16. Zhang Fakui Oral History, p. 685; Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, p. 198. Chiang Yung-ching (Hu Chih-ming, p. 150) claims that Chongqing was not immediately aware that he was actually the veteran revolutionary Nguyen Ai Quoc.
17. HZYZ, p. 95. The information on Feng Yuxiang is from Feng Hongda and Xu Huaxin, “General Feng Yuxiang, Soul of China,” published by the Historical Reference Materials Publishing House, 1981, cited in ibid, p. 94. Chiang Yung-ching makes no reference to the role of Feng Yuxiang and declares that Chiang Kai-shek took an interest in the case as a result of a request from General Hou Zhiming—see Hu Chih-ming, p. 150. In his unpublished memoirs, OSS veteran Charles Fenn recalls a conversation with the Kuomintang leader Chen Lifu, who said chat when General Zhang suggested cooperating with Ho, Chiang Kai-shek rejected the idea. He has “a big sales talk,” Chiang remarked, but he has “nothing to sell.” See Charles Fenn, “Trial Run to Doomsday,” p. 87 (manuscript provided by Charles Fenn).
18. Zhang said that he merely informed the central government of his decision, and they approved. He further commented that Ho Chi Minh was “very good. He talked cautiously, stroking his beard. He seemed very ‘deep.’ He had a cool head and was hardworking.” It probably didn’r hurt that Ho spoke passable mandarin Chinese. See Zhang Fakui Oral History, p. 687.
19. Chiang Yung-ching, Hu Chih-ming, p. 151; draft history presented in honor of visit of North Vietnamese delegation to Liuzhou, July 1964, cited in HZYZ, pp. 95–96.
20. Ho Chi Minh’s toast was an adroit play on words in the classical Chinese tradition. The names of Hou Zhiming and Ho Chi Minh both had the same meaning in the Chinese language—the will to enlighten. At the same time, the word for “revolution” in Chinese (geming), incorporated a different character with the same pronunciation. By deftly switching characters, Ho got his point across. For a discussion, see BNTS, vol. 2, p. 193, note 1.
21. HZYZ, pp. 101–2, citing two manuscripts: “Recollections of Chairman Ho Chi Minh’s Leadership over the Vietnamese Revolution in China,” April 11, 1979, and Ye Ruiting, “A Vignette from the Activity of the Vietnamese Revolutionary League in Liuzhou at the End of the Resistance War,” August 23, 1980.
22. Ho Chi Minh, “Bao cao cua Phan hoi Viet Nam thuoc Dai hoi Quoc te chong xam luoc” [Report of the congress of the International Anti-Aggression League], March 1944. Unpublished report in my possession.
23. Hoang Van Hoan, Drap in the Ocean, p. 200. In past years, a number of Western scholars reported that the conference had established a provisional government for a future Vietnamese republic, but this appears not to be the case. The issue was discussed among members of the Dong Minh Hoi, but rejected for a variety of reasons. For a discussion, see Chiang Yung-ching, Hu Chih-ming, pp. 167–68 (see especially note 95). According to Chiang (p. 169), after the conference some “Vietnamese Communists” allegedly pressed for a government, but it was rejected by Chongqing, partly on the grounds that it might antagonize the Allies. I have seen no evidence that Ho Chi Minh was involved in such proposals. Ho’s speech at the conference is mentioned briefly in HZYZ, p. 103.
24. Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, pp. 201–2; Zhang Fakui Oral History, pp. 691–92.
25. Zhang Fakui Oral History, p. 692. Also see Liu San, “When President Ho Chi Minh was in South China,” Wen Hui Bao (Hong Kong), September 7, 1953.
26. HZYZ, p. 106. Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, p. 202. King Chen states that only sixteen men accompanied Ho from Liuzhou—see his Vietnam and China, 1938–1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 85. If that is so, the additional two members of the group who returned to Vietnam may have been Vu Anh and Vo Nguyen Giap, who met him near Jingxi and joined him en route to Pac Bo.
27. The communiqué is contained in Van kien Dang (1930–1945) [Party Documents (1930–1945)], vol. 3 (Hanoi: Ban nghien cuu lich su Dang Truong uong, 1977), pp. 289–99. For a summary, see Histoire de la révolution d’août (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), pp. 37–38. Also see Hoang Tung, Dong chi Truong Chinh [Comrade Truong Chinh] (Hanoi: Su that, 1991), pp. 123–24.
28. The conference resolution is contained in Van kien Dang (1930–1945), pp. 313–362.
29. Vo Nguyen Giap, in “Ho Chi Minh,” pp. 198–99; Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Vietnam, 1940–1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), pp. 107–8; Chiang Yung-ching, Hu Chih-ming, pp. 184–85.
30. Tran Van Giau, Giai cap cong nhan Viet Nam [The Vietnamese working class (1939–1945)], vol. 3 (Hanoi: Su that, 1963), pp. 143–71.
31. Vo Nguyen Giap, in “Ho Chi Minh,” pp. 201–2. Ho’s critical comments about Giap’s plans for an insurrection are contained in Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, pp. 187–88.
32. The quotations are from Toan Tap I, vol. 3, pp. 375–76. Also see Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, pp. 203–4. King Chen cites a Chinese report that the Vietminh forces had disguised themselves as Vietnamese soldiers in the French army and were thus able to use the element of surprise; Giap had informed Ho Chi Minh that it was important that the new units obtain a victory in their first battle—see Chen, Vietnam and China, p. 89. Also see BNTS, vol. 2, p. 212.
33. Shaw’s own account is given in an unpublished paper titled “The Real Indochina,” and apparently submitted on his return to the United States. Also see Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, p. 203, and “Nguyen Ai Quoc,” a French-language abridgement of Glimpses/Life in Souvenirs, pp. 93–94. According to this source—Ho Chi Minh himself—the Japanese arrived at the crash site shortly after the French patrol and accused the French of assisting the pilot to escape. The Japanese offered a cash reward to anyone who turned him in and threatened severe punishment for those who might assist him. Shaw adds that the local French agreed to cooperate with the Japanese and put a price on his head.
34. Roosevelt’s comment about Indochina, along with his overall views on the situation there, are discussed in William Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), chapter 1.
35. Letter by U.S. Ambassador Clarence Gauss to Secretary of State, December 23, 1943, with enclosure in the Patti collection. The cable dated December 30, 1942, mentioning the arrest of “Ho Chi-chi” is in ibid. For a discussion and other sources, see Archimedes L.A. Patti, Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America’s Albatross (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp, 46–50. Also see Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, p. 29. According to Patti (p. 56), Pham Van Dong had sent the petitions to the U.S. Embassy.
36. Letter by U.S. Ambassador Gauss dated August 18, 1944, in the Patti Collection. Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 53.
37. Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 53–54. For a report by Langdon that dismissed Vietnamese nationalist leaders living in south China as “naive politically,” see “Political Conditions in Indochina, August 1944,” enclosure to despatch no. 2945, dated September 9, 1944, from U.S. Embassy Chongqing, in the Patti collection. Also see Tonnesson, Vietnamese Revolution, p. 137, fns 129 and 130.
38. Telegram from Langdon to the Department, October 9, 1944, in the Patti collection. Memorandum by Philip D. Sprouse titled “Activities at Kunming of a Mr. Ho in connection with Kuomintang broadcasts to Indochina,” dated December 11, 1944, in ibid. The issue remains a bit puzzling. Patti declared that Ho was approached in mid-1944 by the OSS (presumably in Liuzhou) in a vain attempt to organize an intelligence network in Indochina, but provided no source for the information. The visa request submitted by Langdon came from the OWI office in Kunming. There is some circumstantial evidence to support the hypothesis that U.S. officials were interested in him, since General Zhang Fakui later recalled that a U.S. adviser had informed him that U.S. officials wanted to invite Ho to Kunming for training. See Zhang’s comments in his Oral History, p. 696.
39. Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, p. 203. Whether AGAS or any other U.S. agency in Kunming had actually invited Ho Chi Minh to China to thank him for his efforts is uncertain. Vietnamese sources mention that Shaw contacted Kun
ming and that U.S. officials had invited him to come, but evidence suggests that this is unlikely, for other accounts suggest that neither General Claire Chennault nor the local office of the OSS was aware of his existence. If any U.S. office in Kunming knew of him, it would most likely have been AGAS, but Charles Fenn states flatly that he was not aware of Ho’s identity until his arrival in Kunming. In his autobiography, Ho only noted briefly that the Americans came to see him in order to thank him for rescuing Lieutenant Shaw. If Zhang Fakui’s remark that the Americans wanted Ho to go to Kunming for training (Oral History, p. 696) is accurate, OSS officials there appeared unaware of it. It is possible that the conversation referred to by Zhang Fakui had taken place after Ho left Kunming to return to Indochina, and during his brief stopover in Paise, where he probably met Zhang Fakui again.
40. Hoang Quang Binh, “Au Yunnan,” in Avec l’Oncle Ho (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), pp. 239–40.
41. The coffee shop was called the Quang Lac Restaurant on 39 Tai Ho Gai.
42. Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh: A Biographical Introduction (New York: Scribner, 1973), pp. 76–77. “Fam” is not identified but, from his description as a man with “enormous cheekbones and a powerful chin” was probably Pham Van Dong. Patti agrees—see Why Viet Nam?, p. 544, note 52. Also see Fenn, “Trial Run to Doomsday,” p. 211. The reference to the brush-off of Ho Chi Minh by the local office of the OSS seems puzzling, since they had originally expressed an interest in using his services. Perhaps they were responding to the recent prohibition against contacts with resistance groups in Indochina. According to Charles Fenn, the new senior officials in the Chongqing office tended to be pro-French (interview with Fenn, September 22, 1997).
43. Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 78–79. Also see “Trial Run to Doomsday,” p. 233. According to the journalist Robert Shaplen, Chennault had been warned by Kuomintang acquaintances to stay away from Ho Chi Minh—see Shaplen’s The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 34.
44. For Xiao Wen’s distrust of the Vietminh, see Mai Van Bo, Chung toi hoc lam ngoai giao voi Bac Ho [I studied diplomacy with Uncle Ho] (Ho Chi Minh City: Tre, 1998), p. 41. Also see Chen, Vietnam and China, pp. 95–96. Ho Chi Minh’s movements are not well documented during this period. According to Hoang Van Hoan, Ho stopped in Bose (Paise), before returning to Pac Bo; if that is the case, he must have stopped by en route to Jingxi (see his Drop in the Ocean, p. 207). If King Chen’s infotmarion is correct, Ho was still in Paise as late as April 12. Charles Fenn’s account makes no reference to a stopover in Paise, and declares that Ho was back in Pac Bo a week after his arrival in Jingxi. But he also cites a conversation that he had with one of Ho Chi Minh’s couriers after the latter’s return to Indochina. The courier said that Ho had met with a group of rival nationalist leaders who expressed doubt about his links with the Americans. Although the courier seems to imply that the meeting took place inside Vietnam, it seems more likely that it refers to his meeting with the Dong Minh Hoi in Paise. Interview with Fenn, September 22, 1997.
45. The plan was labeled Operation Quail, and was prepared by the Special Intelligence Branch of OSS in China. See “The Quail Project,” report dated February 26, 1945, in OSS Entry 154, Box 202, Folder 3431, RG 226, USNA. Also see Heppner to Bird, April 19, 1945, in Field Station Files, Entry 154, Box 199, Folder 3373, RG 226, USNA. Although Patti appears to imply that the decision to recruit Ho was his own, Fenn recalls being told by an acquaintance that OSS Director William Donovan had heard about Ho and wanted to make use of him for OSS operations in Indochina. If that is the case, Patti was probably under orders to seek him out on his arrival. See Patti, Viet Nam, p. 67 and Fenn, “Trial Run to Doomsday,” p. 265.
46. Patti, Why Viet Nam?, pp. 69–71, 79–88. For Wedemeyer’s instructions, see HQ OSS China, from Wedemeyer to Heppner, April 26, 1945, in NR CFBX 36313, RG 226, USNA.
47. Patti (Why Viet Nam?, p. 86) says thar Ho Chi Minh gave him a “black book” composed of photographs displaying the evidence of the carastrophe; Patti sent the book to the U.S. Embassy, but after the war could not find a copy in State Department files. According to Vietnamese sources, the average fall grain harvest was about 1.1 million metric tons. In 1944 it was only slightly over 800,000 tons, of which the French and Japanese requisitioned about 125,000 tons, leaving only about 700,000 tons for local consumption. For a description, see Mart, Vietnam 1945, pp. 96–107, and Nguyen Kien Giang, Viet Nam nam dau tien sau cach mang thang tam [Vietnam in the first years after the August Revolution] (Hanoi: Su that, 1961), pp. 138–50.
48. “Nhat, Phap ban nhau va hanh dong cua chung ta” [The Japanese-French conflict and our actions] in Van kien Dang (1930–1945), vol. 3, pp. 383–93. Communist historians often describe the March 8 conference as a meeting of the Standing Committee, but several other members of the Central Committee attended as well, including Nguyen Luong Bang, Le Duc Tho, Le Thanh Nghi, and Nguyen Van Tran—see Tennesson, Vietnamese Revolution, p. 356, and Nhung su kien, vol. 1, pp. 601–2.
49. Tonnesson, Vietnamese Revolution, pp. 238, 337, citing “Franco-Jap Squabble in Indo-China,” unsigned note dated March 19, 1945, OSS Records, Soc. 124840, RG 226, USNA. Tonnesson feels that the English in the report was too colloquial to have been written by Ho Chi Minh alone, and that he may have had help in writing it (p. 356, fn 17). In fact, by this time Ho’s command of English was fairly good.
50. Tonnesson, Vietnamese Revolution, p. 345; Marr, Vietnam 1945, p. 226; Vo Nguyen Giap, Tu nhan dan ma ra [From the people] (Hanoi: Quan doi Nhan dan, 1964), p. 207. Attending the meeting were Truong Chinh, Giap, Tran Dang Ninh, Van Tien Dung, Chu Van Tan, and Le Thanh Nghi.
51. Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 102. The pamphlets were sent on to Washington, with a note from the U.S. Embassy official Langdon that the authors were members of the same group that had sent an appeal to Ambassador Gauss in August 1944 under the name of the League for the Independence of Indochina. Langdon commented that the pamphlets reflected a “hatred of France.” Langdon report to Department of State, undated, in RG 59, UPA.
52. Comments by Kim Hien and Mac Shinn at OSS–Vietminh Conference at Hampton Bays, Long Island, September 22, 1997. Ho Chi Minh’s route southward is chronicled in BNTS, vol, 2, pp. 229–39. The letter to Fenn is reproduced in Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, p. 80. According to King C. Chen, the entire group eventually comprised over fifty people—see his Vietnam and China, p. 102.
53. Giap, in “Ho Chi Minh,” p. 207.
54. There is some confusion over this conference. A detailed resolution appears in Van kien Dang (1930–1945), vol. 3, pp. 545–49, and the conference is mentioned in Histoire de la révolution, pp. 101–2, which states that it was called at the order of the Vietminh. In Tu nhan dan ma ra, p. 201, Vo Nguyen Giap mentions that he and Ho Chi Minh met with Hoang Quoc Viet and Nguyen Luong Bang to draft a plan to set up the liberated zone and decided to hold a conference of cadres, which took place on June 4. See also BNTS, vol. 2, p. 244. But in another place, Giap (“Ho Chi Minh,” p. 209) implies that the meeting never took place. Eventually, a telephone was seized during an attack on a local village, which allowed a linkup between Giap’s headquarters and Ho Chi Minh’s office outside the village—see Giap, “Ho Chi Minh,” p. 209. The village of Tan Trao is about thirteen miles east southeast of the provincial capital of Tuyen Quang and slightly to the north of Highway 13 (Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 550, n1).
55. Allison Thomas, in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and Vietnam, 1944–1947, 92d Congress, 2nd sess., Staff Study no. 2, April 3, 1972, pp. 285–87. In Thomas’s report dated September 17, 1945, he described the camp where they arrived: “The camp was located on the side of a hill in a bamboo forest at the end of Kimlung gorge about one kilometer from the small village of Kimlung. Kimlung itself is located 27 kilometers almost due east of Tuyen Quang and about 47 kilometers northwest of Thai Nguyen” (ibid. p. 257). Also see comments by Henry Prunier, a member of the team, at OSS-Vietminh Conference, September 23, 1997
. Ho’s culinary arrangements were recounted by Kim Hien at ibid., September 22, 1997.
56. Patti, Why Viet Nam?, pp. 127–29. For a discussion of French awareness of the identity of Ho Chi Minh and the political orientation of the Vietminh Front, see Alain Ruscio, Les Communistes français et la guerre d’Indochine, 1944–1934 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985), pp. 54–61. Some French officials suspected that Ho was Nguyen Ai Quoc, but others insisted that he had died in a Hong Kong jail in the 1930s. In fact, the Sûreté was now well aware that he had survived the period of imprisonment in Hong Kong and had chaired the meeting at Pac Bo in 1941. See Service de la Sûreté au Tonkin à Résident Supérieur Tonkin, no. 11914–S, June 6, 1941, in dossier labeled “1106 Nguyen Ai Quoc,” in SPCE, Carton 369, CAOM. The ICP veteran Nguyen Khanh Toan informed Ruscio that no one in Chongqing at the end of the Pacific War knew who Ho was. For a different view, see Marr, Vietnam 1945, p. 337.
57. Cited in Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 29. Also see Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, p. 81. Thomas’s report is in Senate Committee, U.S. and Vietnam, p. 245. Phelan was apparently less impressed with some of Ho Chi Minh’s colleagues, who “go charging around with great fervor shouting ‘independence,’ but seventy-five percent of them don’t know the meaning of the word” (ibid., p. 207).
58. Giap, “Ho Chi Minh,” pp. 210–11.
59. Marr, Vietnam 1945, citing William Broyles, Jr., Brothers in Arms: A Journey from War to Peace (New York: n.p., 1986), p. 104. See also Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 332. The medic who diagnosed Ho, Paul Hoagland, later suggested that he felt that his own treatment had been instrumental in saving Ho’s life, and Vietnamese sources today appear to concede that fact—see The Washington Post, December 13, 1969, and comments by Trieu Duc Quang at OSS-Vietminh Conference, September 22, 1997.
Ho Chi Minh Page 90
