Crucible of a Generation

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Crucible of a Generation Page 8

by J. Kenneth Brody


  appreciated fact of life, still limited to a small audience, but their potential power

  had set radio broadcasters into action. A week earlier an article in The Times had made serious accusations that the Columbia Broadcasting System was stif ling the

  development of television in order to enhance the profitability of its radio opera-

  tions. In a vigorous rebuttal, Adrian Murphy, the Columbia Broadcasting System

  executive director for television, said that radio stations and executives had gone

  into television in order to protect not only their own interests, but the future of

  radio. This, said Mr. Murphy, was in no wise blameworthy or sinister, given that

  any industry had a right to protect its future.

  The previous article had charged that “some executives” had admitted that by

  controlling television they had hoped to slow its development. “Some (unidenti-

  fied) executives were dubious authority,” said Mr. Murphy, as long as they remained

  anonymous. But in any event television had become widespread enough among

  competing organizations that it was hardly susceptible of control by anyone.

  40 Last Sunday at Peace: November 30, 1941

  What was important in the last analysis was programming, and this, Mr. Murphy

  declared, was the subject of an intensive effort by Columbia; it sought to advance an

  industry that could hardly be helped by “uninformed and baseless accusations.” 13

  *

  “Modern art” has always been a subject fraught with difficulty for the public

  as well as for those who have exhibited it to the public. In response to shocked

  and dismayed correspondents, The Times critic Edward Alden Jewell confessed

  that the newspaper’s reproduction of Joan Miro’s “Rope and Persons,” then being

  shown at the Museum of Modern Art, had been printed upside down. Such things

  could happen, Mr. Jewell replied, when the editor neglects to write “Top” on

  the back of a photograph or other reproduction. Anyway, Mr. Jewell observed,

  abstractions had been known to have been reproduced lying on their sides and a

  notable work of abstract art had been hung that way at a distinguished museum.

  A few of Mr. Jewell’s correspondents were sympathetic. Melvin Freidel, who

  maintained lowercase throughout, wrote: “alas for the poor maligned modern art-

  ist. Who lays out the art page and what did Miro ever do to him?”

  Mr. F. W. James of Belleville, New Jersey, found the critics’ remarks appalling in

  their childish innocence and closed by attacking the Miro as “indescribable filth.”

  Mr. Saul Raskin opined that American artists were in a bad way precisely

  because of such exhibitions. They had had their fill of Dali and Surrealism. Dali

  was, indeed, a misfortune to the American artist and, by the way, why was the exhi-

  bition at the Museum of Modern Art traveling under the title “Dali & Company”?

  Mr. Jewell was happy to take on Mr. Raskin and indeed all comers. He asked

  a simple question: what indeed was the function of the Museum of Modern Art?

  He gave a simple answer. It seemed to him that the function of the Museum of

  Modern Art was to place modern art before the public. The public might not like

  it, but it ought to be exposed to it as much as possible, and the best way to illumi-

  nate the whole issue was to see the art itself. Here, indeed, was a tempest that has

  not perceptibly faded in the following generations. 14

  Notes

  1.

  New York Times , November 30, 1941, 2/5

  2.

  Atlanta Constitution , November 30, 1941, 6C

  3.

  New York Times , November 30, 1941, 66

  4.

  New York Times , November 30, 1941, 67

  5.

  New York Times , November 30, 1941, 55

  6.

  Atlanta Constitution , November 30, 1941, 1

  7.

  New York Times , November 30, 1941, 18

  8.

  Houston Chronicle , November 30, 1941, 4C

  9.

  Atlanta Constitution , November 30, 1941, 8D

  10. Atlanta Constitution , November 30, 1941, 10D

  11. Houston Chronicle , November 30, 1941, 7C

  12. Oregonian , November 30, 1941, MI

  13. New York Times , November 30, 1941, 8/12

  14. New York Times , November 30, 1941, 8/9

  PART II

  Last Week at Peace

  December 1–6, 1941

  5

  MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941

  A World in Flames: Storm Signals Flying

  Following up its victory at Rostov, Moscow radio announced that the forty-mile

  road from Rostov to Taganrog, the line of retreat of the German army, had been

  cleared. On the central front, Russian counterattacks blunted continuing thrusts

  against Moscow. Berlin had little to say about the situation at Rostov but broad-

  cast claims of gigantic Russian losses.

  The day’s news was favorable to the Allied cause in North Africa, too. The

  British Eighth Army advanced across the Cyranaican hump to the Gulf of Sidra

  below Bengazi, cutting off Axis supply lines in Libya. German and Italian tank

  forces attempting to escape entrapment east of Tobruk were defeated by a flank

  attack. All this amounted to what Rome characterized as a “pause” on the Libyan

  front. 1

  *

  Storm signals were f lying all across the Pacific. A large contingent of British and

  Indian troops “ready for all eventualities” landed at Rangoon in British Burma,

  and London radio said that more British warships had been dispatched to the

  Far East. 2 In a twilight zone between peace and war it was announced that an American air group, with American pilots f lying American planes under the

  Chinese f lag, would defend the vital Burma Road from Japanese air attack. The

  members of the force were officially listed as members of the Chinese Air Force.

  Many were former regular officers of the U.S. Army and Navy. Further confus-

  ing their status, these officers retained their Army and Navy ranks or promo-

  tional standing and, interestingly, they would continue to receive their regular

  Army and Navy pay.

  Singapore was placed under emergency orders. U.S. consular authorities in

  Thailand were advising all American citizens to be ready to evacuate the country

  “at any minute.” Similarly, U.S. consular authorities advised Americans to leave

  44 Last Week at Peace: December 1–6, 1941

  FIGURE 5.1 See color plate section.

  Courtesy of Northwestern University Library World War II poster collection, Pr32.5015:38.

  Shanghai, while the Shanghai branch of the Chase National Bank of New York

  advised its clients that henceforth their accounts would be handled only at the

  depositor’s risk.

  At Manila, the U.S. Army and Navy were alerted; many officers had been

  called back from leave; and all leaves from the Corregidor fortress at the entrance

  to Manila Bay were suspended until further notice. 3

  The Threat of War: Wait and See

  Across the Pacific, The New York Times gravely reported that there had been no

  abatement of tension in relations between the United States and Japan. Under

  Monday, December 1, 1941 45

  the press of events the President had cut short his Warm Springs stay and left for

  Washington. He would arrive at noon to confer with
his advisers. He looked

  “grim” and did not show the crowds that assembled in the Georgia backcountry

  villages through which he traveled the buoyant attitude of the day before. Only

  that evening the President had raised the possibility that U.S. troops could be in

  action within the year, or possibly even sooner.

  Certainly reports from Tokyo were ominous. There had been no formal reply to

  Secretary of State Hull’s statement of principles and the Japanese envoys remained

  in Washington.

  Japan’s Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo rejected Hull’s statement and his prin-

  ciples as “fantastic.” He characterized U.S. attitudes as “regrettable,” reiterating

  Japan’s determination to construct a “new order in East Asia.” The close relationship

  among Japan, Manchukuo, and the puppet regime at Nanking must be cemented,

  he said, going forward to a new order in East Asia on the basis of cooperation and

  coprosperity. The United States didn’t understand the real situation in East Asia,

  Togo charged. It was trying to apply “fantastic principles” and rules not adapted

  to the actual situation of the world. All this tended to obstruct progress toward the

  New Order. What Togo had earlier characterized as “regrettable,” he now labeled

  “extremely regrettable.”

  Japan, he said, stood for “Asia for the Asiatics,” under Japanese leadership, in

  stark contrast to the U.S. policy of the Open Door. That same day Japan, Man-

  chukuo, and China celebrated the first anniversary of a joint declaration of coop-

  eration. Foreign Minister Togo did not appear at a large rally in Tokyo, but his

  message was read by General Ando, the Executive Vice President of the Imperial

  Rule Assistance Organization.

  General Ando’s speech was, if anything, more blunt than the statements of

  the Foreign Minister. He said that Japan, Manchukuo, and China would “take

  all necessary measures and suffer any sacrifices” to establish the New Order on

  the basis of good neighborliness, economic collaboration, and joint defense with

  due respect to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national characteristics

  of each of the three nations. A group of powers, he claimed, was trying to

  obstruct this. Among them was Chungking, a mere puppet of the United States,

  which would collapse once the strings were cut. He named another target.

  The Netherlands East Indies, he said, would be similarly finished once Japa-

  nese troops moved toward that region, and neither the United States nor Great

  Britain would be able to help. One hundred million Japanese were awaiting

  the outcome of negotiations, “determined to meet all eventualities and elimi-

  nate any obstacles in the way of a holy task.” He continued: “We now stand at

  the crossroads of peace and war. The road ahead is beset with difficulties but

  we should not be blinded by the temporary advantage of safety nor go astray on

  the way to our lofty goal.” 4

  All this said, the general concluded that Japan wanted to continue discussions

  with the United States for at least two weeks, despite dissatisfaction with certain

  fundamental points at issue.

  So the talks would continue. Since there had been no sign of Japanese military

  moves, the United States was inclined to wait and see. The question was whether

  46 Last Week at Peace: December 1–6, 1941

  Japan was bluffing. There remained, however, little question that the United States

  stood together with Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies. The problem

  was one the world had faced before. Did the Japanese believe that the United

  States wouldn’t fight for Thailand as Hitler had once believed that Great Britain

  wouldn’t fight for Danzig? And in return for the withdrawal of Japanese troops

  from French Indo-China, would the United States be prepared to relax economic

  sanctions? 5

  *

  Amid rising tensions, Japanese envoy Kichisaburo Nomura spoke the truth when

  he told a reporter that there was still a wide gap between the American and

  Japanese positions but that: “I believe there must be wise statesmanship to save

  the situation.”

  Nomura’s statement gained authority in the light of a dispatch from a Japanese

  newspaper indicating that the closing of Japanese consulates in the United States

  was imminent. 6

  The Threat of War: Deep Divisions

  All of these developments offered a rich field for the pundits and the commenta-

  tors on the current scene. Dewitt Mackenzie, a columnist syndicated by Wide

  World News, concluded that Japan’s decision to continue negotiations with the

  United States should not surprise anyone, given indications that Japan was anx-

  ious to avoid conf lict with the United States. This was a decision, he thought,

  based on necessity and calculated to give Japan additional time to decide which

  side would win the European war. That was why German reverses in Russia and

  North Africa might have deeply inf luenced Japan’s decision makers. Hitler had

  achieved a remarkable string of victories, diplomatic and military, but his cur-

  rent difficulties in Russia and North Africa could result in a loss of luster and

  might forestall Hitler’s plans to capture the Russian agricultural and petroleum

  resources vital to any German victory. 7

  To the Chicago Tribune , it was an old story. Arthur Sears Henning of the Chicago Tribune Press Services saw Hitler goading Japan to fight America and Britain goading America to defend British interests in the Pacific region. It carried a

  parallel story featuring a statement by General Lesley McNair, the general com-

  manding the Carolina maneuvers, that the U.S. Army could fight effectively given

  the necessary resources and equipment. But the losses would be unduly heavy, and

  the results against a force as potent as the German army might not be “all that

  could be desired.” He hoped that a year from now, the standard of performance of

  the army would be as different from today’s as today’s was from last year’s. But, he

  opined, it would take more than a year to bring the U.S. Army up to the standard

  of the German Wehrmacht. 8

  The novelty of many of the aspects of the U.S. military establishment was

  indicated by the death of the Army’s pioneer airman, sometime Lt. Frank Lahm.

  He had made the world’s first solo military flight. After minimal training, Wilbur

  Monday, December 1, 1941 47

  Wright had told him: “Go ahead and take her up.” This sometime cavalryman had

  risen to the rank of Lieutenant General, retiring at age sixty-four as Commander

  of Randolph Field, Texas, where 5,000 troops, 270 basic and advance training

  planes, and 20,000 civilians were present at his retirement ceremony. How these

  forces might compare to Japan’s was a matter of speculation that day.

  America’s Role: An Age of Faith

  The nineties may have been gay and the twenties may have roared, but in 1941,

  religion remained a vital element in both public and private life. Eminent clergy-

  men were well known, indeed in many cases famous, and their utterances were

  not only heard but listened to. Amid rumors of war and preparations for war,

  amid a deepening crisis, with much of the world already at war, it is instructive
r />   to note in the Monday papers what some of the most prominent spiritual leaders

  had to tell their congregations on Sunday, November 30, 1941.

  At Saint Patrick’s Cathedral in New York, Archbishop Spellman opened a forty-

  hour devotion to pray for “peace and true concord” after a solemn mass attended

  by 2,800. In the procession were leading members of the Catholic hierarchy,

  choristers, seminarians, and acolytes, all carrying lighted candles. The sanctuary

  was decorated with ferns and flowers in the papal colors of gold and white. The

  devotion continued with a solemn mass for peace.

  Monsignor Joseph F. Flannelly, administrator of the Cathedral, read two letters

  from Archbishop Spellman. The first called for a renewal of pledges to the Legion

  of Decency to avoid indecent entertainment, specifically condemning the film

  Two-Faced Woman as a danger to public morals. The second letter urged generosity in the next Sunday’s collection. 9

  Few clergymen were more eminent than Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin, President of

  the Union Theological Seminary, who spoke at the Rockefeller-endowed River-

  side Baptist Church. Men could thwart God’s plan, he said, and wreck His world

  with pride, greed, and folly. But, he reassured his audience, “God . . . never gives

  up.” He next addressed what he called a surge of racial feelings and discrimination

  based upon a sense of national superiority. This could be read as a veiled reference

  to anti-Japanese feeling occasioned by the crisis in Pacific relations.

  But his principal concern that day was the need for international institutions.

  We had entered a war, he said, referring to 1917–18, and we had decisively affected

  the outcome; but in the end we had washed our hands of the tasks of maintain-

  ing and developing justice and peace. Nevertheless he did not believe the United

  States would hazard its independence by entering into an association of nations.

  He easily fell in with American exceptionalism, demanding that the United States

  reflect its own national experience in counseling other people toward an orderly

  commonwealth of mankind with sufficient authority to maintain justice, prevent

  wars, and increase the well-being of all. The good reverend did not indicate the

  chances of success in counseling Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo, who both had

 

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