These were precautionary measures, for the Bolshevik leadership had not as yet decided what to do with the ex-Tsar and his relatives. In 1911 Lenin had written that “it was necessary to behead at least one hundred Romanovs.”8 Such mass execution, however, would be dangerous, because of the strong monarchist sentiments of the village. One possibility was to try Nicholas before a Revolutionary Tribunal. Isaac Steinberg, who as Commissar of Justice at the time was in a position to know, writes that such a trial was under consideration in February 1918 to prevent a restoration of the monarchy—tacit admission that one year after his universally welcomed abdication, the unpopular Nicholas appealed to enough Russians to worry the Bolsheviks. According to Steinberg, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, Spiridonova opposed a trial on the grounds that Nicholas would be lynched en route from Tobolsk. Lenin decided that it was still too early for legal proceedings against the ex-Tsar but ordered that materials for them be gathered.†
In the middle of April, the Russian press carried reports of an impending trial of “Nicholas Romanov.” This, it was said, would be the first of a series of trials of prominent figures of the old regime which Krylenko was readying as head of the Supreme Investigatory Commission. The ex-Tsar would be charged with only those “crimes” which he had committed as constitutional ruler—that is, after October 17, 1905. Among them would be the so-called coup d’état of June 3, 1907, which had violated the Fundamental Laws by arbitrarily changing the electoral law; the improper expenditure of national resources through the “reserved” part of the budget; and other abuses of authority.9 But on April 22 the press reported a denial by Krylenko that Nicholas would be tried. According to Krylenko, the rumors were due to a misunderstanding: the government really meant to try an agent provocateur by the name of Romanov.10
The fact that Tobolsk had no railroad saved it from being immediately caught up in the revolutionary turmoil, for at this time the “Revolution” was spread mainly by gangs of armed men traveling by train. This explains why as late as February 1918 Tobolsk had no Communist Party cell and its soviet remained under the control of SRs and Mensheviks.
Tobolsk’s isolation ended in March when the Bolsheviks of nearby Ekaterinburg and Omsk evinced an interest in its royal residents. In February, Ekaterinburg held a Congress of Soviets of the Ural Region at which it elected a five-man Presidium controlled by the Bolsheviks. Its chairman, the twenty-six-year-old Alexander Beloborodov, a locksmith or electrician by profession, had been Bolshevik deputy to the Constituent Assembly.* But the most influential member of the Presidium, by virtue of his intimate friendship with Sverdlov, was Isai Goloshchekin, the Military Commissar of the Ural Region. Born in Vitebsk in 1876 in a Jewish family, Goloshchekin had joined Lenin in 1903 and became a member of the Central Committee in 1912. Goloshchekin also served as member of the Ekaterinburg Cheka. He and Beloborodov were to play critical roles in the destiny of the Imperial family.
Our knowledge of the political situation in Ekaterinburg in the spring and summer of 1918 derives almost entirely from a single Communist source, the accounts of P. M. Bykov, which also provide the earliest Soviet version of the Ekaterinburg tragedy.† The Ekaterinburg Bolsheviks were annoyed by the comforts the ex-Tsar was enjoying in Tobolsk and alarmed by the degree of freedom allowed him and his entourage. They feared that with the coming of the spring thaws the Imperial family would flee.11 At the time persistent rumors circulated in the Urals that all sorts of suspicious individuals were assembling in and around Tobolsk.* Some of the Ekaterinburg Communists were extremists who hated Nicholas II—“Nicholas the Bloody”—with genuine passion because of the persecutions they had suffered at the hands of his police. But all of them were afraid of a restoration of the monarchy: not so much out of any abstract political considerations as from fear for their lives. They reasoned as did Robespierre when he pleaded in 1793 before the Convention for a sentence of death to be passed on Louis XVI: “If the king is not guilty, then those who have dethroned him are.”12 They wished the Romanovs out of the way as quickly and expeditiously as possible: and to make certain the ex-Tsar would not get away, they wanted him under their own control, in Ekaterinburg. To this end, in March-April 1918 they contacted Sverdlov.
Omsk had similar ideas, but it lacked connections in Moscow and in the end lost out.
The Ural Regional Soviet in Ekaterinburg discussed the Imperial family as early as February 1918, at which time some deputies expressed fears that by May, when the ice melted on the rivers, the Romanovs would either escape or be abducted. In early March the Ekaterinburg Bolsheviks requested from Sverdlov permission to remove the Imperial family.13 A similar request came from Omsk.
To leave nothing to chance, Ekaterinburg dispatched on March 16 to Tobolsk a secret mission to investigate conditions there. After the mission had returned and delivered its report, Ekaterinburg sent an armed detachment to Tobolsk to lay the groundwork for the transfer of the Romanov family. It also posted patrols along possible routes of escape. Upon reaching Tobolsk on March 28, this detachment discovered that it had been preceded by a group of armed Communists sent by Omsk for the same purpose. The Omsk group, which had arrived two days earlier, had dispersed the city Duma and evicted the SRs and Mensheviks from the local soviet. The two groups disputed who was in charge. Being the weaker, the Ekaterinburg detachment had to retreat, but it returned on April 13 with reinforcements led by the Bolshevik S. S. Zaslavskii and took charge. Zaslavskii demanded that the Imperial family be incarcerated.14 To this end, cells were readied in the local prison.15
These events disrupted the calm which the Imperial family had been enjoying until then. Alexandra noted in her diary on March 28/April 10 that she “sewed up” jewels with the help of the children.† Although no evidence has come to light that the Imperial family made plans to escape, and all alleged plots toward this end by sympathizers turned out to be empty talk, an oppressive sense that they were captives rather than exiles overcame the Imperial household. Any possibility, however remote and unreal, of escaping from the Bolsheviks now vanished.16
At the end of March, Goloshchekin left for Moscow. He reported to Sverdlov on the situation in Tobolsk, warning of the need for urgent measures to prevent the Imperial family’s escape. Approximately at the same time—the first week of April—the Presidium of the CEC in Moscow also heard a report on the situation in Tobolsk from a representative of the local guard. According to an account given to the CEC by Sverdlov on May 9, this information persuaded the government to authorize the transfer of the ex-Tsar to Ekaterinburg. This explanation, however, is a post facto attempt to justify events which unfolded contrary to the government’s intentions. For it is known that on April 1 the Presidium resolved “if possible” to bring the Romanovs to Moscow.17
On April 22, there appeared in Tobolsk Vasilii Vasilevich Iakovlev, an emissary from Moscow. Long a mysterious figure, suspected even of being an English agent, he has recently been identified as an old Bolshevik whose real name was Konstantin Miachin. Born in 1886 near Orenburg, he had joined the Social-Democratic Party in 1905 and taken part in many Bolshevik armed robberies (“expropriations”). In 1911 he emigrated under false identity (Iakovlev) and worked in Belgium as an electrician. He returned to Russia after the February Revolution. In October 1917 he served on the Military-Revolutionary Committee and was a delegate to the Second Congress of Soviets. In December 1917 he was appointed to the Collegium of the Cheka. He participated in the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly.18 In other words, he was a tried and trusted Bolshevik.
Iakovlev-Miachin was silent about the ultimate purpose of his mission, and Communist sources have been similarly reticent. But it can be established with certainty that his task was to bring Nicholas, and, if feasible, the rest of his family, to Moscow, where the ex-Tsar was to stand trial. This can be established from circumstantial evidence: common sense dictates that the government would not have sent an emissary from Moscow to Tobolsk, nearly 2,000 kilometers away, to escort
the Imperial family to nearby Ekaterinburg, especially since the Ekaterinburg Bolsheviks were most eager to have them in their custody. But there exists also direct evidence to this effect, supplied by N. Nemtsov, a Bolshevik commissar from Tiumen and chairman of the Perm Guberniia Central Executive Committee. Nemtsov recounts that in April he had a visit from Iakovlev, who appeared with a “Moscow detachment” of forty-two men:
[Iakovlev] presented me with a mandate for the “removal” of Nicholas Romanov from Tobolsk and his delivery to Moscow. The mandate was signed by the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, Vladimir Ilich Lenin.
*
This testimony, which somehow slipped by the exceedingly tight Soviet censorship on all information concerning the fate of the Romanovs, should put an end to speculation that Iakovlev either was under orders to bring the Romanovs to Ekaterinburg or that he was a secret White agent sent to abduct them and bring them to safety.
En route to Tobolsk, Iakovlev stopped in Ufa to meet with Goloshchekin. He showed his mandate and asked for additional men. From there he proceeded to Tobolsk, going not by the direct route through Ekaterinburg, but by a roundabout way through Cheliabinsk and Omsk.19 He did so apparently out of fear that the Ekaterinburg hotheads, eager to lay their hands on Nicholas, would abort his mission, for the success of which he had assumed personal responsibility. Indeed, while he was en route to Tobolsk, Ekaterinburg attempted to anticipate him by sending a company of soldiers to bring back the ex-Tsar “dead or alive.” Iakovlev almost caught up with this detachment, arriving in Tobolsk a couple of days later.20 He had a guard of 150 cavalry, 60 of them provided by Goloshchekin. The party was armed with machine guns.
Iakovlev spent two days in Tobolsk acquainting himself with the situation. He met with the local garrison and won its favor by distributing its overdue pay. He also familiarized himself with conditions inside the Governor’s House. He learned that Alexis was severely ill. The Tsarevich, who had suffered no hemophiliac attacks since the fall of 1912, had bruised himself on April 12 and since then was confined to bed. He was in great pain, with both legs swollen and paralyzed. Iakovlev twice visited the Imperial household and convinced himself that the Tsarevich indeed was in no condition to undertake the hazardous journey to Moscow. (“Intelligent, highly nervous workman, engineer” was Alexandra’s impression of him.) April was the worst possible time for traveling in the Urals because by that time the snow had melted sufficiently to impede the movement of sleds and carts but not enough to free the rivers for navigation. On April 24, Iakovlev communicated with Moscow by wire: he was instructed to bring Nicholas alone and for the time being leave the family behind.21†
Up to this time, Iakovlev had been extremely polite, almost deferential, to the Imperial family, which aroused the suspicions of the soldiers of his entourage and of the Tobolsk garrison. They thought it highly suspect that a Bolshevik would so demean himself as to shake hands with “Nicholas the Bloody.”22 After receiving fresh instructions, Iakovlev retained his good manners but turned official. On the morning of April 25, he told E. S. Kobylinskii, the commandant of the Governor’s House, that he had to remove the ex-Tsar; where to he would not say, although he apparently let it slip that the destination was Moscow. He requested an “audience,” which was set for two o’clock that afternoon. On arriving in the Governor’s House, Iakovlev was annoyed to find Nicholas in the company of Alexandra and Kobylinskii. He requested them to leave, but Alexandra made such a scene that he agreed to them staying. He told Nicholas that he had instructions from the Central Executive Committee to depart with him early the next day. His original orders had called for him to take along the entire family, but in view of Alexis’s condition, he was now instructed to bring only Nicholas. The response of the ex-Tsar to Iakovlev’s news is recorded in two versions. According to an interview which Iakovlev gave to Izvestiia the following month, Nicholas merely asked: “Where shall they take me?” Kobylinskii, however, recalls Nicholas saying: “I shan’t go anywhere,” which seems rather out of character. According to Kobylinskii, Iakovlev responded:
Please, don’t do that. I must carry out my orders. If you refuse to go, I will either have to use force or resign my mission. In that case, they may replace me with someone who will be less humane. You may rest easy. I answer with my head for your life. If you do not wish to travel alone, you may take with you whomever you wish. We depart at four tomorrow morning.
23
Iakovlev’s order threw the Imperial couple, especially Alexandra, into a state of extreme agitation. According to him, Alexandra cried out: “This is too cruel. I do not believe you will do that …!”24 He would not say where he was to take Nicholas, and later, writing for a White newspaper, claimed that he did not know. This, of course, is untrue, and was probably intended to give credence to rumors, favorable to him at the time, after he had gone over to the Whites, that he really had meant to bring Nicholas into areas controlled by them.*
After Iakovlev left, Nicholas, Alexandra, and Kobylinskii discussed the situation. Nicholas agreed with Kobylinskii that he was to be brought to Moscow to sign the Brest Treaty. If so, the mission was in vain: “I will rather have my hand cut off than do this.”25 That Nicholas could believe the Bolsheviks needed his signature to formalize the Brest Treaty shows how little he understood of what had happened in Russia since his abdication and how irrelevant he had become. Alexandra, who also believed that this was the purpose of Iakovlev’s mission, was far less confident of her husband’s steadfastness: she had never forgiven him for agreeing to abdicate and felt certain that had she been in Pskov on that fateful day, she would have stopped him. She suspected that unbearable pressure would be brought on Nicholas in Moscow, mainly by threats against his family, to sign the disgraceful treaty and that unless she stood by his side he would cave in. Kobylinskii overheard her saying to a close friend, Prince Ilia Tatishchev: “I fear that if he is alone he will do something stupid there.”26 She was beside herself, torn between love for her sick child and what she felt to be her duty to Russia. And in the end the woman who for years had been accused of betraying her adopted country chose Russia.
The Tsarevich’s Swiss tutor, P. Gilliard, who met with her at 4 p.m., describes the scene thus:
The Czarina … confirmed that I had heard that Iakovlev has been sent from Moscow to take the Czar away and that he is to leave tonight.
“The commissar says that no harm will come to the Czar, and that if anyone wishes to accompany him, there will be no objection. I cannot let the Czar go alone. They want to separate him from the family as they did before …
“They’re going to try to force his hand by making him anxious about his family … The Czar is necessary to them; they feel that he alone represents Russia … Together we shall be in a better position to resist them, and I ought to be at his side in the time of trial … But the boy is so ill … Suppose some complication sets in … Oh, God, what ghastly torture!… For the first time in my life I don’t know what I ought to do; I’ve always felt inspired whenever I’ve had to take a decision, and now I can’t think … But God won’t allow the Czar’s departure; it can’t, it must not be. I’m sure the thaw will begin tonight …”
Tatiana Nikolaevna here intervened:
“But, Mother, if Father has to go, whatever we say, something must be decided …”
I took up the cudgels on Tatiana Nikolaevna’s behalf, remarking that Alexis Nikolaevich was better, and that we should take great care of him …
Her Majesty was obviously tortured by indecision; she paced up and down the room, and went on talking, rather to herself than to us. At last she came up to me and said:
“Yes, that will be best; I’ll go with the Czar; I shall trust Alexis to you …”
A moment later the Czar came in. The Czarina walked towards him, saying:
“It’s settled; I’ll go with you, and Marie will come too.”
The Czar replied: “Very well, if you wish it.” …
The
family have spent the whole afternoon at the bedside of Alexis Nikolaevich.
This evening at half past ten we went up to take tea. The Czarina was seated on the divan with two of her daughters beside her. Their faces were swollen with crying. We all did our best to hide our grief and to maintain outward calm. We felt that for one to give way would cause all to break down. The Czar and Czarina were calm and collected. It is apparent that they are prepared for any sacrifices, even of their lives, if God in his inscrutable wisdom should require it for the country’s welfare. They have never shown greater kindness and solicitude.
This splendid serenity of theirs, this wonderful faith proved infectious.
At half past eleven the servants were assembled in the large hall. Their Majesties and Marie Nikolaevna took leave of them. The Czar embraced every man, the Czarina every woman. Almost all were in tears. Their Majesties withdrew; we all went down to my room.
At half past three the conveyances drew up in the courtyard. They were the horrible
tarantass
. Only one was covered. We found a little straw in the backyard and spread it on the floor of the carriages. We put a mattress in the one to be used by the Czarina.
At four o’clock we went up to see Their Majesties and found them just leaving Alexis Nikolaevich’s room. The Czar and Czarina and Marie Nikolaevna took leave of us. The Czarina and the Grand-Duchesses were in tears. The Czar seemed calm and had a word of encouragement for each of us; he embraced us. The Czarina, when saying good-bye, begged me to stay upstairs with Alexis Nikolaevich. I went to the boy’s room and found him in bed crying.
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