Such contrasts and confusions indicate the contradictory attitude of the parties of the left, and particularly the Communists, to the reconstruction of the armed forces in the South. On the one hand, the policy of national unity, which aimed at waging war against the Germans, required that every effort be concentrated on making the army efficient, and thereby overcoming the Allies’ mistrust. On the other hand, an opposite kind of mistrust of the Italian military class and awareness of the mood of the population made it difficult to proceed coherently and efficiently towards that goal. The equation of partisans of the North and soldiers of the South was, moreover, often made by the northern underground press, with different nuances – with more conviction by that of the right,148 but proposing the gradual diminution of ‘distinctions’ by that of the left. As long as hope remained that volunteers’ divisions might spring up in the South independent of the old army, this was the card that had been played, in the full knowledge of how that tallied with the mood rife among the resistenti. Thus L’Italia Libera hailed the ‘Gruppi combattenti Italia’, on the very day that saw their definitive failure, as ‘the first nucleus of the Italian popular army … without any relationship with the royal authorities’ – a position which did not, however, prevent them from associating the partisans with the soldiers who had fought at Monte Lungo from 8 to 16 December in the first, hapless, attempt to bring Italian regular troops back into the line.149
As early as 19 September, L’Unità had written: ‘And in the regions that have already been liberated we need to set up, we need to impose the setting up of Garibaldi volunteer formations to participate under the Italian flag in the anti-German war.’150 A couple of months later, a local Communist party petition, more or less deliberately forcing the facts, claimed that ‘The Guardia Nazionale and formations from the former army are already operating alongside the Anglo-Americans.’151 L’Unità saluted ‘with faith and enthusiasm’ the first Italian divisions fighting on the southern front.152 A faith that scarcely tallied with the facts was placed in voluntary enrolment as a means of transforming the army from within, creating a more credible symbiosis with the partisans of the North. The orator who at the assembly of the ‘youth committee for the war of liberation’, held at Rome in the Teatro Quirino, argued that the young were not joining up ‘because first they want a republican army’,153 gave an explanation which was to some extent true in politicised city circles, but which over-simplified the infertile terrain on which calls to arms were falling. Here, too, a good example is a case from Rome where, in a demonstration at the university, weariness and scepticism seek refuge in resentment of a nationalist feather. On the one hand, the young men contesting the parties’ appeal claimed that they would not join up ‘because too long a period of suffering must give us the right to be left in peace’. On the other hand, they cited the persisting armistice regime, the imprisonment that so many Italian soldiers were still suffering in Allied hands, and lastly the memory of the ‘mutilated victory’, the myth of which had been an intrinsic part of Fascist ideology. These young men argued that there was ‘no reason to fight for those who at the end of the last war, at whose side we fought, did not recognise our efforts to achieve victory’.154 Similarly inspired, a Liberal Reggio Calabria newspaper had published these reflections by a student: ‘The university students have been forced to take up arms for the defence of a cause they do not even know … The students ask today for many things to be set in order before they are made to fight.’155
Apart from desertions that occurred even among the volunteers,156 voluntary enlistment still proved incapable of solving the problem of re-conquering moral and political unity between the country and the armed forces (it might have done so if it had been taken as the fulcrum of the new army – but this was a proposal that no one seriously supported).157 Besides, there was doubt and wavering even among the forces of the left, particularly over whether preference should be given to group volunteering, the aim of which was to form politically homogeneous divisions, or to individual volunteering, which meant the scattering of volunteers in the ranks of the Royal Army. On this score, a confidential Communist document written shortly after the liberation of Rome, recalling the posters that appeared for enrolment ‘in the various Red Army, Matteotti, and Pilo Albertelli brigades’, concluded: ‘While accepting the volunteers’ applications, our party considered it opportune to aim at forming a more or less regular army, and was the only one, I believe, to refuse to form independent brigades.’158
Palmiro Togliatti’s article, ‘Per un forte e disciplinato esercito italiano’ (‘For a strong and disciplined Italian army’), which appeared shortly after the formation of the Salerno government and aimed at making the most of the turning-point in military terms as well, lucidly outlined the PCI’s fundamental thinking in this regard, but already highlighted its contradictions. These were interwoven with the recurrent demands that the military hierarchies be purged, and the proposal to insert partisans into the regular army. The objective difficulty that the Communist (and not only Communist) position had succeeded in gaining the recognition of both friends and adversaries without arousing misunderstandings or distrust was unwittingly and comically expressed in a few ‘notes’ sent by the carabinieri General HQ to Minister Alessandro Casati on 15 March 1945: ‘Various soldiers frequent left-wing elements in their off-duty hours. It does not appear, however, that defeatist propaganda is practised among the divisions.’159
In the Communist press of the North, due recognition of the achievement of the ‘national democratic government’, with the presence of Italian regular divisions on the Gothic line, is coupled with insistent repetition that ‘the decisive event’ will have to be insurrection;160 and even when a mannered tableau was given of the renovated army, as by Bülow (Arrigo Boldrini) in a broadcast on Radio Ottava Armata (Radio 8th Army), pains were taken to underpin it by emphasising ‘the influx of thousands of volunteers, many of whom are former partisans’,161 or by speaking, as L’Unità did on 22 April 1945, of ‘Italian regular divisions, reinforced by the Garibaldino spirit brought to it by the patriot volunteers’.162
We now have to see how the rejection of the Royal Army and its lifestyle, which had been one of the departure points for the Resistance in its aversion to the Fascist war, had to reckon with the growth and ‘militarisation’ of the bands, which interwove in diverse ways with their politicisation.
1 T. Todorov, ‘La tolleranza e l’intollerabile’, in P. C. Bori, ed., L’intolleranza: uguali e diversi nella storia, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986, p. 103.
2 Manifesto ‘Agli Italiani’, which begins: ‘Italiani, cosa sarà di noi?’ (‘Italians, what will become of us?’, in Bolletino Popolo e Libertà, June 1943).
3 Polybe: ou, la Grèce conquise par les Romains, Paris, 1858, p. 2.
4 Artom, Diari, p. 61 (July 31, 1953); police report, relating to Terni, 1943, quoted in Portelli, Biografia di una città, p. 243; Chiodi, Banditi, p. 7 (10 January 1941).
5 See C. Senise, Quando ero capo della polizia, 1940–1943, Rome: Ruffolo, 1946, p. 38. Senise writes that he inserted the sentence in a report prepared by Bocchini for Mussolini.
6 Quoted in Michel, Les courants, p. 150.
7 C. Botti (C. Dionisotti), ‘Giovanni Gentile’, in Nuovi Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà, vol. I (May–June 1944), p. 94, republished under the title ‘La storia che giudica’, in L’Indice dei libri del mese II: 9 (November 1985), pp. 23–6.
8 See an article bearing that title by A. Lavenir, secretary of the teachers’ union of the department of Rodano, published in L’École Libératrice of 2 April 1938, and quoted in F. Di Palma, ‘Il caso dei maestri in Francia tra fronte popolare e moti antirepubblicani’, in Rivista di storia contemporanea XV (1986), p. 269.
9 La Pensée française. Organe des intellectuels du Front National du Nord e du Pas-de-Calais, April–May 1944. An article dedicated to Herr Déat, ‘Le Père Duchesne’, September 1943, heavily criticised the passage from ‘objection de conscience’
to ‘abjection de conscience’.
10 I recommend everyone read G. D. H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, vol. V, Socialism and Fascism (1931–1939), London: Macmillan, 1960, p. 79ff. See also, in general, A. Salsano, ed., Antologia del pensiero socialista, vol. V, Socialismo e fascismo, Bari: Laterza 1983, part II, Chapter 5, ‘L’IOS di fronte al fascismo e alla guerra’.
11 Emily Balch, cited in W. E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940, New York: Harper & Row, 1963, p. 211.
12 Published in November 1933 in Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà, and later in C. Rosselli, Scritti dall’esilio, vol. I, Giustizia e Libertà e la concentrazione antifascista (1929–1934), ed. C. Casucci, Turin: Einaudi 1988, pp. 250–8.
13 See G. Arfé, ‘La politica del gruppo dirigente socialista nell’esilio’, in Istituto Socialista di Studi Storici, L’emigrazione socialista nella lotta contro il fascismo (1926–1939), Florence: Sanzoni 1982, p. 20. Arfé believes that the way indicated by Rosselli was ‘for the socialists, and not without good reason, too risky’ (p. 22).
14 Leading article, ‘Contro l’illusione della guerra rivoluzionaria e per la libertà’, in Avanti!, Zurich, 2 December 1933. Foa referred to this very article when, in a projected interview with Nenni that never took place (1975), he asked Nenni this question: ‘What weight did a pacifism in principle carry in socialism and in the left in general?’ See V. Foa, ‘Centoquarantacinque domande a Pietro Nenni’, in Per una storia del movimento operaio, p. 199. Nenni’s article and Rosselli’s article in the form of a letter to Avanti! of 30 December 1933 can now be read in Rosselli, Scritti dall’esilio, pp. 312–16, 259–64. Nenni was simply repeating the positions against the war that he had taken in articles that had previously appeared in Avanti!: ‘Amsterdam e la guerra rivoluzionaria’ (10 September 1932); ‘Risposta a tre quesiti’ (17 September 1932); ‘Condannare la guerra in sé e per sé’ (24 September 1932); ‘Né guerra rivoluzionaria né guerra per la libertà’ (4 March 1933). The articles can now be read in P. Nenni, La battaglia contro il fascismo, ed. D. Zucaro, Milan: Mursia 1977, pp. 327–43.
15 See S. Colarizi’s recapitulatory article, ‘La guerra e i partiti antifascisti’, in Pacetti, Papini and Sarcinelli, La cultura della pace, pp. 327–43.
16 See A. Landuyt, ‘Un tentativo di rinnovamento del socialimo italiano: Silone e il Centro estero di Zurigo’, in Istituto Socialista di Studi Storici, L’emigrazione, pp. 75–6. The motion concluded with an appeal to the United States of Europe.
17 See G. Arfé, Storia dell’Avanti! 1926–1940, Milan–Rome: Edizioni Avanti! 1958, p. 212. Nenni’s article can be read in Nenni, La battaglia socialista contro il fascismo, pp. 537–43. But in a figure like Modigliani, pacifism and neutralism were so deeply rooted as to inspire his conduct even after the outbreak of war. See G. Arfé, ‘Modigliani Giuseppe Emanuele’, in F. Andeucci and T. Detti, eds, Il Movimento operaio italiano. Dizionario biografico 1853–1943, vol. III, Rome: Riuniti 1977, pp. 491–503.
18 The text of Nenni’s then unpublished report (following his resignation as party secretary with an announcement that appeared in the 7 September issue of Nuovo Avanti!) can be found in the Tasca archive, and was published as S. Merli, ‘La ricostruzione del movimento socialista in Italia e la lotta contro il fascismo dal 1934 alla seconda guerra mondiale’, in Annali dell’Istituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli V (1962), pp. 836–44. The essay was republished, without the documents, in S. Merli, Fronte antifascista e politica di classe. Socialisti e comunisti in Italia, 1923–1939, Bari: De Donato 1962, pp. 3–74. From a copy, now in ACS, sent by the Fascist representative from Paris to the Ministry of the Interior, and republished in S. Colarizi, ed., L’Italia antifascista dal 1922 al 1940. La lotta dei protagonisti, Bari: Laterza 1976, pp. 154–68. Colarizi notes that Nenni’s report was rejected by six votes to two. See also, in general, Leonardo Rapone’s paper, ‘Guerra e politica. L’emigrazione antifascista agli inizi della seconda guerra mondiale’, at the conference ‘L’Italia in guerra 1940–43’, held at the Fondazione Micheletti of Brescia from 27 to 30 September 1989.
19 The document was published by the Rome edition of Avanti!, 6 May 1944, under the title ‘L’esecutivo del partito definisce la posizione socialista di fronte al nuovo Governo Badoglio ed ai problemi dell’ unità d’azione e della unità antifascista’. The Communists replied severely with an article, ‘Il partito socialista, il governo nazionale democratico di guerra e il problema dell’unità’ in La nostra lotta II: 10 (June 1944), pp. 6–9.
20 For Silone, see his ‘Tesi del Terzo Fronte’, adopted by the Centro Estero (Foreign Center) of the PSI in Zurich, and published in L’Avvenire dei lavoratori, 1 August 1944. See Landuyt, Un tentativo di rinnovamento, pp. 90–5. For Basso see the whole affair, which is fairly well known, of the MUP and of Bandiera Rossa. See in particular M. Salvati, ‘Il Psiup Alta Italia nelle carte dell’archivio Basso (1943–1945)’, in Il Movimento di liberazione in Italia, XXIV: 109 (October–December 1972), pp. 61–88, and Enzo Collotti, ed., Ripensare il socialismo: la ricerca di Lelio Basso, Milan: Mazzotta 1988.
21 For the unsuccessful attempts by the Socialists, the Republicans, GL, the Lega Italiana dei Diritti dell’Uomo, and the Unione Popolare immediately after the declaration of war, to create the legion, see Arté, Storia dell’Avanti!, p. 218. For the no less fortunate successive attempts, see Emilio Lussu’s note, ‘Il problema della legione’, undated, Archivi di Giustizia e Libertà. 1915–1945, inventory edited by C. Casucci, Rome: Publications of the Archivi di Stato, 1968, p. 59; and regarding Randolfo Pacciardi’s initiatives, A. Baldini and P. Palma, ed., Gli antifascisti italiani in America. 1942–1944, Preface by R. De Felice, Florence: Le Monnier, 1990.
22 Letter to Giuseppe Faravelli, 10 May 1939, in Merli La riconstruzione, pp. 831–4.
23 L. Sturzo, ‘Italy after Mussolini’, Foreign Affairs, April 1943. For the Weimar syndrome and anti-Fascism’s merits for having avoided it, see C. Casucci, ‘La guerra di Carlo Rosselli’, in Libera Stampa (Lugano), 21 June 1990.
24 See I. Bonomi, Diario di un anno (2 giugno 1943–10 giugno 1944), Milan: Garzanti, 1947, p. 35.
25 Letter to his mother, 2 August 1935, in Lettere di antifascisti dal carcere e dal confino, ed. L. Cortesi, Rome: Riuniti, 1962, p. 123.
26 Letter of 19 May 1940, not censored as a mark of respect for its non-belligerence. My thanks to Foa for drawing my attention to it.
27 Spinelli polemicised against those who, during the Falklands War, supported the cause of the Argentinian generals on the basis of the argument that about 50 percent of the population of Argentina is of Italian origin (Vittorio Foa’s testimony to the author).
28 Articles entitled, respectively, ‘Al popolo italiano, agli amici, ai nemici’ and ‘Nostalgie colonialistiche’, in La Libertà, 27 October 1943, and L’Italia Libera, 18 January 1945.
29 For an account of events during that two-year period see P. Spriano, Storia del Partito comunista italiano, vol. IV, La fine del fascismo. Dalla riscossa operaia alla lotta armata, Turin: Einaudi, 1973. See also, in vol. III, I fronti popolari, Stalin, la guerra, Turin: Einaudi 1970, Chapter XVIII, ‘I comunisti e la guerra’.
30 A. Spinelli, Io Ulisse. Come ho tentato di diventare saggio, Bologna: Il Mulino 1984, p. 281.
31 The report, entitled ‘La preparazione di una nuova guerrra mondiale da parte degli imperialisti e i compiti dell’Internazionale comunista’, is in P. Togliatti, Opere, vol. III: 2, ed. E. Ragionieri, Rome: Riuniti, 1973, pp. 730–805 (the passage quoted is on p. 765).
32 See the appeal of 24 June 1941 in F. Etnasi, La Resistenza in Europa, Rome: Grafica Editoriale, 1970, 1, pp. 275–8. Compare the identical position assumed by the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (pp. 87–9).
33 See the ‘Lettere di Spartaco’, no. 9 of 1–10 March and no. 11 of 1–15 April 1940. Togliatti, Opere, vol. IV: 2, pp. 21–3, 26–31. In the second article a passage from Dimitrov is quoted against ‘the legend of the reputed anti-Fascist character of the war’
.
34 This is the title of a leading article (March 1940) of Le Réveil des cocherschauffeurs du Comité pour l’idependance et l’unité des syndicats (cyclostyled).
35 Motto of La Bretagne, cited in Michel, Les courants, p. 570.
36 J. J. Becker, ‘L’Union Sacrée: l’exception qui confirme la règle?’, in Vingtième Siècle vol. 5 (January–March 1985), p. 120.
37 ‘Chi è Spartaco’, in Lettere di Spartaco, 1–10 March 1940 (Togliatti, Opere, vol. IV: 2, p. 13).
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