Media on the Battlefield is an Army-wide program designed to prepare soldiers in field situations to deal with the media. The preparation can take several forms. It can be as simple as providing soldiers with cards that spell out procedures for handling unplanned media events, and it can be as elaborate as formal classroom training (such as PAOs receive).
The JRTC Media on the Battlefield Program places a unit commander in a press conference situation with a simulated television news crew trained to give the officer a grueling workout under the lights and cameras (all of which is taped for later as-sessmentand scoring). Led by a female roleplayer, who goes by the name “Maggie LaLouch,” the three-person team throws tough questions. Not a few officers would choose combat before an hour with Maggie and her crew.95
Lieutenant Colonel Roy Dunn, USA, following a simulated press conference during NTC 99-02. The woman next to him is a roleplayer from Fort Polk, Louisiana, who simulates a “challenging” member of the media on the battlefield.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
Handling a skilled reporter may not be up there with combat in the soldier’s hierarchy, but the military must still face the consequences of the “CNN Effect” (when the shoe drops, everyone in the world will be watching what they are doing). Reporters are not always hostile. But they often are. Screwups can be costly. Maggie came on as tough and hostile.
The press conference started promptly at 1600 hours. Lieutenant Colonel Dunn opened with a short command briefing about FOB 31 and its job on the Island of Yuma, with emphasis on efforts to reach out to the local population. He looked good, he was well-prepared, and had a nice, relaxed presence before the camera.
Maggie’s first questions were lobs, and Dunn’s answers were charming. It was all pretty easygoing ... for a while.
She came on tougher when she slipped in a question about chemical warfare training (implying that chemical weapons might be used in the “Tierra Del Diablo War”). But Dunn handled that one as smoothly as the lobs (chemical warfare training is necessary insurance, but the U.S. would never be the first to use WMDs).
About twenty minutes into the interview she fired her “bomb”: “What about the soldier who went AWOL?” (“AWOL” or “Absent Without Leave” is the military term for desertion, and is a very serious crime.)
A few days earlier, a pair of MPs from the 108th MP Company had gone AWOL for real, and were still missing. Maggie was hitting him with questions about a real-world event and not a contrived exercise situation. In other words, the question was totally unexpected, and totally unprepared for. Even worse, from Dunn’s point of view, AWOLs are an extremely sensitive subject among our military. On the one hand, they are extremely rare. On the other, they cast doubt on the leadership of the unit deserted—a subject other commanders don’t relish getting into in public.
Dunn took the high road. “No, Maggie, we do not have one AWOL, we have two,” he acknowledged, “but we’ve been making a serious and ongoing effort to find and return the two soldiers.” And he went on: “I do hope the young men are safe and will come in before the charges they face get more serious.” He added: “And if their families have any idea about where they are, I would ask them for their help in getting the two safely back to their units.”
Almost as an afterthought—a smart afterthought—he offered to bring the female captain commanding the MP detachment to the briefing theater for an interview. This was in fact done (and she did okay). After which the conference came to a friendly end.
In the AAR that followed, Maggie and her crew gave Lieutenant Colonel Dunn a big thumb‘s-up. His obvious compassion, tact, and openness, together with the artfulness of his responses, had proved a winning combination.
Friday, October 30th—Yuma Proving Ground
On October 30th, the 3rd/3rd Infantry (Mech.) entered the fight up at Fort Irwin, and (not specifically related to that event) change-of-mission orders went out to the SR teams in the field. (In real combat, where events are fluid—not to say chaotic—plans must constantly be changed. So also in simulated combat.)
For ODA 324/SOT-A 301 working on SR002, their new orders meant big changes: Their mission would now be extended several days (they would be resupplied over the weekend); the team would be conducting a TG (Terminal Guidance) mission on Monday (their assigned target would be an enemy camp just north of the crossroads, approximately 1.5 miles/2,500 m. from their current position); and instead of an exfiltration by a UH-60 Blackhawk, they would link up with elements of the conventional forces sometime the following week. The mission change—from observation and signals interception to a DA assignment—brought with it extra hazards.
All in a day’s work.
The team immediately began to consider where to site their PAQ-10 Ground Laser Target Designator (GLTD) to maximize the probability of a successful and precise strike on the target.
Since the target was well within the range of their battery-powered GLTD, and the Harrier drivers would use their ARBS to handle the delivery, in theory, all the team had to do was punch in a digital pulse code into the GLTD, “paint” the target with the laser spot just prior to the strike, and the ARBS would handle the rest. In fact, the mission was more complicated than that. For the team would also be responsible for the Harriers’ final approach route to the target. That is, they would have to find the best way for the two Marine aircraft to thread through probable antiaircraft defenses, while at the same time placing them on a course that maximized their chances for a successful weapons delivery.
To this end, the team captain made several reconnaissance trips on foot to map out the area, and then transmitted the results back to FOB 31. This information went up to the SOCCE (Mojave) element at IMC, which handed it off to the air-tasking cell of JTF (Mojave).
On Monday, I would ride up to Fort Irwin and observe the outcome of all this activity.
Monday, November 2nd—National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
Because of the ever present possibility of discovery by the bad guys, it was an anxious weekend for the members of the ODA 324/SOT-A 301 team. The change of mission was not exactly welcome, either, but the team, of course, accepted it with typical SF stoicism. Meanwhile, SATCOM communications were still spotty, though the HF systems continued to work reliably.
On the brighter side, the resupply mission that weekend could almost be called a blessing. More MREs. And fresh water.
The airstrike was scheduled for 2200 hours Pacific Standard Time that evening, which meant that Major McCollum and I had some serious travel ahead of us. The run to Fort Irwin would take a supremely boring six hours.
We arrived around 1800 hours PST, and linked up with the post PAO. After a quick run to the local Burger King, we loaded into a HMMWV and headed north for the two-hour drive into the Fort Irwin “box.”
During this nighttime action, we would once again be using PVS-7B NVGs, and all the O/C rules (wearing BDUs, full-face camouflage, etc.) were in effect. Since this would technically be a “live-fire” event (the Harriers would be dropping live Mk. 82 500 Ib./227 kg. bombs), we would have to observe it from a sandbagged position laid out by the Fort Irwin range control personnel. Per the rules, this site was uprange and to the side of the planned flight/weapons delivery path of the Marine jets. Also present at the safe site were a number of other personnel from the NTC staff.
Darkness fell about 2000 hours, and we stayed in the HMMWVs until just thirty minutes prior to the planned Time-on-Target (TOT). Moving about in the dark at Fort Irwin is not recommended. Rattlesnakes and other unpleasant critters are common.
At the sandbagged bunker, range control personnel handed out Kevlar helmets and flak jackets, in case a Harrier dropped “short.” And then we listened to the chatter of the range control and O/C radio circuits. The two VMA-513 AV-8Bs had launched successfully from Yuma, and were holding near the main post until they were cleared to make their run. At about fifteen minutes to TOT (2200 hours), the range was cleared as green, and we listened to the
ODA 324/SOT-A 301 team coach the Marine pilots in. Final instructions were transmitted, along with authentication codes and laser code. At five minutes to TOT, the jets were cleared “hot,” and they began their run onto the target. Meanwhile, the PAQ-10 GLTD was turned on, and the target was illuminated by the laser designator.
A map of ODA 324’s Terminal Guidance mission during NTC 99-02.
RUBICON, INC. BY LAURA DENINNO
Since the jets were making their run at over 500 knots, we only heard them a few seconds before they arrived. In the cockpits, the pilots tuned their ARBS to “look” for the LLDR laser spot, and successfully “saw” it.
“The target is locked,” they announced, and the final run started.
The first Harrier roared over the mountain to our south, making a low-level “laydown” run to the target tents north of the crossroads. When the onboard computer decided the time was right, it released the bombs from the racks. Once released, the weapons were retarded by high-drag “ballute” fittings so the Harrier could escape from shrapnel after the bombs detonated.
From our position more than two miles away, we stared through our NVGs as the bombs crashed directly on the target. The second Harrier, a few seconds later, had little to do but “make the rubble bounce.”
And that was it.
The range control personnel headed out to the target area to make sure all the bombs had detonated safely. And we headed back to Fort Irwin—a brief stop for me, to be followed by a drive to Las Vegas, an overnight stay, and a flight home.
The next day ODA 324/SOT-A 301 abandoned their surveillance positions and exfiltrated successfully to the lines of the 3rd/3rd Infantry (Mech.). In fact, as it turned out, all the FOB 31 missions had good outcomes; every major objective was attained, and every target hit as planned. As a result, the 3rd/3rd Infantry (Mech.) went into their rotation free of worry from enemy WMD and missile attack.
The close, professional coordination between the conventional and SOF forces had greatly contributed to the eventual success of NTC 99-02.
Downrange: Special forces in the Field
It’s Metric Monday in Kuwait!
Army Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer
Military forces don’t earn their keep perfecting their skills, but in operations in other countries ... downrange. Training is obviously essential, and observing training can tell us a great deal about a military organization, but there is no substitute for the real thing. For that reason, SFC wanted me to spend as much “downrange” time as possible. There I could best observe how Special Forces play their unique part within the national security system.
Specifically, SFC wanted me to experience the day-to-day activities of SF soldiers doing JCET-type missions (which comprise the majority of SF field missions), as well as to sample a broad cross-section of other SF operations.
Almost There: Bosnia
To that end, on our journey east after NTC 99-02, Major McCollum and I made a stop at Fort Carson, Colorado, one of the many military facilities scattered around Colorado Springs (others: the Air Force Academy, Peterson AFB and Shriever AFB, and Cheyenne Mountain—home to the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD). Fort Carson is home to the 7th Infantry Division (an Army National Guard formation), 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and numerous other units, including the 10th Special Forces Group (a newly built compound houses its two continental U.S.-based battalions).
This trip had a double purpose: First, I would talk with the 2/10th SFG command staff about their unit and its capabilities. But second, a plan was afoot to have me experience 10th SFG operations downrange in Bosnia-Herzegovina (I was to observe SF teams carrying out actual peacekeeping mission tasks), and I was to receive initial briefings and other instructions in preparation for that trip.
Three 10th SFG ODAs were scheduled to deploy to Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after New Year’s 1999, where they would be working as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force. This force, working under Operation Joint Forge (the NATO name for the operation), was responsible for implementing the terms of the 1995 Dayton Accords.96 So far, the peace plan had held up without a major breach—but only just. The Bosnian Serbs didn’t like it: The Accords meant they would lose the regional dominance that had been theirs prior to the summer of 1995. They had made their distaste evident mostly by “foot dragging” on full implementation of the agreement, and more openly by the occasional protest or riot, or by harassment of NATO personnel. The U.S.-led peacekeeping force had had to come down on them hard.
Meanwhile, the dogs of war were barking again in what was left of Yugoslavia, and NATO was butting heads with Slobodan Milosevic over the fate of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians.
Practically, that meant the units headed into the next rotation had to prepare for a wide range of contingencies—from simple conflict resolution to full-scale civil war. It was against this backdrop that Major McCollum and I tugged our coats against a light falling snow, and headed over to the headquarters of the 2/10th SFG.
Wednesday, November 4th, 1998—2/10th SFG Headquarters, Fort Carson, Colorado
The 2/10th’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Rendall, met us in the 2/10th SFG headquarter’s lobby. After introductions, he guided us to the battalion’s briefing room. Tacked to all the walls were maps, photos, and charts, outlining missions SF teams would run into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Earlier, Major McCollum had made initial arrangements for my own Bosnia trip. Now things began to get serious. Today I was to be given operational sensitive material about dates, locations, personnel, and intent of several key missions being executed by 2/10th SFG. If I blabbed, real people—including me—could be at risk.
As I took a seat, the commander explained this and other ground rules. Then the lights were doused and the briefings began.
Here is the situation at the time: The peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation Joint Forge) is in its fourth year. The peacekeeping force, known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR), is composed of heavy and conventional forces from more than two dozen nations, most of which are members either of NATO or the associated Partnership for Peace program (the NATO program that helps qualify former Warsaw Pact and other nations for NATO membership). SFOR works missions in the three primary control zones—American, French, and British. The American force, known as Task Force Eagle, is based at a huge, heavily defended fortress compound near Tuzla in the northern part of the American zone (most of the center portion of Bosnia). Because of its ethnically mixed population, the peace is not easy to keep here. Thus brigade-sized units rotate in and out.
The new headquarters of the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Carson, Colorado. Located in a high mountain valley, this is the home for the group assigned to support European Special Operations.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
What do they do? Quite a bit: patrolling and reconnaissance; evaluating possible future “hot” spots; settling property and access disputes; and suppressing any insurgent activity.
Originally, the American brigade came from units based in Europe, but more recently the mission has been handled by units based in the continental U.S. During the early part of 1999, a brigade from the 1 st Armored Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, was operating out of Tuzla. They would be replaced by a brigade from the 10th Mountain Division (who had been training for that at JRTC).
Peacekeeping is never easy: Because people with a mind to hatred, revenge, and violence are not easily persuaded to calm down, a peacekeeping force is close to an oxymoron—yet a necessary oxymoron. The “force” must behave peacefully, yet carry a big stick. If there’s no stick, warring factions will simply resume fighting ... and everyone in the force becomes a potential hostage and target for extortion—or bullets. These truths glare especially bright in what was once Yugoslavia, where the wounds have been open for centuries, and only the heavy hand of Marshal Tito kept something like order in that tragic land. A good case can be made that diplomacy is wasted here.
For these re
asons, SFOR has traditionally maintained a “big dog” posture. This means lots of Bradley fighting vehicles and heavily armed HMMWVs, with soldiers in full body armor and their weapons locked and loaded. Such a concept of operations, of course, where the unit resembles an occupation force more than a flock of Mother Teresa’s nuns, does very little to persuade the locals that peace is in their near-term future. On the other hand, peace has hardly been part of their near- or long-term past. Perhaps here is an instance where we have to give force a chance.
So far, in fact, the SFOR approach to their mission has worked. Perhaps keeping the lid on the pressure cooker will give the various factions a chance to make some kind of workable—and peaceful—arrangements with one another. There is no reason why the two kinds of Christians—Orthodox and Roman—can’t get along with each other and with their Muslim neighbors. Someday it may come home to all of them that they all worship the same God.
Meanwhile, the heavy, conventional forces—the lid on the cooker—would be blind without good on-the-ground intelligence. Along with superb air and logistics support and a high level of intelligence surveillance, SFOR has placed a small contingent of Special Forces teams out in the countryside. These teams, drawn from the 10th SFG, and 3rd SFG, are sent into problem areas, putting down eyes and ears where they will be needed most... for example, inside a town near a partition line where they expect tension. The teams are also used as liaison elements with nonU.S. peacekeeping units.
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