‘Let’s hope they stay there, as I don’t much like this,’ the President said, to nobody in particular. ‘We seem to be waiting now on Pyongyang and, if the Agency’s right, when they do decide to jump, there might not be a lot we can do about it.’ He turned back to Walter Hicks, who was refilling his coffee cup from one of the silver pots the stewards had brought in fifteen minutes earlier. ‘We’ve looked at a nuclear blackmail attempt before, Walter, so how credible do you think this threat is against Japan? Does the Agency feel sure the North Koreans could possess warheads small enough to be carried by their short-range missiles?’
‘It’s credible enough to take seriously, Mr President. They’ve been working on their atomic weapons programme for a long time now. Back in the fall of ninety-eight two nuclear weapons were tested at Ras Koh and Wazir Khan Koh in the Kharan Desert in Pakistan. At that time, Pakistan couldn’t possibly have produced enough plutonium from its research reactor at Pinstech to create one nuclear device, let alone two. So we believe those tests were joint ventures between North Korea and Pakistan, with Pyongyang – or rather Yongbyon – supplying the fissionable material and most of the technology. That’s why we believed they had a credible nuclear capability even before that Pacific explosion, and that’s why we should take them seriously now.’
‘And you think their intention is genuinely to target Japan?’
‘I don’t know, sir.’ Hicks shook his head in a helpless gesture. ‘All I can tell you is that we think they must certainly have a fairly small nuclear arsenal. If they were going to fire weapons across the DMZ into South Korea, we would expect them to use their southerly missile bases, and shorter-range weapons like the Scud B or Hwasong 5 and 6. All three of those can reach the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, and they’ve got maybe seven or eight hundred altogether, easily enough to ensure some would get past our Patriot batteries. They’d probably launch non-nuclear missiles to overwhelm the Patriots, and then fire their missiles armed with nuclear warheads towards the end of the barrage. And, of course, there’d be no way of our telling what each missile was carrying until it detonated.
‘Preparing to launch nuclear-tipped No-dong missiles from places like Mayang and Ok’pyong only makes sense if they’re planning to fire them in an easterly or south-easterly direction. And the only target that’s out there is Japan.’
‘You seem to be forgetting something, Mr Hicks,’ the Secretary of Defense interrupted. ‘The No-dong has a fairly limited range, and the shortest straight-line distance from North Korea to Japan – or at least to Kyūshū, on Japan’s south-west tip – is directly over the southern end of the Korean Peninsula. If Pyongyang was really trying to threaten Japan, they would be more likely to load the nuclear warheads on missiles at their southernmost bases, which lie just north of the DMZ.’
Hicks shook his head again. ‘I disagree, Mr Secretary. As I’ve just said, if they fired their missiles directly over South Korea, the Patriot batteries would certainly be able to take out some of them. Pyongyang knows we’ve got Patriots there, even if they don’t know their exact locations. To avoid that risk, if they are targeting Japan, launching their missiles on a south-easterly trajectory from bases well to the north of the DMZ is the only strategy that makes sense. That way they’d avoid the Patriots, and once they’re in the air we’ve got nothing that can stop them. I don’t have too much confidence in the effectiveness of the PAC-3 batteries on Okinawa, because the best time to intercept an ICBM is during the boost phase, not after the missile’s re-entry.’
‘And the reality of the situation is that if they do manage to detonate an atomic bomb, even a small one, on Japanese soil, we’re probably going to get involved in a nuclear exchange,’ the President said gloomily. ‘After all, we can hardly stand by and let them nuke one of our most important allies in the area. So how effective do you think these Russian aircraft – those Foxbats that the North Koreans have stolen – would be at intercepting our incoming missiles?’
Before Hicks could answer, General Sterling chimed in. ‘They wouldn’t be a particularly viable defence, Mr President. I know the Russians claim the aircraft was designed for that role, but it’s old, it doesn’t have particularly good serviceability, and it’s probably being flown by North Korean pilots with little real experience of either the aircraft or its weapon systems. They might score some successes against ICBMs, but those aircraft would be useless against nuclear-tipped cruise missiles or air-dropped weapons. If we deliver a nuclear strike, there’s no way a handful of near-obsolete interceptors could stop it.’
‘I quite agree, General,’ Hicks said, ‘but what worries the Agency is another aspect of the Foxbat’s design: its survivability in a post-nuclear strike environment. If I was a betting man, I’d suggest that the MiG-25’s alleged ability to intercept ICBMs is only half of the equation, and perhaps not even the most important half. I believe the main reason for them is because, if an airburst weapon is detonated over the Korean Peninsula, the Foxbat will remain operational because of its old-style valve technology. The EMP, or electromagnetic pulse, will fry everything else. That would give the North Koreans immediate and total air superiority, and don’t forget that the MiG-25 is still the fastest interceptor ever built. In the right hands it’s therefore a very potent weapon.’
‘And that,’ Richard Muldoon interjected, ‘could indeed be a part of their overall strategy. Target Japan with No-dong missiles tipped with nuclear warheads, and then detonate another weapon over Seoul, say, if we or the South Koreans resist their southern advance. That would virtually eliminate any opposition to their invasion.’
‘How dangerous is this EMP?’
‘To human beings, Mr President,’ Hicks replied, ‘it’s completely harmless. Obviously the detonation of any nuclear weapon could kill thousands as a result of the blast, burns and radiation, but the electromagnetic pulse just sends an instant power surge through all electronic equipment within range. That cooks solid-state circuitry, unless it’s very well shielded, so that would include telephones, computers, radar sets, and most communication devices.
‘Our pilots would find their aircraft impossible to fly, especially the new generation of air-superiority fighters. Even those that don’t rely on flight-control computers would still find their radars burnt out and their weapon control systems inoperative. Missile radars and infrared homing devices wouldn’t work. On the ground, most of our command and control systems would be destroyed, all the way down the line to the radios carried by individual soldiers. Vehicles with engine-management systems wouldn’t start or run. Targeting computers in tanks wouldn’t work. Even electronic devices like digital watches would fail.
‘In short, we’d be reduced to fighting the kind of battle last seen in the First World War – with no smart weapons, very few working vehicles, and poor or non-existent communications. And, worse still, the only aircraft flying overhead would be those operated by the North Korean Air Force.
‘It’s also possible that, if Pyongyang scheduled the nuclear detonation precisely – I mean, if they decided when they were going to trigger it rather than react to a counter-attack by us – their armed forces could power down their own electronic equipment and get their vulnerable assets into underground shelters for the duration. That wouldn’t guarantee everything would work when they hauled it out again, but almost certainly they’d be left with a better battlefield capability than we would.’
For a few moments the President sat in silence, sipping his coffee thoughtfully. Finally, he replaced his cup on the table and leant back in his chair. ‘I hear the Secretary of Defense’s opinion about the possible consequences of us initiating a first strike against North Korea, but I’m beginning to think that it might be the only way we could win this thing.’
‘Mr President, I must strongly advise—’
‘Hear me out, please. You people are my military and intelligence experts. What you’ve told me so far is that North Korea probably has missile-deliverable nuclear weapons an
d is most likely to target them on Japan, and even the USA, as nuclear blackmail to stop us resisting their invasion of South Korea. If we counter-attack, they could detonate a nuclear air-burst over the peninsula that will cripple our conventional forces. The implication is that we won’t be able to roll them back north of the DMZ the way Oplan 5027 envisages, and the only option we’ll be left with is surgical nuclear strikes with cruise missiles and the like. And even if we do that, they could still launch a nuclear attack on Japan, and that would generate an international political shit-storm like we’ve never seen before. And it’s still possible that we could lose South Korea to their invasion. Is that a fair summary?’
Heads nodded, but none of the men in the Oval Office responded verbally.
‘OK, so it seems to me that the only way we can avoid getting royally shafted by that little bastard in Pyongyang is to hit him first. I know they could still launch a massive assault on Seoul, but if we can take out their long-range missile sites – the ones with the No-dong weapons – we could at least prevent an attack on Japan. That seems to me to be our first priority. If we can keep this conflict within the Korean Peninsula, we’ll have a much better chance of coming out smiling. Anyone disagree with that?’
‘With the principle, no, Mr President,’ the Secretary of Defense said, ‘but I’m still very unhappy with the idea of America launching a first strike – especially a nuclear first strike – on a country that, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, is apparently just conducting a military exercise. Whichever way you look at it, and however you try to justify it, that would still be accounted an act of war.’
‘There might,’ Richard Muldoon said tentatively, ‘just might, be a way around that.’
‘What?’ the President demanded. ‘How?’
So Muldoon told him.
Hammersmith, London
Richard Simpson wasn’t normally to be found in his office at weekends, but the escalating crisis in Korea had changed all that. However, as it was a Sunday he’d forgone his usual grey pinstripe suit and Churchill brogues in favour of blue slacks, an open-neck shirt and loafers. He looked as if he should be out on a golf course somewhere, but nobody had the time or the inclination to point this out to him.
He was reading the overnight messages and signals when the Intelligence Director knocked on his door and walked in.
‘The Americans,’ the ID announced, ‘have come up with a plan.’
This was one of the shortest sentences Simpson had ever heard him speak, and the slightly shocked expression on the man’s face suggested that whatever scheme Washington or Langley had concocted might be the reason for that.
‘Which is?’ Simpson prompted.
‘They want us, or rather the Royal Navy, to attack four North Korean bases and destroy missiles they believe could be carrying nuclear payloads and are aimed at Japan.’
‘Do they, now? Let me see.’
The ID handed over the slim folder he was carrying and sank down into the chair facing Simpson’s desk. ‘It would amount to an act of war and an unprovoked assault, so it’s absolutely out of the question.’
‘Not necessarily,’ Simpson argued, reading quickly through the four pages that the folder contained.
‘You can’t be serious, Director. We have no authority to instigate such an action, and I very much doubt if their Lordships at the Admiralty would look upon it with favour.’
‘You’re not keen on the idea?’ Simpson stated the obvious.
‘No, not at all.’
‘Well I like it. The tricky bit’s going to be selling it to the Navy, but if it’s packaged right they might just go for it.’
‘I cannot support this proposal, and you should be aware that I will have to put my objection in writing if you elect to proceed.’
‘Objection noted. Now get out of here and organize me a car and driver. Then pre-warn Northwood that we’ll want a conference with CINCFLEET staff as soon as we arrive.’
‘Are you expecting me to accompany you?’
‘Certainly not. You’d only depress everyone. So you can hold the fort here. I’ll take whichever wheel I can raise at Legoland.’
The sniff as the ID stood up and headed for the door was more eloquent than anything he could have verbalized. Simpson stared after his retreating back for a moment, wondering if it would be worth while trying to find someone more amenable to replace him, then picked up the scrambled phone and dialled Vauxhall Cross.
Office of Commander-In-Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Northwood, Middlesex
‘The admiral is extremely busy, gentlemen. As you’ll appreciate, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula is occupying most of his time, and I very much doubt if he’ll be able to see you.’ The captain was clearly unimpressed by these two men – a senior Secret Intelligence Service officer, and the head of an outfit he’d never even heard of – demanding to see the Commander-In-Chief Fleet.
But Richard Simpson was not a man used to having obstacles thrown in his way. ‘Listen to me, Captain, I hold a rank equivalent to an Air Vice Marshal and my colleague here is slightly more senior than that. We have information for your admiral that could significantly affect the outcome of the Korean crisis, and that he will definitely want to hear. If we don’t get to see him within the next fifteen minutes, I’ll be making two calls tomorrow morning and by the end of the week you’ll be down at the Job Centre – that’s if the admiral himself doesn’t fire you first. Do I make myself clear?’
‘Perfectly . . . sir.’ The captain appeared unfazed, and the second word came as an obvious afterthought. ‘But I still doubt if the admiral will find time to see you. However, it’s his decision, not mine, so I’ll convey the substance of your message to him.’
‘Nice going, Richard,’ Nicholas Ashton remarked as the captain left the room. ‘Nothing like issuing a blatant threat or two to ensure we get all the willing cooperation we need.’
Ashton was P4 at SIS – his full title was Head of the Middle East Controllerate of the Directorate of Requirements and Production – and he was the most senior officer Simpson had been able to rustle up at such short notice.
‘Threats usually work, in my experience.’ Simpson smiled nastily. ‘You’ll notice that at least he’s now gone to ask.’
Five minutes later the captain returned and beckoned to them. ‘If you’ll follow me, please.’
He led them down several flights of stairs, descending well below ground-level into the semi-hardened operational headquarters, and finally pulled open a heavy steel door. The room beyond was vast, rising at least three storeys high, and expansive enough to accommodate over fifty people working at separate consoles arranged in rows. On the wall facing them was a huge screen currently displaying the Korean Peninsula in considerable detail, dotted with red marks indicating DPRK troop concentrations, airfields and missile sites. On the screen beside it, a larger-scale display showed the entire action area with Allied force dispositions. At first glance, this was noticeably less impressive, the principal symbols indicating the two halves of the Illustrious group in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan respectively, and the Enterprise Carrier Battle Group still some distance out in the North Pacific.
Several senior Naval officers stood looking up at the screens. The captain led the way over to them, and made the necessary introductions.
‘I understand you have some information relevant to the present crisis?’ the admiral inquired.
‘Not entirely,’ Simpson replied first. Though, as the Head of an SIS Controllerate, Ashton was technically his senior, this was Simpson’s ball and he fully intended to run with it. ‘We have exactly the same information, but I know something about it that you don’t.’
‘I don’t have time for riddles, Mr Simpson, so tell me what’s on your mind.’
‘You’ve had a request from Washington about undertaking a possible first strike against North Korean missile facilities? A strike, in fact, using the Harriers from Illustrious?’ Simpson opened a notebook and
read out a date-time group.
‘Yes,’ the admiral replied, ‘we’ve received that signal, but I’m not sure the Americans entirely grasp the magnitude of what they’re asking from us.’
‘Actually, I think they have grasped it, and SIS believes such action might be the best response to whatever nasty little plan Pyongyang has cooked up.’ The admiral opened his mouth to reply, but Simpson didn’t give him the chance. ‘As we see it, there are exactly two choices here. If we sit back and do nothing, and just wait for the North Koreans to push their way south across the DMZ, or launch a nuclear attack on Japan or whatever else they intend to do, we’ll be forced to react after the event. If the Americans are right, the North Koreans’ attempted nuclear blackmail might well work because, even if South Korea is occupied by the DPRK and Japan simultaneously held hostage, that’s still a far better outcome than the probable alternative, meaning an exchange of nuclear weapons that would leave a million corpses rotting in Seoul and probably twice that number in Tokyo.
‘The ace in the hole that Pyongyang holds is their possession of nuclear weapons, but they can’t have that many so they’ve got to use them intelligently, hence their probable plan to strike at Japan. If they merely fired them into South Korea, the American Patriot batteries would hopefully take them out, and then the US war machine would roll the invading forces back across the DMZ, all the way to Pyongyang, which would be a military disaster for the North. So I think Washington is right in its thinking.
‘The only ploy that makes sense is that North Korea should threaten an American client state, which describes Japan fairly accurately, and hope that by doing so it will keep the Yanks off the playing field. The second string to their bow involves their recent demonstration in the Pacific that clearly shows they have missiles able to reach mainland America. Pyongyang may be confident that those two threats will be enough to stop the US getting involved any further. Then they can cross the border in the reasonable certainty that the South Korean armed forces will offer them little or no resistance, simply because the government in Seoul will realize that the Americans won’t be coming to bail them out.’
Foxbat Page 26
