No, it would not be hopeless. It would be hard, desperate, but we could win. We have a weapon every bit as powerful as the most modern cannon: nationalism! Do not underestimate its power. You Americans above all ought to remember that a ragged band of barefooted farmers defeated the pride of Europe’s best-armed professionals.
Schoenbrun countered that the advent of modern weapons of war made such an approach impossible in today’s world, but Ho insisted that modern weapons could be obtained if necessary. In any case, he insisted, the heroism of the Yugoslav partisans against Nazi Germany showed that the spirit of man was more powerful than machines, which could not operate effectively in swamps and thick jungles. There were millions of straw huts that could serve as “Trojan horses” in the rear of an invading army. “It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger,” he replied.
If the tiger ever stands still the elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks. But the tiger does not stand still. He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges by night. He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his hide, and then he will leap back into the dark jungle. And slowly the elephant will bleed to death. That will be the war of Indochina.49
There was always the possibility that national elections in France could bring the FCP into a new coalition government in Paris, and Maurice Thorez may have tried to persuade Ho to delay a decision to resort to hostilities on the chance that a diplomatic solution could still be achieved. On the evening of September 14, Ho met once again with Marius Moutet; shortly before, Ho had warned Sainteny that a failure to reach agreement would lead to war. “You will kill ten of my men while we will kill one of yours,” he predicted, “but you will be the ones to end up exhausted.” At the meeting, Ho asked that both sides take responsibility for solving the problem of Cochin China, but Moutet had refused, declaring that Vietnamese participation in a mixed commission to monitor the situation there would violate French sovereignty. Moutet then appealed to Ho Chi Minh to sign a modus vivendi (in diplomatic parlance, a temporary arrangement between parties pending a final agreement) to avoid a total breakdown of the talks. The draft document called for a cease-fire in Cochin China to take effect on October 30 and the resumption of negotiations in January 1947. Ho refused and left the meeting at 11:00 P.M., declaring his intention to leave for Indochina on Monday morning, September 16. Shortly after midnight, however, Ho contacted Moutet and asked to resume the talks. The two then agreed in principle that a Vietnamese representative would be authorized to cooperate with High Commissioner d’Argenlieu in bringing about an armistice in Indochina. Ho then consented to sign the modus vivendi.
This modus vivendi was precious little for Ho Chi Minh to have obtained after two months of talks at Fontainebleau. Sainteny later described it as a “pathetic” piece of paper that had been drawn up hastily in his own office and gave Ho “much less than he had hoped for when he came to France.” In Indochina, French residents were delighted, but Vietnamese attitudes were ambivalent, with some convinced that it represented a national humiliation. Ho tacitly admitted as much, remarking to Sainteny as they left the meeting at three in the morning, “I have just signed my death warrant.”50
Even after signing the September 14 agreement, to the exasperation of his hosts Ho Chi Minh still seemed reluctant to return to Vietnam (in an extended biographical essay on Ho, David Halberstam noted that the French attitude toward Ho’s visit could be marked by the steady shrinking of his protocolary red carpet). According to Sainteny, Ho had refused the plane that the French agreed to put at his disposal, citing reasons of health, and expressed a preference to go by ship. Sainteny was reluctant to approve the request, but Ho appealed directly to the Ministry of Marine and was assigned passage on the French cruiser Dumont d’Urville, which was then docked in the port of Toulon preparing to sail to Indochina. On September 16, Sainteny accompanied Ho Chi Minh on the train to Toulon. At Montélimar, Ho descended briefly from the train to address a number of Vietnamese students gathered at the station, explaining why he signed the modus vivendi and asking them to work hard at their studies. He did the same at Marseilles, where a few shouts of “traitor” (Viet gian) were heard in the audience. On the eighteenth, the train arrived at Toulon, and he boarded the Dumont d’Urville. (The Vietnamese delegation had departed on the warship Pasteur from Marseilles four days previously.)51
To make room for President Ho Chi Minh on his vessel, Captain Gerbaud had been instructed to remove the cargo and the passengers who had previously boarded the ship. In their place came Ho, his aidesde-camp, and four Vietnamese students who were returning independently to Indochina after completing their studies in France. On the morning of September 19, flying the red flag with the gold star of the government of Vietnam, the ship weighed anchor and sailed into the Mediterranean Sea. Ho Chi Minh had informed the Vietnamese government of the modus vivendi by telegraph before leaving Paris, sending a copy by airmail as well. From the ship he cabled Hanoi to explain the terms of the accord to the population and to order preparations to carry it out; he also asked for word on current conditions in Indochina. On his first day aboard ship, he sent a short message to Marius Moutet, thanking him for his assistance and asking for his cooperation in carrying out the agreement. A few days later he received a brief telegram from Prime Minister Georges Bidault. In his reply, Ho thanked Bidault for his courtesy, but remarked that the modus vivendi had not been received favorably by the Vietnamese people. The reaction, he noted, was human: “I will do my best and will succeed if French friends in Cochin China loyally apply democratic liberties, cessation of hostilities, liberation of prisoners, and avoid unfriendly words and acts. I count on your active assistance to carry through the work in the interests of both our countries.”52
On September 22, the ship arrived at Port Said, the northern entrance into the Suez Canal. From there Ho sent a letter to a Frenchwoman who had recently written a brief appeal to him not to allow war to break out between the two countries. Ho used the occasion to make the point that the Vietnamese people hated bloodshed as much as did the French but that, like the French, they insisted on the independence and national unity of their fatherland. If France would agree to recognize Vietnamese independence, he concluded, it would win the hearts and love of all Vietnamese.53
The ship next stopped at the French port of Djibouti, where Ho left the ship for a short honorary visir with the governor-general. It then proceeded to Colombo, Ceylon, where envoys from the Indian nationalist leaders Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru came to the ship to greet him. Throughout the journey, progress had been slow, for the ship had spent several days in port to undergo maintenance work, and at sea it carried out shelling exercises as part of its routine drill. On shipboard, Ho lived simply. He carried no luggage except for one change of clothes, and he did the washing himself. In spare moments he talked with the French sailors and Vietnamese students aboard, and as usual, got in his propaganda licks, giving the latter a study course on Vietnamese and world affairs. One of his shipmates later recalled his comments: “We lack everything,” he said. “We have neither machines, not primary materials, not even skilled workers; our finances have been reduced to a minimum. But our country possesses mountains and forests, rivers and seas in abundance, and our compatriots are strong in resolution, in courage and creative spirit.”54
Not all those onboard were seduced by his personality. Captain Ger-baud commented that although Ho Chi Minh was “intelligent and charming,” he was “a passionate idealist entirely devoted to the cause he has espoused.” In Gerbaud’s view, the Vietnamese revolutionary had a naïve belief in the slogans of the day. When, at the captain’s order, the ship tested its guns at sea, one of his compatriots asked Ho: “They’re testing your nerves. Are you afraid?” Ho Chi Minh just laughed.55
The Dumont d’Urville finally sailed into beautiful Cam Ranh Bay on October 18. Here Ho was received by High Commissioner Thierry d’Argenlieu and General Louis Morlière, Sainteny’s replacement as senior F
rench representative to the Hanoi government, on the French cruiser Suffren. For the second time in seven months, the high commissioner welcomed the Vietnamese president in an official ceremony at sea. Then, after Ho Chi Minh had inspected the guard of honor, Ho, d’Argenlieu, and Morlière discussed the means of implementing the modus vivendi. Prime Minister Bidault had already forwarded a copy of Ho Chi Minh’s cable about the Vietnamese reaction to d’Argenlieu, instructing him, as French plenipotentiary in Indochina, to respond as he saw fit. The two sides agreed on some points. D’Argenlieu consented to the appointment of a representative from the Vietnamese government to cooperate on the implementation of the cease-fire, while Ho Chi Minh disavowed any official support for terrorist incidents in Cochin China. But Ho adamantly refused the high commissioner’s demand that all Vietnamese troops in the southern provinces be immediately repatriated to the north. Nevertheless, the meeting concluded in good spirits, and d’Argenlieu reported to Paris that success would depend on the actions of the Vietnamese government once Ho Chi Minh returned to Hanoi.
Two days later, the Dumont d’Urville entered the Cua Cam River and sailed into Haiphong harbor. The Vietnamese delegation had arrived two weeks earlier, and Pham Van Dong had reported on the results of the negotiations at Fontainebleau to his colleagues in Hanoi. As the ship docked in midafternoon, representatives from the government were on hand to welcome Ho Chi Minh home after four months abroad with a brief ceremony (Ho insisted that the crowd sing the “Marseillaise” as well as the Vietnamese national anthem). Then the group went to the headquarters of the Haiphong municipal committee, where they dined while Ho commented briefly on his voyage.
The next morning, Ho boarded a special train to the capital. In the towns and villages along the route, which were festooned with red and gold flags, crowds had gathered to wave at the president. As the train pulled into Hanoi railway station, Ho was met by French and Vietnamese representatives and then escorred by car through streets packed with onlookers to the Northern Palace. There he consulted with Truong Chinh and other members of the Party Standing Committee, while a crowd of nearly 100,000 gathered in the streets surrounding the palace to welcome him.56
Why did Ho Chi Minh take his time returning to Indochina? That question has inspired debate ever since, and it has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Ho Chi Minh’s own explanation to the French is hardly credible, since he had never before allowed his healrh to interfere with his political objectives. Some historians have suggested that he might have wanted to give his subordinate Vo Nguyen Giap sufficient time to eliminate opposition elements in Vietnam and thus strengthen the authority of the government in Hanoi in preparation for all-out war. Others have argued that he might have been concerned at the adverse reaction to the modus vivendi in Indochina and wanted to delay his return until passions had cooled. But Jean Sainteny later speculated that he might have feared an attempt on his life if he went by air, and in comments to colleagues in Hanoi many years later, Ho Chi Minh confirmed that this was his primary concern.57
There is no doubt that the intense Vo Nguyen Giap, who (like many of his colleagues) was increasingly skeptical of the prospects for a peaceful settlement, had taken advantage of Ho Chi Minh’s lengthy absence to strengthen Party control over the apparatus of government. During the summer, tensions between Vietminh elements and non-Communist political parties had escalated, leading to armed clashes and the withdrawal of several nationalist figures—including Nguyen Hai Than, Vu Hong Khanh (who then left for China), and Foreign Minister Nguyen Tuong Tam—from the government. Those who remained presented no threat to Vietminh control over the reins of power.
In Giap’s view, the government’s crackdown on rival groups was fully justified. Early in the summer, French military authorities had demanded the right to organize a march through Hanoi on July 14, Bastille Day. Vietnamese intelligence sources reported that nationalist elements were preparing a serious provocation against French troops during the celebration in the hope of provoking a breakdown of the peace talks. The government thereupon turned down the French request, citing security concerns, and on the following day police penetrated the VNQDD headquarters in Hanoi, where they reportedly discovered a torture chamber, the bodies of several victims, and a number of prisoners, along with incriminating evidence of a plan to kidnap French residents of the city. The operation crippled VNQDD efforts to discredit the government, but armed clashes and tension between Communist and non-Communist elements continued throughout the next months until Ho Chi Minh’s return in October.58
The government’s relations with the French also continued to be problematic. After he assumed Sainteny’s post in the spring, General Morlière, an affable and conciliatory man, attempted to calm the situation, but with tensions inflamed by the failure of the peace talks at Fontainebleau, incidents between Vietnamese and French residents in Indochina became a frequent occurrence. On each occasion, Morlière felt obligated to issue an ultimatum to punish the perpetrators, leading sardonic Vietnamese to dub him the “general of ultimatums.”
The ongoing conflict in Cochin China undoubtedly contributed to the problem. Widely criticized for his brutal tactics, Tran Van Giau had been replaced as commander of resistance forces by Nguyen Binh. Described by French sources as squat and ugly, with one blind eye hidden behind dark glasses, Binh was a native of Tonkin who had joined the VNQDD in the late 1920s. After many years in exile in China, he had suddenly reappeared after World War II in the Viet Bac and served with Vietminh forces there. Fanatically anti-French and totally lacking in scruples, Binh soon showed signs of military genius, and although he was apparently not a Party member, in January 1946 he was assigned to take charge of the struggling movement in Cochin China.
Party leaders may have hoped that Nguyen Binh would be more effective than Giau, whose scorched-earth tactics and pitiless elimination of rival elements had alienated many. But Binh was equally ruthless. (Some Vietnamese sources assert that Party leaders never trusted him, even when they sent him to lead the movement in Cochin China, because his methods were too brutal.) Energetic but pitiless in his disciplinary methods, Binh organized large guerrilla bases north of Saigon (in an area later to be known as Zone D), in the Plain of Reeds in the heart of the Mekong delta, and in the U Minh forest in the Ca Mau Peninsula, from which he harassed French installations and attempted to spread the revolution. However, Binh ignored an admonition by Ho Chi Minh to minimize violence and form a broad united front in the south, at the same time that he was raising the art of terrorism to a new level. One of those whom Binh ordered assassinated was Huynh Phu So, the religious mystic known popularly as the “mad bonze,” who had founded the Hoa Hao sect just before the war.59
Ho must have had mixed feelings about the way his Party colleagues administered the country while he was away for four months. (He had repeatedly asked them to avoid provoking any problems until his return.) The consolidation of Vietminh authority and the suppression of rival elements would undoubtedly make it easier to adopt policies during the crucial months to come. But at the same time, the narrowing of the government’s popular base—a base that Ho had so assiduously cultivated in the months following the August Revolution—could make it more difficult to mobilize national unity in the event of an armed confrontation with the French.
Ho Chi Minh may have also become increasingly aware that his efforts to secure a peace agreement in France had undercut his reputation and prestige with senior colleagues within his Party, many of whom were more skeptical than he that a compromise solution could be achieved, and more inclined to engage in a test of arms and wills with the French. Several of the leading members of the Party—including Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong, Hoang Quoc Viet, and General Secretary Truong Chinh himself—may have had occasion to question Ho’s judgment during his absence in Europe, and were now emboldened to take a more aggressive attitude in Party councils. In an article written to celebrate the first anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Truong Chinh had
set forth his own vision of the Vietnamese revolution. The article was critical of the tendency toward “unprincipled compromise,” which demonstrated a lack of confidence in the masses, and added that revolutionaries should not fear the enemy but rather the “errors by our comrades.” Although no criticism of Ho’s leadership appeared in public, it was clear that from now on he would be compelled increasingly to take a collégial approach in arguing for the adoption of key policies.60
Whatever the reality of his relations with his senior colleagues, there seems little doubt that the vast majority of the people of north Vietnam were still devoted to him. Ho Chi Minh’s fervent dedication to the cause of national independence, his personal simplicity, and his avuncular style had struck a responsive chord among the population, and he was already assuming an almost mythic role as bearer of the national destiny. Despite rising concerns about the prospects for peace, many accepted his decision to sign the modus vivendi in the conviction that if anyone could make it succeed, it would be President Ho Chi Minh. On October 23, he issued a public statement assuring the people that despite current difficulties, sooner or later Vietnam would be reunited and independent. To the population in the southern provinces he declared that all Vietnamese shared the same ancestors and belonged to one single country. “I solemnly declare to you,” he promised, “that with your determination, with the determination of all the people in the country, our beloved south will certainly return to the bosom of the Fatherland.”
Because Ho refused to talk about his past, continuing to insist that he was merely an “old patriot” who had long served his country, few Vietnamese realized at this point that their president was actually the Comintern agent Nguyen Ai Quoc. His own sister, Nguyen Thi Thanh, who had been living near Kim Lien since her release from prison prior to World War II, apparently realized his identity only by seeing his picture in the newspaper. She later traveled to Hanoi and visited him briefly in the Northern Palace. Later in the year, Ho’s brother, Nguyen Sinh Khiem, now working as a schoolteacher in Kim Lien, also came to see him, and they met secretly in a house in the suburbs. His brother died in 1950, and his sister passed away four years later.61
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