The corps is assembling in the environs of Petrograd toward evening August 28. Request that Petrograd be placed under martial law August 29.
56
If any more proof is needed that Kornilov did not engage in a military putsch, this cable should furnish it: for surely if he were ordering the Third Corps to Petrograd to unseat the government, he would hardly have forewarned the government by telegraph. It is even less credible that he would have entrusted his alleged coup to a subordinate. Zinaida Gippius, pondering the mystery of the Kornilov Affair a few days after its occurrence, asked herself the obvious question: “How was it that Kornilov sent his troops while he himself sat quietly at headquarters?”57 Indeed, had Kornilov really planned to topple the government and take over as dictator, a man of his temperament and military presence would certainly have commanded the operation in person.
The receipt at 7:00 a.m. on August 27, at headquarters of Kerensky’s cable dismissing Kornilov threw the generals into complete confusion. Their initial reaction was that the cable had to be a forgery, not only because its contents made no sense in view of the Kerensky-Kornilov talk ten hours earlier but also because it was improperly formatted, lacking ihe customary serial number and bearing only the signature “Kerensky,” without the title. It also had no legal force, since by law only the cabinet had the authority to dismiss the Commander in Chief. (Headquarters, of course, did not know that the previous night the cabinet had resigned and Kerensky assumed dictatorial powers.) On further thought the generals concluded that the message perhaps was genuine, but that Kerensky had sent it under duress, possibly while a prisoner of the Bolsheviks. From such considerations, Kornilov refused to resign and Lukomskii to assume his duties “until the circumstances had been fully clarified.”58 Convinced that the Bolsheviks were already in control of Petrograd, Kornilov, ignoring Kerensky’s instructions to the contrary, ordered Krymov to speed up the advance of his troops.59
To clarify any confusion that may have arisen in Petrograd in connection with Kornilov’s answer to Lvov’s questions, whom no one in Mogilev as yet suspected of being an impostor, Lukomskii sent the government a telegram in his own name, reaffirming the need for strong authority to prevent the collapse of the armed forces.60
That afternoon Savinkov, as yet ignorant of Lvov’s machinations but suspecting some monumental mistake, contacted Kornilov. Vasilii Maklakov stood by and toward the end joined in the conversation.61 Referring to Lukomskii’s latest telegram, Savinkov protested that on his visit to Mogilev he had never raised political matters. In response, Kornilov for the first time mentioned Vladimir Lvov and referred to the three options which Lvov had laid out before him. He went on to say that the Third Cavalry Corps was being moved toward Petrograd on instructions of the government, as conveyed by Savinkov. He was acting entirely loyally, carrying out the government’s orders. “Deeply convinced that the [dismissal] decision, entirely unexpected to me, had been taken under pressure of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies … I firmly declare … that I will not leave my post.” Kornilov added that he would be happy to meet with the Prime Minister and Savinkov at his headquarters, confident that “the misunderstanding could be cleared up through personal explanations.”
At this point, the breach was still mendable. Had Kerensky displayed the same circumspection in dealing with charges against Kornilov and held out for “documentary evidence” that would prove his “treason in final form,” as he had done the month before in the case of Lenin, all that happened would have been avoided. But while Kerensky feared to repress Lenin, he had no interest in conciliation with the general. When Miliukov, upon being informed of the course of events, offered his services as mediator, Kerensky responded that there could be no conciliation with Kornilov.62 Kerensky rejected a similar offer from the Allied ambassadors.63 People who saw Kerensky at the time thought he was in a state of complete hysteria.64
All that was needed to prevent a complete break between the Provisional Government and the generals was for Kerensky or his proxy to ask Kornilov point-blank whether he had authorized Lvov to demand dictatorial powers. Savinkov urged him to do so, but Kerensky refused.65 Kerensky’s failure to take this obvious step can be explained only in one of two ways: that he was in a mental condition in which all judgment had deserted him or else that he chose deliberately to break with Kornilov in order to assume the mantle of the Revolution’s savior and in this manner neutralize the challenge from the left.
Having learned from Kornilov of Lvov’s actions, Savinkov rushed back to the Prime Minister’s office. He ran into Nekrasov, who told him that it was too late to seek a rapprochement with Kornilov because he had already sent to the evening papers the Prime Minister’s statement charging the Commander in Chief with treason.66 This was done despite Kerensky’s promise to Savinkov that he would delay release of this document until after he had had a chance to communicate with Kornilov.67 A few hours later, the press published in special editions a sensational communiqué bearing Kerensky’s signature, said to have been drafted by Nekrasov.68 Golovin believes that Nekrasov released it deliberately before Savinkov had had a chance to report on his conversation with Kornilov.* It read:
On August 26, General Kornilov sent to me Duma Deputy Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov, to demand that the Provisional Government transfer to General Kornilov full civil and military authority with the proviso that he himself, at his own discretion, would appoint a new government to administer the country. The authority of Duma Deputy Lvov to make such a proposal was subsequently confirmed to me by General Kornilov in a direct wire conversation.
69
To defend the country from the attempts of “certain circles of Russian society” to exploit its difficulties for the purpose of “establishing … a political system inimical to the conquests of the Revolution,” the statement went on, the cabinet had authorized the Prime Minister to dismiss General Kornilov and place Petrograd under martial law.
Kerensky’s accusation threw Kornilov into an uncontrollable rage because it touched his most sensitive nerve, his patriotism. After reading it, he no longer thought of Kerensky as a Bolshevik captive, but as the author of despicable provocation designed to discredit him and the armed forces. He responded by sending to all front commanders a counterappeal drafted by Zavoiko:†
The telegram of the Prime Minister … in its first part is an out-and-out lie. I did not send Duma Deputy Vladimir Lvov to the Provisional Government—he came to me as a messenger from the Prime Minister.… Thus, there occurred a grand provocation which gambles with the destiny of the Fatherland.
Russian people: our great homeland is dying!
The moment of death is near!
Forced to speak out publicly, I, General Kornilov, declare that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolshevik majority in the Soviet, acts in full accord with the plans of the German General Staff and, concurrently with the imminent landings of enemy forces on the coast of Riga, destroys the army and convulses the country from within …
I, General Kornilov, the son of a Cossack peasant, declare to each and all that I personally desire nothing but to save Great Russia. I swear to lead the people through victory over the enemy to the Constituent Assembly, where it will decide its own destiny and choose its new political system.
70
61. N. V. Nekrasov.
This, at last, was mutiny: Kornilov later admitted that he had decided on an open break with the government because he had been accused by it of open rebellion—that is, treason. Golovin believes that by his actions Kerensky provoked Kornilov to rebel:71 the assessment is correct in the sense that Kornilov rebelled only after having been charged with rebelling.
That Kerensky wanted to exacerbate rather than heal the breach became apparent from the several communiqués he released on August 28. In one he instructed all military commanders to ignore orders from Kornilov, whom he accused of having “betrayed the Fatherland.”72 In another, he lied to the public about the
reasons for the advance of Krymov’s corps on Petrograd:
The ex-Commander in Chief, General Kornilov, having rebelled against the authority of the Provisional Government, while professing in his telegrams patriotism and loyalty to the people, has now by his deeds demonstrated his treachery. He has withdrawn regiments from the front, weakening its resistance to the pitiless enemy, the German, and has sent all these regiments against Petrograd. He has spoken of saving the Fatherland and consciously instigates a fratricidal war. He says that he stands for freedom, and sends against Petrograd Native Divisions.
73
Had Kerensky forgotten, as he was later to claim, that only a week earlier he himself had ordered the Third Cavalry Corps to Petrograd to come under his command?74 It would strain credulity to the utmost to find such an explanation plausible.
During the three days that followed, Kornilov tried without success to rally the nation “to pull our Fatherland out of the hands of the mercenary Bolsheviks, who lord it over Petrograd.”75 He appealed to the regular armed forces as well as the Cossacks and ordered Krymov to occupy Petrograd. Many generals gave him moral support and sent wires to Kerensky protesting his treatment of the Commander in Chief.76 But neither they nor the conservative politicians joined him, being confused by the disinformation spread by Kerensky, which, by blatantly distorting the background of events, made Kornilov into a mutineer and counterrevolutionary. The refusal of all the top generals to follow Kornilov furnishes additional proof that they had not been involved in any conspiracy with him.
On August 29, Kerensky wired Krymov as follows:
In Petrograd complete calm. No disturbances [
vystupleniia
] expected. There is no need for your corps. The Provisional Government commands you, on your personal responsibility, to stop the advance on Petrograd, ordered by the removed Commander in Chief, and direct the corps not to Petrograd but to its operational destination in Narva.
77
The message makes sense only if Kerensky assumed that Krymov was advancing to Petrograd to quell Bolshevik disturbances. Although confused, Krymov obeyed. The Ussuri Cossack Division stopped at Krasnoe Selo, near Petrograd, and on August 30 swore loyalty to the Provisional Government. The Native Division, apparently on orders of Krymov, also halted its advance. The actions of the Don Cossack Division cannot be determined. In any event, the available sources indicate that the role usually attributed to agitators sent by the Soviet to dissuade the Third Corps from advancing on Petrograd has been considerably exaggerated. The principal reason why Krymov’s forces did not occupy Petrograd was the realization of its commanding officers that the city was not, as he and they had been told, in the hands of the Bolsheviks and that their services were not required.*
62. Soldiers of the “Savage Division” meet with the Luga Soviet.
Krymov arrived in Petrograd on August 31 on the invitation of Kerensky and with a promise of personal safety. He saw the Prime Minister later that day. He explained that he had moved his corps to Petrograd to assist him and the government. As soon as he had learned of a misunderstanding between the government and headquarters, he ordered his men to halt. He never intended to rebel. Without going into explanations and refusing even to shake hands with him, Kerensky dismissed Krymov and instructed him to report to the Military-Naval Court Administration. Krymov went instead to a friend’s apartment and put a bullet through his heart.*
Because the two generals whom he had asked to assume Kornilov’s duties—Lukomskii followed by V.N. Klembovskii—had turned him down, Kerensky found himself in the awkward position of having to leave the military command in the hands of a man whom he had publicly charged with treason. Having previously instructed the military commanders to ignore Kornilov’s orders, he now reversed himself and allowed Kornilov’s strictly military orders to be obeyed for the time being. Kornilov thought the situation extraordinary: “An episode has occurred which is unique in world history,” he wrote, “the Commander in Chief, accused of treason,… has been ordered to continue commanding his armies because there is no one else to appoint.”78
Following the breach with Kerensky, Kornilov fell into despondency: he was convinced that the Prime Minister and Savinkov had deliberately trapped him. Afraid that he would commit suicide, his wife requested him to surrender his revolver.79 Alekseev arrived in Mogilev on September 1 to assume command: it had taken Kerensky three days to enlist him for this mission. Kornilov yielded without resistance, asking only that the government establish firm authority and cease abusing him.80 He was first placed under house arrest at a Mogilev hotel and then transferred to the Bykhov Fortress, where Kerensky incarcerated thirty other officers suspected of involvement in the “conspiracy.” In both places he was guarded by the faithful Tekke Turkomans. He escaped from Bykhov shortly after the Bolshevik coup and made his way to the Don, where with Alekseev he would found the Volunteer Army.
Was there a “Kornilov plot”? Almost certainly not. All the available evidence, rather, points to a “Kerensky plot” engineered to discredit the general as the ringleader of an imaginary but widely anticipated counterrevolution, the suppression of which would elevate the Prime Minister to a position of unrivaled popularity and power, enabling him to meet the growing threat from the Bolsheviks. It cannot be a coincidence that none of the elements present in a genuine coup d’état ever came to light: lists of conspirators, organizational charts, code signals, programs. Such suspicious facts as communication with officers in Petrograd and orders to military units are in all instances perfectly explicable in the context of the anticipated Bolshevik putsch. Had an officer plot been hatched then surely some generals would have followed Kornilov’s appeals to join in his mutiny. None did. Neither Kerensky nor the Bolsheviks have ever been able to identify a single person who would admit to or of whom it could be demonstrated that he was in collusion with Kornilov: and a conspiracy of one is an obvious absurdity. A commission appointed in October 1917 completed in June 1918 (that is, already under Bolshevik rule) an investigation into the Kornilov Affair. It concluded that the accusations leveled at Kornilov were baseless: Kornilov’s military moves had been intended not to overthrow the Provisional Government but to defend it from the Bolsheviks. The Commission completely exonerated Kornilov, accusing Kerensky of “deliberately distorting] the truth in the matter of Kornilov from lack of courage to admit guilt for the grandiose mistake” he had committed.* 81
Kornilov was not a particularly complicated person and his behavior in July–August 1917 can be explained without resort to conspiracy theories. His first and foremost concern was with Russia and the war. He was alarmed by the vacillating policies of the Provisional Government and its dependence on the Soviet, which with its meddling in military matters had made the conduct of military operations all but impossible. He had reason to believe that the government was penetrated by enemy agents. But even though he considered Kerensky unfit for his post, he felt for him no personal animosity and regarded him as indispensable in the government. Kerensky’s behavior in August caused him to doubt whether the Prime Minister was his own man. His inability to carry out the military reforms which Kornilov knew Kerensky wanted convinced Kornilov that the Prime Minister was a captive of the Soviet and the German agents in it. When Savinkov told him of the impending Bolshevik putsch and asked for military assistance to suppress it, Kornilov saw a chance to help the government liberate itself from the Soviet. He had every reason to expect that after the putsch had been liquidated an end would be put to the “duality of power” and Russia would receive a new and effective regime. Of this he wanted to be a part. General Lukomskii, who was at his side throughout these critical days, provides what sounds like a reasonable explanation of Kornilov’s thinking during the brief interval between Savinkov’s visit to Mogilev and his break with Kerensky:
I presume that General Kornilov, being convinced of Bolshevik action in Petrograd and of the necessity of suppressing it in the most ruthless manner, assumed that
this will naturally lead to a governmental crisis and the creation of a new government, new authority. He decided to participate in the formation of that authority along with some members of the current Provisional Government and major public and political figures on whose full support he had apparently reasons to rely. From his words I know that General Kornilov had discussed the formation of the new government, which he would join in the capacity of Commander in Chief, with A. F. Kerensky, Savinkov, and Filonenko.
82
It is hardly justified to define as “treasonous” efforts by the Commander in Chief to revitalize the armed forces and help restore effective government. As we have seen, Kornilov rebelled only after having been accused, without cause, of being a traitor. He was the victim of Kerensky’s boundless ambition, sacrificed to the Prime Minister’s futile quest to shore up his eroding political base. A fair summary of what Kornilov wanted and failed to achieve is provided by an English journalist who observed the events at first hand:
He wanted to strengthen the Government, not to weaken it. He did not want to encroach upon its authority, but to prevent others from doing so. He wanted to compel it to be what it had always professed to be but [had] never really been—the single and unchallenged depository of administrative power. He wanted to emancipate it from the illicit and paralyzing influence of the soviets. In the end, that influence destroyed Russia, and Kornilov’s defiance of the Government was a last desperate effort to arrest the process of destruction.
83
If it is correct that Kerensky provoked the break with Kornilov to enhance his authority, he not only failed but achieved the very opposite. The clash fatally compromised his relations with conservative and liberal circles without solidifying his socialist base. The main beneficiaries of the Kornilov Affair were the Bolsheviks: after August 27, the SR and Menshevik following on which Kerensky depended melted away. The Provisional Government now ceased to function even in that limited sense in which it may be said to have done so until then. In September and October, Russia drifted rudderless. The stage was set for a counterrevolution from the left. Thus, when Kerensky later wrote that “it was only the 27th of August that made [the Bolshevik coup of] the 27th of October possible,” he was correct, but not in the sense in which he intended.84
The Russian Revolution Page 72
