Charles Rappleye writes insightfully of Morris’s efforts to assist GW’s Yorktown campaign; according to Rappleye, “the loose coalition of moderates who became the Nationalist faction . . . emerged as the most capable and most adroit administrators the struggle would produce,” in Robert Morris, p. 228. Robert Selig in March to Victory cites James Hendricks’s Aug. 21, 1781, letter, in which he predicts the French army’s use of specie “will effectively prevent the [American] commissioners from procuring any [provisions],” pp. 32–33; Selig also writes of how Robert Morris and Timothy Pickering divided up the commissary duties with Morris “in charge of finding supplies [and] Pickering and his staff focused on selecting roads and campsites,” p. 30; and how Pickering “after being informed of Washington’s decision to march to Virginia, had only four days to accomplish myriad supporting tasks,” p. 30. In an Aug. 19, 1781, entry in his Revolutionary Journal, von Closen writes of how the French commissary had been “sent to make some purchases of flour and some forages along the right bank of the North River under the pretext of having some ovens built for the army at Chatham. That there would be many demonstrations there, and that the necessary bricks would even be collected along the Raritan,” p. 104. James Thacher in his Military Journal writes of how GW “makes the great plans and designs under an impenetrable veil of secrecy” and how “[o]ur situation reminds me of some theatrical exhibition,” pp. 261–62. GW writes of how “[t]he success of our enterprise depends upon the celerity of our movements” in an Aug. 24, 1781, letter to Benjamin Lincoln in WGW, 23:43. GW writes of how the entire French army halted “for the purpose of bringing up our rear as because we had heard not of the arrival of de Grasse and [I] was unwilling to discover our real object to the enemy” in an Aug. 29, 1781, entry in his Diaries, 2:257. In an Aug. 27, 1781, letter to Col. Samuel Miles, GW writes of how he “delayed having these preparations made until this moment, because I wished to deceive the enemy with regard to our real object as long as possible,” in WGW, 23:54–55. GW’s Aug. 28, 1781, letter to Lt. William Colfax, in which he complains of Colfax’s unavailability and requests that “[w]hen business or inclination (especially on a march) calls you from your command I should be glad to know it,” is in WGW, 23:62. In a Sept. 6, 1781, letter to Timothy Pickering, GW writes that it is of the “utmost importance . . . that gent. who are acting at the head of departments should at this present period be with the troops,” adding he should “join them with all possible dispatch,” in WGW, 23:92.
Samuel Hood’s letter to Henry Clinton, written at sea on Aug. 25, 1781, which includes a listing of his “line of battle” and the confident statement “And I trust you will think it equal fully to defeat any designs of the enemy, let de Grasse bring or send what ships he may in aid of those under Barras,” is quoted in French Ensor Chadwick, ed., The Graves Papers, p. 141. In an Aug. 30, 1781, letter to Philip Stephens, Hood writes, “I put to sea on Aug. 10 at dawn of day, not caring to wait for the St. Lucia ships, lest the enemy should get to America before me,” quoted in Chadwick’s The Graves Papers, pp. 57–58; in the same letter, he recounts “finding no enemy had appeared either in the Chesapeake or Delaware,” p. 58. Months later, in a May 4, 1782, letter to Philip Stephens in The Graves Papers, Graves insisted that Hood “never saw the Capes of the Chesapeake, nor any other land until he made the Neversink [coastal highlands near Sandy Hook],” p. 161. In “New Light on the Battle Off the Virginia Capes: Graves vs. Hood,” Michael Crawford, using coordinates from the logs of Hood’s fleet, convincingly makes the case that Graves was correct, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YTYCdX47G7KDpdGAiQhy/full. William Smith writes that “Sir Henry is all mystery, seems to approve but changes and resolves nothing,” in an Aug. 1, 1781, entry in his Memoirs, p. 429. Andrew O’Shaughnessy in The Men Who Lost America discusses the well-paid and exceedingly comfortable life Clinton had constructed for himself in New York, p. 238. Smith writes of the sycophants in Clinton’s military family along with the despairing judgment, “Poor Sir Henry! His want of parts renders him insensible of his dangers,” in an Aug. 15, 1781, entry in his Memoirs, p. 430. Clinton makes the claim that “I was in no capacity to interrupt [GW’s] march to the southward whenever he pleased to make it” and that he “could not entertain the most distant suspicion that [GW] really intended to march his army to the Chesapeake” because he “had every reason to be certain of our having a naval superiority” in The American Rebellion, pp. 327–28.
In an Aug. 30, 1781, letter to Philip Stephens, Graves writes, “Whether the French intend a junction, or whether they have left the coast, is only to be guessed at,” in Chadwick’s The Graves Papers, p. 53. Hood describes his meeting with Clinton and Graves and how “I humbly submitted the necessity which struck me very forcibly of such of Graves’s squadron as were ready coming without the bar immediately,” in an Aug. 30, 1781, letter to Philip Stephens, in The Graves Papers, p. 58. Smith recounts how Clinton and Graves were “not fond of” Hood’s proposal to sail for the Chesapeake immediately, as well as Hood’s declaration “that the French are gone to Havana and will be coming here,” and that the British fleet “will be superior to the united force of French and Spaniards after their detachment for the trade home” in an Aug. 29, 1781, entry in his Memoirs, p. 435. On the incident leading to Graves’s court-martial in 1757, see John Tilley’s The British Navy and the American Revolution, p. 127.
GW’s Sept. 2, 1781, letter to Lafayette, in which he expresses his fear that “by occupying the Chesapeake,” the British fleet will “frustrate all our flattering prospects in that quarter,” is in WGW, 23:77. GW’s Sept. 4, 1781, letter to NG, in which he admits that “the present time is as interesting and anxious a moment as I have ever experienced,” is in WGW, 23:85. James Thacher writes of how “[o]ur destination can no longer be a secret” in his Military Journal, p. 262. GW enclosed the list of wood flats, schooners, and sloops capable of carrying 4150 men with his Aug. 31, 1781, letter to Benjamin Lincoln in WGW, 23:71; he advises Lincoln that “[s]ome delicacy must be used” in making sure the American soldiers left room for the French in an Aug. 28, 1781, letter to Lincoln, p. 60. Rochambeau tells of how the Delaware River was low enough that his army was able to cross it at a fording place “near Trenton” in his Memoirs, p. 62. Rappleye describes how GW and Rochambeau and their staffs took over Morris’s house on Front Street in Philadelphia, “Mattresses were strewn on the floor, and for the next week the house served as temporary headquarters for the allied high command,” in Robert Morris, p. 260. GW’s Sept. 2, 1781, instructions to Lt. Col. Jean Baptiste Gouvion, in which he is ordered to assess the condition of the roads to the south and “excite the inhabitants,” is in WGW, 23:79. GW writes of his “strongest fears” concerning his army not receiving enough provisions in a country “otherwise well provided” is in a Sept. 3, 1781, circular sent to the states of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland in WGW, 23:81–82. Rappleye writes of the “hybrid currency” Morris created, which came to be called Morris notes, or “Bobs” for short, in Robert Morris, pp. 258–59. In an Aug. 9, 1781, entry in his Diary, Frederick Mackenzie recounts a report by a British spy claiming the Americans are “very ill supplied with provisions. . . . At the same time the French troops were furnished with one and half pounds of bread per day, and numbers of them came into the Continental camp and offered to sell their loaves, which weight 3 pound for half a dollar in cash, as no other money is circulating. This has given great offense to the Continental soldiers and militia, who abuse the French and say that they who have never done any service to the country are well paid, fed and clothed, while themselves, who have been fighting for the country, are almost destitute of everything. The French soldiers are frequently knocked down, and their loaves taken from them. The French will not suffer the Rebel soldiers to come into their encampment,” 2:583–84.
Thacher describes how the American soldiers marched “in slow and solemn step” through Philadelphia while kicking up “a dust like a smothering snow storm” in
his Military Journal, pp. 263–64. Lee Kennett in The French Forces in America recounts how the French soldiers paused outside of Philadelphia to powder their hair and put on their white gaiters, p. 135, while Thacher notes that rather than the fife and drum of the Americans, the French employed “a complete band of music” in his Military Journal, p. 264. Baron von Closen writes of the sensation created by “the gilded contingent” of the French army in Philadelphia in his Revolutionary Journal, p. 120. Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger describes how President Thomas McKean asked Rochambeau “if it would be proper for him to salute the field officers” in ACRA, p. 134.
GW’s Sept. 2, 1781, letter to Lafayette, in which he confesses to being “distressed beyond expression” and requests that he send any news of de Grasse “on the Spur of Speed,” is in WGW, 23:77. Clinton’s Sept. 2, 1781, letter to Cornwallis, in which he reveals that GW “is moving an army to the southward with an appearance of haste,” is in Benjamin Franklin Stevens, ed., The Campaign in Virginia, 2:149. Mackenzie writes of how Clinton has allowed GW “to advance a good way into Jersey, without molestation or obstruction; while the army in Virginia . . . is now entirely unprepared for being attacked by a fleet and an army,” in an Aug. 29, 1781, entry in his Journal, p. 606. GW writes of “everything in a tolerable train” in Philadelphia in a Sept. 5, 1781, entry in his Diaries, 2:258. Von Closen describes how Mauduit du Plessis served as their tour guide as Rochambeau and his officers sailed down the Delaware River during their tour of the fortifications at Fort Mifflin, Red Bank, and Billingsport in his Revolutionary Journal, pp. 121–23. Guillaume de Deux-Ponts writes of how GW is “of a natural coldness and of a serious and noble approach” in ACRA, p. 126. Douglas Southall Freeman recounts how GW received the packet of expresses from Mordecai Gist about three miles past Chester, Pennsylvania, in George Washington, 5:321. In describing GW’s astonishing demonstration of joy on the Chester waterfront, Baron von Closen writes, “One must experience such circumstances to appreciate the effect that such gratifying news can have,” in his Revolutionary Journal, p. 123. James Thacher describes how the city of Philadelphia reacted to the news of de Grasse and how “[s]ome merry fellows mounted on scaffolds and stages” in his Military Journal, p. 265. The Duc de Lauzun makes the claim that “I have never seen a man more overcome with great and sincere joy” in his Memoirs, p. 204. Guillaume de Deux-Ponts recounts how GW “put aside his character as arbiter of North America and contented himself for the moment with that of a citizen, happy at the good fortune of his country,” in ACRA, p. 126. Baron von Closen writes of how GW and Rochambeau “embraced warmly on the shore” in Revolutionary Journal, p. 123; von Closen also insists that “one must not count his chickens before they are hatched,” p. 123.
Cornwallis’s Sept. 1, 1781, note to Clinton, “An enemy’s fleet within the Capes, between 30 and 40 ships of war, mostly large,” is in Stevens’s The Campaign in Virginia, 2:147. Clinton’s Sept. 6, 1781, letter to Cornwallis, in which he writes, “I can have no doubt that Washington is moving with at least 6000 French and rebel troops against you,” is also in Stevens, pp. 152–53. Frederick Mackenzie makes the prediction that “an action must ensue” between de Grasse and Graves in a Sept. 3, 1781, entry in his Diary, p. 612. William Smith predicts, “A week will decide perhaps the ruin or salvation of the British Empire,” in a Sept. 4, 1781, entry in his Memoirs, p. 438. Robert Selig in March to Victory lists the number of vessels assembled at Head of Elk, and details how many men from both armies traveled by water and by land, p. 40. Jonathan Trumbull writes of how “[t]he country through which we have passed [was] greatly pleased with the prospect of our expedition” in a Sept. 7, 1781, entry in “Minutes of Occurrences Respecting the Siege and Capture of Yorktown,” p. 333. GW writes of how “no circumstance could possibly have happened more opportunely” in his announcement of de Grasse’s arrival in the Chesapeake to the American troops in the general orders of Sept. 6, 1781, in WGW, 23:93–94. Selig in March to Victory cites Robert Morris’s worried observation that the American soldiers showed “great symptoms of discontent . . . on their passing through this city,” p. 39. GW’s Sept. 6, 1781, letter to Robert Morris, pleading that the money to pay the Continental soldiers be delivered “on the Wings of speed” is in WGW, 23:89. Charles Rappleye in Robert Morris details the complex negotiations between Morris and Rochambeau that resulted in the loan of the specie and how the American paymaster dramatically knocked off the heads of the casks of borrowed coins, pp. 261–62. John Hudson’s claim that the money he received at Head of Elk was the “only pay that I ever drew for my service during the war” is in Selig’s March to Victory, p. 40.
Jonathan Trumbull describes the “[g]reat joy” in Baltimore on GW’s arrival in a Sept. 8, 1781, entry in “Minutes,” p. 333. I have relied on Robert and Lee Dalzell’s George Washington’s Mount Vernon for my description of the two major renovations of GW’s house, pp. 47–49, 67–69, 90–93. The Dalzells write of “Lund’s understandable doubts about the wisdom of spending so much time, energy, and money rebuilding a house that might at any minute be destroyed,” p. 103. In Valiant Ambition I cite GW’s Sept. 30, 1776, letter to Lund Washington, in which he writes of being in “an unhappy, divided state,” while detailing changes to the new room on the north end of the house, pp. 19–20. The Dalzells chronicle the progress of Mount Vernon’s renovations through the war years in George Washington’s Mount Vernon, pp. 107–11. GW’s March 28, 1781, letter to Lund, in which he asks him a long list of questions about the house and then adds, “An account of these things would be satisfactory to me . . . as I have these kind of improvements very much at heart,” is in WGW, 21:386. GW writes of “a spirit of exertion” he was pleased to observe in Maryland in a Sept. 11, 1781, letter to Governor Thomas Sim Lee in WGW, 23:112. GW writes of having “reached my own seat at Mount Vernon (distant 120 miles from Head of Elk) where I staid till the 12” in his Diaries, 2:260. The Dalzells cite an Aug. 19, 1776, letter to Lund, in which GW details the kinds of trees to be planted “without any order or regularity (but pretty thick, as they can at any time be thin’d)” on the north and south ends of the house, in George Washington’s Mount Vernon, p. 108. The October entry in a 2018 calendar published by the Mount Vernon Ladies’ Association in cooperation with George Washington’s Mount Vernon states that “[t]he most prominent feature on the 3rd floor [of Mount Vernon] is the large oval or ‘oxeye’ window,” which has recently undergone restoration by the organization’s preservation carpenter. The Dalzells state that GW’s “first rebuilding of Mount Vernon was not particularly original,” while detailing how he decided “to stray . . . from the path of architectural correctness” by adding features (the cupola and the piazza) in the second renovation that were in GW’s description “things not quite orthodox,” in George Washington’s Mount Vernon, pp. 90–93; they also cite Bryan Fairfax’s 1778 letter to GW in which he writes, “I like the house because it is uncommon,” p. 5.
GW’s Sept. 9, 1781, letter to Peter Waggoner ordering the local Virginia militia to improve the roads is in WGW, 23:109. Selig writes that a supply train of 1500 horses, 800 oxen, and 220 wagons headed to Virginia from Maryland in March to Victory, p. 41. The Dalzells write that “[t]he new roof leaked, and badly” and describe the unfinished north room as “an empty shell” in George Washington’s Mount Vernon, p. 113. Jonathan Trumbull describes Mount Vernon as “[a]n elegant seat and situation, great appearance of opulence and real exhibitions of hospitality and princely entertainment,” in a Sept. 11, 1781, entry in “Minutes,” p. 333. GW’s Sept. 10, 1781, letter to Lafayette, in which he asks him to “keep Lord Cornwallis safe, without provisions or forage until we arrive,” is in WGW, 23:110. Trumbull describes GW being “[m]uch agitated” after receiving the message that “[t]he French were gone out from the bay in pursuit of the English” in his Sept. 13, 1781, entry in his “Minutes,” p. 333.
CHAPTER 8 ◆ “LIGNE DE VITESSE”
According to Olivier Chaline, de Grass
e’s fleet was pushed so far to the northeast by the Gulf Stream during its passage from Cuba that it actually overshot the Chesapeake. Chaline has also determined that at one point de Grasse’s fleet was so close to Hood’s (which had left the Caribbean after the French) that the two fleets may have even sighted vessels from each other’s squadrons in “Season, Winds and Sea: The Improbable Route of de Grasse to the Chesapeake,” https://vimeo.com/174351130. In a Sept. 4, 1781, letter to GW, Louis Lebègue Duportail writes, “When 27 of line are in Chesapeake, when great American and French forces are joined, we must take Lord Cornwallis or be all dishonored,” in Washington and de Grasse, Correspondence of General Washington and Comte de Grasse, 1781, August 1–November 4 (subsequently referred to as Correspondence), p. 13. Charles Lee Lewis cites the Comte d’Orvilliers’s 1772 assessment of de Grasse as “the best skilled captain in the squadron,” as well as how “[h]is frequent collisions with other ships . . . seems to demand something more perfect in his estimate of a situation at a glance,” in Admiral De Grasse and American Independence, p. 49. GW writes of how de Grasse’s character was “marred by his own impetuosity” in an April 28, 1788, letter to Rochambeau in the Washington Papers, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-06-02-0212; see also www.revolutionary-war-and-beyond.com/george-washington-letter-to-the-marquis-de-lafayette-april-28-1788.html. The reference to de Grasse’s “[f]eeling the full cost of time” appears in “Summary of the Campaign Through the End of October 1781” (which may have been authored by de Grasse himself) in ANM B4 184, at LOC. In a Sept. 2, 1781, letter to GW, Duportail, who had just spoken in detail with de Grasse, refers to the fact that Cornwallis’s works at Yorktown “shall be forced with difficulty” in Correspondence, p. 13. One of the more undermanned ships in de Grasse’s fleet was the 80-gun Auguste, captained by Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, which was missing 200 of her approximately 700-man crew, according to Jean-Marie Kowalski in “The Battle of the Chesapeake from the Quarterdeck,” p. 4. De Grasse describes the officers and sailors who transported Saint-Simon’s troops up the James River as “the best drilled part of the crew” in the account attributed to him in John Shea, ed., The Operations of the French Fleet Under the Count de Grasse, p. 155. In a Sept. 4, 1781, letter to GW, de Grasse writes, “I am doing the impossible to hasten [the arrival] of your troops, by sending to meet you six or seven men-of-war, chosen from amongst those of my fleet which draw the least water, in order to take on board the greatest number possible. These ships will be followed by frigates, and generally by every ship fit to mount the river,” in Correspondence, pp. 18–19. Lafayette was mindful of de Grasse’s overly impetuous nature; in a Sept. 1, 1781, letter to GW, he writes, “My little influence will be employed in preaching patience as our affairs cannot be spoiled unless we do spoil them ourselves,” in LAAR, 4:382.
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