After assigning these events to the archonship of Theophrastus, he describes the occurrences of the succeeding year when Lysimachides was archon after the violation of the peace. Here again I will quote only the most essential particulars. ‘Lysimachides of the deme Achamae. Under this archon the Athenians, in consequence of the war against Philip, deferred the construction of the docks and the arsenal. They resolved, on the motion of Demosthenes, that all the funds should be devoted to the campaign. But Philip seized Elateia and Cytinium, and sent to Thebes representatives of the Thessalians, Aenianians, Aetolians, Dolopians, Phthiotians. An embassy, headed by Demosthenes, was at the same time despatched by the Athenians, with whom the Thebans resolved to enter into alliance.’ Now it is clear that it was under the archonship of Lysimachides, when both sides had already made preparations for war, that the Athenian envoys headed by Demosthenes and those sent by Philip. entered Thebes Demosthenes himself, in his speech On the Crown, will show clearly what were the claims preferred by the two embassies. I will quote from the actual text the parts which bear upon the question. ‘By these means Philip sowed discord among the Greek states; and encouraged by the decrees and answers already mentioned, he came with his army and seized Elateia. He assumed that, whatever happened, we and the Thebans could never again act in concert.’ Moreover, after describing the events which then ensued and describing also the speeches delivered by himself before the public assembly and the circumstances under which he was sent by the Athenians as an ambassador to Thebes, he adds (to quote his actual words): ‘When we arrived at Thebes, we found representatives of Philip, of the Thessalians and of the rest of the allies, already there and our friends in a state of alarm, his full of confidence.’ Then, after requesting a certain letter to be read, he continues: ‘So when the Thebans had convened the assembly, they introduced Philip’s representatives first, because they had the status of allies. And these came forward and addressed the people, paying many compliments to Philip, and laying to your charge many faults, recalling every instance in which you at any time opposed the Thebans. In brief, they urged them to show their gratitude for the favours conferred upon them by Philip, and to seek satisfaction for the wrongs done them by you. They might avenge themselves in either of the two following ways as they pleased; they might allow Philip’s troops to pass through their territory to attack you, or they might join him in invading Attica.’ Now if it was in the archonship of Lysimachides, the successor of Theophrastus, and after the peace had been dissolved, that the ambassadors of Philip were sent to the Thebans urging them to join in invading Attica, or (failing that) to allow Philip the right of passage in recognition of his services in the Phocian War, and if further this is the embassy mentioned by Aristotle, as I showed a little earlier when I cited his own words, then surely it is demonstrated by irrefutable proofs that all the speeches of Demosthenes which were addressed to public assemblies and to law-courts before the archonship of Lysimachides are earlier than the Rhetoric of Aristotle.
XII
I will add another piece of evidence furnished by the philosopher, from which it will appear still more plainly that his Rhetoric was composed after the war which broke out between Philip and the Athenians, when Demosthenes had reached his prime as a statesman and had delivered all the deliberative and the forensic speeches which I mentioned a little while ago. Among the topics of enthymemes enumerated by him, the philosopher includes that of cause. I will adduce his own words. ‘Another topic consists in regarding what is no cause as a cause, because (it may be) one thing happens with or after another. Post hoc is assumed to be identical with propter hoc; and this is specially the case in the world of politics. Demades, for example, considered the administration of Demosthenes to have caused all the troubles of the state, for it was thereafter that the war occurred.’ Now what can the speeches have been which Demosthenes composed under the guidance of the Rhetoric of Aristotle if (as I have previously shown) all the public addresses on which his reputation and fame depend preceded the war? The sole exception is the speech On the Crown. This, and this alone, came before a tribunal after the war, in the archonship of Aristophon, eight years after the battle of Chaeroneia, six years after the death of Philip, at the time of Alexander’s victory at Arbela.
If some captious critic suggests that possibly Demosthenes did not write this, the best of all his speeches, before he had perused the Rhetoric of Aristotle, I have much to say in reply to him. But in order that my discussion may not run to undue length, I engage to show, on the evidence of Aristotle himself, that this oration also was completed before the publication of the Rhetoric. In dealing with the topic of enthymemes derived from relative terms, he writes the exact words which follow. ‘Another topic is that derived from relative terms. If the terms “honorably” or “justly” can be applied to the man who acts, they can also be applied to the man who is affected by the action; if they can be applied to a command, they can also be applied to its execution. In this spirit the tax-gatherer Diomedon exclaimed: “If it is no discredit to you to sell the taxes, it is no discredit to us to buy them.” And if the terms “honorably” or “justly” can be applied to a man affected by an action, they can also be applied to the action itself and to the man who has done or is doing it. This is a case of unsound argument For if a man has been justly treated, it does not necessarily follow that he has been justly treated by a particular agent. Accordingly we must consider separately whether the treatment is right and whether the action is right, and then deal with the case in whichever of the two ways seems the more suitable. For sometimes there is a distinction to be made, as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes — Another example is the trial in which Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor were involved.’ What, then, is the trial of Demosthenes [and of those who slew Nicanor] to which Aristotle here refers, in which the most important point in the controversy was derived from the topic of relative terms? It is that in which he defended, against Aeschines, Ctesiphon, who had proposed to crown Demosthenes and was on his trial as the author of an unconstitutional measure. For in this case the point at issue was not the general question whether Demosthenes deserved honours and crowns as having provided for the construction of the fortifications out of his own means, but whether he deserved these things while he was an official liable to account, and notwithstanding the fact that it was illegal to crown men who were so liable. Here we have the topic of relative terms: the point is whether a man liable to account had the same right to receive, as the people to give, the crown. It is my opinion, therefore, that Aristotle refers to this trial. If, however, it is maintained that the reference is to the accusation of corruption against which Demosthenes pleaded in the archonship of Articles, about the time of the death of Alexander, this will prove that the Rhetoric of Aristotle is later than the speeches of Demosthenes by a still greater interval.
But enough. The orator did not derive from the philosopher the rules of rhetoric which he embodied in his celebrated speeches. On the contrary, Aristotle wrote his Rhetoric with the works of Demosthenes, and the other orators, within his reach. I have, I think, proved my point.
EPISTULA AD CN. POMPEIUM GEMINUM.
DIONYSIUS TO GNAEUS POMPEIUS
WITH GREETINGS.
I
I have received with great pleasure the scholarly letter you sent me. Zeno, our common friend, has supplied you (so you write) with a copy of my treatises. In going through them and making them your own, on the whole you admire them, but are dissatisfied, you say, with one portion of their contents, namely, the criticism of Plato. Now you are right in the reverence you feel for that writer, but not right in your view of my position. You may rest assured that I must be numbered among those who have fallen most completely under the spell of Plato’s gifts of expression. But I will explain to you my attitude towards all thinkers who are public benefactors and desire to reform our lives and words. And what is more, I mean to convince you that I have discovered nothing new, or startling, or contrary to the universally a
ccepted view.
Now I think it is an author’s duty, when he elects to write a panegyric of some achievement or some person, to give prominence to merits rather than to any deficiencies.
But when he wishes to determine what is most excellent in some walk of life and what is the best among a number of deeds of the same class, he ought to apply the most rigorous investigation and to take account of every quality whether good or bad. For this is the surest way of discovering truth, than which there is no more precious boon. So much premised, I make a further declaration. If there is any writing of mine which, like the work of Zoilus the rhetorician, contains an attack upon Plato, I plead guilty of impiety. And if when my design is to write a eulogy of him I interweave some fault-finding with my praises, I admit that I am in the wrong and am transgressing the laws by which eulogies are governed among us. For in my opinion they should not contain even vindications, much less detractions. On the other hand, when after undertaking to examine varieties of style, together with their foremost representatives among philosophers and orators, I chose from the entire number three who are generally held to be the most brilliant — Isocrates and Plato and Demosthenes — and among these again I gave the preference to Demosthenes, I thought I did no wrong either to Plato or to Isocrates.
That may be, you say, but you should not have exposed the faults of Plato, in your desire to extol Demosthenes. How then would my argument have undergone the most searching test had I not compared the best discourses of Isocrates and Plato with the finest of Demosthenes, and thus shown with the utmost candour in what respect their discourses are inferior to his, not maintaining that those two writers were always at fault (for that would be sheer lunacy), but not maintaining, either, that they were always and uniformly successful? If I had avoided this course, and had simply eulogised Demosthenes and detailed all his excellences, I should certainly have convinced my readers of the orator’s worth; but unless I had compared him with the best of his rivals, I should not have proved that he holds the very first place among all who have distinguished themselves in oratory. For many things which in themselves are thought beautiful and worthy of admiration appear to fall short of their reputation when set side by side with other things that are better. Thus gold when contrasted with other gold is found to be superior or inferior, and this is true of all manufactured articles, and of all objects designed to produce a brilliant effect.
But if in the province of civil oratory the comparative method of inquiry be judged ungracious, and a demand made for the examination of each writer individually, the same restriction will inevitably be introduced everywhere. Poetry will no longer be compared with poetry, nor historical treatise with historical treatise, nor constitution with constitution, nor law with law, general with general, king with king, life with life, tenet with tenet. And yet no reasonable man would acquiesce in this. But if you need also the proofs which personal testimonies supply, to render it more plain to you that the best mode of examination is the comparative, I will pass over all others and appeal to Plato himself as my witness. Desiring to exhibit his own proficiency in civil oratory, he was not satisfied with the rest of his writings, but [in rivalry with] the foremost orator of the time, himself composed in the Phaedrus another speech with Love as its subject. Nor after advancing so far did he pause and leave to his readers to decide which speech was the better, but he actually assailed the faults of Lysias, allowing that he had excellences of style, but attacking his treatment of subject-matter. Since, therefore, Plato when engaging in the most vulgar and most invidious of tasks, that of praising himself in respect of his oratorical power, thought he was doing nothing blameworthy in claiming that his own speeches should be examined side by side with those of the best orator of the day, and in exhibiting the errors of Lysias and his own merits, what is there so astonishing in my comparison of the speeches of Plato with those of Demosthenes and my scrutiny of anything I found amiss in them? I forbear to quote from his writings generally, in which he attacks his predecessors, Parmenides, Hippias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias, Polus, Theodorus, Thrasymachus and many others, not writing of them in a spirit of perfect fairness, but (you must pardon me for saying so) with a touch of vainglory. There was, there really was in Plato’s nature, with all its excellences, something of vainglory. He showed this particularly in his jealousy of Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth, after crowning him with a garland and anointing him with myrrh. Strange indeed to suppose that Homer needed such compliments in the hour of his expulsion, when it is through him that every refinement, and in the end philosophy itself, passed into human life! But let us suppose that Plato said all this in a spirit of perfect fairness and simply in the interest of truth. What, then, was there to excite surprise in our action when we obeyed his ordinances, and wished to compare the discourses of his successors with his own?
Furthermore, it will be seen that I am not the first and only critic that has ventured to speak his mind about Plato. Nor could anyone justly take me to task on the special ground that I essayed to examine the most distinguished of philosophers, and one more than a dozen generations earlier than myself, in the hope forsooth of obtaining some credit thereby. No, it will be found that many have done so before me, whether in his own time or at a much later date. For his tenets have met with disparagement and his discourses with criticism. First on the list is his most representative disciple Aristotle, and next Cephisodorus, Theopompus, Zoilus, Hippodamas, Demetrius, and many others. These did not attack him out of envy or malice, but in the search for truth. Encouraged accordingly by the example of so many eminent men, and above all of the great Plato himself, I considered that my action was in no way alien to the spirit of philosophic rhetoric when I matched good writers against good. As regards, therefore, the principle on which I acted in comparing style with style, I have defended myself sufficiently even in your eyes, my dear friend.
II
I have now to refer to my actual remarks on Plato in the treatise on the Attic Orators. I will quote the passage in the words there written. ‘The language of Plato, as I have said before, aspires to unite two several styles, the elevated and the plain. But it does not succeed equally in both. When it uses the plain, simple, and unartificial mode of expression, it has an extraordinary charm and attraction. It is altogether pure and translucent, like the most transparent of streams, and it is correct and precise beyond that of any other writer who has adopted this mode of expression. It pursues familiar words and cultivates clearness, disdaining all extraneous ornament. The gentle and imperceptible lapse of time invests it with a mellow tinge of antiquity; it still blooms in all its radiant vigour and beauty; a balmy breeze is wafted from it as though from meadows full of the most fragrant odours; and its clear utterance seems to show as little trace of loquacity as its elegance of display. But when, as often happens, it rushes without restraint into unusual phraseology and embellished diction, it deteriorates greatly. For it loses in charm, in purity of idiom, in lightness of touch. It obscures what is clear and makes it like unto darkness; it conveys the meaning in a prolix and circuitous way. When concise expression is needed, it lapses into tasteless periphrases, displaying a wealth of words. Contemning the regular terms found in common use, it seeks after those which are newly-coined, strange, or archaic. It is in the sea of figurative diction that it labours most of all. For it abounds in epithets and ill-timed metonymies. It is harsh and loses sight of the point of contact in its metaphors. It affects long and frequent allegories devoid of measure and fitness. It revels, with juvenile and unseasonable pride, in the most wearisome poetical figures, particularly in those of Gorgias; and “in matters of this kind there is a good deal of the hierophant about him,” as Demetrius of Phalerum has somewhere said as well as many others: for “not mine the word.”
I should be sorry to be so perverse as to conceive this opinion with respect to so great a man. On the contrary, I am well aware that often and on many subjects he has produced writings which are great and a
dmirable and of the utmost power. What I desire to show is that he is apt to commit errors of this description in his more ornate passages, and that he sinks below his own level when he pursues what is grand and exceptional in expression, and is far superior when he employs the language which is plain and exact and seems to be natural but is really elaborated with unoffending and simple artifice. For then he commits either no errors at all or only such as are extremely slight and venial. My own view, however, is that so great a man should have been perpetually on his guard against any censure. Now all his contemporaries, whose names I need not recall, reproach him with the same fault; and the most striking thing is that he does so himself. He was aware of his own lapse from good taste and gave it the name of “dithyramb”: a thing I had thought shame to say, true though it be. This trait in him appears to me to be due to the fact that, although he was bred among the Socratic dialogues, which were most spare and most exact, he did not continue under their influence, but became enamoured of the artificiality of Gorgias and Thucydides. It was, therefore, no unnatural result that he should imbibe some of the errors, together with the good points, exhibited by the styles of those authors.
‘I will cite examples of the plain and the elevated style from one of the most celebrated books, in which Socrates has addressed the discourses on Love to one of his associates, Phaedrus, from whom the book takes its title....’
In this passage I blame in no way the subject-matter of the writer, but the tendency in the department of expression to figurative and dithyrambic diction, matters wherein Plato loses command of the due mean. And I criticise him not as an ordinary mortal but as a great man who has come near the standard of the divine nature. His fault is that, in imitation of the school of Gorgias, he has introduced the pomp of poetical artifice into philosophical discourses, so that some of his productions are of the dithyrambic order. And what is more, he does not even attempt to hide this failing but avows it. It is clear from your own letter, excellent Geminus, that you yourself entertain the same opinion as I with regard to him. For you write thus, to quote your own words: ‘In other forms of expression there may well occur something which deserves mingled praise and blame. But in embellishment whatever is not success is utter failure. So that, in my opinion, these men should be judged not by their few most hazardous attempts but by their many successes.’ And a little later you add the following words: ‘Although I could defend all, or at any rate most, of these passages, I do not venture to gainsay you. But this one thing I strongly affirm, that it is not possible to succeed greatly in any way without such daring and recklessness as must needs fail now and then.’ There is no quarrel between us. You admit that the man who aspires to great things must sometimes fail, while I say that Plato, in his desire for elevated and stately and audacious diction, did not succeed in every detail, but that his mistakes are nevertheless only a small fraction of his successes. And in this one respect, I say, Plato is inferior to Demosthenes, that with him elevation of diction sometimes lapses into emptiness and dreariness, whereas with Demosthenes this is never so, or only very rarely. This is what I have to say with reference to Plato.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 146
