8. Adrian Smith, Mountbatten: Apprentice Warlord (London: IB Tauris, 2010). Kindle edition.
9. Life magazine, 17 August 1942, 64.
10. TNA ADM 196/93/0/56; ADM 196/123/0/346; ADM 196/147/0/425.
11. Mountbatten’s alleged homosexuality was a source of constant debate before and after his assassination in 1979. His most recent biographer, Adrian Smith, has found no direct proof of any homosexual relations between the Chief of Combined Operations and Coward or any of the other openly gay men whom he kept as friends. Smith states categorically that “no correspondence held by the University of Southampton contains any obvious suggestion of a homo-erotic relationship,” though he does caution that “this is scarcely surprising as any intimate letters would remain firmly under lock and key at Broadlands [Mountbatten’s home].” Smith, Mountbatten, 23.
12. Elizabeth Nel, Winston Churchill by His Personal Secretary: Recollections of the Great Man by a Woman Who Worked for Him (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2007), 1045–46. Kindle edition.
13. Donald McLachlan, Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action, 1939–45 (London: Atheneum, 1968), xi.
14. TNA ADM 196/93/0/56; ADM 196/123/0/346; ADM 196/147/0/425.
15. McLachlan, Room 39, xi.
16. Quoted in David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2005), 12528–29. Kindle edition.
17. “Brigade 115 Force Operation Order 1,” 6 December 1941, TNA ADM 202/352.
18. For Anklet, see TNA CAB 121/455; ADM 116/4381; ADM 202/351; ADM 202/352.
19. For Operation Archery, see TNA WO 231/5; WO 199/3057; AIR 20/1050; WO 32/10535.
20. Ken Ford, Operation Archery: The Commandos and the Vaagso Raid 1941 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 18.
21. Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. London Gazette, 16 August 1940.
25. John Hughes-Hallett, “Before I Forget,” Hughes-Hallett Papers, LAC MG30-E463.
26. Lieutenant Commander A. de Costobadie, DSC, RN, “Report on Operation Archery,” in Niall Cherry, Striking Back: Britain’s Airborne and Commando Raids 1940–1942 (Solihull, U.K.: Helion & Co., 2010), app. XIII.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. “Handling of Naval Special Intelligence,” 177, TNA HW 8/46.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Naval Section Memorandum No. 12, “State of Work Report, February 1942,” 3 January 1942, Naval Section Miscellaneous Papers, TNA HW 8/24.
36. William Manchester and Paul Reid, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Defender of the Realm, 1940–1965 (New York: Little, Brown, 2012), 10408–10. Kindle edition.
37. Naval Section memorandum, 9 March 1942, Naval Section Miscellaneous Papers, TNA HW 8/24.
38. Naval Section Memorandum No. 6, 31 January 1942, TNA HW 8/24.
39. Naval Section Miscellaneous Papers, TNA HW 8/24.
40. Schlüssel M (Form M4), c. 22 January 1942, HW 8/24.
41. “History of Hut 8,” 74, TNA HW 25/2; and Schlüssel M (Form M4) c. 22 January 1942, HW 8/24. The date of the message referring to the outfitting of two destroyers was January 14, 1942.
42. TNA HW 8/24 S.
43. Naval Section Miscellaneous Papers, 20 January 1942, TNA HW 8/24.
44. J.H. Godfrey, “History of Naval Intelligence Division 1939–1942,” 46, TNA ADM 223/464.
45. Cavanaugh Report, 7, TNA HW 8/103.
46. Ibid., 16–17.
47. Ibid., 8; and Schlüssel M (Form M4), TNA HW 8/24.
48. A glossary of German naval technical terms was also of paramount importance. When the cryptographers managed to break into the German messages, they were confronted by the plain-language technical terms that could be almost as daunting as a cipher itself.
49. Cavanaugh Report, 8, TNA HW 8/103.
50. Ibid. According to the historian at GCHQ, these cards were destroyed at the end of the war as they were considered “ephemeral” and therefore not for historical preservation.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Godfrey to Mountbatten, 13 May 1942, University of Southampton Mountbatten Papers, MB1/B15.
54. Mountbatten to Godfrey, 15 May 1942, University of Southampton Mountbatten Papers, MB1/B15.
55. Frank Birch, “Our Intentions,” 11 April 1942, TNA HW 8/24.
56. Ibid.
57. Frank Birch to Captain Haines, 7 April 1942, TNA HW 8/24.
58. TNA ADM 196/93.
59. Baillie-Grohman to Mountbatten, 14 September 1942, NMM GRO/29.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Mountbatten to Baillie-Grohman, 17 September 1942, NMM GRO/29; TNA ADM 196/93. A further assessment of Hughes-Hallett from 1942 related that “he had a forceful personality and much self-confidence and is generally right, but not quite always.”
63. Hughes-Hallett, “Before I Forget,” 117.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., 106.
66. TNA ADM 196/149/615.
67. Hughes-Hallett, “Before I Forget,” 118.
68. COHQ, “War Diary, Operation Bludgeon,” TNA DEFE 2/2.
69. Hughes-Hallett, “Before I Forget,” 117; “Operation Myrmidon,” TNA DEFE 2/366.
70. Hughes-Hallett, “Before I Forget,” 117.
71. Ibid., 118.
72. Ibid.
SIX: FADE TO BLACK
1. Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997), 202
2. Gudmundur Helvason, “U-109,” http://uboat.net, http://uboat.net/boats/u109.htm (accessed August 11, 2013).
3. The Wrecksite, “SS Tacoma Star,” http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?31352 (accessed August 11, 2013).
4. U-boat Archive, “Report of 4th War Patrol U-109,” http://www.uboatarchive.net/AdmiraltyMessage1942-MAY-Frame.htm (accessed August 11, 2013).
5. Gudmundur Helvason, “Tacoma Star,” http://uboat.net/allies/merchants/ships/1307.html (accessed August 11, 2013).
6. U-boat Archive, “Report of 4th War Patrol U-109.”
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. “U-Boat Tracking and Anti-U-Boat Warfare” NID 8S, 3, TNA ADM 223/284; John Godfrey, NID 8S “U-Boat Tracking,” 24 April 1947, ADM 223/284.
10. “U-Boat Tracking and Anti-U-Boat Warfare” NID 8S, 3, TNA ADM 223/284.
11. Ibid.
12. “History of Hut 8”, TNA HW 25/2.
13. Ibid., 65.
14. Michael Smith, The Secrets of Station X: How the Bletchley Park Codebreakers Helped Win the War (London: Biteback, 2011), 2624–29. Kindle edition.
15. Ibid., 2666–69.
16. Jim DeBrosse and Colin Burke, The Secret in Building 26 (New York: Random House, 2004).
17. “U-Boat Tracking and Anti-U-Boat Warfare.”
18. Naval Intelligence Division and Operational Intelligence Centre, Intelligence Reports and Papers. Operational intelligence: special intelligence monographs, TNA ADM 223/294.
19. TNA ADM 223/464; Memorandum No. 65, RFP and TINA, 8 September 1942, HW 8/24; Naval Section Analysis of RFP/TINA on U/B W/F, July–August 1942, HW8/24.
20. Godfrey to Rear Admiral Willis, 19 January 1942, TNA ADM 223/285.
21. Ibid.; TNA ADM 223/464.
22. Godfrey to First Sea Lord and Vice Chief Naval Staff (VCNS), 9 June 1942, TNA ADM 223/285.
23. Ibid.
24. TNA ADM 223/464; Hervie Haufler, Codebreakers’ Victory: How the Allied Cryptanalysts Won World War II (New York: New American Library, 2003), 1488–90. Kindle edition.
25. Naval Air Requirement, 27 February 1942, ADM 205/15; T.D. Statistical Section, “Note on Annual rate of loss of Merchant tonnage (Required for the First Lord)”, 18 March 1942.
26. Naval Air Requirement, 27 February 1942, ADM 205/15.
27. First Sea
Lord’s Records 1939–1945, “Merchant Tonnage Sunk by Enemy Action as Reported up to 22nd December 1942” (Thousands gross tons), TNA ADM 205/14.
28. “Requirements in Aircraft to Regain Command at Sea,” c. October 1942, TNA ADM 205/15.
29. Naval Air Requirement, 27 February 1942, ADM 205/15; T.D. Statistical Section, “Note on Annual rate of loss of Merchant tonnage (Required for the First Lord)”, 18 March 1942.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. William Manchester and Paul Reid, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Defender of the Realm, 1940–1965 (New York: Little, Brown, 2012), 10935–44. Kindle edition.
34. DeBrosse and Burke, Secret in Building 26, Prologue.
35. T.D. Statistical Section, “Note on Annual rate of loss of Merchant tonnage (Required for the First Lord)”, 18 March 1942.
36. Director of Plans, “Memorandum: Sea and Air Power in Future Developments,” 27 February 1942, ADM 205/15.
37. Naval Air Requirement, 27 February 1942, ADM 205/15.
38. Ibid.
39. “Imports into United Kingdom 1942,” ADM 205/14.
40. Memo for First Sea Lord, 25 June 1942, TNA ADM 205/20.
41. Ibid.
42. Director of Plans, “Memorandum: Sea and Air Power in Future Developments,” 27 February 1942, TNA ADM 205/15; “Requirements in Aircraft to Regain Command at Sea,” c. October 1942, ADM 205/15; Naval Air Requirement, 27 February 1942, ADM 205/15.
43. Laurence Paterson, 2nd U-Boat Flotilla (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 139.
44. Elizabeth Nel, Winston Churchill by His Personal Secretary: Recollections of the Great Man by a Woman Who Worked for Him (Bloomington IN: iUniverse), 1403–11. Kindle edition.
45. Naval Air Requirement, 27 February 1942, TNA ADM 205/15.
46. Sir Dudley Pound to Vice Chief Naval Staff (VCNS) et al., 24 February 1942, TNA ADM 205/15; Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 259. Kindle edition.
47. Martin Gilbert, “Churchill and Bombing Policy” (Fifth Churchill Center Lecture, Washington, D.C., 18 October 2005).
48. WSC memorandum, “A Review of the War Position,” 21 July 1942, CAB 66/ 26/ 41WP (42) 311, quoted in Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, 385.
49. Tovey to Pound, 7 June 1942, ROSK 7/ 210, quoted in Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, 262.
50. National Security Agency, Early Papers Concerning U.K.–U.S. Agreements, “Aide Memoire for the President,” 8 July 1940.
51. Herbert Osborn Yardley, The American Black Chamber (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1930).
52. “History of Liaison with OP-20-G (Washington)”, 4, TNA HW 8/49.
53. Robert L. Benson, “Origins of British-American Intelligence Cooperation (1940–1941)”, U.S. National Security Agency web page.
54. David O’Keefe interview with Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 13 February 1996.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Benson, “Origins of British-American Intelligence Cooperation.”
58. J.H. Godfrey to Ted Merrett, 19 February 1965, NMM GOD/68.
59. Message for C.S.S. from Tiltman Washington, 27 November 1941, TNA HW 57/10.
60. Godfrey to Hastings, 23 January 1942, TNA ADM 223/285; and Message for Naval Attaché, 5 March 1942, TNA ADM 223/285. In March 1942, the British had yet to deliver upon their promise to provide a captured naval Enigma to OP-20-G. With the Ultra pipeline now dry and unable to aid in reducing the slaughter off the Eastern Seaboard, the U.S. Navy fired off a message direct to its naval attaché in London that not only violated proper channels and normal protocol but reinforced Britain’s two greatest fears concerning American insecurity and impatience: “Urgently desire the Admiralty furnish Navy Department one captured German Naval Enigma Cipher Machine, even if damaged and inoperative, plus all available keys, even though out of date. This in accordance agreement mutual exchanges all cryptographic information of Axis Powers under which U.S. Government furnished Japanese Purple Machine and other Japanese naval and diplomatic codes and ciphers to British Government. Also request all available captures or solutions of weather report, contact report, and other minor systems.”
61. Quoted in Stephen Puleo, Due to Enemy Action: The True World War Two Story of USS Eagle (San Francisco: Untreed Reads, 2013), 56.
62. DeBrosse and Burke, Secret in Building 26.
63. “Enigma Policy,” 5 May 1942, TNA HW 57/9.
64. Ibid.
65. Colin Burke, “Agnes Meyer Driscoll vs. the Enigma and the Bombe,” http://userpages.umbc.edu/~burke/driscoll1-2011.pdf (accessed March 27, 2013).
66. DeBrosse and Burke, Secret in Building 26, ch. 4.
67. Burke, “Agnes Meyer Driscoll.”
68. Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (Barnsley, U.K.: Pen and Sword Books, 2008), 144.
69. Tiltman to Travis, 6 April 1942, TNA HW 57/9.
SEVEN: KICK AT THE DARKNESS
1. Originally known as NID6.
2. Godfrey to Menzies, 13 January 1942, TNA ADM 223/285.
3. Obituary of Margaret Godfrey, Independent (London), November 1, 1995.
4. J.H. Godfrey, “The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J.H. Godfrey,” Vol. 5 1947–1950 NID, Part II, 284, MM GOD 171.
5. Ibid., 365.
6. Ibid., 284.
7. Ibid., 284.
8. J.H. Godfrey, “Churchill and Strategy,” 16 June 1966, NMM GOD 177.
9. J.H. Godfrey, “Working with Churchill,” 1966, NMM GOD 177.
10. Godfrey, “Naval Memoirs,” Vol. 5, Part II, 288.
11. Ibid., 284. As Godfrey himself noted years later, the concept was truly profound and displayed foresight that he later argued served as a basis for the creation of the modern MOD structure in the United Kingdom.
12. J.H. Godfrey, “Afterthoughts: ‘Total Intelligence,’ the ISTD and Geographical Handbooks,” 87, TNA ADM 223/619; Patrick Beesly, Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J.H. Godfrey (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980).
13. Godfrey, “Naval Memoirs,” Vol. 5, Part II, 211.
14. “Inter-Services Topographical Department—The Early Days,” TNA ADM 223/466.
15. Ibid.
16. Godfrey, “Naval Memoirs,” Vol. 5, Part II, 285.
17. Nicholas Rankin, Ian Fleming’s Commandos: The Story of 30 Assault Unit in WWII (London: Faber and Faber, 2011).
18. Bassett and Wells, “Inter-Services Topographical Department”; Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 205.
19. Beesley, Very Special Admiral, 205.
20. Godfrey, “Naval Memoirs,” Vol. 5, Part II, 286.
21. Ibid., 289.
22. Ibid.
23. TNA WO 252/469.
24. Godfrey, “Naval Memoirs,” Vol. V, Part II, 383.
25. C.E. Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All (London: Heinemann, 1958); and Jeremy Clarkson: Greatest Raid of All Time (BBC television documentary, 2007).
26. This dry dock had been specially built to service the passenger liner Normandie, hence its name.
27. Interestingly, Charles Lambe, the deputy director in the Plans Division and, after March 1942, the director, was one of Mountbatten’s trusted confidants. Earlier, in 1936, Mountbatten had used his connections to secure Lambe an appointment as a royal aide-de-camp, partly as a career boost for his old friend, but primarily to ensure that the Royal Navy was permanently represented inside Buckingham Palace. In 1959, Lambe succeeded Mountbatten as First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.
28. TNA DEFE 2/131.
29. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950).
30. J.H. Godfrey, “History of Naval Intelligence Division 1939–1942,” 56, TNA ADM 223/464.
31. TNA CAB 121/364. Although the citation has March 25 noted on it, this date is a mistake. According to Alan Brooke’s diary, the meeting to discuss the outline plans for the raids took place on the morning of Februa
ry 25. On March 25, he wrote, “no points of great importance” occurred. Considering that Chariot went in on March 28 and Myrmidon a week after that, there is no way that an outline plan for an operation of this size could gain approval and move into full operation in such a short space of time.
32. “Myrmidon Outline Plan,” n.d., TNA DEFE 2/367.
33. “Myrmidon Summary,” 22 February 1942, TNA DEFE 2/367.
34. Minutes from COS meeting, 25 February 1942, TNA CAB 121/364.
35. “Naval Orders Operation Myrmidon,” TNA DEFE 2/367.
36. Ibid.
37. Ken Ford, St. Nazaire 1942: The Great Commando Raid (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001), 63.
38. Richard Hopton, A Reluctant Hero: The Life of Captain Robert Ryder VC (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2012), 4253–54. Kindle edition.
39. This road, however, was not without its bumps. On March 5, Godfrey sent a message that can only be described as a “rocket” to Mountbatten, complaining about a comment he had made at a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in which Mountbatten claimed they did not have sufficient intelligence in the Bayonne area for Operation Myrmidon. “Actually, our intelligence on this part of the world is not at all bad and could easily be worked up … I do suggest in common fairness that it would be better to bring us into the picture as early as possible and, of course, you will appreciate how discouraging it is for my junior intelligence officers to see such a remark when they are simply longing to do all they can to help you and, incidentally, working very hard on our behalf. I am sure you won’t mind my calling your attention to this, but Intelligence is a two-way traffic business. One’s got to push and pull and not be content to sit down and let the stuff come to him.” (Godfrey to Mountbatten, 5 March 1942, TNA ADM 223/90)
40. Quoted in Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985), 170.
41. “Confidential Report on Operation Myrmidon,” 9 April 1942, TNA DEFE 2/366.
42. Jock Gardner, “Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay,” in Stephen Howarth, ed., Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War Two (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), 360.
43. Mountbatten to Major General F.H.N. Davidson, Director of Military Intelligence, 14 May 1942, TNA DEFE 2/366.
44. Quoted in Ziegler, Mountbatten, 165. The actual motto was “United We Conquer.”
One Day in August Page 40
