The Gold Room, the Pentagon, Washington, DC
Despite its official name, the Emergency Conference Room had not been designed for conferences, only briefings, so as soon as Walter Hicks had finished delivering the Agency’s assessment of the current situation, the Joint Chiefs left the ECR and moved along the corridor into the ‘Gold Room’ conference suite, also on the third floor of the Pentagon.
Thirty minutes after Hicks had departed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the situation in North Korea was sufficiently serious to merit an upgrade in the alert status of US forces worldwide, and the most senior general present recommended this precaution to the President in a lengthy telephone conference call that included the Secretary of Defense.
Fifteen minutes after that, the American alert state was upgraded to DEFCON Four, and alerting signals were dispatched to all units and formations, worldwide. At the same time, most specific orders were flashed to the USS Enterprise in the North Pacific Ocean, but for the eyes of the captain only.
The President then instructed the Secretary of Defense and his National Security Adviser to contact Pyongyang to obtain clarification of North Korea’s intentions, and to request an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the ongoing situation. That, the President said, would probably turn out to be just another goddamned waste of everyone’s time, but after the Iraq fiasco he thought they should at the very least go through the motions.
Base Communication Center, RAF Mildenhall, Suffolk
In a scene repeated in communications centres around the world, the warning bell, to indicate receipt of a signal classified ‘Secret’ or above, sounded as the teleprinter began clattering. The Duty Communications Officer walked briskly over and scanned the lines of text as they were printed out.
FLASH OVERRIDE
FROM: JCS WASHINGTON DC/ /J3 NMCC/ /
TO: AIG 931
SECRET (S)
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DECLARED STEP UP IN DEFENSE READINESS CONDITIONS (DEFCON) FROM DEFCON 5 FOR US FORCES WORLDWIDE TO DEFCON 4. COMMANDERS WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO ASSURE INCREASED READINESS.
‘Oh, fuck,’ he muttered, tore the signal out of the machine, rapidly entered the Date-Time Group and the originator in the log, then left the Center at a run.
The Gold Room, the Pentagon, Washington, DC
Two hours later, highly detailed orders, classified Top Secret and prepared on the specific instructions of the President, were sent with Military Flash precedence from the Pentagon to the United States Strategic Command (USStratCom) Center at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska.
Office of Commander-In-Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Northwood, Middlesex
The briefing had been arranged with under thirty minutes’ notice for all participants, and was classified Top Secret. The lowest-ranking officer inside the locked room was a Royal Navy commander, and he was there only to change the hastily prepared vu-graphs and slides, and point at things on the screen.
A four-ring captain stood beside the podium. He’d already run through the substance of the raft of signals they’d received from both the Americans and the Chief of the Defence Staff in London, and he’d just finished the operational appreciation and tactical situation.
‘In your opinion, how much of this is pure speculation on the Americans’ part?’ CINCFLEET demanded.
‘Frankly, sir, I think most of it. All they know for sure is that there are troop movements taking place north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone that could be interpreted as the prelude to an invasion, though they’re also consistent with the pre-planned exercise designated “Silver Spring”. They also know that the North Koreans have obtained a minimum of ten MiG-25 interceptors. But in the overall scheme of things, I don’t believe a dozen Foxbats will make any significant difference, bearing in mind that our intelligence suggests that the North Koreans can already field over eight hundred combat aircraft.’
‘What’s your analysis of the Americans’ suggestion that those MiG-25s are intended to intercept incoming ballistic missiles?’
‘I believe it’s fanciful at best, sir. I understand the Russians have confirmed it was specially designed for that tasking, but I personally doubt if any aircraft would be capable of achieving this. The speeds involved would be just too great, and the intercept calculations too complex. I also don’t myself believe that the North Koreans are planning to invade the South, so I think the Americans are reading far more into this situation than the evidence warrants.’
‘Noted,’ the admiral said. ‘Very well, we’ve been instructed to assist, so what assets do we have in that area?’
The captain stepped across to the large-scale drop-down chart he’d been using to show North Korean troop movements, and indicated an area towards the south of the peninsula. ‘About here, sir, off the southern tip of Japan, is the Illustrious group, returning home after a deployment to Australia, and presently en route between Tokyo and Manila. As well as the carrier, which has seven Harriers embarked, the group includes the Type 42 destroyer Edinburgh and two frigates: HMS Cornwall, a Type 22, and the Type 23 HMS Portland.’
‘Support?’
‘They have four Royal Fleet Auxiliaries in company – the tankers Oakleaf and Grey Rover, and two of the Fort-class solid-stores vessels, namely Fort George and Fort Austin.’
‘What assets have the Americans got, apart from their troops in South Korea?’
The captain pulled down a larger-scale map and pointed to a spot in the northern Pacific Ocean. ‘The USS Enterprise Carrier Battle Group is currently about here. According to Washington, it’s en route towards North Korea but realistically they don’t expect it to reach the area for at least two or three days. Their best forecast is fifty hours, but there’s a tropical storm brewing to the north-east of the Korean Peninsula, and the CBG’s arrival time will depend on how the weather system develops, and whether or not the ships have to detour around it.’
The admiral made the only decision possible, his instructions from Downing Street and the CDS having been most specific. ‘Very well,’ he said. ‘Signal Illustrious and tell her and her escorts to take on fuel to their maximum capacity. Then the group is to split. Illustrious and Cornwall are to proceed north into the Yellow Sea, while Oakleaf and Fort George are to follow and catch up as quickly as they can.
‘Edinburgh and Portland are to move into the Sea of Japan and the two remaining RFAs are to follow. Once there, this group is to hold position off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula, keeping well clear of territorial waters, and then monitor shore and air activity north of the DMZ.
‘Illustrious is to report passing abeam the southern tip of the peninsula, and is then to hold position south-west of Inchon, outside Korean territorial waters, pending diplomatic clearance from Seoul to move closer.
‘The Air Group is to prepare for both offensive and defensive operations, including Combat Air Patrol and ground attack, and all ships are to ensure that they carry sufficient warshots to conduct autonomous real-world operations for a minimum period of three days, pending the arrival of the auxiliaries. Detailed tasking instructions will follow. Any questions?’
The captain shook his head. ‘No, sir.’
‘Finally,’ CINCFLEET added, addressing the assembled officers, ‘I’ve received further instructions regarding our independent nuclear deterrent. Downing Street has instructed the CDS to retask our patrolling submarine until this crisis is resolved. I will be issuing separate orders to HMS Victorious in due course.’
Rossyia Hotel, Moscow
Paul Richter closed his laptop, disconnected the power cable and tucked everything away in the leather carrying case. His small suitcase was already packed and sitting beside the door of his hotel room. Three minutes later he walked out of the building and climbed into the taxi he’d ordered. He had nearly three hours before his flight to Seoul was due to leave Moscow, which even by Russian standards should be time enough.
HMS Victorious, Barents Sea
Commander-In-Chief Fleet exercises operational control of Britain’s Trident boats, which provide the independent nuclear deterrent. Unlike surface ships, which can both send and receive detailed messages via satellite wherever they are in the world, communicating with submarines is difficult. The deeper the boat submerges, the more difficult communications become. The standard operating procedure is for submarines to deploy a short aerial designed to receive Extremely Low Frequency signals. ELF is very slow, so it’s only possible to send a very small number of characters in a given time period – normally between two and four characters a minute. Passing a complete operational message by this means would clearly be impossible, so ELF is only used to transmit a coded warning to a submarine.
This type of message is a repeated sequence of a few characters. The acronym, when decoded, will advise the submarine that an operational message is going to be transmitted, the time it will be sent and the transmission method. At the specified time, the submarine will reduce its depth and either trail a long aerial reaching up to just below the surface, or else extend a vertical aerial above the water from the sail. The former is slow but relatively secure, while the above-surface aerial allows reception of high-speed transmissions but naturally carries a greater risk of detection.
Just over an hour after the briefing finished at Northwood, a Group Warning Signal was transmitted to HMS Victorious, the single ‘boomer’ on patrol, from the ELF radio relay station situated near Rugby in Warwickshire. Twenty-five minutes afterwards, a Military Flash Operational Tasking Signal was relayed by communications satellite to the submarine. Five minutes after this signal had been received, the boat was again submerged at its normal operating depth.
Chapter Thirteen
Saturday
North Korea
In some ways, the programmed troop movements were overkill, but Pak Je-San knew that they’d only have this one chance and he was determined to get it right.
Even before any reservists were called up, or a single vehicle or aircraft started its engine, the regular forces of North Korea were already able to unleash a devastating attack on their southern neighbour. Because of Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ, the South Korean capital was within range of some five hundred North Korean artillery pieces, including the 170-millimetre Koksan gun, and over two hundred 240-millimetre multiple-rocket launchers. It has been assessed by Western intelligence agencies that the North Korean forces could, without any significant troop or artillery movements, unleash a barrage of up to half a million rounds per hour against Seoul and other strategic targets in the north of the country, and could sustain that level of assault for several hours.
North Korea’s one million or so soldiers are organized into 170 brigades and divisions that include special operations groups, artillery, tank and infantry units, and about sixty of these are permanently located south of a line running between Pyongyang and Wonsan. The country has deployed well over half of its forces close to the DMZ, and about seventy per cent of its front-line troops – some 700,000 men, 2,000 tanks and 8,000 artillery pieces – are permanently based within a hundred miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Many of these units are located in underground or hardened facilities, almost a North Korean trademark, of which there are more than four thousand close to the DMZ.
And it’s not just troops on the ground. The North Korean Navy, a significant force in its own right, has positioned the majority of its surface vessels and submarines in forward bases on both coastlines of the peninsula, near to the DMZ. Forty per cent of the country’s 800 fighter aircraft are also based very close to the border. Without repositioning a single soldier, vehicle or aircraft, the DPRK is capable of launching a major attack on South Korea within a matter of hours.
But Pak Je-San had no intention of doing any such thing: his plan was a good deal more subtle, and should, he hoped, take the Americans and the South Koreans completely by surprise and negate their carefully constructed defensive strategy. Details of the constantly evolving Oplan 5027 have been known within Pyongyang and the country at large for well over a decade. In fact, news statements in the North Korean media frequently refer to it by name.
The mountainous terrain of the Korean Peninsula would largely dictate the way any invasion must be conducted, as was equally obvious to the planners in Washington and Seoul. The advance towards Seoul by ground forces would have to proceed down the Chorwon, Kaesong-Munsan and Kumwa corridors, crossing the Imjin or Han rivers, and the troops would then be facing well-prepared defences, including the South Barrier Fence, manned by South Korean and American troops of the Combined Forces Command.
Standard battle tactics decree that any attack across the DMZ would be preceded by a major artillery barrage, possibly by special forces’ raids against highly specific strategic targets, and even by missile- or artillery projectile-delivered chemical and biological weapons designed to kill or incapacitate the defenders.
The Combined Forces Command perception is that any invasion of South Korea would be conducted in three phases. In the first, the ground forces would smash through the CFC defences and destroy their ability to counter-attack. In the second phase, Seoul itself would be isolated and captured. This would be the prime objective, because nearly half of the population of South Korea lives within forty miles of the nation’s capital. The third phase would be essentially mopping-up exercises, before the occupation of the entire peninsula.
To counter this, Oplan 5027 postulates that substantial numbers of American troops – nearly 700,000 men – and armour would be landed in the south of the peninsula and that these assets, supported by aerial bombardment, should be able to push the DPRK forces back north of the DMZ. Amphibious assaults into North Korea would isolate and surround the enemy, and air power would help destroy their land forces in the narrow passes through which they’d have to travel. The ultimate intention of the Oplan, since its 1998 revision, is to continue the advance north to capture Pyongyang, eliminate the DPRK leadership there, and thus place the whole of the peninsula under South Korean control.
And all that, of course, was also known to Pak Je-San, which was exactly why he’d devised ‘Golden Dawn’.
Seoul, South Korea
The flight to Seoul was nothing like as bad as Richter had expected, Aeroflot having come a long way since the last time he’d flown with the airline, but it was still a hell of a long haul from Moscow to Korea.
He had never been comfortable sleeping on an aircraft unless he was absolutely exhausted, and he was far from tired as he boarded the flight. Despite reading distractedly for a couple of hours, and then lying with the seat reclined as far as it would go, sleep still eluded him.
The first thing he did on departing Kimpo International Airport was to switch on his Enigma mobile. Less than thirty seconds after it reported good signal strength, he stepped away from the group of Asian businessmen standing waiting for taxis in front of him to answer it.
‘Richter,’ he announced.
‘You’ve taken your time. I’ve been trying to get hold of you for ages.’
‘I’ve been on an aircraft for the last twelve hours, Simpson. In case you didn’t know, you’re supposed to switch off your mobile while you’re in the air.’
That wasn’t strictly true, but Richter had left his phone turned off deliberately, on the off-chance that he might get some sleep.
‘Things have been developing since you left Moscow,’ Simpson continued regardless, and he then explained Washington’s concern about the DPRK troop movements their satellites had detected north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone.
‘So what are they doing about it?’ Richter asked.
‘Pretty much as you’d expect,’ Simpson sighed. ‘They’ve asked for an emergency session of the United Nations so that Pyongyang can have a chance to explain exactly what they’re doing.’
‘They’ll insist it’s just an exercise,’ Richter interrupted.
‘They already have. So then Washington broke protocol and contac
ted the North Koreans direct. They claimed it’s a routine exercise called “Silver Spring”, but nobody believes them. The Americans will continue with the usual diplomacy, but I don’t think they seriously expect anything useful to come of it, so they’re now also looking at military options. Their nearest surface group, the Enterprise CBG, is currently in the north Pacific and still a couple of days away from Korea. So they’ve now hiked the alert state to DEFCON Four.’
‘That’s not good news.’
‘No.’ Simpson’s tone was uncharacteristically subdued. ‘We’re not fully in the loop here, but the Intelligence Director thinks the Yanks will probably target North Korean airfields and military bases with their ICBMs, silo- and sub-launched, and inform Pyongyang that they’ve done so, just to try to make them back down. Or, in case they really are conducting this “Silver Spring” thing, to make sure that it stays just an exercise.’
‘What do you want me to do?’
‘First, make your number with the NIS, then request them to fly you down to Kunsan as soon as possible.’
‘Which is where, exactly? And what do I do when I get there?’
‘It’s an air base on the west coast of South Korea. Let me know your likely arrival time as soon as you’ve worked it out, so I can coordinate things from here.’
Foxbat Page 18
