From II What is the situation?
To II New countermeasures being prepared.
From II 0935 To Commanding Officer 300:
1) Enemy is digging in from direction of WUHDEN in a second trench running from the shot-up Panther to here from the direction of the main road. Thus there is a danger that this trench will eventually lead to the track and form a second continuous trench between you and us.
2) Fire direction is being tried via tank, as own set is u/s.
2) Request permission to fire upon identified heavy weapons.
The ODER is clearly visible.
From II 0946 For establishment of new fire direction it will be necessary for the command tank to drive to the firing position of the 2nd Battalion, Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’.
From II 1026 To 13 Company: Prepare for orders to fire.
To II 1037 Give short basis for commendation of Sergeant Hennecke.
To II 1055 Fire direction will be conducted via tank. From 1130 hours reciprocal callsign is ROTHKELCHEN.
From II 1132 To Regiment: Sergeant Hennecke has as Forward Observer in heavy fighting under the heaviest artillery fire so outstandingly conducted himself, that a considerable part of successful defence is attributable to him.
From II 1218 To Regiment: Request urgent running harassing fire on SPERBER, EMIL, DROSSEL by all available artillery resources.
To II Still no orders from Corps.
There followed recommendations for the award of the Iron Cross First Class for six officer cadets, and Second Class for a further 38 officer cadets, 26 other ranks and eight Volkssturm men, the promotion of Second Lieutenant Heinrich to lieutenant and Gunner Brandenburg to bombardier for his outstanding conduct as a radio operator under the heaviest enemy fire.
All the while Colonel Willy Langkeit, the ‘Kurmark’ divisional commander, was doing his utmost to get permission from the XIth SS Panzer Corps commander, the fanatical Nazi SS-General Matthias Kleinheisterkamp, to give permission for the garrison to break out, but so far without success.
The log continues:
From II Where is resupply?
To Commanding Officer 300: Request further harassing fire during the whole night on DROSSEL, SPERBER, GUSTAV.
Query: Where is 6 Company? Conditions for wounded bad.
From II 1910 Strength of Grenadier Regiment 300 and Engineer Regiment 309: 4/11/30, plus 1/9 wounded.
From II To Commanding Officer 300:
Some enemy barrages from heavy mortars, otherwise quiet.
From II Artillery working well. Request once more urgent artillery action during night on GUSTAV, DROSSEL and EMIL. Greetings please from 6, 7 and 8 Companies. The fire has not gone out yet.
From II 2118 To Regiment:
Fighting strength: 5 officers, 55 officer cadets, 17 senior NCOs, 107 other ranks, plus 2 tank crews.
Wounded: 1 officer cadet, 3 other ranks.
Wounded of 2nd Battalion/1242 in KLESSIN 54.
Request supply of following: flares, batteries, machine gun ammunition, Verey cartridges, replacement machine gun, food.
There was a second successful supply drop by the Luftwaffe that night with thirteen containers recovered.
The whole of 22 March Klessin lay under heavy bombardment from artillery, mortars, anti-tank guns and heavy machine gun fire. The situation had become almost untenable, as the radio log records:
From II 0500 Barrages on GUSTAV and TONI.
From II 0510 Barrages up 100m and 100m more to left.
From II To 13 Company: Once TONI fired, one barrage on MARS, where enemy forming up.
From II Order to 13 Company cancelled.
To II 0555 Has enemy broken in?
From II 0618 What is the situation on the left?
From II 0621 Russians broke in 2 Company at 0500 hours. 7 Russians in trench left behind a machine gun when thrown out again. 1 dead and 2 wounded in this. 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’ fired well-laid bombardments during the night. Situation restored.
Waiting urgently for food, Verey cartridges, hand grenades and machine gun ammunition.
From II 0920 Request one salvo harassing fire on RITTERSPORN, from where sound of tanks.
From II 1003 Enemy bombardment with heavy mortars. Situation for wounded bad.
From II To 13 Company: Request harassing fire on MARS and ILONA from 11 to 1300 hours. Timing from Regiment.
From II Expecting enemy attack. Under running artillery bombardment. Conditions for wounded unbearable.
From II 1000 KLESSIN fortress boundaries: From crossroads at western exit SE 300m, NE 250m, N 300m, W 150m, S 150m. Please pass on to Luftwaffe.
From II 1111 To Regiment: Prepare barrage all round.
From II Is barrage ready?
To II Barrage is ready.
From II 1148 MARS, GUSTAV, ILONA, one salvo.
From II 1200 Bombardment of own positions by Russians.
From II 1203 Query: Has salvo been fired on MARS, ILONA, GUSTAV?
From II 1209 One salvo on DROSSEL.
From II 1217 Prepare barrage all round once more.
From II Enemy attack. Fire barrages on GUSTAV, TONI, RABE, MARS and keep firing.
From II Barrage on GUSTAV urgent.
From II Barrage on GUSTAV urgent. Keep on firing, and DROSSEL.
From II Enemy attack. Barrages on DROSSEL, GUSTAV and SPERBER.
From II Fire again on GUSTAV urgent. Enemy attacking!
From 7 Coy Enemy attack on KLESSIN clearly visible. Barrage on hollow!
To 7 Coy Where exactly is enemy attack? Give exact areas.
From II Fire rockets 600m further to north.
From II Fire on GUSTAV again.
From II 1247 Enemy is attacking from directions of 49.7, 56.2 and 16.8, from north and northwest.
From II Request concentrated fire on GUSTAV. One running barrage on RITTERSPORN 2.
To 7 Coy The enemy attacking KLESSIN is most urgently to be forced to ground with machine guns.
From 7 Coy Enemy attack from WUHDEN toward west swung round on KLESSIN and from the dip in front of our own Sector on KLESSIN.
To II Do you have lamps for a night supply air drop?
From II 1344 To 13 Company: 2 salvoes on MARS.
From II 1347 Situation re-established, cleared up. Casualties from enemy artillery fire expected.
To II 1350 Query: Have all attacks been beaten back?
From II 1355 Prepare for further all round fire.
To II 1419 How was the last rocket barrage?
From II 1435 To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’:
One salvo on GUSTAV immediately.
From II Query: Is the barrage ready? Command TONI 100m up, otherwise in own trenches.
To II 1448 Barrage ready.
From II 1448 …and thrown out again in a counterattack. The enemy was being driven on by commissars. Current statements from prisoners. We are expecting further enemy attacks.
Casualties not yet reviewed.
Conditions for wounded very, very bad.
Cover hardly possible. Reserves fully committed.
Urgently request fighter aircraft support.
To II What is situation?
From II 1540 Relief today urgently necessary. The enemy is occupying the eastern part of the SCHLOSS and is constantly reinforcing. Forces for a counterattack not available. Please relieve urgently.
From II Barrage all round.
From II Continual barrage all round urgent.
To 7 Coy Force the enemy now attacking southern KLESSIN to the ground with all your weapons.
From II Barrage all round urgent.
From II Where is the barrage?
To II Where is the main enemy point of attack?
From II East and south of SCHLOSS.
From II 1630 Heavy losses. We are fighting to the last man.
To II 1643 Hold on. Decision applied for.
From II One battery on GUSTAV. O
wn artillery firing too short.
From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: one salvo on SPERBER.
From II One salvo on GUSTAV.
From II 1711 Situation difficult. We must fear the worst this evening.
From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: one salvo on GUSTAV.
From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: Harassing fire on SPERBER, GUSTAV and RITTERSPORN 2.
From II Where is the harassing fire on areas GUSTAV, SPERBER and RITTERSPORN 2?
To II Harassing fire being fired constantly. Report where and how strong enemy penetration.
From II Enemy has penetrated SCHLOSS and southern part of village with one company.
From II Where is the harassing fire?
To II 1754 Artillery report that they are firing constantly. What is the situation?
From II 1800 Prepare all round barrage.
To II 1805 Barrage ready.
From II Request constant harassing fire all round.
To II 1821 Own artillery doing everything possible.
From II 1825 Wounded can no longer be provided shelter in the position. Considerable collapse of trenches. We are using the last of our strength. Enemy preparing to attack.
To II Tell Lieutenant Schöne of concern that all the divisional Radio codes, including the most important, be destroyed in radio station HOPP. Report immediately if code blown. Corporal Hopp is already aware.
From II 2000 Fire barrage!
From II 2001 Request last orders.
To II 2036 Is there an enemy attack?
From II No!
From II Mortar fire landing on own positions.
From II 2055 Heavy artillery harassing fire on position.
To II 2104 Decision whether KLESSIN garrison is to continue fighting has been passed by Division to Army Group.
From II 2101 To Regiment: Old command post blown up.
To II 2126 Through a direct hit or demolition?
From II Several direct hits. Burnt, then exploded.
From II One salvo on all blocking areas.
To II 2206 KLESSIN can be assured that the Regiment is doing everything possible.
The garrison’s fighting strength fell dramatically through losses in dead and wounded, and both tanks were knocked out by direct hits during the course of the day. That evening Second Lieutenant Greib of the Bicycle Platoon knocked out a Stalin tank with a Panzerfaust at point-blank range. However, the situation demanded constant artillery support, which did not stop the Soviets getting a foothold in the eastern corner of the Schloss that evening that proved of considerable tactical value to them.
Although the situation in Klessin was now desperate, both the Corps and Army commanders regarded Hitler’s orders as sacrosanct, so Colonel Langkeit apparently decided to bypass them and appeal direct to Colonel General Gotthardt Heinrici at Army Group. Meanwhile decorations and promotions were used as morale-boosters. Years later Schöne was to comment that they had never lost confidence in their regimental and divisional commanders in this situation.
On the morning of the 23rd March the Soviets broke through into the main part of the Schloss after a long and heavy artillery preparation and after several failed attempts. The defence were by now too weak to mount a counterattack and were obliged to form a cordon west of the building. The Soviets then brought in two tanks, an anti-tank gun and several heavy machine guns with which they began to dominate the hamlet from the Schloss, causing trenches to collapse and inflicting heavy casualties to the extent that nearly everyone of the defence were wounded.
Two breaches in the northern defences had to be cleared during the morning, and by noon the last fifteen to twenty unwounded soldiers formed a hedgehog around the battalion command post, into which a number of the wounded had to be carried. Then, during the late afternoon, the Soviets forced their way into the centre and the northern part of the hamlet, splitting the garrison into several groups. The radio log shows how the situation developed during the day:
To II 0036 All officer cadet staff sergeants in KLESSIN are promoted second lieutenant with immediate effect. Heartiest congratulations.
From II To Commanding Officer 300:
Enemy is pressing in ever closer on inner defences from all sides.
One tank destroyed in close fighting. The wounded are lying in the trenches. Everything can be expected to be overrun in the next attack. No reserves left. Is it possible to break out or be relieved by 0300 hours?
From II Tanks are ready with infantry.
To II Send further recommendations for Iron Cross.
From II Where are the barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2?
To II Barrages coming.
From II Decision presses until 2300 hrs. This combat team cannot take another attack without reinforcement and will be overrun.
To II Highest recognition of your brave conduct. Hold on!
Langkeit, Colonel.
From II Request harassing fire on DROSSEL.
To II Men of KLESSIN! One looks on you full of pride and admiration. You are the decisive wave-breakers against the Bolshevist storm on the Reichs capital. Heil our Führer! SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS Kleinheisterkamp.
From II To 2nd Battalion/Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’: one salvo on RITTERSPORN 2.
Enemy forming up point.
To II Lieutenant Schöne: The Führer has awarded you the Knights’ Cross. Heartiest congratulations from the Regiment.
From II 0410 Strength 90 men.
From II 0445 Request permission to break out. Russians ready to attack.
To II 0515 To Captain Böge: High Command insists position is to be held under all circumstances.
From II Enemy attacking. Barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2.
From II Enemy attacking. Barrages on ILONA down 50m and RITTERSPORN 2, for 13 Company.
From II All artillery resources on RITTERSPORN 2.
To 13 Company: on SCHLOSS and 8 Company.
From II ILONA up 200m. Barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN.
From II Enemy attacking from east via SCHLOSS (one company). Request running barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN.
To II Query: whether one can fire on the SCHLOSS?
From II The SCHLOSS can be fired on. Not too short!
From II What is the situation?
To II 0750 Hold on! How is it, Lieutenant Schöne?
From II Where is barrage on ILONA? Schöne OK.
To II ILONA fired on several times.
From II Prepare barrages on ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2.
To II 0826 Ready.
To II 0910 Is it known that Schöne has been awarded the Knights’ Cross?
To II 0952 Award all those recommended for Iron Cross First and Second Class, also Iron Cross First Class for Christ, Second Class for Hohenstein, Ackermann and Scherzinger.
From II 0957 Why no fire on ILONA?
From II Artillery firing too short. Up 100m.
From II 1000 Enemy in company strength in SCHLOSS. No reserves left to throw them out with. Situation of wounded hopeless. One cellar of wounded in enemy hands in SCHLOSS. Fire support from own arms especially lacking. Artillery radio unserviceable through battery, also Panthers. Transmitting with last battery. Desperately need ammunition, food, batteries, flares.
From II 1100 To Regiment: Recommend Iron Cross First Class for Second Lieutenant Zeller (twice wounded) and Second Lieutenant Plonka.
To II 1103 What are hedgehog coordinates now?
From II 1130 Prepare barrages for ILONA and RITTERSPORN 2.
To II 1130 Artillery fire on ILONA. Give corrections immediately.
From II 1137 Fire barrages.
From II 1142 Fire barrages immediately.
From II 3 salvoes on RITTERSPORN 2, 100m left.
To II Where enemy attack? Give bearing.
From II Enemy attack from east.
From II 1200 Two shots were too short.<
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To II 1302 Please report whether codes for all radio stations in KLESSIN (apart from the valid sheets for the 23rd and 24th) have been destroyed or have fallen into enemy hands.
From II 1345 When is relief coming? Own artillery especially tired.
To II 1349 Highest Command have yet to give orders.
From II Urgent barrages on RITTERSPORN 2 and ILONA.
From II 1440 To Regiment: Enemy counterattack in northern part.
No reserves available. Cutting off hardly possible. Repeat request of this morning as last possibility. Dead and wounded mounting by the hour.
From II 1510 Direct hit on command post. Fighting to the last man.
From II 1535 Urgent barrages on MARS and RABE.
From II 1549 Barrage on MARS.
From II 1559 Mortars firing too short, up 100m.
To II 1738 The decorations and promotions are evidence to you of Highest Command’s recognition of your exemplary fight. The Division is proud of you. Langkeit, Divisional Commander.
To II How many enemy have penetrated northern and western parts?
From II I cannot encipher as I have no codes.
To II Are the codes destroyed?
From II 1759 Yes.
From II 1810 Request barrage on Schloss.
To II Are there no more codes available?
From II 1822 Correct, none.
At last at 2120 hours the message from Division was passed to Klessin by Regiment: ‘Mission accomplished; fight your way through!’
Captain Böge ordered those men immediately to hand to assemble at the potato store at the western edge of the hamlet with the intention of breaking through during the night as a compact group. As many as possible of the severely wounded were taken along to the assembly point. Meanwhile Lieutenant Schöne took a group to the east to create a diversion and, due to the heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire, contact with him and his group was soon lost.
Using the cover of the thick smoke and dust of an artillery barrage, Captain Böge’s group reached the hollow southwest of Klessin just ahead of a group of twenty to thirty Soviets and were able to use captured Panzerfausts found in the hollow to blast their way through and reach the unoccupied first and second lines of Soviet trenches. By this time the Soviet troops were fully alerted and using flares and Verey lights to illuminate the breakthrough point, which was brought under heavy machine gun fire from both north and south. But Böge’s men, using the last hand grenades and Panzerfausts stormed the third, heavily-manned Soviet trench and broke through, just 26 of them reaching the German lines.
With Our Backs to Berlin Page 10
