun Regiment were adopting resolutions to demonstrate. At the time, the three were in Taurida. Their plan was to take control of the Workers’ Section of the Soviet, proclaim in its name the passage of power to the Soviet, and present the Ispolkom as well as the Soldiers’ Section and the Plenum with an accomplished fact. The pretext was to have been the irresistible pressure of the masses.150
To this end, the Bolsheviks engineered later in the day a mini-putsch in the Workers’ Section. Here, as in the Soldiers’ Section, they were in a minority. The Bolshevik faction requested the Ispolkom on very short notice to convene an extraordinary session of the Workers’ Section for 3 p.m. This allowed no time to contact all the SR and Menshevik members of the section: the Bolsheviks, however, made certain that their members turned up in a body, which assured them of a momentary majority. Zinoviev opened the meeting with a demand that the Soviet assume full governmental power. The Menshevik and SR deputies on hand opposed him and asked the Bolsheviks instead to help stop the Machine Gun Regiment. When the Bolsheviks refused, the Mensheviks and SRs walked out, leaving their rivals in full control. They elected a Bureau of the Workers’ Section, which duly passed a resolution presented by Kamenev, the opening sentence of which read:
In view of the crisis of authority, the Workers’ Section deems it necessary to insist that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies take power in its hands.
151
Of course, no such “All-Russian Congress” existed, even on paper. The message was clear: the Provisional Government was to be overthrown.
This accomplished, the Bolsheviks departed for Kshesinskaia’s for a meeting of the Central Committee. At 10 p.m., as the meeting was about to start, a column of the mutinous troops drew near. According to Communist sources, Nevskii and Podvoiskii, speaking from the balcony, urged them to return to their barracks, for which they were booed.* The Bolsheviks were still wavering. They were itching to move, but they worried about the reaction to a coup of front-line troops, among whom, despite vigorous propaganda, they had managed to win over only a few regiments, most notably the Latvian Rifles. The bulk of the combat forces remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Even the mood of the Petrograd garrison was far from certain.152 Still, the intensity of the disorders and the news that thousands of Putilov workers, accompanied by wives and children, were gathering in front of Taurida overcame their hesitations. At 11:40 p.m., by which time the rioting troops had returned to their barracks and calm had been restored to the city, the Central Committee adopted a resolution calling for the overthrow of the Provisional Government by armed force:
Having considered the events currently taking place in Petrograd, the meeting concludes: the present crisis of authority will not be resolved in the interests of the people if the revolutionary proletariat and garrison do not, at once, firmly and unequivocally, declare that they favor the transfer of power to the Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies.
To this end, it is recommended that the workers and soldiers at once take to the streets to demonstrate the expression of their will.
153
The Bolshevik objective was unequivocal, but their tactics, as always, were cautious and left room for a face-saving retreat. Mikhail Kalinin, a participant in these events, thus describes the party’s position.
Responsible party workers faced a delicate question: “What is this—a demonstration or something more? Perhaps the beginning of a proletarian revolution, the beginning of a power seizure?” This appeared important at the time, and they especially badgered [Lenin]. He would answer: “We will see what happens; now one can’t tell anything!” … This was, indeed, a review of the revolutionary forces, their numbers, quality, and activism.… This review could turn into a decisive encounter: everything depended on the correlation of forces and any number of chance occurrences. In any event, as if for purposes of insurance against unpleasant surprises, the commander’s order was: “We will see.” This in no way precluded the possibility of throwing the regiments into battle if the correlation of forces proved favorable or, on the other hand, of retreating with the least possible losses, which is what actually happened on July 4.
*
The Central Committee entrusted the management of its operation scheduled for the next day, July 4, to the Military Organization, with Podvoiskii in charge.154 Podvoiskii and his associates spent the night communicating with pro-Bolshevik military units and factories, advising them of the pending action and giving them marching orders. Kronshtadt received a call from Bolshevik headquarters at Kshesinskaia’s requesting troops.155 The armed manifestation was to begin at 10 a.m.156
On July 4, Pravda appeared with a large empty space on its front page: visible evidence of the removal the preceding night of an article by Kamenev and Zinoviev urging restraint.157 The role of Lenin in these decisions, if any, cannot be determined. Bolshevik historians insist that he was enjoying the peace and quiet of the Finnish countryside, oblivious of what his colleagues were doing. He is said to have first learned of the Bolshevik action at 6 a.m. on July 4 from a courier, following which he immediately left for the capital in the company of Krupskaia and Bonch-Bruevich. This version seems unconvincing in view of the fact that Lenin’s followers never undertook any action which he did not personally approve: certainly not action which carried such immense risks. It is also known from Sukhanov (see below) that during the night preceding the riots, Lenin wrote an article for Pravda on the subject: this was almost certainly “All Power to the Soviets,” which the paper printed on July 5.158
The Provisional Government had known as early as July 2 what the Bolsheviks were up to. On July 3 it contacted the headquarters of the Fifth Army in Dvinsk to request troops. None were forthcoming, at least in part because the socialists in the Soviet, whose approval was essential, hesitated to authorize resort to force.159 In the early hours of July 4, General P. A. Polovtsev, the new commander of the Petrograd Military District, posted announcements forbidding armed demonstrations and “suggesting” to the garrison troops that they help preserve order.160 The Military Staff surveyed the forces available to suppress street disorders and found them to be all but nonexistent: 100 men of the Preobrazhenskii Guard Regiment, one company from the Vladimir Military Academy, 2,000 Cossacks, and 50 war invalids. The rest of the garrison had no desire to become involved in a conflict with the mutinous troops.161
July 4 began peacefully: only the eerie silence of the deserted streets suggested something was brewing. At 11 a.m., soldiers of the Machine Gun Regiment, accompanied by Red Guards in automobiles, occupied key points in the city. At the same time, 5,000 to 6,000 armed sailors from Kronshtadt disembarked in Petrograd. Their commander, Raskolnikov, later expressed surprise that the government did not stop his force by sinking one or two of the boats from shore batteries.162 The sailors were under instructions to proceed from the landing pier near Nikolaevskii Bridge directly to Taurida. But as they lined up, a Bolshevik emissary told them that orders had been changed and they were to go instead to Kshesinskaia’s. The protests of the SRs present were ignored, and the SR Maria Spiridonova, who had come to address the sailors, was left without an audience. Preceded by a military band and carrying banners reading “All Power to the Soviets,” the sailors, drawn out in a long column, crossed Vasilevskii Island and the Stock Exchange Bridge to the Alexander Park, from where they continued to Bolshevik headquarters. There they were addressed from the balcony by Iakov Sverdlov, Lunarcharskii, Podvoiskii, and M. Lashevich. Lenin, who had arrived at Kshesinskaia’s a short time before, displayed an uncharacteristic reluctance to speak. At first, he refused to address the sailors on the grounds that he was not well, but he finally yielded and delivered a few brief remarks. Hailing the sailors, he told them that
he was happy to see what was happening, how the theoretical slogan, launched two months earlier, calling for the passage of all power to the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies was now being translated into reality.
163
Even these cautious words could leave no doubt in anyone’s mind that the Bolsheviks were engaged in a coup d’état. It was to be Lenin’s last public appearance until October 26.
The sailors marched off to Taurida. What transpired inside Bolshevik headquarters after their departure is known from Sukhanov, who was told by Lunacharskii:
… during the night of July 3–4, while sending to
Pravda
a declaration calling for a “peaceful demonstration,” Lenin had in mind a concrete plan for a coup d’état. Political power—in reality assumed by the Bolshevik Central Committee—was to have been formally embodied in a “Soviet” ministry composed of outstanding and popular Bolsheviks. At this point, three ministers were appointed: Lenin, Trotsky, and Lunacharskii. This government was to have issued at once decrees on peace and land, gaining in this manner the sympathy of millions in the capital and the provinces, thereby solidifying its authority. Lenin, Trotsky, and Lunacharskii reached such an agreement after the Kronshtadt [sailors] had left Kshesinskaia’s for Taurida Palace.… The revolution was to have been accomplished as follows: The 176th Regiment from Krasnoe Selo—the very same regiment to which Dan had entrusted the protection of Taurida—would arrest the Central Executive Committee, whereupon Lenin would arrive at the scene of action and proclaim the new government.
*
The sailors, led by Raskolnikov, marched down Nevsky. Interspersed in their ranks were small army contingents and Red Guards. In front, on the side, and in the rear drove armored cars. The men carried banners with slogans prepared by the Bolshevik Central Committee.164 As they turned into Liteinyi, in the heart of “bourgeois” Petrograd, shots rang out. The column broke up in panic, firing wildly and scattering in all directions: an eyewitness photographed the scene from a window, producing one of the few pictorial records of violence in the Russian Revolution (plate 53). When the shooting stopped, the demonstrators regrouped and resumed the march to Taurida, but they no longer kept an orderly formation and carried their guns at the ready. They arrived at the Soviet around 4 p.m., greeted with loud cheers from soldiers of the Machine Gun Regiment.
The Bolsheviks also brought to Taurida a large contingent of Putilov workers—estimates vary from 11,000 to 25,000.† Other factories and military units swelled the crowd, which came to number in the tens of thousands.‡ Miliukov thus describes the scene that unfolded in front of Taurida—a scene which despite the appearance of spontaneity was closely orchestrated by Bolshevik agents dispersed in the crowd:
Taurida Palace became the focus of the struggle in the full sense of the word. Throughout the day armed military units gathered around it, demanding that the Soviet, at last, take power.… [Around 4 p.m.] the sailors of Kronshtadt arrived and tried to penetrate the building. They called for the Minister of Justice, Pereverzev, to explain why the sailor Zhelezniakov and the anarchists had been arrested at Durnovo’s villa. Tsereteli came out and told the hostile crowd that Pereverzev was not in the building, that he had already handed in his resignation and was no longer a minister: the first was true, the second not. Deprived of a direct excuse, the crowd for a while was at a loss what to do. But then shouts resounded that the ministers were responsible for each other: an attempt was made to arrest Tsereteli but he managed to escape inside the palace. Chernov emerged from the palace to calm the crowd. The crowd immediately threw itself on him and searched him for weapons. Chernov declared that under such circumstances he would not talk. The crowd fell silent. Chernov began a long speech about the activities of the socialist ministers in general and his own, as Minister of Agriculture, in particular. As for the Kadet ministers, bon voyage to them. The crowd shouted in response: “Why didn’t you say so before? Declare at once that the land is being turned over to the toilers and power to the soviets!” A tall worker, raising his fist to the minister’s face, shouted in a rage: “Take power, you s.o.b., when they give it to you!” Several men from the crowd seized Chernov and dragged him toward a car, while others pulled him toward the palace. Having torn the minister’s coat, the Kronshtadt sailors shoved him into the car and declared that they would not let him go until the Soviet took power. Some workers broke into the hall where the Soviet was in session, shouting: “Comrades, they are beating up Chernov!” In the midst of the turmoil, Chkheidze appointed Kamenev, Steklov, and Martov to liberate Chernov. But Chernov was liberated by Trotsky, who had just arrived on the scene. The Kronshtadt sailors obeyed him and Trotsky accompanied Chernov back into the hall.
*
53. July events.
In the meantime, Lenin had unobtrusively made his way to Taurida, where he stayed out of sight, prepared, depending on how events unfolded, either to assume power or to declare the demonstration a spontaneous outburst of popular indignation and then disappear from sight. Raskolnikov thought he looked pleased.165
Not all the action occurred at Taurida. While the mobs were converging on the seat of the Soviet, small armed detachments directed by the Military Organization occupied strategic points. Bolshevik prospects improved considerably when the garrison of the Peter and Paul Fortress, 8,000 strong, went over to them. Motorized Bolshevik units took over the plants of several anti-Bolshevik newspapers; anarchists seized the most outspoken of them, Novoe vremia. Other detachments took up guard duty at the Finland and Nicholas railroad stations, and set up machine gun emplacements on Nevsky and its side streets, which had the effect of cutting off the staff of the Petrograd Military District from Taurida Palace. One armed unit attacked the seat of the counterintelligence service where materials on Lenin’s dealings with the Germans were stored.166 No resistance was encountered. In the judgment of a liberal newspaper, in the course of the day Petrograd passed into Bolshevik hands.167
The stage was thus set for a formal takeover: nominally in the name of the Soviet, in reality on behalf of the Bolsheviks. In preparation for this crowning event the Bolsheviks had arranged for a delegation of handpicked “representatives” of fifty-four factories to call on Taurida with a petition demanding the Soviet assume power. These men forced their way into the room occupied by the Ispolkom. Several of them were allowed to speak. Martov and Spiridonova supported their demand: Martov declared that such was the will of history.168 At this point it seemed that the rioters would physically inundate and take over the seat of the Soviet. The Soviet had no defense against this threat: its total protection consisted of six guards.169
And yet the Bolsheviks failed to deliver the coup de grace. It is impossible to tell whether this was due to poor organization, indecisiveness, or both. Nikitin blamed the Bolshevik failure to take power on poor planning.
The uprising was improvised: all the actions of the enemy indicated that it had not been prepared. The regiments and large units did not know their immediate missions even in the main area. They were told from the balcony of Kshesinskaia’s: “Go to Taurida Palace, take power.” They went and while awaiting the promised further orders commingled with one another. By contrast, units of ten to fifteen men in trucks and armored cars and small detachments in automobiles enjoyed complete freedom of action, lorded it over the city, but they, too, received no concrete orders to take over the strongpoints such as railroad stations, telephone centers, supply depots, arsenals, the doors to all of which stood wide open. The streets flowed with blood, but there was no leadership …
*
But in the ultimate analysis the Bolshevik failure seems to have been caused by factors other than inadequate forces or bad planning: contemporaries agree that the city was theirs for the asking. Rather, it was due to a last-minute failure of nerve on the part of the commander in chief. Lenin simply could not make up his mind: according to Zinoviev, who spent these hours by his side, he kept wondering aloud whether this was o
r was not the time to “try,” and in the end decided it was not.170 For some reason he could not summon the courage to make the leap: possibly the dark cloud which hung over him of government revelations about dealings with the Germans held him back. Later, when both of them sat in jail, Trotsky told Raskolnikov, in what Raskolnikov took to be veiled criticism of Lenin: “Perhaps we made a mistake. We should have tried to take power.”171
When these events were taking place, Kerensky was at the front. The frightened ministers did nothing. The roar of thousands of armed men in front of Taurida, the sight of vehicles with soldiers and sailors racing to unknown destinations, the knowledge of being abandoned by the garrison filled them with a sense of hopelessness. According to Pereverzev, the government was effectively captive:
I did not arrest the leaders of the uprising on July 4, prior to the publication of documents, only because at that moment they already in effect had under arrest a part of the Provisional Government in Taurida Palace, and could have arrested Prince Lvov, myself, and Kerensky’s deputy without any risk to themselves, if their determination matched even one-tenth their criminal energy.
172
In this desperate situation, Pereverzev decided to release part of the information at his disposal on Lenin’s German connections, hoping that it would unleash a violent anti-Bolshevik reaction among the troops. He had urged two weeks earlier that this information be made public, but the cabinet overruled him, on the grounds (according to a Menshevik newspaper) that “it was necessary to display caution in a matter concerning the leader of the Bolsh[evik] Party.”173 Although Kerensky was later to accuse Pereverzev of an “unpardonable” mistake in having released the facts on Lenin, he himself, having learned on July 4 of the disturbances, urged Lvov to “speed up the publication of information in the possession of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.”174 After checking with Colonel Nikitin and General Polovtsev, Pereverzev invited to his office over eighty representatives of military units stationed in and around Petrograd as well as journalists. This occurred around 5 p.m., as the disturbance at Taurida was coming to a head and a Bolshevik coup seemed but minutes away.* In order to save the most damning material for the prospective trial of the Bolshevik leaders, Pereverzev released only fragments of the evidence at his disposal, and the least credible part at that. It consisted of a shaky account by Lieutenant D. Ermolenko, who reported that while a prisoner of war of the Germans he had been told that Lenin was working for them. This hearsay evidence did a great deal of harm to the government’s case, especially with the socialists. Pereverzev also released some of the information on Bolshevik financial dealings with Berlin by way of Stockholm. He unwisely asked G. A. Aleksinskii, a discredited onetime Bolshevik Duma deputy, to attest to the veracity of Ermolenko’s account.175
The Russian Revolution Page 67
