Leaving Moscow by train sometime in the early fall of 1938, Nguyen Ai Quoc traveled eastward across the vast grasslands of Soviet Central Asia. After stopping in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, he continued on to the Chinese border, where he joined a caravan heading through Ürümqi in Chinese Turkistan to Lanzhou, once the eastern terminus of the Silk Road and now a bustling rail center and capital of Gansu province. At Lanzhou he received assistance from local representatives of the CCP, who made arrangements for him to continue on to Xian. There he was greeted by Wu Xiuquan, head of a local office of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which served the CCP as a contact point for visitors arriving from the USSR. As Wu recalled it in his memoirs: “I was told by higher authorities that I must meet an important Asian, but I didn’t know his name. Higher authorities demanded that I treat him carefully and with respect, and that I must escort him safely to Yan’an.”1
After a two-day stay in Xian, which had just suffered its first air raid by Japanese bombers, Nguyen Ai Quoc joined a group of travelers who were being transported by bullock and horse cart on a two-hundred mile trek northward into the mountains to Yan’an. Because there were many Kuomintang troops along the route, Quoc was disguised as an “escort” for the horse carts, which were ostensibly transporting clothing and footwear to the impoverished peoples living in the hills; he thus covered much of the route on foot.
As Nguyen Ai Quoc recalled many years later, Yan’an in 1938 was flooded with nearly 200,000 PLA troops, most of whom were housed in the numerous caves that studded the loess-covered hillsides throughout the region. Many senior CCP cadres also lived in the caves, which were warmer in winter and cooler in summer than ordinary housing in the area. It was difficult for him to distinguish Chinese officers from enlisted men, however, since they all wore the same dark blue uniform and cloth shoes. Quoc was housed in the Apple Garden (Tao Yuan), a relatively spacious seven-room villa later to be occupied by CCP Chairman Mao Zedong. In Yan’an, he met a number of Chinese acquaintances whom he had known in Moscow, but he apparently did not meet Mao himself, although the latter was rapidly becoming the dominant force within the CCP.2
After about two weeks in Yan’an, Nguyen Ai Quoc headed south in a caravan of five automobiles carrying the retinue of the PLA military commander Ye Jianying. Danger came not from the Japanese, who had just seized Shanghai and were advancing up the Yangtze River toward Hankou, but from elsewhere. Although the united front between the CCP and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government had been in operation for over a year, the truce was a fragile one, and was not always observed with scrupulous care by the local Kuomintang’ authorities. To disguise his identity, Quoc adopted the Chinese name Hu Guang and posed as the orderly of a senior officer traveling with the group. According to Communist sources, during the course of their journey government troops periodically harassed the caravan until nearby PLA units forced them to withdraw.3
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s destination was Guilin, a rustic city in the heart of Guangxi province famous for the sculptured limestone hills that surround it and have historically provided an inspiration for classical Chinese landscape painters. There he took up tesidence at the local headquarters of the CCP’s Eighth Route Army in Lu Ma village, located just outside the municipal boundaries. He was assigned employment as a journalist and public health cadre at the local National Salvation Office (a mass organization subordinated to the CCP-Kuomintang united front). One of his Chinese acquaintances latet recalled:
I worked with Ho Chi Minh at the Eighth Route Army headquarters in Guilin from the end of 1938 to the spring and summer of 1939, and we lived together in a large house to the west of Lu Ma village. At that time he used the name of Hu Guang, and from his accent I thought he was Cantonese. Our office was like a club, but not just any club, since it also performed the function of carrying out political education and culture … and it had many cadres responsible for economics and finance, health, journalism, and so forth. Ho Chi Minh was responsible for hygiene but was a journalist as well, and was therefore one of the leading officials in our organization. I remember that in his inspections of sanitation conditions he took his job seriously, and had very high standards. If sanitation conditions weren’t good, he could be quite blunt in his criticism. He was also responsible for editing our journal, Shenghuo Xiaobao [Life Journal], … He designed the cover and made up the title.... He also wrote many articles as well as Chinese poetry in the classical style.
While Quoc was in Guilin, his friend continued,
he gave me a very sharp impression. Every day he rose early, and then swept the floor.... It was a dirt floor, so when he swept it raised a cloud of dust, and Hu Guang had to cover his mouth with a cloth to protect his mouth.... Serving as a health inspector and a journalist took a third to a half of Hu Guang’s time. For the remainder of the time he either read books or typed on his typewriter. He had a foreign typewriter. I could tell that he was very proficient at it.... At that time I also didn’t know Hu Guang’s real identity. Later I came to realize that he had connections, because on one occasion I criticized him on some small matter in the office. In those days, in our office mutual criticism and self-critic ism were an expected form of behavior. But the next day, [a CCP official] came to me and asked if I had criticized Hu Guang. Why [he asked] are you just haphazardly criticizing people? Thus I realized that Hu Guang was not just an ordinary person, but had connections.
Nguyen Ai Quoc was careful to cultivate the friendship of his colleagues. On his arrival, he had discovered that only English-language typewriters were available at the Eighth Route Army club in Guilin. Fortunately, one of his Chinese colleagues periodically traveled on official business to Hong Kong and Haiphong, and in the course of one visit was able to purchase a French typewriter, which he brought back for Quoc’s use. In gratitude, Quoc took his friend to dinner at a local restaurant, and even splurged on two bottles of wine.4
Some of Nguyen Ai Quoc’s articles, written in French under the name of P. C. Line, were sent to Hanoi, where they were published in the French-language Vietnamese newspaper Notre Voix. Most dealt with conditions in wartime China, attacking the Japanese and praising the indomitable courage of the Chinese people in resisting aggression. One early piece, written in December 1938, sarcastically described Tokyo’s “civilizing” efforts in China, pointing to the massacre that had taken place at Nanjing earlier in the year as an example of Japanese brutality. Another praised the spirit of cooperation as exemplified in the CCP-Kuomintang united front, while a third pointed out that although Japanese technological superiority had resulted in early military success, the Japanese army’s mechanized equipment was now becoming bogged down on primitive Chinese roads and thus getting increasingly useless. The Japanese government had promised victory in three months, he said, and then six months. But, he noted, the war continued without letup.5
Notre Voix was published legally under the direction of ICP leaders based in Hanoi, and its appearance was just one of the consequences of the shift in French colonial policies that had taken place after the formation of the Popular Front in 1936. With leftist parties taking part in the new government in Paris, political prisoners were released early from jail in Indochina, and political parties of all orientations were authorized to take part in limited organizational acriviries.
The policy shift in Paris, together with the change of strategy in Moscow at the Seventh Comintern Congress, took ICP leaders somewhat by surprise. At the Macao congress in March 1935, Ha Huy Tap and his colleagues had adopted a strongly sectarian approach that reflected the leftist line promulgated at the Sixth Congress in 1928, on the clear assumption that such a strategy would continue.
On his return from Moscow in the spring of 1936, Le Hong Phong immediately convened a meeting of the ICP Central Committee in Shanghai to discuss the results of the Seventh Congress. He explained the significance of the recent policy shift in Moscow and proposed steps to bring the Indochinese party into line with the new strategy. At his u
rging, the committee approved the creation of a new Indochinese Democratic Front (Mat tran Thong nhat Dan chu Dong duong) to oppose global fascism and reactionary French colonialism. The resolurion was silent on the approach to be adopted toward rival political parties, but after the conference, the Central Committee sent an open letter to all Parry members explaining the new policy. Letters had already been sent to the VNQDD and other nationalist parties proposing cooperation in the common goal of achieving national independence and bringing about social reforms.6
Although internal sources insist that the Central Commirtee had unanimously approved the new line as ordered by Moscow, it must have been a bitter pill to swallow for members such as Ha Huy Tap who had been weaned on a more doctrinaire approach. There was also some resistance from within the ranks, primarily from Party members who had spent time in prison and thus had bitter personal experiences with the French colonial regime.
Whatever their reluctance, Party leaders approved the new strategy, and after the conference the Central Committee moved back to Indochina, where it set up a new headquarters in Hoc Mon village, a northern suburb of Saigon. Le Hong Phong, still serving as Comintern representative to the ICP, returned with them. During the next two years, the Party moved more and more into the open, while seeking to increase its membership among all progressive strata of Vietnamese society. “Mutual assistance associations” representing the interests of various social groups such as farmers, workers, youth, and women, were established in towns, villages, factories, and schools to serve as training grounds and recruitment centers for potential followers, as well as a cover for ICP activities. Party newspapers, run by promising young cadres such as Vo Nguyen Giap, Truong Chinh, and Tran Huy Lieu, were established in all major cities to present the new moderate line in an effort to seek the support of the patriotic middle class.
In some respects, the stratagem was a success. During the next two years Party membership increased severalfold, and the percentage of followers from among the working class and the peasantry skyrocketed. But the colonial government had only a limited tolerance level for nationalist activities, and when ICP newspapers became more strident in their criticism of official policies, the authorities struck back, A number of prominent critics, including the radical nationalist Nguyen An Ninh and Le Hong Phong himself, were arrested and held briefly, then released.
The vagaries of colonial policy, which sparked periodic tensions within the Party over the relative importance of overt and clandestine activity, became the chief topic at Central Committee meetings held at Hoc Mon in 1937 and 1938. At a meeting held in March 1938, the issue came to a head. General Secretary Ha Huy Tap was the most prominent critic of the new Popular Front straregy, while Le Hong Phong was its most vocal advocate, arguing in favor of a policy of cooperation with all progressive nationalist parties. In the middle was Nguyen Van Cu, a young Party member from the Red River delta who wanted to maintain a balance between overt and covert activity, to cooperate with other progressive organizations while continuing to oppose the Constitutionalists. In the end, Cu’s views won the day. Ha Huy Tap, whose confrontational personality and suspicious nature had by now alienated most of his colleagues, was replaced by Nguyen Van Cu as general secretary.7
Nguyen Ai Quoc had observed the changes taking place in Indochina from his temporary base in south China. To avoid the possibility that the Sûreté might become aware of his whereabouts, he had feared to identify himself as the real author of the articles by P. C. Line, but he hoped that Party members on the editorial board at Notre Voix (some of whom might have been familiar with Lin, his Moscow pseudonym) would recognize the style and divine the name of the author. In July 1939, he became bolder, sending through an acquaintance a short message containing advice to members of the Central Committee, along with his address in China, so that they could contact him. The message was an unabashed declaration of support for the united front policies adopted at the Seventh Comintern Congress.
1. For the time being, the Party should not be too ambitious in its demands (national independence, a parliament, etc.). To do so would be to play into the hands of the Japanese fascists. It should therefore only demand democratic rights, freedom of organization, freedom of assembly, freedom of press and freedom of speech, a general amnesty for all political prisoners, and struggle for the legalization of the Party.
2. To attain this objective, it must seek to organize a broad National Democratic Front. That Front should consist not only of the peoples of Indochina but also of all progressive French people living in Indochina, not only of working people but also of the national bourgeois class.
3. The Party must adopt a wise and flexible attitude toward the national bourgeoisie. It should seek to draw it into the Front, to rally the elements that can be rallied, and to neutralize those that can be neutralized. We must by all means avoid leaving them outside the Front, lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy of the revolution and increase the strength of the reactionaries.
4. We cannot make any alliance with or any concession to the Trots-kyite group. We must do everything possible to lay bare their faces as the running dogs of the fascists and annihilate them politically.
5. To increase and consolidate its forces, to widen its influence, and to work effectively, the Indochinese Democratic Front must keep close contact with the Popular Front in France, because the latter also struggles for freedom and democracy, and can give us great help.
6. The Party should not demand that the Front acknowledge its leadership. It must instead show itself to be the organization that makes the greatest sacrifices, and is the most active and loyal. It is only through daily struggle and work that the masses of the people will acknowledge the correct policies and capability for leadership of the Party and that it can win the leading position.
7. To be able to carry out the above tasks, the Party must uncompromisingly fight against factionalism and must systematically organize Marxist-Leninist cooperation to raise the cultural and political level of all Party members. It must assist all non-Party cadres to raise their level. It must maintain close contact with the French Communist Party.8
Nguyen Ai Quoc enclosed a copy of the message in a report that he sent to the Comintern. It was his first formal communication with his colleagues in Moscow since his departure the year before. Quoc apologized for his delay in reporting conditions in Asia, explaining that the present crisis had upset his plans. He explained that he had made some attempts to contact the ICP, but without result. In the meantime, he said that he had written a manuscript titled Khu vuc dac biet (The Special Region—this probably dealt with the CCP’s liberated area in north China) and a number of newspaper articles.
Nguyen Ai Quoc also apologized for any theoretical shortcomings in his message of advice to the ICP Central Committee, explaining (perhaps disingenuously) that he had lost the notes on Comintern strategy that he had brought with him from Moscow and was forced to rely on memory. With what may have been a hint of sarcasm, he asked his comrades in the USSR to check carefully to see whether he had made any mistakes. He then concluded with a discussion of the current situation in Indochina, noting that the election of the Popular Front in France had resulted in a number of improvements since 1936, but adding that many of these reforms had been reversed with the appointment of the more conservative government of Prime Minister Edouard Daladier in late 1938. The government’s lurch to the right had provoked a number of worker strikes, many of which were supported by other classes in Vietnam.9
In February 1939, CCP headquarters instructed commander Ye Jianying to set up a military training program at Hengyang, about 200 miles northeast of Guilin in Hunan province. The program was a cooperative venture by the CCP and the Nationalist government that had been planned the previous autumn. An institute was established in the nearby town of Nanywe to train Chinese Nationalist troops to carry on guerrilla war in enemy areas, and Chiang Kai-shek instructed Ye Jian-ying to select several Communist cadres to conduct cl
asses there. The first class opened on February 15 and concluded in mid-May. A second class commenced shortly afterward. In June (still operating under the name Hu Guang, although now with the rank of major), Nguyen Ai Quoc was sent from Guilin to Hengyang to serve as an administrator at the institute. He also served as the unit’s radio operator. He lived with other administrators in the manor house of a local landlord west of town.
After completing his assignment at the end of September, Nguyen Ai Quoc returned to Guilin. A few days later he left for Longzhou, the town in Guangxi province where Le Hong Phong had lived in 1932, in the hope of establishing contact with two cadres who had been sent by the ICP Central Committee specifically for that purpose. However, by the time Quoc arrived, the Vietnamese cadres had already run out of funds and returned to Indochina.10
Having failed at his first attempt to reestablish links with the Party leadership inside Indochina, Nguyen Ai Quoc returned to Guilin to make other arrangements. He now decided to go Chongqing, in the heart of Sichuan province, where Chiang Kai-shek had set up his wartime capital after the Japanese occupation of the Yangtze valley; Quoc’s trip to Chongqing was apparently motivated by his desire to seek assistance from the CCP liaison office there. En route he stopped briefly at Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou province, and took temporary lodgings in a room on the upper floor of the local Eighth Route Army office. On November 7, he left Guiyang for Chongqing. Taking up residence at the CCP liaison office, he renewed his friendship with Zhou Enlai, whom he had known in Paris and later in Canton, where Zhou had served as Chiang Kai-shek’s political commissar at the Whampoa Academy. Now Zhou was serving as the CCP liaison chief in Chongqing. A Chinese colleague later recalled that Quoc lived simply, dressed in a country manner, and spoke with a Cantonese accent, but always carried his typewriter with him. Few in the office knew his real identity.11
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