It may have been at least partly for the purpose of exploring Chinese views on the issue of peaceful coexistence that the DRV invited Zhou Enlai to Hanoi. Zhou, who had long maintained good relations with Ho Chi Minh, arrived on November 18 on the first stop of a swing through several nations in Asia, and his hosts pressed him to provide concrete forms of support on the issue of Vietnamese reunification. Zhou agreed on the need for joint action to fulfill the provisions of the Geneva conference, but he avoided specifics on what could be done. When Vietnamese leaders pressed him to demand that the Geneva conference be reconvened, Zhou was studiously vague.
It eventually became clear to his hosts that Zhou Enlai’s visit was motivated primarily by Beijing’s desire to obtain Vietnamese support in connection with China’s emerging dispute with the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders were particularly uneasy about the dispatch of Soviet military forces to overthrow the reformist government of Imre Nagy in Hungary. In public comments made in Hanoi, Zhou alluded briefly to the dangers of “great nation chauvinism,” an oblique reference to Soviet actions in Europe, and to the importance of mutual relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence that had been publicized by China and India a couple of years earlier.
Beijing’s discomfort with Moscow’s tendency to dictate to other members of the socialist community was probably shared by many Party leaders in Hanoi; some also felt disdain for Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence, which appeared to represent a capitulation to the class enemy, and argued for closer ties with China. But Ho Chi Minh insisted on the importance of maintaining cordial relations with both China and the Soviet Union, and the final communiqué from Zhou’s state visit contained no direct or indirect criticism of the USSR.50
Zhou’s stopover preceded the Eleventh Plenum of the VWP Central Committee, which convened the following month. Le Duan attended the conference, and he undoubtedly defended the ideas contained in his pamphlet, The Path of Revolution in the South, before the assembled delegates. Since in recent years the pamphlet has frequently been described in Hanoi as a document of “pivotal importance” in the history of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement, it seems probable that Duan’s proposals provoked lively discussion, but it seems clear that it did not result in an immediate shift in the general line of the Party. An editorial published in the Party’s theoretical journal Hoc Tap a few days after the close of the plenum stated that consolidation of the North was still the primary task: “We must not allow the winning over of the South to detract from the requirements of consolidating the North.” Ho Chi Minh’s role in the debate is unknown. In a speech to the National Assembly early in 1957, he reiterated his view that for the time being domestic construction must take precedence, calling on the Vietnamese people to unite behind the task of consolidating the North in order to make it a solid rear base for national liberation, the struggle for which, although “long and difficult,” would certainly be victorious.
The meeting did attempt to respond to Le Duan’s appeal by approving a secret policy calling for the gradual buildup of the revolutionary organization in South Vietnam and the selective punishment there of reactionary elements (called tru gian, or “killing tyrants”). Although Ho Chi Minh had always criticized the indiscriminate use of terrorism as an inappropriate tool of revolutionary action, it had been applied selectively during the war of resistance against the French. Now the Central Committee approved a more concrete policy calling for a program of limited terrorism to protect the revolutionary apparatus in the South by throwing fear into the ranks of the enemy and creating confidence among the masses that the movement could take care of its own.51
The Eleventh Plenum in December 1956 had taken a cautious first step toward the approval of a more aggressive approach toward the unification of the two zones. The same month, Le Duan’s regional committee had met to consider the June 1956 directive from the Politburo calling for preparations to strengthen the self-defense capabilities of the movement to supplement the political struggle against the Saigon regime. In the words of a document issued by the committee, “through Central’s guidance” it had now become clear that revolutionary war was “the only correct way” to bring about national reunification. During the next few months, there was a marked rise in terrorist activities directed against government officials and other key personnel in South Vietnam. Official sources in Hanoi claimed that those targeted were corrupt officials, wicked landlords, and traitors. In fact, many victims were popular and honest officials and teachers who were seen as a threat to the revolutionary movement because they heightened the sense of legitimacy of the Saigon government in the eyes of the local population.
Perhaps the clearest signal that a new era was dawning came in early 1957, when Le Duan was suddenly selected to serve as acting general secretary of the VWP. After the dismissal of Truong Chinh at the Tenth Plenum the previous fall, Ho Chi Minh had formally taken over that post, but reluctantly. Ho had occupied the relatively ceremonial positions of chairman of the Party and president of the DRV since his return to Hanoi in October 1954. At the same time that he took an active interest in issues related to foreign policy and national reunification, he increasingly limited himself to an avuncular role in domestic and Party affairs, offering advice to colleagues at Politburo meetings while delegating executive authority to younger colleagues like Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh.
The reasons for Le Duan’s selection as acting general secretary have long inspired debate. Some believe it was a testimony to his organization, dedication, and strategic vision, qualities that had earned him the sobriquet of “Uncle Ho of the South” (Cu Ho mien Nam). Others see it as a gesture of recognition that the struggle to achieve national reunification was destined to play an increasingly major role in decision making in Hanoi. As a southerner, Le Duan could be expected to represent the vast constituency of Vietnamese living south of the demilitarized zone. Or perhaps it was because as an outsider, Le Duan represented no threat to Party leaders like Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh, who could be expected to retain their influence within the Politburo in a Le Duan era. Some have speculated that Le Duan was preferred over Vo Nguyen Giap because he had spent several years in prison during World War II. A stint in the famous “schools of bolshevism” was considered a necessary rite of passage among the leading Party faithful at the time, many of whom had paid their own blood debt by spending time in French prisons. Giap not only had avoided arrest, but had been tainted by having applied for a scholarship to study in France.52
The evidence on Le Duan’s elevation is not yet clear. Whatever the case, the appointment appeared to have the blessing of Ho Chi Minh, who could rest assured that his successor would give high priority to the issue of national reunification. With Le Duan occupying the post of the Party’s chief executive officer, Ho now had the time to focus on matters relating to diplomacy and relations with the socialist community, as well as to pen articles on a variety of subjects. After twelve years of disguising his real identity, at the age of sixty-seven, Ho now finally confessed that he was indeed the famous revolutionary Nguyen Ai Quoc, and official biographies suddenly appeared in print to praise his lifelong dedication to the cause of the fatherland. While the revelation was a complete surprise to many Vietnamese, close acquaintances had long been aware of his real identity. In June 1957, he made a ceremonial visit to Kim Lien, the childhood home that he had left half a century earlier.53
While North Vietnamese leaders were grappling with how to prevent the division of Vietnam from becoming permanent, Soviet officials appeared determined to make it a fait accompli. In early 1957 the USSR suddenly proposed that the two Vietnams be admitted as separate states in the United Nations. Hanoi, which had apparently not been briefed beforehand, was stunned and immediately issued a formal protest. Shorty afterward, the U.N. General Assembly, by a large majority, voted for the admission of the Republic of Vietnam, or RVN (as the non-Communist government in South Vietnam now formally called itself) into the Un
ited Nations. Pham Van Dong wrote a letter of protest to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, co-chairs of the Geneva conference, and the question was referred to the U.N. Security Council. The issue had not yet been resolved when in mid-May, Kliment Voroshilov, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the USSR and one of Stalin’s longtime cronies, arrived in Hanoi on a state visit.
There has been some speculation about the purpose of the trip, which was announced at the last minute and came after relatively leisurely stops in China and Indonesia. Vietnamese officials probably wanted to ascertain Soviet thinking on the issue of national reunification, while Moscow’s objective may have been to persuade the DRV to avoid hostile acts that might provoke a renewal of war in Indochina. On several occasions, Voroshilov publicly called on his hosts to maintain their policy of promoting the “peaceful reunification” of the two zones.
Such appeals for a moderate approach to the issue could not have been welcome to all of his Vietnamese listeners. To soothe the growing sense of irritation in Hanoi, Voroshilov also announced an increase in Soviet economic assistance to the DRV, and assured Vietnamese leaders that the USSR would not permit the RVN to be admitted to the U.N. (In September, the Soviets would use their Security Council to kill a proposal for the admission of both Vietnams into the U.N., and the question of membership was indefinitely postponed. The official press in Hanoi laconically declared its approval of Moscow’s “correct attitude.”54)
Voroshilov’s trip to Hanoi may have been intended to paper over the strains brought about by Moscow’s maladroit proposal to admit both Vietnams to the United Nations, but the potential for a rift between the two countries over the issue of Vietnamese reunification still remained. According to one foreign observer living in Hanoi, sentiment against the Soviet Union was looming so large within the Party leadership that a number of events on the agenda during Voroshilov’s visit were canceled or took place with a minimum of ceremony in order to avoid the likelihood of bringing the disagreement before the public eye.55
For Hanoi, any serious breach in relations with Moscow could be catastrophic, since the DRV relied on the USSR not only for financial aid to build up the domestic economy and modernize the Vietnamese armed forces, but also for diplomatic support. In July 1957, Ho Chi Minh left for Moscow to seek a closer understanding with Soviet leaders on key issues. En route he stopped off in Beijing, where Mao Zedong reiterated the current Chinese view that the reunification of the two Vietnams might have to be postponed until a more appropriate time. The trip lasted almost two months and included stops in several Eastern European countries, as well as North Korea. On his return to Hanoi in September, Ho announced in a speech to the Vietnamese people that he had achieved “unity of views” with the nations of the Soviet bloc.56
This was hardly the case. A few weeks later, Ho set off again in the company of a delegation including Politburo members Le Duan and Pham Hung to attend the November meeting of world Communist parties in Moscow. The composition of the delegation was significant, since both Duan and Hung were southerners by birth and upbringing, and Hung had served as Le Duan’s deputy in the southern apparatus after the Geneva conference. Clearly, the issue of national reunification would figure prominently in Vietnamese concerns in Moscow.
One of the underlying objectives of the November conference was to hammer out an agreement among the socialist nations on the issue of a peaceful transition to socialism. Among those opposing the Soviet view were the Chinese, who had become increasingly concerned about resolving the problem of Taiwan since the recent breakdown of Sino-U.S. talks on that issue and were increasingly suspicious that the new leadership in Moscow was prepared to betray the interests of world revolution on the altar of peaceful coexistence. In a bid to thwart the Soviets, Mao Zedong himself headed the Chinese delegation, the first time since the winter of 1949–50 that he had left the country. In Mao’s view, recent achievements in the Soviet Union demonstrated the technological superiority of the socialist over the capitalist camp (the “east wind,” he said, now prevailed over the “west wind”), and Moscow should use its superior might to play a more aggressive role in leading the struggle against imperialism throughout the world. A major debate on the subject at the meeting resulted in a compromise. According to a Chinese source, the first Soviet draft had said nothing about a nonpeaceful transition to socialism, but after discussion among the delegates it was amended, and in the end the final communiqué noted that “in conditions in which the exploiting classes resort to violence against the people, it is necessary to bear in mind another possibility—the nonpeaceful transition to socialism. Lenin teaches and history confirms that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily.”57
The precise role played by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese delegation in the drafting and final approval of the declaration is unknown. German and Italian reports claimed that the declaration was drawn up as the result of discussion between the Soviets and Chinese, with little input from representatives of other parties. But the phraseology quoted above is so close to what Ho Chi Minh had used in his speech to the Ninth Plenum in April 1956 that it seems likely that he played a crucial role in bringing about the final compromise. In any event, Vietnamese sources indicate that the DRV delegation made clear to Moscow its view that although a peaceful transition to socialism may sometimes take place, a policy of “revolutionary violence” was the general rule.58
After the conference, Le Duan returned to Hanoi with the remainder of the delegates, but Ho Chi Minh remained in Moscow for additional talks with Soviet leaders. The topic of his discussions is unknown, but it seems probable that they dealt with the ominous split that was beginning to emerge between Soviet and Chinese leaders over the issue of peaceful coexistence and the leadership of the socialist community. For the Vietnamese, a split could obviously have disastrous consequences, since it would enable the United States to play off one Communist giant against the other. To prevent such a development, during his swing through Eastern Europe in September Ho had expressed his opinion that unity of views among Communist states was in the best interests of the revolutionary camp. In an article published in Pravda in November, he called for a commitment from all socialist nations to unify around the leadership of the USSR, a view that he repeated in a speech before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. But his article did stress the need to adapt revolutionary tactics to local conditions.59
Once Le Duan and his asssociates arrived back in Hanoi in late November, they conferred with the Politburo. On December 1, the Vietnam News Agency announced that Party leaders were elated at the results achieved in Moscow and expressed confidence in the maintenance of solidarity among the nations within the socialist community. Whether such solidarity actually existed within the socialist camp is doubtful. It certainly did not exist in Hanoi, where growing differences were beginning to emerge within the Party leadership over the relative priority to be assigned to domestic concerns and advancing the cause of reunification with the South. For three years, Party leaders had maintained a fragile consensus on the advisability of delaying initial moves toward the construction of a socialist system until the consolidation of the North had been completed and the question of reunification clarified. Now, with plans for reunification placed on hold for an indefinite period, some senior Party leaders—chief among them Truong Chinh, who had managed to retain his influence within the Politburo despite his demotion—began to press for immediate steps to begin a socialist transformation in both urban and rural areas of the DRV before the end of the decade.
This issue was hotly debated at an enlarged thirteenth plenary session of the Central Committee in early December 1957. Although one of the stated reasons for the meeting was to report on the results of the Moscow conference, the key topic for discussion was a new three-year plan drafted by the Politburo to begin the transformation to a socialist society in the North. Press reports indicated that the decision to approve the plan was by no means unanimous. In the weeks following the close
of the meeting, Party leaders launched a campaign to explain the decision and put an end to “confused ideas concerning the close relationship between the task of the socialist revolution in the North and that of national liberation in the South.”60
The debate at the Thirteenth Plenum was undoubtedly complicated by the emergence of Le Duan as acting general secretary of the Party. The sudden elevation of a relatively junior member of the ruling clique could not avoid irritating some senior Party leaders. To his predecessor Truong Chinh, Le Duan was a cheeky upstart who had usurped his own rightful role as Ho Chi Minh’s chief lieutenant and the senior ideological mentor of the Party. Moreover, Duan’s obvious interest in the struggle in South Vietnam threatened to derail Chinh’s plans to begin the installation of socialist institutions in the DRV. It may well be that Truong Chinh had managed to rally his supporters within the Politburo and the Central Committee to bring about approval of the three-year plan as a way of thwarting Le Duan. To the intense Vo Nguyen Giap, who had been passed over in the recent contest for Party leadership, Le Duan’s brash recommendations on how to wage the struggle in the South undercut Giap’s position as the chief military strategist within the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. Moreover, Duan’s burning desire to intensify revolutionary activities in the South threatened to involve the People’s Army of Vietnam (as it was now known), or PAVN, in a conflict for which (in Giap’s view) it was not yet prepared. The comment in Nhan Dan in early November that “some comrades” had to learn that Party control over the army must be complete may well have been directed by Le Duan at Giap.61
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