by Nigel West
Dangerous:
(i) Containing definite political, naval or military information.
(ii) Addressed to persons on the Black List.
(iii) Offering service to the enemy.
(iv) Containing ciphers and codes.
Suspicious:
(i) Indicating unusual relations between persons resident in the UK and abroad.
(ii) Indicating payments made to or demanded by persons in the UK without mention of corresponding business.
(iii) Expressing intention of Germans to join the British Red Cross or similar organisations.
Indiscreet:
Expressing pessimistic views; letters from or concerning Germans or Austrians liable to military service. All letters and telegrams to or from neutral countries in connection with trading with enemy countries and ordinary trade telegrams from and to any place were submitted to the Home Office and duplicates were sent to the Foreign Office; all letters and telegrams other than above mentioned and especially those connected with diplomatic, consular, political, military and naval arrangements were sent to MO5. However, it was expressly stated that correspondence dealing with banking and finance were to be sent to the Treasury, certain trade papers to C3, and correspondence dealing with naval matters to the DID.
In addition to the Central Censorship, the competent military authority of a district had power to ask the postmaster to stop specific letters and telegrams, and at the ports papers carried by passengers might be seized by officers stationed there by MO5.
In examining letters submitted (1) by the Censor, (2) by the port officers, and (3) examining advertisements of the agony columns of the newspapers three codes, which were supposed to have been used by enemy agents, were employed. Special arrangements were made in the branch to carry out the work and a plant was established for testing letters by chemical means.
A special check was placed on cables to Smith, German consul at Rotterdam, with a view to ascertaining the names and addresses of suspects here. Of the names submitted, for example, one Sloman, father of Mrs Gould, was doubtful, and two, Blassneck and the German consul Menke, were well-known suspects. Very soon methods of evading the Central Censorship became known to MO5. Censor labels were removed from old envelopes and pasted on to fresh ones; messages were sent abroad in bundles of newspapers; letters were carried by smugglers to and from enemy-occupied territory or posted via intermediaries in neutral countries.
The methods of the Censor developed with experience aided by the suggestions of MO5. Thus in December 1914, Major Drake reported that it was known that German agents were sending information out of the country written in invisible ink on the margins of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets; however, no specific instance had come to light and it was desirable to take action with regard to printed matter passing through the post. An order had been issued in April 1916 that printed matter addressed to neutral countries should be delayed for forty-eight hours unless it were despatched by newsagents or publishers, the sending of all such matter to enemy countries was prohibited to all but certain publishers and newsagents, and by July private persons had been forbidden to post newspapers to Holland and a delay of a fortnight was imposed on press matter addressed to other neutral countries. Further, Major Drake, early in January 1915, desired that the Censorship should cover all mails to countries within five days journey of the United Kingdom. This was carried out in May 1915 when mails to Bulgaria and Greece were censored. At the same time a warrant for censoring the American mail (North and South) was obtained and put into force, intermittently at first. The question of mails in transit between France and northern neutral countries, including Holland, had for some time engaged attention. In April 1915 also mails in transit through the UK were made subject to censorship.
A weak point was found in the system of submitting to MO5 a précis only of interesting letters for, owing to this, evidence that would have served to convict a German agent was allowed to go through. The system was therefore altered; letters of interest were submitted attached to the précis of contents and MO5 made special arrangements for dealing with these letters. Investigation had been made of eight foreign businesses and of one hotel, the Ritz-Carlton, which had come under suspicion either of trading with the enemy or of being concerned in espionage. The establishment of Siemens & Co. was searched on several occasions and special examination made for wireless, and for some time a police officer was established on the premises to keep check. As regards the firm of Hugo Stinnes, coal merchants, with branches at several ports, MO5’s officers at Cardiff were keeping special watch on their shipments of coal and one of the managers, Mr Fergusson, who had met Stinnes in Holland since the outbreak of war, was not again allowed to leave the country. Steps had been taken to remove from all vulnerable points and ports the tranches of Goldstuck Hainze & Co., grain merchants, a business largely managed by and employing a number of foreigners, which had reorganised itself into an absolutely British firm with suspicious alacrity.
The Admiralty was notified of the foreign composition of a firm with which it had large contracts and in the case of a similar firm dealing with the War Office, arrangements were made to prevent profits going to alien enemies.
The premises of Isenthal & Co., manufacturers of wireless telegraphy apparatus, were searched and measures suggested to safeguard public security while enabling the firm to carry on its government contracts. Vickers Ltd had been warned against an emissary of the Irish-German-American element, who was seeking employment there, and the man himself was placed under police supervision. As regards London hotels, enemy members of the staffs who were of military age had been interned. Among the twenty-one cases of individual suspects mentioned some five or six are organisations of special interest as proving the efforts of the Germans to re-establish their Secret Service here. Major Ostertag was reported to be actively engaged in this work and a British citizen ‘G-8’ had been signalled from Rotterdam as being a friend of Ostertag, very pro-German, and an agent for journalistic pro-German propaganda in the United States. Adolf Becker, a partner of Becker & Wirth, Brussels, well-known as having supplied an accommodation address for Frederick Gould’s correspondence, who had come to England, was interned after interrogation; Paul Esser and Kampe proved to be acting as connecting links in the system of German espionage in this country and were interned under a deportation order; a man named Huitket, who was going to Paris from Blankenberg carrying money, as it was presumed, for the payment of German agents, was intercepted at Folkestone and detained here.
*
Baron von Hettlebladt, who had been suspected of acting for Germany in South Africa in 1904 and 1905 and had afterwards come under suspicion in Canada, was interned in September 1914. He had married an Englishwoman, had settled at Cranbrook in Kent, and had influential friends who procured his release. The Chief Constable of Kent protested and he was detained by request of the Home Office.
A search made at his premises brought documentary proof of his having been formerly in the employ of the German Secret Service. Hettlebladt was interned finally in November.
*
On 6 November 1914, Carl Hans Lody, the first spy to be tried by court martial since the outbreak of war, was shot at the Tower. Lody was a lieutenant in the 2nd German Naval Reserve known as the Seewehr and a travelling agent in the employ of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. He used the cover of a genuine American emergency passport belonging to Charles A. Inglis who had deposited it for a visa at the Berlin Foreign Office, where it disappeared. Lody came to England via Denmark and Bergen, procuring there a certificate of American nationality. Arriving at Newcastle on 27 August 1914, he went straight to Edinburgh where he stayed a month with occasional absences of a night. One of these trips was to London, another to Peebles. From Edinburgh he went to Liverpool and then crossed to Ireland. He was arrested at Killarney. In the course of his travels he managed to dispose of a small hand-bag which was never traced.
Lody carried about £200 in banknotes, English go
ld and German gold. Some of the notes were traced to a South American named Kinkelin who left England on 1 August. Besides sending reports, Lody collected quantities of newspapers representing different opinions and classes of the community. Twenty-two different journals are represented in his collection. Generally speaking he seems to have protected himself by cultivating chance acquaintances and making trips in their company. Lody communicated with Stockholm in a telegraphic code and sent under cover to the same address letters in German containing spy reports en clair and directed to Stammer, Courbierestrasse, Berlin, and also to other addresses.
He used the signatures Charles, Lody and Nazi. His mission seems to have been a general one but he was to stay in England until after the first battle when he was to report British naval losses and then proceed to America.
Since 4 August all mails from the United Kingdom to Norway and Sweden had been brought to London and examined for letters to certain suspect addresses. Lody wired to the spy address at Stockholm on 20 August and having to endorse the telegram with his name wrote ‘Charles Inglis’. His first letter, posted on 4 September was read, photographed and forwarded and others that followed were similarly treated in the hope of learning more. Eventually a letter came through to Charles A. Inglis c/o Thomas Cook, Edinburgh, dated 8 September 1914. This Inglis never called for. At what precise moment the traveller Inglis was connected with the writer of the letters does not appear, but two long reports signed ‘Nazi’ of 27 and 30 September were retained and orders issued for Lody’s arrest, which took place on 2 October. Various addresses and a telegram were found on him. At the trial it was learned that such harmless words as ‘shall’ and ‘leave’ had code meaning. As a result of the trial special enquiries were made at King’s Lynn as to the steps taken to guard against the arrival of undesirable aliens. Some uncorroborated evidence was adduced to the effect that Lody had been there in June and in the early part of July and had received telegrams under the name of Inglis and of Sideface. The details of Lody’s American passport may prove this statement to be false.
The emergency passport issued to Charles A. Inglis on 4 August 1914 was sent to the United States for examination and returned afterwards to MI5. Through enquiries made by MO5 the name of the agent in Stockholm with whom Lody was in communication, K. Leipziger, was established.
CHAPTER III
1915 and 1916
BEFORE the outbreak of war the bureau had worked mainly through the agency of the police. With the organisation of huge new forces in 1914 counter-espionage might expect a great accession of strength from the work of intelligence officers appointed to the armies. With a view to securing uniformity of procedure the following set of instructions for the guidance of officers in dealing with suspects whether alien or British was issued to the General Officer, Commanding-in-Chief; the GOC London District; the GOC Aldershot Training Centre; the GOC Aldershot Station; the GOCs of the Channel Islands.
1. Indications of espionage instructions were to be reported at once to Commanding Officers for transmission to the intelligence officer, or if urgent, the intelligence officer was to be informed direct.
2. The intelligence officer was usually to consult the Chief Constable with a view to discreet enquiry being made.
3. If the investigation showed serious reason for believing espionage was being practised, the competent military authority was to be informed and he would decide whether to refer the matter to the War Office.
4. If he decided upon getting an internment or removal order he must refer to the War Office for particulars concerning the individual in question.
5. Such reference was to be addressed to MO5G.
6. When the help of the police was involved the enquiry was as a rule to be left in their hands.
7. In cases of emergency the competent military authority or intelligence officer would use his own discretion.
Thus the tradition of the bureau was imparted to the military officers distributed throughout the country and at the same time the bureau kept in touch with all genuine cases of espionage. Besides tracking undesirables in the country, a considerable part of the ports’ defence consisted of keeping them out, hence it was decided that any Home Defence Intelligence concerning ports and the coast of the United Kingdom should be handed on to MO5G which would warn the Chief Constables concerned, the Home Office for the Aliens Officers, and Scotland Yard for the approved ports or other police matters.
Moreover, since September 1914, an officer of MO5G had been stationed at Folkestone for the special purpose of watching the influx of Belgian refugees, with a view to taking action in the case of undesirables. A similar measure was adopted at Gravesend in February 1915 and at Southampton a little later. In the two-fold work of distributing information with regard to espionage and investigating reported spy cases MO5G established contacts with the Metropolitan Police, MO5G officers at Folkestone, Tilbury and Liverpool; intelligence officers in fortresses and commands; city police at Hull, Newcastle and Liverpool; special police officers in the Admiralty coalfields (through local Chief Constable); the police at Southampton (through the Metropolitan Police); the Diplomatic and Consular Services (through the Foreign Office); ports, aliens, customs officers (through the Home Office); the Permit Office, Admiralty, Scottish Office, the Local Government Board, the Board of Trade, the Registrar-General, the Labour Exchanges and the Belgian Relief Committees.
The thirteenth monthly report which was issued in April 1915, laid stress on the fact that although the Special Intelligence Bureau employed a certain number of persons on direct enquiry, yet, on the whole, its functions were administrative, advisory and co-ordinative rather than executive. ‘It gathers information from all sources on subjects bearing on espionage, sees that this information is placed at the disposal of the executive authorities concerned, and supervises enquiries and their results’. The circulation of information was part of the work of the officers of A Branch (investigation).
In April information was received through the Foreign Office that a school had been established at Stockholm to train neutral spies to act as commercial travellers in the United Kingdom and Allied countries and it was afterwards learned that the German Secret Service had established its headquarters at the Strand Hotel, Stockholm.
The growth of the work in G Branch can be gauged from this table which shows, as far as is obtainable, the increase in certain classes of investigation from April to August.
Figures taken from the monthly reports, April to August 1915 inclusive, which give an idea of certain classes of investigation and of the growth of the work of the branch during these months
April May June July August
General suspects 158 251 449 763 852
Persons of hostile origin reported 118 76 113 175
Friendly and neutral aliens 29 40 56 62 80
Americans 15 2 18 27 25
Easterns 5 6 4 8 16
Suspects in public offices 12 9 8 14 14
Connected with the Army and Navy 37 37 32 48 60
Dockyards, shipping and aviation 18 17 8 25
Suspects abroad and coming to England 39 105 124 256 241
Alien clubs and resorts 1 4 3
Letter agencies 10 9 19
Carriers 16 13 11
Passport permits 19 33 24 32 42
Press 8 29 8 6 8
Correspondence submitted:
Letters, 730, 1006, 969, 979. Telegrams, 273, 376, 728, 616.
A few cases of some interest may be quoted. A case of mistaken civil status; the wife of a British subject living with a German whose name she had taken by Deed Poll: under observation. An Austrian woman in a London flat having a telephone, found to be the mistress of a retired ex-naval officer in a ship-building firm: deported. A German engaged in anti-recruiting: interned. The German manager of a firm of city chemists, who was allowed to go to Rotterdam to superintend the packing of medical stores intended for the army, wrote to his wife in Hamburg that he hoped to visit her. An attempted evasion of any
order which might be passed for the confiscation of German property, a German at Middlesbrough asked his landlady to declare he owed her a debt of £81.
Friendly aliens and neutrals
Two Swedish officers, who said they were going to Vancouver, had come to join the British Army: not allowed. A Frenchwoman travelled frequently between Paris and London on the pretext that she was interested in the estate of a person lost in the Lusitania: description circulated.
Two fresh types of offence are classified in May, e.g. illicit motor traffic and indiscretion, and the following occasions for suspicion seem worthy of note:
1. Conduct: persons interesting themselves in soldiers or military affairs; women intimate with officers or soldiers; pro-German women.
2. Friendly neutrals: Swiss waiters, because Germans might seek to pass as Swiss, and also German-Swiss would be of hostile sympathies; a Danish wireless-telegraphy expert entered an agricultural college.
Connected with Army and Navy
One case of opposing recruiting. Press: a London newspaper had on several occasions used a military telephone to ask for information. An enemy agent had in his possession a document proving that he was to communicate by means of advertisements in newspapers.
In addition, four cases of American journalists or agents for newspaper syndicates came under suspicion; one of these had arranged for a source of military news from the Front.
A map of England divided into large districts had been found in the effects of the late German vice-consul at Newcastle; charts of the Irish coast and Bristol Channel had been intercepted on their way to Genoa; charts of the Persian Gulf and maps of coal mines in the north of England and Scotland had been asked for from Norway.
