5. See, for example, Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Reminiscences (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), p. 224. According to the Vietnamese historian Nguyen Kien Giaog, some viewed the public dissolution as “an error in principle”—see his Nam dau tien, p. 130. The decree is located in Van kien Dang (1945–1954) [Party Documents (1945–1954)] vol. 1 (Hanoi: Ban nghien cun lich su Dang, 1979), pp. 19–20. Also see Philippe Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), p. 108. According to Devillers, the decision may have been influenced by Tran Van Giau, who urged the formation of the broadest possible united front to lure moderates in the south.
6. “Khang chien kien quoc” [Resistance and reconstruction], in Van kien Dang (1945–1954), vol. 1, pp. 21–35; Nguyen Kien Giang, Nam dau tien, p. 133.
7. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 103–4. On the negotiations, see King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938–1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 129.
8. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, p. 106. Lam Quang Thu, “Bac Ho tai ky hop dau tien cua Quoc hoi khoa I” [Uncle Ho at the first session of the National Assembly], in NCLS, no. 184 (January–February 1975), p. 8; Chen, Vietnam and China, pp. 129–30.
9. Chen, Vietnam and China, p. 130; Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 106–7. According to Giap, Nguyen Hal Than spoke in Chinese. When Ho offeted him a large house and his own automobile, he was delighted and offered to tell Ho’s fortune.
10. For de Gaulle’s letter to Leclerc and other quotes, see Jacques de Folin, Indochine, 1940–1955: La fin d’un rêve (Paris: Perrin, 1993), pp. 130–33, citing Dossier E 166, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Hereafter MAE. See also Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi, p. 95.
11. According to de Folin, de Gaulle had instructed d’Atgenlieu not to make a deal with the Vietminh, or to accept foreign mediation—see Indochine, p. 112.
12. Jean Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh and his Vietnam: A Personal Memoir, trans. Herma Briffauit (Chicago: Cowles, 1970), p. 54.
13. Dossiet E, 166–1, MAE, cited in de Folin, Indochine, p. 98.
14. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 58. Bao Dai says that he met Sainteny on only one occasion, despite efforts by Sainteny to meet with him privately. He confirms that Ho insisted that all his colleagues address the ex-emperor by the honorific “Ngai.” See Bao Dai, Le Dragon d’Annam (Paris: Plon, 1980), p. 134.
15. Bao Dai, Dragon, pp. 135–50. On one occasion during a cabinet meeting, a colleague from the VNQDD passed Bao Dai a book about Nguyen Ai Quoc and pointed to Ho Chi Minh. When Ho noticed the book in Bao Dai’s hands, he gave him a malicious smile.
16. Caffery to Secretary of State, February 6, 1946, in book 8, p. 59, United States Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government printing office, 1971). Hereafter USVN. Ho Chi Minh’s letter to Truman is located in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and Vietnam, 1944–1947, 92d Congress, 2d sess., Staff Study no. 2, April 3, 1972, pp. 10–11. London’s reports to Washington are in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 8: pp. 26–27. Ho Chi Minh’s letter appears in OSS cable to Kunming dated February 28, 1946, S1-INT 32, Entry 140, Box 53, Folder 427, RG 226, USNA. Also see Vietnamese-language excerpts in BNTS, vol. 3, p. 121.
17. De Folin, Indochine, pp. 137–38, citing Thierry d’Argenlieu, Chronique de l’Indochine, 1945/1947 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1985), p. 148. According to this source, d’Argenlieu and Leclerc detested each other, and the high commissioner once demanded the general’s recall. Leclerc once took issue with de Gaulle’s advice to restore order in the north before opening negotiations by saying that Fiance larked the power to do so.
18. Gras, Histoire de la guerre, p. 91.
19. Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi, p. 143; BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 147–48. Bao Dai recalls that the meeting took place on February 27—see his Dragon, pp. 150–51. See also Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, p. 145. In his Ho Chi Minh, Sainteny recalled that Ho had sometimes hinted that if an accord was to be reached, someone else might sign it (p. 60).
20. De Folin, Indochine, pp. 139–44. Pignon later remarked that if the French had wanted precision in the Sino-French treaty, it probably wouldn’t have been signed—see ibid., p. 144, citing Note of July 4, 1946, by Pignon, MAE.
21. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 159–66; BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 152–53. According to Lam Quang Thu, early in the morning Ho and others went to VNQDD headquarters to inform them that the meeting would be held a day early—see his “Bac Ho tai,” p. 9.
22. Paul Mus, Viet-Nam: Sociologie d’une guerre (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1952, p. 85. See also Kobelev, p. 192.
23. “Tinh hinh va chu truong” [Situation and recommendations], in Van kien Dang (1945–1954), vol. 1, pp. 36–42. The resolution is dated March 3. Other sources declare that the meeting had been held on February 24. See Toan Tap I, vol. 4, p. 598, and BNTS, vol. 3, p. 148.
24. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 62. Vo Nguyen Giap, in Unforgettable Days (p. 171), refers to Leclerc’s request as well.
25. Frank Whire, in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War, 92d Congress, 2d sess., 1972, has an account—see p. 148. White dates the incident in December 1945, but is apparently mistaken. See the paper presented by Joseph Kelly, a U.S. observer, at the OSS-Vietminh Conference at Hampton Bays, N.Y., September 21–23, 1997.
26. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 176–77, and Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 62–64. The two accounts are roughly similar. Both make reference to the fact that at the last minute the Chinese persuaded Ho to sign. A cable to Washington by the U.S. diplomatic representative who attended the ceremony estimated that the referendum in Cochin China would probably be close—see Hanoi no. 37, dated June 5, 1946, in RG 59, UPA.
27. “Hoa de tien” [Conciliate to advance), in Van kien Dang (1945–1954), vol. 1, p. 53. Ho’s speech is reported in Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, p. 189, and Kobelev, p. 195; for a slightly different version, see Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 64. One contemporary recalls that when Ho Chi Minh visited the University of Hanoi to seek the support of the agreement, one student walked out of the shower in the dormitory completely naked in a patent effort to embarrass him. Ho recovered quickly and remarked: “Oh, it’s you, little brother. You’re always looking for a good laugh, aren’t you?”—see Bui Diem, In the Jaws of History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), p. 40.
28. Gras, Histoire de la guerre, p. 98.
29. Senate Committee, Causes, pp. 148–52. White places this dinner much earlier in time, but his comments suggest that it took place around Leclerc’s arrival in March. Washington was apparently using OSS officers to provide information on Indochina, since diplomatic offices had not yet been reopened. For the description of the city at the time of the arrival of the French, I have relied on the remarks of George Wickes at the OSS-Vietminh Conference, September 22–23, 1997.
30. Byrnes to French Ambassador Henri Bonnet, April 12, 1946, in USVN, book 8, part B.2, pp. 64–65. The telegram to Truman, dated February 28, 1946, is from OSS Kunming, SI-INT 32, Entry 140, Box 53, Folder 427, RG 226, USNA. A letter from Ho Chi Minh containing the same message, dated February 16, 1946, is in the Patti collection. Carlton Swift, Patti’s immediate successor in Hanoi, says that he had been reprimanded by his superiors for giving his tentative agreement to the creation of a U.S.-Vietnamese Friendship Society (remarks by Swift at the OSS-Vietminh Conference, September 23, 1997).
31. Comments by George Wickes at the OSS-Vietminh Conference, September 22–23, 1997. Also see Gras, Histoire de la guerre, p. 98; Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, p. 231; and Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 67.
32. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 221–22. Ho’s remark to Salan can be found in Kobelev, p. 198. According to Gras, Histoire de la guerre, p. 111, the final decisions on the Dalat conference were not made until after the Ha Long Bay meeting.
33. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 270–
74; Nguyen Thanh, Chu tich Ho Chi Minh o Phap [Ho Chi Minh in France] (Hanoi: Thong tin Ly luan, 1988), pp. 168–69. In addition to chairman Pham Van Dong, members of the delegation were Hoang Minh Giam, Phan Anh, Ta Quang Buu, Nguyen Van Huyen, and Trinh Van Binh. Foreign Minister Nguyen Tuong Tam was scheduled to join the group, but declined at the last moment on the pretext of illness. He later admitted that he hadn’t wanted to take part in the talks—see Hanoi to Department of State, no. 29, May 30, 1946, RG 59, UPA.
34. The loss of the eastern territories of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had aroused a fierce sentiment of revenge among the French people, serving as a major factor in the outbreak of World War I. For Ho’s remark, see Gras, Histoire de la guerre, p. 118, who cites Salan’s memoirs. Gras points out that the French government did not intend to grant formal recognition to the new government until after a referendum. The trip is also traced in BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 216–21.
35. Ho was originally scheduled to stay in Cannes, according to Mai Van Bo—see his Chung toi hoc lam ngoai giao voi Bac Ho [I studied diplomacy with Uncle Ho] (Ho Chi Minh City: Tre, 1998), p. 60. There is some confusion over the accommodations in Biarritz. Several sources indicate that Ho stayed at the Carlton, which has now been transformed into a condominium. Jean Sainteny has recorded that Charles Tillon, minister of aviation in the Gouin cabinet, visited Biarritz in secret in order to determine “with his own eyes” in what conditions Ho was being held there. See Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 80. But Vietnamese sources state that he stayed at the Hotel Le Palais—see BNTS, vol. 3, p. 226, and Nguyen Thanh, Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, p. 169. Philippe Devillers says that the delegation was housed with Ho at the Carlton, but a U.S. diplomatic source reported that it was put up in a second-class hotel—see Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi, p. 289, and U.S. Embassy Paris to Department of State, no. 5411, June 15, 1946, RG 59, UPA.
36. Most of this material comes from Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 74–75, who noted that the crew of the fishing boat was amazed at Ho Chi Minh’s “sea legs” on the choppy waters of the Bay of Biscay, not realizing that he had spent several years at sea earlier in life. He adds that a wit later added the phrase “gone with the wind” to Ho’s dedication at the restaurant in Biristou. Also see BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 226–32.
37. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 76. The remark about Ta Thu Thau is in Gras, Histoire de la guerre, p. 118. Some Vietnamese sources hostile to Ho Chi Minh claim that he was responsible, directly or indirectly, for Thau’s execution—see the article in Chroniques Vietnamiens (Fall 1997), p. 19.
38. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 76–78. En route to Normandy, a second car, which was carrying a number of his aides, suddenly left the road and overturned in a ditch. No one was seriously hurt, but both Ho Chi Minh and Sainteny briefly wondered whether it had been a botched attempt on his life.
39. Nguyen Thanh, Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, pp. 202–3 (the article in Le Figaro is cited on p. 165). Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 77.
40. Leclerc apparently had obtained a copy of a message from Ho advising his colleagues to “be ready for any eventuality” during his absence in Paris. See Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, pp. 81–82.
41. Nguyen Thanh, Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, p. 179. Also see Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, p. 299. Ho Chi Minh informed colleagues in later years that he was well aware of French efforts to seduce him by according him royal treatment in Paris, including the hanging of the Vietnamese flag next to the French tricolor—see Mai Van Bo, Chung toi hoc lam, pp. 60–61.
42. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 71. The FCP’s suspicion of Ho was reported in a cable to the State Department—see Paris to Department, June 16, 1946, RG 59, UPA. Historian Alain Ruscio surmises that, in his comments about fighting for Indochina, Thorez was referring not to the government in Hanoi, but to the radical nationalists; in general, he portrays relations between the two parties as amicable—see his Les Communistes français et la guerre d’Indochine, 1944–1954 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985), p. 109. But Thorez later explained to journalist Philippe Devillers that his party had no intention of serving as the liquidator of the French presence in Indochina and that it ardently supported the vision of the tricolor flying over the far-reaching territories of the French Union around the globe—see Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi, p. 269.
43. BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 237–240; Ruscio, Les Communistes, p. 103; Kobelev, Ho Chi Minh, p. 201.
44. The American reporter was David Schoenbrun. Ruscio, Les Communistes, pp. 129–31; Nguyen Thanh, Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, pp. 187–89. When someone wondered whether he would accept a separate South Vietnam, Ho replied by asking rhetorically why they would not wish to join the rest of the country, since they shared the same language and the same ancestors—see Ruscio, Les Communistes, p. 131.
45. For Moutet’s views, see the cable quoted in Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi, pp. 208–12.
46. Caffery to Burns, September 11 and 12, 1946, in RG 59, UPA. Also see BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 298–99, and Devillers, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi, p. 218,
47. DOS 241 to Reed in Saigon, August 9, 1946, in RG 59, UPA; Office Memo: Moffat to JCV-FE, August 9, 1946, in ibid. Both messages were drafted by Charlton Ogburn, later an outspoken critic of French policy in Indochina.
48. Many years latet, Ho Chi Minh confided to younger colleagues that by the late summer of 1946 he was convinced that war was inevitable. “The situation was quite tense,” he explained. “They were seeking to gain time to prepare an attack on us. We understood their plot and sought in turn to gain time to prepare ourselves.” See Mai Van Bo, Chung toi hoc lam, p. 61. The phrase “sorcerer’s apprentice” is from Jean Sainteny, in his Ho Chi Minh, p. 88.
49. David Schoenbrun, As France Goes (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 234–36.
50. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 88–89, Hanoi 88 to Secretary of State, September 26, 1946, in RG 59, UPA. On the meeting with Moutet, see Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 333–35, citing an article in the French newspaper Franc-Tireur. According to Ruscio, Ho’s secretary confided that the president really wanted peace—see Les Communistes, p. 114.
51. Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 90; Nguyen Thanh, Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, pp. 205–6; Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, p. 337; Stein Tonnesson, 1946: Déclenchement de la guerre d’Indochine: Les vêpres tonkinoises du 19 Décembre (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1987), pp. 40–41. For the story of the incredible shrinking carpet, see David Halberstam, Ho (New York: Knopf, 1987), second edition, p. 89.
52. Tonnesson, Déclenchement, pp. 41–42. The French obtained copies of all of his messages from the Dumont d’Urville because he was compelled to use their military telegraph system. French agents also snuck into his room and photographed documents that he was carrying in a dispatch case (see ibid). There is some discrepancy on Ho’s departure date. Most sources give the date as September 18, while Sainteny gives the nineteenth. According to Mai Van Bo, (Chung toi hoc lam, p. 64), Ho left Paris on the eighteenth for Marseilles and arrived in Toulon the next day.
53. Alain Ruscio, ed., Ho Chi Minh Textes, 1914–1969 (Paris: L’Harmattan, n.d.), pp. 132–34.
54. Avec l’Oncle Ho, pp. 337–40.
55. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 82.
56. Ho Chi Minh’s arrival in Haiphong and Hanoi is reported in Giap’s Unforgettable Days, pp. 342–47. The tumultuous return and the crowds surrounding the palace are confirmed by a U.S. diplomatic observer—see Hanoi 94, October 24, 1946, in RG 59, UPA.
57. For a variety of interpretations, see Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh, p. 90; Tonnesson, Déclenchement, p. 41; and Bui Diem, In the Jaws, p. 49. For Ho Chi Minh’s own comments, see Mai Van Bo, Chung toi hoc lam, p. 65. Ho added that it was nice to sail on a ship as a passenger for a change.
58. Vo Nguyen Giap, Unforgettable Days, pp. 283–86, The VNQDD headquarters was at 132 Minh Khai Street. Responsibility for these clashes has always been a matter of controversy. It is worth noting, however, that both French and U.
S. diplomatic sources put most of the blame for fomenting disorders on nationalist elements—for one account, see Hanoi to Secretary of State, June 18, 1946, in RG 59, UPA.
59. A bonze is a Buddhist monk. Nguyen Binh (real name Nguyen Phuong Thau) is truly one of the bêtes noires of the Vietnamese revolution, but surprisingly little is known about his life. For Ho Chi Minh’s directive, “Reduce the Campaign of Terrorism,” see Extrait de télegrammes décryptés, 2ème Bureau no. 2186/2, dated April 15, 1946, in dossier labeled “1946–1949,” in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM.
60. Truong Chinh, “The August Revolution,” in Truong Chinh: Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), pp. 62, 73. U.S. intelligence sources reported a comment by Pham Van Dong that Ho had gone to Paris “suffering from the illusion that national liberation could be wrested from an imperial power by negotiations”—see To NA, Mr. Bond from SY Jack D. Neal, “The Position of Ho Chi Minh,” June 15, 1950, RG 59, UPA. Contemporary French sources now began to speak increasingly of the existence of rival factions within the Party and the Vietminh leadership. There is some evidence from Ho Chi Minh himself to the contrary. In a conversation with General Raoul Salan en route to France in late May, Ho remarked that “Giap is totally devoted to me. He only exists as a result of my support. He, like the others, can do nothing without me. I am the father of the revolution”—see de Folin, Indochine, p. 165, citing Salan’s memoirs. Such blunt comments, however, do not sound much like Ho Chi Minh.
61. Information on his sister’s visit was provided by officials at the Ho Chi Minh Museum in Kim Lien. Also see BNTS, vol. 3, pp. 366–67 and BNTS, vol. 10, pp. 490–92. According to one hostile source, Dat came under suspicion from Party members during the Franco-Vietminh conflict, but because of his relationship to Ho Chi Minh no one who was aware of the relationship dared interfere—see China News Analysis, December 12, 1969.
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