[3] Κλοίλιος μὲν δὴ πρὶν ἢ γενναῖον ἀποδείξασθαί τι τοιαύτης τελευτῆς ἔτυχεν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἐκείνου τόπον ἀποδείκνυται στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου Μέττιος Φουφέττιος, ἀνὴρ οὔτε πολέμου ἡγεμὼν ἱκανὸς οὔτε εἰρήνης βέβαιος φύλαξ, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἧττον Ἀλβανῶν πρόθυμος ὢν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς διαστῆσαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῆς ἀρχῆς μετὰ τὸν Κλοιλίου θάνατον ἀξιωθείς, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἔτυχε καὶ ὅσα ἦν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι δυσχερῆ καὶ ἄπορα συνεῖδεν, οὐκέτι διέμεινεν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς βουλεύμασιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀναβολὰς καὶ διατριβὰς ἄγειν ἠξίου τὰ πράγματα ὁρῶν οὔτε τοὺς Ἀλβανοὺς ἅπαντας ὁμοίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι προθυμίαν πρὸς πόλεμον οὔτε τὰ σφάγια ὁπότε θύοιτο περὶ μάχης καλὰ γινόμενα:
[3] Such, then, was the end that Cluilius met, before he had performed any noble deed. In his place Mettius Fufetius was chosen general by those in the camp and invested with absolute power; he was a man without either ability to conduct a war or constancy to preserve a peace, one who, though he had been at first as zealous as any of the Albans in creating strife between the two cities and for that reason had been honoured with the command after the death of Cluilius, yet after he had obtained it and perceived the many difficulties and embarrassments with which the business was attended, no longer adhered to the same plans, but resolved to delay and put off matters, since he observed that not all the Albans now had the same ardour for war and also that the victims, whenever he offered sacrifice concerning battle, were unfavourable.
[4] τελευτῶν δὲ καὶ εἰς καταλλαγὰς ἔγνω προκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους πρότερος ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος, μαθὼν τὸν ἐπικρεμάμενον ἔξωθεν Ἀλβανοῖς τε καὶ Ῥωμαίοις κίνδυνον, εἰ μὴ σπείσονται τὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμον, ἀφύλακτον ὄντα, ὃς ἔμελλεν ἀμφοτέρας ἀναρπάσασθαι τὰς δυνάμεις. ἦν δὲ τοιός2δε: [p. 277]
[4] And at last he even determined to invite the enemy to an accommodation, taking the initiative himself in sending heralds, after he had been informed of a danger from the outside which threatened both the Albans and Romans, a danger which, if they did not terminate their war with each other by a treaty, was unavoidable and bound to destroy both armies. The danger was this:
[1] Οὐιεντανοὶ καὶ Φιδηναῖοι μεγάλας καὶ πολυανθρώπους ἔχοντες πόλεις ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμύλου βασιλείας εἰς πόλεμον ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας Ῥωμαίοις κατέστησαν, ἐν ᾧ πολλὰς ἀπολέσαντες δυνάμεις ἀμφότεροι καὶ χώρας ἀποδασμῷ ζημιωθέντες ὑπήκοοι τοῖς κεκρατηκόσιν ἠναγκάσθησαν γενέσθαι. περὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης δεδήλωκα γραφῇ τὸ ἀκριβές: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Νόμα Πομπιλίου δυναστείας εἰρήνης ἀπολαύσαντες βεβαίου πολλὴν ἔσχον ἐπίδοσιν εἰς εὐανδρίαν τε καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν. τούτοις δὴ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐπαρθέντες ἐλευθερίας τε αὖθις ὠρέγοντο καὶ φρόνημα ἐλάμβανον ὑψηλότερον παρασκευάζοντό τε ὡς οὐκέτι Ῥωμαίων ἀκροώμενοι.
[6.1] The Veientes and Fidenates, who inhabited large and populous cities, had in the reign of Romulus engaged in a war with the Romans for command and sovereignty, and after losing many armies in the course of the war and being punished by the loss of part of their territory, they had been forced to become subjects of the conquerors; concerning which I have given a precise account in the preceding Book. But having enjoyed an uninterrupted peace during the reign of Numa Pompilius, they had greatly increased in population, wealth and every other form of prosperity. Elated, therefore, by these advantages, they again aspired to freedom, assumed a bolder spirit and prepared to yield obedience to the Romans no longer.
[2] τέως μὲν οὖν ἄδηλος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἦν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸς Ἀλβανοὺς ἐφανερώθη πολέμῳ. ὡς γὰρ ἐπύθοντο πανστρατιᾷ Ῥωμαίους ἐξεληλυθότας ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀλβανοὺς ἀγῶνα, κράτιστον ὑπολαβόντες εἰληφέναι καιρὸν ἐπιθέσεως ἀπορρήτους ἐποιήσαντο διὰ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν συνωμοσίας ἅπαντας τοὺς ὁπλοφορεῖν δυναμένους εἰς Φιδήνην συνελθεῖν κρύφα καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγους ἰόντας, ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα γένοιντο τοῖς ἐπιβουλευομένοις καταφανεῖς:
[2] For a time, indeed, their intention of revolting remained undiscovered, but during the Alban war it became manifest. For when they learned that the Romans had marched out with all their forces to engaged the Albans, they thought that they had now got the most favourable opportunity for their attack, and through their most influential men they entered into a secret conspiracy. It was arranged that all who were capable of bearing arms should assemble in Fidenae, going secretly, a few at a time, so as to escape as far as possible the notice of those against whom the plot was aimed,
[3] ἐκεῖ δ᾽ ὑπομένοντας ἐκδέχεσθαι τὸν καιρόν, ὅτε αἱ Ῥωμαίων τε καὶ Ἀλβανῶν δυνάμεις ἐκλιποῦσαι τοὺς χάρακας ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα προελεύσονται, ῾τοῦτον δὲ φανερὸν ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς ἔμελλον διὰ συμβόλων σκοποί [p. 278] τινες ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι λοχῶντεσ᾽ ὅταν δὲ ἀρθῇ τὰ σημεῖα λαβόντας τὰ ὅπλα χωρεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἔδει πάντας κατὰ τάχος, ῾ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοὺς χάρακας ἀπὸ Φιδήνης φέρουσα ὁδός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον ἢ δυσὶν ὥραις ἢ τρισὶν ἀνυσθῆναι τὸ μακρότατον᾽ ἐπιφανέντας δὲ τῷ ἀγῶνι τέλος ἤδη ἔχοντι ὥσπερ εἰκὸς μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι φίλιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τε Ἀλβανοὶ νικῶσιν ἐάν τε Ῥωμαῖοι κτείνειν τοὺς κεκρατηκότας αὐτῶν. ταῦτα ἦν ἃ διέγνωστο πράττειν τοῖς προεστηκόσι τῶν πόλεων.
[3] and should remain there awaiting the moment when the armies of the Romans and Albans should quit their camps and march out to battle, the actual time to be indicated to them by means of signals given by some scouts posted on the mountains; and as soon as the signals were raised they were all to take arms and advance in haste against the combatants (the road leading from Fidenae to the camps was not a long one, but only a march of two or three hours at most), and appearing on the battlefield at the time when presumably the conflict would be over, they were to regard neither side as friends, but whether the Romans or the Albans had won, were to slay the victors. This was the plan of action on which the chiefs of those cities had determined.
[4] εἰ μὲν οὖν θρασύτερον ἐπὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ὥρμησαν Ἀλβανοὶ Ῥωμαίων καταφρονήσαντες καὶ μιᾷ κρῖναι μάχῃ τὰ ὅλα διέγνωσαν, οὐ�
�ὲν ἂν τὸ κωλῦον ἦν τόν τε κατασκευασθέντα δόλον ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς λεληθέναι καὶ διεφθάρθαι τὰ στρατεύματα αὐτῶν ἀμφότερα: νῦν δὲ ἡ διατριβὴ τοῦ πολέμου παράδοξος ἅπασι γενομένη καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ παρεσκευάζοντο πολὺς ἐφελκυσθεὶς διέχεεν αὐτῶν τὰ βουλεύματα. τῶν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς συνωμοσίας τινές, εἴτε οἰκεῖα κέρδη περιβαλέσθαι ζητοῦντες εἴτε τοῖς κορυφαιοτάτοις τῶν σφετέρων καὶ τὸ ἔργον εἰσηγησαμένοις φθονοῦντες εἴτε μήνυσιν ἑτέρων δεδιότες, ὅ τι πολλοῖς συνέβη παθεῖν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρώποις καὶ χρονιζομέναις συνωμοσίαις, εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι γνώμης οὐκ ἀξιούσης ἔργον ἀνόσιον εἰς εὐτυχὲς κατασκῆψαι τέλος μηνυταὶ γίνονται τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ δόλου. [p. 279]
[4] If, therefore, the Albans, in their contempt for the Romans, had rushed more boldly into an engagement and had resolved to stake everything upon the issue of a single battle, nothing could have hindered the treachery contrived against them from remaining secret and both their armies from being destroyed. But as it was, their delay in beginning war, contrary to all expectations, and the length of time they employed in making their preparations were bringing their foes’ plans to nought. For some of the conspirators, either seeking to compass their private advantage or envying their leaders and those who had been the authors of the undertaking or fearing that others might lay information — a thing which has often happened in conspiracies where there are many accomplices and the execution is long delayed — or being compelled by the will of Heaven, which could not consent that a wicked design should meet with success, informed their enemies of the treachery.
[1] ταῦτα δὴ μαθὼν ὁ Φουφέττιος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔσπευσε ποιήσασθαι τὰς διαλύσεις, ὡς οὐδὲ αἱρέσεως ἔτι τοῦ μὴ ταῦτα πράττειν σφίσι καταλειπομένης. ἐγεγόνει δὲ καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῆς συνωμοσίας ταύτης ἡ μήνυσις παρὰ τῶν ἐκ Φιδήνης φίλων, ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔτι διαμελλήσας δέχεται τὰς τοῦ Φουφεττίου προκλήσεις. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνῆλθον εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων χωρίον ἐπαγόμενοι συμβούλους ἑκάτεροι τοὺς φρονῆσαι τὰ δέοντα ἱκανούς, ἀσπασάμενοι πρῶτον ἀλλήλους ὡς πρότερον εἰώθεσαν καὶ φιλοφρονηθέντες τὰς ἑταιρικάς τε καὶ συγγενικὰς φιλοφροσύνας διελέγοντο περὶ τῶν διαλύσεων.
[7.1] Fufetius, upon learning of this, grew still more desirous of making an accommodation, feeling that they now had no choice left of any other course. The king of the Romans also had received information of this conspiracy from his friends in Fidenae, so that he, too, made no delay but hearkened to the overtures made by Fufetius. When the two met in the space between the camps, each being attended by his council consisting of persons of competent judgment, they first embraced, according to their former custom, and exchanged the greetings usual among friends and relations, and then proceeded to discuss an accommodation.
[2] ἤρχετο δ᾽ ὁ Ἀλβανὸς πρότερος τοιάδε λέγων: ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τὰς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἐπιδεῖξαι, δἰ ὰς ἐγὼ πρῶτος ἠξίωσα περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου διαλέγεσθαι, οὔτε μάχῃ κρατηθεὶς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν οὔτ᾽ ἐπισιτισμοὺς εἰσάγεσθαι κωλυόμενος οὔτε εἰς ἄλλην κατακεκλεισμένος ἀνάγκην οὐδεμίαν, ἵνα μή με ὑπολάβητε τῆς μὲν οἰκείας δυνάμεως ἀσθένειαν κατεγνωκότα, τὴν δὲ ὑμετέραν ἰσχὺν δυσκαταγώνιστον εἶναι νομίζοντα εὐπρεπῆ ζητεῖν ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ πολέμου. ἀφόρητοι γὰρ ἂν γένοισθε ὑπὸ βαρύτητος, εἴ τι πεισθείητε περὶ ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐθὲν ἂν τῶν μετρίων ὑπομείναιτε ποιεῖν, ὡς κρατοῦντες [p. 280]
[2] And first the Alban leader began as follows:
“It seems to me necessary to begin my speech by setting forth the reasons why I have determined to take the initiative in proposing a termination of the war, though neither defeated by you Romans in battle nor hindered from supplying my army with provisions nor reduced to any other necessity, to the end that you may not imagine that a recognition of the weakness of my own force or a belief that yours is difficult to overcome makes me seek a plausible excuse for ending the war. For, should you entertain such an opinion of us, you would be intolerably severe, and, as if you were already victorious in the war, you could not bring yourself to do anything reasonable.
[3] ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ. ἵνα δὴ μὴ τὰς ψευδεῖς αἰτίας εἰκάζητε περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς προαιρέσεως, δι᾽ ἃς ἀξιῶ καταλύσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, ἀκούσατε τὰς ἀληθεῖς: ἐγὼ στρατηγὸς ἀποδειχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος αὐτοκράτωρ ἅμα τῷ παραλαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσκόπουν τίνες ἦσαν αἱ συνταράξασαι τὰς πόλεις ἡμῶν προφάσεις. ὁρῶν δὲ μικρὰς καὶ φαύλας καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὰς διελεῖν τοσαύτην φιλίαν καὶ συγγένειαν οὐ τὰ κράτιστα ἡγούμην οὔτε Ἀλβανοὺς οὔτε ὑμᾶς βουλεύσασθαι.
[3] In order, therefore, that you may not impute to me false reasons for my purpose to end the war, listen to the true reasons. My country have been appointed me general with absolute power, as soon as I took over the command I considered what were the causes which had disturbed the peace of our cities. And finding them trivial and petty and of too little consequence to dissolve so great a friendship and kinship, I concluded that neither we Albans nor you Romans had been governed by the best counsels.
[4] ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἔγνων τοῦτο καὶ πολλὴν κατέγνων ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν μανίαν, ἐπειδὴ παρῆλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ πεῖραν ἐλάμβανον τῆς ἑκάστου προαιρέσεως. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις οὔτ᾽ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς συλλόγοις ὁμονοοῦντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου πάντας Ἀλβανοὺς ἑώρων, μακρῷ δέ τινι τῶν ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνου λογισμοῦ καταλαμβανομένων χαλεπῶν τὰ δαιμόνια σημεῖα, ὁπότε χρησαίμην σφαγίοις περὶ μάχης, χαλεπώτερα γινόμενα πολλὴν δυσθυμίαν παρεῖχέ μοι καὶ ἀμηχανίαν.
[4] And I was further convinced of this and led to condemn the great madness that we both have shown, an once I had taken hold of affairs and began to sound out each man’s private opinion. For I found that the Albans neither in their private meetings nor in their public assemblies were all of one mind regarding the war; and the signs from Heaven, whenever I consulted the victims concerning battle, presenting, as they did, far greater difficulties than those based on human reasoning, caused me great dismay and anxiety.
[5] ἐνθυμούμενος δὴ ταῦτα τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ὁρμῆς ἐπέσχον, ἀναβολὰς δὲ κα�
�� διατριβὰς ἐποιούμην τοῦ πολέμου προτέρους ὑμᾶς οἰόμενος ἄρξειν τῶν περὶ φιλίας λόγων: καὶ ἔδει γε, ὦ Τύλλε, τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀποίκους ὄντας ἡμῶν καὶ μὴ περιμένειν ἕως ἡ μητρόπολις ἄρξῃ. ὅσης γὰρ ἀξιοῦσι τιμῆς τυγχάνειν οἱ πατέρες παρὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων, τοσαύτης οἱ κτίσαντες τὰς πόλεις παρὰ τῶν ἀποίκων.
[5] In view, therefore, of these considerations, I restrained my eagerness for armed conflicts and devised delays and postponements of the war, in the belief that you Romans would make the first overtures towards peace. And indeed you should have done this, Tullius, since you are our colony, and not have waited till your mother-city set the example. For the founders of cities have a right to receive as great respect from their colonies as parents from their children.
[6] ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἐμέλλομεν καὶ παρετηροῦμεν ἀλλήλους, [p. 281] πότεροι τῶν εὐγνωμόνων ἄρξουσι λόγων, ἑτέρα τις ἡμᾶς ἀνάγκη κρείττων ἅπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου λογισμοῦ περιλαβοῦσα συνάγει: ἣν ἐγὼ πυθόμενος ἔτι λανθάνουσαν ὑμᾶς οὐκέτ᾽ ᾠόμην δεῖν τῆς εὐπρεπείας τῶν διαλλαγῶν στοχάζεσθαι. δειναὶ γὰρ, ὦ Τύλλε, μηχαναὶ πλέκονται καθ᾽ ἡμῶν καὶ δόλος ἄφυκτος ἔρραπται κατ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων, ὃς ἔμελλεν ἀκονιτὶ καὶ δίχα πόνου πάντα συντρίψειν καὶ διαφθερεῖν ἡμῶν τὰ
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 472
