34. Robert M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origins of the American Containment Policy in Asia (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 122. The possibility of Ho-Bao Dai talks came from Indian sources and was reported in “The Position of Ho-Chi-Minh,” in To NA Mr. Bond from SY Jack D. Neal, dated June 16, 1950, RG 59, UPA. Ho firmly denied to another journalist that he would deal with traitors like Bao Dai—see the article in Khong Dich (June 12, 1949), contained in high commissioner’s report dated April 17, 1950, in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM.
35. Secretary of State to Gibson, May 20, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, vol. 7 (East Asia), pt. 1, pp. 29–30.
36. Cited in Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, p. 81.
37. Luo Guibo, “Lishi,” pp. 163–68. As always, Ho Chi Minh was solicitous of the comfort of his guests, instructing his private secretary, Vu Dinh Huynh, to make sure that Luo and his colleagues were given appropriate accommodations: “With me it doesn’t matter, but with others it has to be just tight. They care about things like that.” See Vu Thu Hien, Dem giua ban ngay: Hoi ky chinh tri cua mot nguoi khong lam chinh tri (Westminster, Calif.: Van Nghe, 1997), p. 108.
38. See Truong Chinh, “Hoan thanh nhiem vu chuan bi chuyen manh sang tong phan cong” [Complete the task of preparation, switch strongly to the general counter-offensive], in Van kien Dang (1945–1954), vol. 2, part 2, pp. 265–338. The DRV decision to move to the general offensive sometime in 1950 was reported by the New China News Agency shortly after. See the report by U.S. Consul Edmund Clubb, in Peiping [Bejing] to Secretary of State, no. 395, February 25, 1950, RG 59, UPA.
39. Vo Nguyen Giap, Nhiem vu quan su truoc mat chuyen sang tong phan cong [The military task in preparing for the general counteroffensive] (Hanoi: n.p., 1950). French intelligence sources obtained a July 15, 1950, report from the ICP Central Committee to the Vietminh leadership in the south that described the general offensive as taking place in several stages and involving arduous sacrifices—see Saigon to Secretary of State, August 21, 1950, RG 59, UPA, Documents from the Third National Conference can be found in Van kien Dang (1945–1954), vol. 2, part 2, pp. 241–431.
40. Liu Shaoqi cabled Ho Chi Minh reporting the appointment of General Wei; see Liu Shaoqi nianpu, p. 247. Liu’s comment on the global significance of the assignment is in ibid., p. 256. Also see Hoang Van Hoan’s article in Beijing Review, November 23, 1949. For a lengthy analysis of Chinese assistance to the Vietminh during this period, see Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950–1954,” The Journal of Military History (October 1993). Also see Furuta, “Indochinese Communist Party’s Divisions,” p. 150. French intelligence reports on the new China connection were relayed to U.S. officials, who reacted initially in a low-key manner and expressed skepticism that China was about to become directly involved in the conflict. An undated message from the State Department to the U.S. Embassy in Paris in the summer of 1950 remarked that a Chinese invasion was unlikely in light of historic Vietnamese suspicions of the Chinese. At most, the writer noted, the two were cooperating to achieve common goals. See For Bruce from Secretary, undated, drafted by Gibson, August 15, 1950, in RG 59, UPA.
41. Zhongguo junshi guwentuan fang Ywe kang fa douzheng shishi [The Chinese Military Advisory Group in Vietnam during the Anti-French War] (Beijing; Liberation Army Publishers, 1990), pp. 44–46. See also ZYG, p. 28, and Gras, Histoire de la guerre, pp. 315–16. According to an informer, Party leaders gave some consideration to establishing an external headquarters at Guilin in order to strengthen contacts with Beijing and also to facilitate Ho Chi Minh’s activities to promote revolution elsewhere in Southeast Asia. See BR no. 9426 du Service de Sécurité du Haut Commissariat au Nord Vietnam, July 13, 1950, in dossier labeled “Ho Chi Minh années 1949 à 1953,” in SPCE, Carton 370, CAOM.
42. Truong Chinh, “Chuyen manh sang tong phan cong” [Vigorously switch to the general counteroffensive] in Van kien Dang (1945–1954), vol. 2, part 2, pp. 264–338. Also see Motoo Furuta, “Indochinese Communist Party’s Division,” pp. 157–58. Furuta points out that the ICP had technically adopted the concept of a “growing over” of the Vietnamese revolution as early as 1948, But had refrained from taking key steps to bring theory closer to reality until the beginning of the new decade.
43. According to a defector who had once been well placed in the movement, after Ho’s return from his 1950 trip to Moscow and Beijing, chief responsibility for formulating the Party’s domestic agenda was turned over to General Secretary Truong Chinh—see “Déclarations sur la vie.” For some of the press reports mentioned in this paragraph, see the extract from the Bangkok journal The Democrat, June 1950, and the Journal d’Extrême Orient, June 13, 1950, and Saigon cable no. 1644 dated March 13, 1951, all in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM. For Figuères’s visit to Vietnam, see Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography, trans. Peter Wiles (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 185–87. According to the French journal Aux Ecoutes, Moscow warned Ho that the final objective of the revolution was not national independence, but the advent of world communism, and advised him to accept Chinese advice and assistance. Whether this report has any basis in fact, there seems little doubt that both Moscow and Beijing continued to harbor doubts about Ho Chi Minh’s intentions. See the folder on the Figuères visit in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM.
44. Translation of an extract from, the journal Gia Dinh dated November 16, 1950, annex to “Note pour le Conseiller Politique” no. 1257/C/SG, I, February 23, 1951, in dossier labeled “1951,” in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM.
45. For an account, see Vo Nguyen Giap, Duong toi, pp. 17, 41–43. Also see Chen Geng Riji [Chen Geng’s Diary], vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1984), p. 37.
46. Manila 788 to Secretary of State, October 2, 1950, RG 59, UPA.
47. See Heath to Secretary of State, November 4, 1950, in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), book 8, pp. 405–8. Also see Heath to Secretary of State, October 15, 1950, RG 59, UPA.
48. Hoang Van Hoan, Drop in the Ocean, pp. 295–96; Vo Nguyen Giap, Duong toi, pp. 12, 36–44; Ngoc Chau, Chiec ao Bac Ho [Uncle Ho’s Jacket] (Hanoi: Thanh nien, 1987), p. 60; Boudarel and Ky, Hanoi, p. 123; Chen Jian, “China,” pp. 93–94. For Chen Geng’s criticisms of Vietminh performance—and there were many—see Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model,” pp. 700–703, and Chen Geng Riji, pp. 38–39. According to the latter source, many of these ideas were apparently passed on to Ho and Giap prior to Chen’s departure. They “happily” accepted his suggestions. According to Vo Nguyen Giap (Duong toi, p. 14), Ho Chi Minh had considerable respect for Chen Geng, and had initially requested that he head the original Chinese delegation to Indochina in early 1950.
49. According to Vo Nguyen Giap, at the end of the successful border offensive Chen Geng recommended a three-pronged attack similar to the recent campaign in the vicinity of the Red River delta sometime the following year—see Duong toi, p. 99. The role of Chinese advisers—and their superiors in Beijing—in planning the offensive is described briefly in Zhongguo junshi, p. 27. Senior Chinese military planners apparently gave their approval to the plan, although it should be noted that in a letter to Ho Chi Minh in December, Liu Shaoqi had expressed Beijing’s agreement with Ho’s declared intention to fight a protracted war based on a policy of self-reliance. Liu expressed confidence that, with the assistance of Chinese advisers, such a strategy would eventually succeed, but only if it were carried out on the basis of careful planning and painstaking efforts to improve the effectiveness of the movement. Liu also stressed that all Chinese suggestions should be adapted to conform with conditions inside Vietnam—see Liu Shaoqi nianpu, telegram of December 8, 1950, p. 265. Doubts within the Vietminh leadership about the likelihood of a successful offensive are discussed in Vu Thu Hien, Dem giua ban ngay, pp. 361–62.
XIII | A Place Called Dien Bien Phu
1. Ngo Van Chieu, Journal d’un combattant Viet-minh (Paris: Ed
itions du Seuil, 1957). p. 154.
2. Hanoi 366 to Secretary of State, January 23, 1951, RG 59, UPA,
3. Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War,” China Quarterly (March 1993), p. 95; Yves Gras, Histoire de la guerre d’Indochine (Paris: de Noel, 1992), pp. 383–84; Zhongguo junshi guwentuan fang Ywe kang Fa douzheng shishi [The Chinese Military Advisory Group in Vietnam during the Anti-French War] (Beijing: Liberation Army Publishers, 1990), pp. 30–31. For the meeting of Party leaders in April, see BNTS, vol. 5, pp. 43–46. According to Saigon 1580 to the Secretary of State, dated March 10, 1951, RG 59, UPA, local journals reported that Giap had committed suicide. For the reaction of Chinese advisers, see Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950–1954,” The Journal of Military History (October 1993), p. 704.
4. Georges Boudarel, Autobiographie (Paris: Jacques Bertoin, 1991), pp. 406–7. One of the key texts used in the program, Reform Work Methods, was a direct translation of Liu Shaoqi’s Lun Dang [On the party], which was used for the same purpose in China—see HZYZ, p. 130.
5. For one report on his fate, see Saigon ARMA, MC 361–51, dated December 13, 1951, RG 59, UPA. According to sources in Hanoi, one of the members of the team that escorted Nguyen Binh to the north was Le Duan, later Ho Chi Minh’s successor as Party general secretary. Other sources say Nguyen Binh had been under suspicion for months, because he was “too tough.” For reports of Sino-Vietnamese friction, see Saigon 928 to Secretary of State, October 27, 1951, and Hanoi 536, April 4, 1951, both in RG 59, UPA.
6. For Truong Chinh’s report to the Congress, see Ban ve cach mang Viet Nam [On the Vietnamese revolution] (Hanoi: 1956], p. 6. Also see Ken Post, Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism in Vietnam, vol. 1 (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1989), pp. 172–73.
7. For the captured document, see U.S. Department of State, Working Paper on North Viet-Nam’s Role in the War in South Viet-Nam (Washington, D.C., 1968), appendix item no. 1, p. 2–2.
8. This captured document was reported to Washington by U.S. Consulate in Hanoi no. 10, July 12, 1950, RG 59, UPA. The three countries, it stated, were contiguous and should mutually aid one another in every field to fight the imperialist invader and provide mutual assistance in building “new democracies.” Party directives were to be valid for action throughout Indochina, but should be applied according to the situation in each country. According to the document, the Democratic Federation of Indochina would not be created until the independence of all three countries had been achieved. Then each would join the new federation on its own volition.
9. Extract from Bulletin des Ecoutes Viet-minh no. 1211 dated April 26, 1951, in dossier labeled “1951,” in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM. For some of the rumors regarding Ho Chi Minh, see Saigon 220, June 12, 1950, RG 59, UPA. French media and intelligence sources reported that Ho had been replaced by the militant Truong Chinh—see the Journal d’Extrême Orient, June 11, 1950. A newspaper in Thailand said that Stalin had ordered the eviction of Ho Chi Minh from the Party because he refused to follow the Soviet line.
10. For references to Sino-Vietnamese discussions of the campaign, and Ho’s trip to Beijing, see Zhongguo junshi, pp. 52, 56–57; also see Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model,” pp. 706–7, and Chen Jian, “China,” pp. 96–97. According to these sources, Beijing refused a Vietnamese request to dispatch Chinese troops from Yunnan province to take part in a future attack on Lai Chau.
11. For rumors of Ho’s death, see the paper by Edmund Gullion attached to Memo, Far East (Allison) to Sec, January 28, 1953, and Memo to Undersecretary titled “Intelligence Note,” April 9, 1954, both in RG 59, UPA. According to the latter, no reliable source had seen him since May 1947, when he had tuberculosis. Also see Joseph Starobin, Eyewitness in Indochina (New York: Cameron & Kahn, 1954).
12. This information was printed in the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily. See “Bulletin officiel du New China News Agency” (trad, française), January 12, 1951, in dossier labeled “1951,” in SPCE, Carton 366, CAOM. Also see “Bulletin des renseignements,” no. 88 (September 10, 1951), in ibid. For his frequent change of residence, see BNTS, vol. 5, p. 153.
13. For an interview with a Vietminh defector on conditions in liberated areas, see Hanoi 34, March 25, 1952, in RG 59, UPA. For a more favorable view, see Starobin, Eyewitness, especially pp. 82–89 (Starobin, a journalist with ties to the U.S. Communist Party, spent several weeks in the liberated area in the spring of 1953).
14. Duong Van Mai Elliott, The Sacred Willow: Four Generations in the Life of a Vietnamese Family (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 234–35.
15. Cited in Bernard B. Fall, The Vietminh Regime: Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1954), p. 109. For a classic account of the land reform program from a critical point of view, see Hoang Van Chi’s From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1964). On pp. 182–83, Chi quotes Ho Chi Minh as having observed that when you need to straighten a curved piece of bamboo, it is necessary to bend it in the opposite direction and hold it a while. Then it will slowly straighten up.
16. Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 168; Starobin, Eyewitness, pp. 88–91.
17. For the full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 12–34.
18. Ambassador in France (Dillon) to Secretary of State, July 22, 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. 13 (Indochina), pt. 1, p. 693. From Saigon, U.S. Ambassador Donald Heath angrily took the editors of Life to cask for their pessimistic view of the situation, and the latter eventually agreed to publish his response, “France Is Fighting the Good Fight,” in September; however, the author of the original article, Douglas Duncan, defended himself and claimed chat it reflected the views of most U.S. military officers in Indochina. In exasperation, Henry Luce, the publisher, complained to State Department officials that he was being accused by his own subordinates of ignoring lower-level views. See Saigon 391, September 3, 1953, and 397, September 4, 1953, both in RG 59, UPA.
19. See Han Huaizhi, comp., Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The military activities of the contemporary Chinese army], vol. 1 (Beijing: Social Sciences Press, 1989), p. 529. Also see Zhongguo junshi, pp. 89–90.
20. Zhongguo junshi, p. 90. According to Han Huazhi, Dangdai, vol. 1, p. 530, the attack on Dien Bien Phu was suggested to Vo Nguyen Giap by his Chinese advisers. Beijing indicated that a victory at Dien Bien Phu could have strong political and international significance. Also see Hoang Van Thai’s article in Vietnam Courier (March 1984), pp. 19–23, and Vo Nguyen Giap’s People’s War, People’s Army (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 148.
21. For the Chinese viewpoint, see François Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d’Indochine: Genève 1954 (Paris: Sorbonne, 1979), pp. 68–71. Also see Zhai Qiang, “China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,” The China Quarterly, no. 129 (March 1992), p. 107.
22. For a similar conclusion, see Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model,” pp. 708–9.
23. In actuality, Ho had not rejected the idea of peace talks, but had simply stated that they should take place only under highly favorable conditions—see Toan Tap I, vol. 6, p. 459. For the TASS report, see Joyaux, La Chine, p. 68; also see U.S. Embassy Saigon, dispatch 208, October 11, 1951, and U.S. Ambassador in Moscow (Bohlen) to Department of State, September 3, 1953, both in RG 59, UPA. On French peace feelers, see Jacques de Folin, Indochine 1940–1954: La fin d’un rêve (Paris: Perrin, 1993), p. 261.
24. This report is contained in Saigon Joint Weeka 49, December 7, 1953, in RG 59, UPA. The interview was summarized in U.S. Embassy (Stockholm) to Department of State, November 29, 1953, in RG 59, UPA. In an editorial that accompanied the interview, Expressen expressed
some skepticism about Ho Chi Minh’s sincerity and indicated that the article seemed to be “inspired by Moscow.” For a Vietnamese-language version, see Toan Tap I, vol. 6, pp. 494–96.
25. Toan Tap I, vol. 6, pp. 430–42.
26. Chu tich Ho Chi Minh voi cong tac ngoai giao [Chairman Ho Chi Minh and foreign relations] (Hanoi: Su that, 1990), p. 143.
27. Zhai Qiang, “China and Geneva Conference,” p. 108; Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Bantam, 1971), pp. 532–34. Chen Jian, “China in the Vietnam Wars,” in Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), p. 159. According to this author’s source, the Vietnamese apparently agreed.
28. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), p. 191.
29. Ho’s letter is quoted in Chu tich Ho Chi Minh, p. 142, citing Lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam [A history of the Vietnamese Communist Party] (Hanoi: Su that, 1984), p. 691; For Zhou Enlai’s message, see Zhongguo junshi, p. 99. The figures on Chinese aid are from ibid. According to one Chinese source, from 1950 to 1954 China provided the Vietminh with 116,000 rifles and 4,630 cannons, equipping five infantry divisions, one engineering and artillery division, one anti-aircraft regiment, and one guard regiment. See Han Huaizhi, Dangdai, vol. 1, pp. 520–22.
30. Sniping between Beijing and Hanoi over the relevance of Chinese advice to conditions on the battlefield has been common since the end of the Vietnam War. For Vietnamese complaints, see Georges Boudarel, “Comment Giap a failli perdre la bataille de Dien Bien Phu,” Le Nouvel Observateur, April 8, 1983.
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