If Ho Chi Minh, with his acute sensitivity to changes in the international climate, was concerned that the announcement of a closer relationship between his government and the new regime in China could provoke the United States into playing a greater role in the Indochina conflict, his fears were only too justified. In fact, Beijing’s decision in mid-January to grant diplomatic recognition to the DRV, followed two weeks later by a similar announcement from Moscow, had a dramatic impact on Washington. The Truman administration had been observing with considerable discomfort the faltering French efforts to encourage non-Communist elements in Vietnam to participate in the struggle against the widely popular Vietminh Front. The decision by French leaders to select Bao Dai as their alternative to Ho Chi Minh as the legitimate representative of Vietnamese nationalism had aroused severe misgivings among many U.S. officials, who continued to view the former emperor as lacking the requisite degree of determination and popular support to serve as the focal point for a new independent state in Vietnam.
The signing of the Elysée Accords in March 1949 thus received only a lukewarm reaction in Washington. Dean Acheson, who had replaced George C. Marshall as secretary of state in early 1949, cabled U.S. Ambassador David Bruce in Paris that in his view, unless the French granted more autonomy to the young Vietnamese state, they were unlikely to succeed. There were rumors in the press that the White House was preparing to approach Ho Chi Minh about participating in a coalition government with Bao Dai. Other reports intimated that the two Vietnamese rivals were already in secret contact with each other. Ho Chi Minh, of course, was ever ready to take advantage of such reports as a means of disarming his adversaries. In an interview with the veteran U.S. journalist Harold Isaacs, he declared that he was not a Communist. As for the DRV, it was, he insisted, a broad-based government with legitimate nationalist credentials, and not a Soviet satellite.34
Reports that Washington was toying with the idea of a Ho—Bao Dai coalition regime, however, were far off the mark. Although Dean Acheson was skeptical of Bao Dai’s ability to serve as an effective spokesman for the peoples of Indochina, he was even more suspicious of Ho Chi Minh’s pose of being a “national Communist” along the lines of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, who had recently been ejected from the Soviet bloc because of his independent views. Whether Ho was a nationalist or a Communist was purely academic, Acheson argued, because in colonial societies all Communists were nationalists as well. Once they had come to power, their Stalinist proclivities would clearly become evident.35
Throughout the last half of 1949, the White House rejected pleas from Paris for diplomatic recognition of the Bao Dai regime and refused to provide assistance to the French in carrying on the struggle in Indochina, while implying that aid would be forthcoming if France granted true independence to its new client state. But debate over the issue within the State Department was intense. Europeanists argued for recognition of the Bao Dai government as a means of appeasing the French, but Asianists argued that recognition would alienate nationalist forces in Vietnam and elsewhere. In June, Acheson tried halfheartedly to persuade Paris to grant further concessions, but after Ambasssador Bruce vigorously complained that such actions would undoubtedly antagonize the French, Acheson (who was a Europeanist by training and instinct) backed off, instructing Bruce simply to state to the French that future U.S. actions would be dependent upon implementation of the Elysée accords. Only a few U.S. officials continued to speak out against adopting a Bao Dai solution. Raymond Fosdick, the former president of the Rockefeller Foundation and a leading member of an ad hoc committee to advise the Truman administration on its Asian policy, warned that the Bao Dai experiment was doomed and that the Elysée Accords themselves were “a shabby business” and “a cheap substitute” for independence. Although Fosdick admitted that Ho Chi Minh was an unattractive alternative, he argued that Ho was an unpredictable factor because of the complex relations between China and Vietnam, which “in the end will be more favorable to us than now seems probable.”36
Fosdick’s views, however, had little resonance in a city where the issue of communism was now increasingly seen in the stark colors of the Cold War. The formation of the new People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, added fuel to the fire of congressional criticism that the Truman administration had no policy to resist the further expansion of the “red tide” in Asia. During the last months of the year, Washington fretted and delayed a decision on the matter, resisting French pressure to commit itself to the struggle in Indochina and hoping forlornly that Paris would eventually grant more autonomy to the new Bao Dai regime.
However, the formal ratification of the Elysée Accords by the National Assembly in Paris on January 29, 1950, combined with reports (many of them provided by the French) of growing Chinese assistance to the Vietminh, changed the equation. In early February, the White House decided to grant diplomatic recognition to the Bao Dai government. The proposal was rapidly approved by the cabinet and signed by the president. Great Britain and a number of other nations followed suit shortly but, despite strenuous efforts by U.S. diplomats, most governments in Asia refused to follow their lead. Shortly thereafter, the White House approved an appeal from Paris for military assistance in the fight against the red tide in Asia. On March 10, Truman approved a grant of $15 million in military assistance for Indochina, and an additional $10 million for Thailand. Plans were launched to send advisory missions to Indochina to determine how best to administer the program.
The Chinese liaison team led by Luo Guibo arrived at the Vietnamese border on February 26, 1950. They were greeted by Vo Nguyen Giap and Hoang Van Thai, Giap’s chief of staff, who led them to Vietminh headquarters in the heart of the Viet Bac. There, they were met by General Secretary Truong Chinh, who was in charge of the party in Ho Chi Minh’s absence in China and the USSR.37
Three weeks after Ho’s departure for China at the end of December 1949, Truong Chinh had convened a lengthy meeting of civilian and military leaders to discuss plans for the upcoming general offensive. Documents issued at the close of the meeting, known in Party histories as the Third National Conference (Hoi nghi toan quoc lan thu III) brimmed over with confidence in the prospects for ultimate victory. In the keynote speech to the conference, Truong Chinh had declared that, with the creation of the new China, “we are no longer encircled; a pathway to the world has been opened for Vietnam. We now have a large and powerful ally at our side.” In preparation for the coming general offensive, on February 21 Party leaders called for a general mobilization of manpower under the slogan “All for the front, all for people’s war, all for victory.”
There is no doubt that the appearance of the PLA on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier changed the fundamental equation in the Franco-Vietminh conflict. At a minimum, China now provided a more secure sanctuary for Vietminh units in case they needed to flee from enemy attacks. Equally important, the presence of a powerful hostile force on the northern frontier of Indochina promised to act as a deterrent to the French in seeking to expand their efforts against rebel forces operating in the Viet Bac. At a maximum, the new situation opened up the exciting possibility of a shift to a more aggressive strategy to defeat the colonial forces and achieve victory throughout the entire country.
Still, in his report at the Third National Conference, Truong Chinh conceded that some within the Party were skeptical that conditions were ripe for an advance to the third stage, and even implied that he himself might be one of the doubters. Chinh cautioned that the campaign was unlikely to result in a quick victory, and warned that intervention by Great Britain or the United States might lead to increased French resistance or to the emergence of a more conservative government in Paris. At the same time, he alerted his comrades to the reality that Chinese assistance did not guarantee Vietminh success and counseled the Party that it must still rely primarily on its own efforts to bring about victory.38
The Party’s internal debates at the conference were reflected in a lengthy analysis of th
e situation written by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap admitted that the French still retained military superiority throughout Indochina as a whole, but he contended that the moral superiority and strategic leadership of the revolutionary forces, combined with the increasingly favorable international situation (a clear reference to diplomatic recognition and the promise of military support from the USSR and China), would all make contributions to a decisive victory. Giap explained that the offensive would not necessarily take the form of a single campaign, but might consist of a series of attacks launched in several areas of Indochina at the same time, thus resulting in a gradual shift of the balance of forces in favor of the Vietminh.39
During the next few months, China began to provide military equipment to the DRV, while a Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) under General Wei Guoqing arrived at Vietminh headquarters to train cadres and provide advice on strategy and tactics. Before their departure from Beijing, members of the advisory group were given an audience with Chinese leaders, who informed them that their task in Vietnam had “global significance.” If the enemy weren’t driven out of Indochina and imperialism retained its toehold there, Liu Shaoqi warned his listeners, the situation for China could become more difficult and more complex.
The first Vietnamese main-force units left for training in Yunnan province in April. War matériel, much of it captured weapons of Japanese or U.S. manufacture, came by land or by sea from the port of Yulin, on the southern coast of Hainan Island. By mutual agreement, there was no provision for direct Chinese intervention in the conflict unless the very survival of the Vietminh should be threatened. At Beijing’s request, all arrangements were to be kept secret to avoid aggravating China’s relations with France. Such precautions turned out to be futile, however, as the French were fully briefed on Ho Chi Minh’s trip and its consequences.40
By late spring, training institutes for Vietminh troops had been established at various locations in south China. Most of the programs lasted for three months and were administered by cadres of the PLA Second Army. By September 1950, about twenty thousand Vietminh soldiers had been armed and trained in south China; on return, many of them were integrated into a newly formed Vietminh 308 Division. Two schools for political cadres were opened at Nanning and at Kaiyuan in Yunnan province for a six-month training course. Senior Chinese advisers such as Luo Guibo and Wei Guoqing routinely attended important meetings of the Vietnamese Party leadership.41
The new relationship with China was destined to have enormous consequences for the future course of the Vietnamese revolution. Although there were now more than 160,000 troops serving under Vietminh command (a force numbering only slightly less than that of the adversary), they were poorly equipped and almost entirely lacking in logistical capabilities or artillery support. For the first time in its short history, the DRV now had a commitment of substantial assistance from a powerful outside donor. The promise of weapons, advisers, and other war matériel provided the basis for a shift in war strategy to the anticipated third stage of people’s war—the general counteroffensive.
Vietnamese leaders made no secret of the importance of the new relationship. In an interview with the U.S. journalist Andrew Roth in August, Ho Chi Minh dropped his previous reticence about Chinese influence and remarked that the Vietnamese liberation movement had changed its tactics and was now prepared to adopt the Chinese model. As if to underline his point, a campaign was now launched throughout the Viet Bac to study the CCP’s experience in the wars against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek; documents and training materials were translated into Vietnamese and distributed to cadres and troops throughout the area. Study sessions were held periodically to encourage those in attendance to internalize the Chinese model and put its precepts into practice in Indochina.
Public statements by Vietminh sources regarding the sudden relevance of the Chinese model were somewhat disingenuous, because, as we have seen, Party leaders had long since sought to draw useful lessons from the Chinese revolution. One of Ho Chi Minh’s first official statements after the outbreak of war in December 1946 had been to announce that Vietminh leaders would follow the Maoist model of people’s war in their struggle for victory. Early the following year, Truong Chinh had authored a pamphlet called The Resistance Will Win, which drew extensively from Mao Zedong’s own writings on guerrilla warfare during the past two decades. Chinh had apparently written the pamphlet with the approval of the entire Party leadership, and the revolutionary pseudonym that he had chosen (“Long March”) was a clear expression of his admiration for the Chinese revolution. Yet Chinh was careful to point out that some elements of the Chinese model did not cross national boundaries. Because Vietnam was smaller in territory and fully under colonial domination, the Vietminh could not hope to build a large liberated base area similar to that constructed by the CCP in north China during the war against Japan. Not could they afford to neglect the importance of diplomatic initiatives, a tool that had played only a limited role in the Communist struggle for power in China. Still, Vietminh leaders clearly felt that the Chinese model had already been of significant value in their struggle against the French, and they were now willing to give the Chinese advisory team an opportunity to assist them in rendering their efforts more effective.
But it was soon clear that Chinese influence was not to be limited to the sphere of military activities, but would encompass domestic policies and the nature of the Party organization as well. Shortly after his arrival in the Viet Bac at the end of February, Luo Guibo had assumed leadership of a Chinese civilian advisory team to assist the Vietnamese in remodeling their party and government along Chinese lines. Since the Eighth Plenum, held at Pac Bo in May 1941, Party leaders had assigned a higher priority to the cause of national liberation against the forces of imperialism than to the struggle against feudal forces inside the country, thus returning to the Leninist model that Ho Chi Minh had brought back to Asia in the 1920s. Under this plan, the Vietnamese revolution had been divided into two stages, a first one to complete the task of national liberation, and a second to carry out the transformation to socialism. During the first stage, the central role of the ICP within the Vietnamese revolution was disguised in order to avoid alienating moderate elements inside the country and provoking intervention from reactionary forces abroad. It was this vision that had characterized DRV policy after the August Revolution of 1945, and during the first three years of the Franco-Vietminh conflict.
Now, with the triumph of Communist forces in mainland China and the heightened prospects for victory over the French, Party leaders shifted toward a new strategy based on the Chinese model, in which Party leadership over the movement was openly acknowledged, while the first stage of national liberation would evolve without a rigid dividing line into the second stage of social revolution. The process got under way at the Third National Conference in late January 1950, when Party leaders decided to place more emphasis on class issues in the united front and launch initial preparations to bring the Communist Party back into the open. Such actions would foster closer identification between the DRV and other members of the socialist community, including the new Chinese government and the “people’s democracies” in Eastern Europe; but it would complicate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and to prevent the United States from entering the conflict on the side of the French. During the next few months, Party leaders inaugurated a major campaign to introduce their followers to the ideas and practices of the Chinese Communists and their leader, Chairman Mao Zedong.42
To what degree was this momentous shift in focus adopted with the approval of Ho Chi Minh? Ho had been clearly identified with the more gradualist two-stage formula since the mid-1920s, and was undoubtedly instrumental in bringing about its adoption at the Eighth Plenum in 1941. The new policy would not only restrict his capacity to manipulate the international situation to his advantage, but would also result in a degree of subservience to Chinese tutelage that Ho had successfully resisted in the past.
&nb
sp; Moreover, it is curious that the fateful Third National Conference had been held in Ho’s absence. There may have been growing doubts—both within the international Communist movement and among his senior colleagues—about his commitment to the principles of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy as propagated by Moscow and Beijing at the end of the 1940s. During the winter of 1949–50, there was a flurry of press reports—many of them admittedly based on remarks by defectors—to the effect that Ho Chi Minh had been replaced by Truong Chinh as the leader of the Vietnamese Communist movement at Stalin’s order, or even that he had been formally declared a heretic because he had refused to toe Moscow’s line. When the French Communist Léo Figuères arrived in the Viet Bac for a visit in March 1950, it was widely rumored that he had been sent not only to restore party to party contacts with the ICP, but also to stress the importance of restoring the latter as the vanguard of the Vietnamese revolution.43
Still, although Ho Chi Minh may have accepted the new line with some reluctance, he undoubtedly recognized that growing U.S. support for the French could no longer be avoided, and that closer ties with Moscow and Beijing represented the best chance for a Vietminh victory in Indochina. In any event, he adjusted himself to the new realities and sought to use them to his advantage. In his messages to Chinese leaders during the remainder of the year, Ho was fulsome in his praise of the new government in Beijing and its wise leadership, suggesting strongly that his government and Party would follow the Chinese model. By now, of course, he had become a master at the art of flattering his benefactors by implying that their advice and experience would be taken to heart in the new Vietnam. For example, it was probably not by accident that in the fall of 1950, for the first time, he began to extol the benefits of collectivized agriculture for the future prosperity of an independent Vietnam.44
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