Noting the loss of 60 Confederate majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals in Hardee’s attacks, the assistant adjutant general of the corps lamented, “The loss in officers, especially field officers, was unparallel and irreparable.” Half of those losses were in Cleburne’s division. “This day was the most disastrous as to casualties in the career of the division,” sighed Cleburne’s adjutant, “not so much as to loss of numbers, but that of officers, which was exceptionally heavy, and irreparable, amounting to 30 general, field, and acting field officers alone, not to count company commanders.” Regimental commanders who appeared destined to be elevated to brigade command, like Colonel John E. Murray of the 5th/13th Arkansas, instead were being lowered into graves. Brigadier General Daniel Govan somehow survived the battle unscathed, and he could proudly exult how his brigade accomplished more than any other on July 22, but the price paid for the limited achievement was abysmal. All of his commanders of consolidated Arkansas regiments—including Colonel Murray—were killed or wounded in the battle. Worse was the state of his infantry on July 23. Govan could count on a total of 772 effectives; two regiments had less than 70 foot soldiers prepared to fight again.18
The Battle of Atlanta wrecked the Confederate Army of Tennessee through and through. Admitting that he was reduced to tears by the sight of the wounded in the army hospital, a brigade staff officer from Maney’s division wailed, “Many of the noblest, and most gallant spirits in the Army of Tenn[essee] have been sent off.” Too few men and a dearth of talented and experienced commissioned officers to lead them was a direct and devastating result of this battle. No longer would Hood be able to plan a tactical strike with any hope of significant success. Sherman could call in several thousand men from Tennessee and Alabama if he needed them; and as he slowly encircled the city and squeezed the life out of it, Hood’s numbers would only shrink. Hood could claim a “partial success” on July 22, but his choice of words was telling. He no longer was confident of dispelling Sherman, as he had been when he took over the army. That opportunity came and went on July 22. Sherman’s capture of Atlanta was approaching inevitability.19
For three days after the battle the opposing armies of July 22 continued to lick their wounds and adjust to the devastation each had wrought upon the other. The Army of the Tennessee felt reverberations from the battle for days. Colonel William Belknap of the 15th Iowa—who horse-collared 45th Alabama Colonel Lampley during the battle—was commissioned brigadier general for his conduct on the battlefield. The promotion made it inevitable that Belknap would command the Iowa brigade, a result that did not sit well with Colonel William Hall, who for several hours commanded a division and then saw the brigade he led since 1863 earmarked for a former subordinate. Hall resigned from the army in disgust and returned to Iowa to sit out the rest of the war. Charles Walcutt could have been punished for disobeying General Harrow’s order to pull back to a second line of defense during the assault against the XV Corps, but Walcutt anchored the position from which to rally and for this he achieved his promotion to brigadier general two weeks later. Upon his commission, Walcutt became the youngest general in the army at the age of twenty-six years.20
Another commander was also forced to sit out the rest of the war. General Thomas J. Sweeny could not let go of how undermined he felt during the battle by General Dodge, who refused to delegate through Sweeny and seemingly acted as a corps, division, and brigade commander at the same time during the first hour of the battle. Sweeny despised Dodge and vice versa. About ten days before the battle Dodge attempted to have Sweeny court-martialed for a run-in over the chain of command within the XVI Corps medical departments. Sweeny’s disdain for the 4th Division’s commander, General John Fuller, was consistent with the long-standing animosities the Irish held against the English. So on Monday, July 25, when Dodge and Fuller happened upon Sweeny at his headquarters tent, they went inside and, in doing so, lit a powder keg.
Sweeny shortened the wick by purposely sitting between Dodge and Fuller and hurling charged remarks about the conduct of affairs during Friday’s battle. When Sweeny insinuated that Fuller’s inability to hold his line firm (against Gist’s assault) severely threatened Sweeny’s position east of Fuller, Dodge and Fuller protested in unison. Dodge accused Sweeny of telling tall tales. The wick was completely consumed when Sweeny could no longer control his temper. “You are a God-damned liar, sir!” Sweeny exclaimed to his superior. The epithets continued. “You are a cowardly son of a bitch, sir!” goaded Sweeny, egging Dodge further by protesting, “You are a God-damned inefficient son of a bitch, sir!”
Then the keg exploded. Dodge struck Sweeny in the face. To prove that his one arm was good enough to handle Dodge, Sweeny punched his corps commander in the nose. Fuller joined in and the two division commanders and their superior tussled within the tent as staff officers stood stunned at what was transpiring. Sweeny punched himself out, was swiftly subdued, and led away under arrest. Dodge got the court-martial he sought, replacing Sweeny with Brigadier General John M. Corse. Sweeny’s only satisfaction came a few weeks later at the hands of the Confederates when one of them fired a shot that furrowed the top of Dodge’s head without penetrating the skull. The wound took Dodge out of field command for the rest of the war.21
The change in division command was exceeded by Sherman’s desire to settle upon an army commander he could deal with for the rest of the campaign and beyond. General Logan’s ascension from regimental colonel within the Army of the Tennessee to major general in charge of the army in just two years was achieved despite his political background as a Democrat, and not because of it. General Grant, when he led the Army of the Tennessee, overturned two attempts by President Lincoln to prevent the promotion of the Democrat, but Logan had responded with sound performances throughout 1863 and the first half of 1864, symbolized by his inspirational leadership at Atlanta. Logan indeed had been a favorite of Grant, but not so with Sherman, whose preference for West Point-educated commanders was known to all. Sherman considered Logan’s command of the army as a temporary or interim position while he sought a general with a strong background in logistical training to complete the campaign at the helm of the army.
On July 26 Sherman chose Major General Oliver Otis Howard, the commander of the IV Corps in the Army of the Cumberland. The choice of Howard was not entirely surprising given his West Point education and strong friendship with Sherman, but based on his record and position it was unusual. Howard did not have a strong record of success in the war: He was routed from his position at Antietam and Chancellorsville and unsuccessful in attempted assaults at Resaca and New Hope Church in the Atlanta campaign. Most surprising about the choice of Howard was that the Army of the Tennessee would for the first time be commanded by an outsider, a general who did not have any previous ties within the army, as Grant, Sherman, McPherson, and Logan had.22
So, why did Sherman shun Logan in favor of Howard? Sherman offered several reasons over the years, including the strong misgivings of General Thomas, who had difficulties with Logan earlier in the campaign. Sherman also claimed that since Logan was not a West Pointer, he held little interest in and appreciation for logistics (but in fact, as a corps commander Logan displayed a heightened sensitivity to supply issues throughout the campaign).23
When Sherman called Logan to headquarters to explain his decision, he revealed to him that he essentially considered the Army of the Tennessee more as a department than a field army. Sherman reported, noting that Logan “thought he ought to have been allowed the command of the army in the field until the end of the campaign; but I explained to him that a permanent department commander had to be appointed at once, as discharges, furloughs, and much detailed business could alone be done by a department commander.” Sherman defended his decision for most of his life, only once considering that “I made a mistake at Atlanta.”24 Logan sulked over the decision but immediately returned to command the XV Corps five days after the Atlanta battle, returning Morgan L. Smith to hi
s division, Joseph Lightburn to his brigade, and Colonel Wells Jones back to his regiment, the 53rd Ohio Infantry. So, by July 27, the Army of the Tennessee had a new leader but every single corps had the same commander that led it during the battle of Atlanta and only one new division commander when General Corse replaced General Sweeny.
Conversely, General Hood’s army underwent considerable reconstruction as a result of the Battle of Atlanta. The Army of Tennessee had lost only one brigade commander in the ill-fated assault at Peachtree Creek on July 20, but Hood’s army was so depleted of officers and foot soldiers on July 22 that the commanding general was forced to consolidate commands and shuffle commanders. So strapped was Hood for quality and experienced commanders that he decided to break up General William Walker’s command rather than replace the dead division commander. One brigade went to Bate’s division, Rawls’s brigade served under Cleburne, and the South Carolinians and Georgians that formerly served under States Rights Gist were then brigaded under the command of Colonel James McCullough in the Tennessee division.
The same brigade and division commanders of Cheatham’s corps that led their men off the Atlanta battlefield stayed in command for their next battle, except that they would be reporting to a new corps commander. Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee arrived with a mixed record of successes and failures in Mississippi. With his senior rank, he took over Hood’s old corps and General Cheatham was returned to his division, while General Maney went back to his brigade, filling a void created by the death of Colonel Francis Walker.
Under those conditions and changes, the Army of Tennessee and the Army of the Tennessee battled again on July 28, just six days after the battle of Atlanta. The latter contest between the two occurred 180 degrees from the first one, 2 miles west of Atlanta near Ezra Church. Hood’s grand plan was to isolate a moving portion of the Army of the Tennessee and destroy it, but new corps commander Stephen D. Lee proved overzealous in his first battle while serving under Hood. Lee’s corps, the same one led by General Cheatham on July 22, attacked the Union XV Corps, the same opposing forces that clashed at the Troup Hurt house. Contrary to last time the Union men held their ground against repeated assaults by Lee and Alexander P. Stewart’s corps (the lone corps not engaged at Atlanta the week before).
The result was a one-sided affair with a disparity of casualties that Kennesaw Mountain could not top. Hood’s army suffered 3,000 losses to a mere 632 Union casualties. General John A. Logan again was the field commander of record since his corps fought virtually alone giving him a second victory in six days. That battle reflected the downside of the fighting ability of Hood’s army after the Atlanta battle: toothless and desperate assaults that failed to budge an unprepared force from its newly gained position. The outcome seemed inevitable within the first hour of the four-hour contest. When General Sherman was informed of the mass of Confederates hurled upon the Army of the Tennessee at the start of this battle, he responded with such nervous delight that he could not help repeating himself, “That is fine—just what I wanted, just what I wanted. Tell Howard to invite them to attack, it will save us trouble, save us trouble, they’ll only beat their brains out, beat their brains out.”25
Sherman’s excited scorn was not directed at the Confederate soldiers, for he freely admitted to his wife four days after the Atlanta battle and two days before Ezra Church, “These fellows fight like Devils and Indians combined, and it calls for all my cunning and strength.” Still, Sherman knew that after July 22, Hood could not beat him in an open-field fight and Hood no longer was going to surprise him with night marches through woods. After Ezra Church, Hood’s army was down 12,000 fighting men in just a week and a half. Weaker by 20 percent in manpower and immeasurably crippled by voids in leadership at the regimental and brigade level, the Army of Tennessee could not possibly win another battle against Sherman’s three armies, even at Ezra Church where just one Union infantry corps became separated from the other six and was forced to fight without the aid of artillery or the protection of earthworks. The Battle of Atlanta started Hood on an inevitable downward spiral.26
General Hood had failed to dislodge his opponent in three big battles fought in nine days. The Confederates and the citizens of Atlanta were suffering, but Hood was by and large not blamed for the troubles. His losses in ten days of command were approaching the casualties suffered by General Joseph E. Johnston in the previous ten weeks. Early in August a member of the 1st Arkansas explained to his parents, “The troops regretted the removal of General Johnston but now they are perfectly satisfied with Gen. Hood. They know he will fight—the Federals will never be able to get Atlanta.” Complete concurrence came from others who insisted the morale of the army remained high, confident that Hood would eventually drive Sherman from Georgia.27
Others were leery of Hood’s aggression. “All that I hear say anything about General Hood say that he is too fond of charging the enemy’s works,” wrote a Texan to his uncle early in August, “We had rather not charge them, but would rather be charged by them, until our number equals theirs.” A horse soldier saw the carnage at Atlanta and surmised that General Hood “gives us evidence of some ability—but at what fearful cost? We have lost 8,000 killed and wounded in the last two or three days. This sort of fighting, unless we meet with some more decided success, will dissipate our army very soon.” Even those who were satisfied with General Hood were uncomfortable with his tactics. “We are getting used to being shot at,” claimed one of Cleburne’s men, “but you may guess there is no fun in it.”28
No one in the North was seeing any fun in the Georgia campaign either. Sherman’s midsummer progress was reported throughout the North exactly as it appeared from a distance—a siege of Atlanta. The three July battle victories received considerable press but the battle victories on the outskirts of Atlanta were muted by disasters elsewhere. On July 24—two days after the Atlanta victory—the last substantial Union force in the Shenandoah Valley was routed by Jubal Early at the Second Battle of Kernstown. Before July closed, Early’s men had invaded the North again, this time torching two-thirds of the town of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Grant was making no progress at Petersburg and on July 30 (the same day that Chambersburg was nearly burned off the map) a secret operation to blow up the Confederate defense near Petersburg with underground explosives produced another fiasco with the loss of 3,800 Union soldiers who charged into the crater created by the mine explosion. “The effort was a stupendous failure,” admitted Grant.29
By the middle of August the progress at Atlanta was no longer hailed in the North. To readers of Northern newspapers the battle victories merely appeared as successful repulses of Hood’s attacks without any tactical or strategic gain. The appearance was deceiving, for both Sherman and Hood recognized that the diminished Confederate manpower and the failure of Hood to destroy a significant portion of Sherman’s department meant that the eventual capture of Atlanta was a fait accompli.
Lincoln came to the conclusion in early August that his time had run out. When a White House visitor informed the president that his reelection bid was likely to fail, Lincoln candidly responded, “You think I don’t know that I am going to be beaten, but I do and unless some great change takes place, badly beaten.” Hands tied, Lincoln could no longer change the direction of the political ill winds that continuously blew against him, preventing any attempt to push forward with momentum. Political insiders fed Lincoln the bad news of which he was all too aware. “I told Mr. Lincoln that his re election was an impossibility,” wrote Thurlow Weed of New York, a top political insider who told another, “Lincoln is gone, I suppose you know as well as I. And unless a hundred thousand men are raised sooner than the draft, the country’s gone too.” When an Illinois confidant asked Lincoln about his prospects for reelection, Lincoln replied, “Well, I [don’t] think I ever heard of any man being elected to an office unless someone was for him.”30
Perhaps he was exaggerating, but not by much. Lincoln’s prospects looked bleak to near
ly all. Before August closed, Lincoln set the table to prepare for his defeat. He called a meeting between himself and Frederick Douglass. Lincoln explained to Douglass about his likely defeat and his concern that a Democratic administration would negotiate away the Emancipation Proclamation to bring the South back to the Union. Concerned that the slaves in the Southern states had yet to be informed that they had been freed two years earlier, Lincoln was assured by Douglass that he would recruit black agents to slip behind opposing lines of armies and “carry the news of emancipation” to prod the slaves of the South to head to the North.31
Four days after meeting with Douglas, Lincoln asked his cabinet to sign a statement without reading it, ostensibly concerned that the press would seize and publish its fatalistic contents. The cabinet secretaries did as requested, putting their signatures to the “Blind Memorandum,” not knowing that it stated, “This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reelected.” The statement concluded by promoting the Lincoln administration’s support for the incoming president-elect “to save the Union between the election and the inauguration” because Lincoln maintained that the Democrat would be elected under the premise “that he can not possibly save it afterwards.” The first statement of Lincoln’s memorandum could not be clearer. He was so convinced he would lose the November election that he called for his entire administration’s signatures to that effect.32
The Democratic National Convention convened in Chicago at the end of August. Lincoln predicted that they would choose a War Democrat on a peace platform or a Peace Democrat on a prowar platform. The delegates followed the former template with Major General George McClellan balloting as the nominee. The platform was a stark contrast to Lincoln’s ideals. It branded the war “a failure” and although it supported the Union over a separate Confederacy, it made it clear that it would do so by allowing the Southern states to return with its prewar status intact, including slavery. Lincoln’s reelection, indeed his legacy, was entirely dependent on outcomes in the four theaters of offensives.
The Day Dixie Died: The Battle of Atlanta Page 26
