by Nigel West
In consequence of the visit by the welfare campaigner of Miss Emily Hobhouse to the Ruhleben internment camp in Berlin, a section was added to the DRR making it an offence for a British subject voluntarily to enter enemy country or enemy occupied territory during the war except under special permit.
It has been convenient to summarise the cases of spies arrested or examined between August 1915 and December 1916; those of Pauline Slager and her friends which belong chronologically to May, June and July 1915. Slager’s value to the Germans seems to have been greater after her journey to England than before and definite knowledge of her spy activities came to G Branch only in the autumn of 1915. In reviewing the four groups of cases mentioned, two main periods of German activity may be distinguished, from late July 1915 to early May 1916, and from June 1916 to December 1917.
The achievements of G Branch during these seventeen months were as follows:
– More complete information about the personnel etc. of the Antwerp Marine Bureau; discovery of new recruiting system in Holland; discovery of subsidiary centres in Stockholm and Madrid.
– Sentence on four spies; many others, of whom two most important, checkmated permanently.
– Discovery and disruption of very big and dangerous centre in New York, subsidiary to Antwerp. Sentence on two spies in England and three in America. The internment of one possible spy.
When caught in the toils, the average spy either offered to give information against his employer or stated that the giving of such information had been his ulterior motive in coming to England. Certain it is that from June 1915 onwards an increasing number of Dutchmen accepted German service with the intention of betraying their employers; others like Charles van Ekeren, served them faithfully for a time and then quarrelled on a question of pay; others, like [XXXXX] had a patriotic motive; and a fourth class belonged to the race of double agents who served and betrayed both aides impartially.
The success of MO5G in catching German spies during the summer induced the Antwerp bureau to take special steps to discover what organisation lay behind such results, and in November they sent over Peter Age Christianus Steunebrink, apparently to enquire into British counter-espionage. There seems little doubt that Steunebrink gave the British more information than the Germans bargained for.
The usual method followed in such cases was for the double to offer his services to British officials abroad; the offer would be duly forwarded to MO5G which would request the British official to move warily and examine the man further. If the man seemed genuine, or sometimes it there seemed a good chance of gaining valuable information without too great a risk, he would be allowed to come over, would be interviewed, and finally sent back with a no return permit. This was the course taken in the case of Steunebrink.
From these various agents mentioned above very important information was obtained about the Antwerp bureau. This was supplemented in 1918 by the discovery of the Antwerp roll of spies for 1916 and 1917, and the statements of Hans Eils who had worked at that office since the latter end of 1915. Of these various statements the following summary may be made.
The bureau was established at 38 Chauseee de Malines (Mechelsche Steenweg), Antwerp. All its dossiers were marked Admiralstab – Zweig Marine Nachrichtstelle, Antwerp; Aht. Berlin; Marine Korps, Brügge; Meldeamt Hord Wesel.
It would seem therefore that the Antwerp bureau worked in with Berlin in launching spies on England from Scandinavia, and that the Wesel branch was the collecting place for news.
The bureau was the centre from which agents were sent to England and America. It was founded by Ludwig Schnitzer, director of a firm of tobacconists at Rotterdam, who in 1914 was compelled to leave that town. Captain von Gorschen, who was head of the organisation, was born and brought up in England. Under him worked Rittmeister Eugen Wilhelm, known as the ‘Coffee King of Hamburg’, and Captain Alfred Schulyze.
These men interviewed and trained the spies, while Carl Schultz took charge of the secret inks and instructed the spies in the use of them.
The instruction of spies included the use of telegraphic and written codes, the silhouettes of different types of warships of differentiations, and the questions, which they were presumably to memorise. The spy was given two addresses to write to. These addresses were changed for his next visit to England. Charles van Ekeren’s four addresses were:
– Heer W. Atzrott, c/o Firma Scharenberg, 52 Willem de Zwijgerlaan, Hague.
– A. Niendecker, 147 van Blankenburgstraat, Hague.
– Adolphe Carré, 41a Zwaarde Croonstraat, Rotterdam.
– Jan Hendriks, c/o Hotel Fleissig, 129 Warmoesstraat, Amsterdam.
It is to be noted that Heinrich Flores was said to have gone to live at Zwaarde Croonstraat and that the name Adolphe Carré may conceal that agent’s personality. Charles van Ekeren also denounced Theodore, alias Frank Greite.
From Peter Steunebrink, MO5G learned of the recruiting agency which had grown up in succession to that of Hilmar Dierks, that of A-4, Alexander Blok, a Jewish ex-banker of Hamburg, whose business had been wrecked by the war, and of G. Elte. The spy cases of 1916 show the importance of this information. He also gave the cover addresses of Christian Mulder, 28b van der Taketraat, Rotterdam, and Ferdinand Grant, 139, Leeuwehaven, Rotterdam.
Steunebrink supplied a specimen of secret ink and the correct information that the message was written across and not between the lines. His instructions were never to ask any questions but to listen in clubs, public houses and popular resorts. He was to stay a month, to receive £75 a month and £15 for expenses. He was to furnish reports on ship-building in the different ports and on the results achieved by air-raids and other matters. Steunebrink returned to Holland and told the Germans that the British Secret Service knew all about the Antwerp centre. The Germans, realising that the movements of their agents crossing the frontier could be watched, gave up summoning recruits and spies to Antwerp and thenceforward conducted the training and interviews in Holland. Wilhelm and Schiltze then travelled regularly in Holland, putting up at the Vieux Doelen Hotel in The Hague, and the Victoria Hotel, Amsterdam. The Hotel Maas, Rotterdam, was also a spy centre and various of the spies on the Antwerp roll lent their rooms for the purposes of spy instruction and interviews. Such was the position of affairs in 1916.
In that year also the counter-espionage section at the Villa Arcadia, 106 Badhuisweg, Scheveningen, emerged into prominence and eventually grew to very great importance.
The names of some 136 agents were on the Antwerp books; of these, ninety-two figure in the extract in MI5’s files, and MI5 had records and correct information of about sixty-six of these agents.
The notes attached to the spies’ names on the rolls and information from other sources, show the following types of services required recruiting agents, covering address and confidential tasks; espionage in England – travelling and residential; espionage in Holland:
1. Interrogation of crews.
2. Interrogation of travellers from England, and especially journalists.
3. General look-out off the Dutch coast.
4. Special look-out for signs of a British landing.
5. Watch on British legation and consulate.
6. Manipulation of relations with the English and French services and with the Dutch police.
7. Manipulation of Dutch telegraphists.
8. Watch on travellers going to Germany.
9. Manipulation of Dutch firms connected with English trade.
10. Financial and unpaid agents, e.g. German merchants.
The list shows the balance of espionage weighted heavily on the Dutch side and the consequent immense importance of our establishing our outer frontier in Holland.
Among these agents two seem to have filled residential posts in Great Britain. A-6, Harry Bekkers, was secretary to the Dutch consulate at Liverpool, who is said by Hans Eils to have sent, during 1915 and 1916, daily reports in secret ink through a lady at The Hague, and A-46, de Bie, who had
a permanent post with a London firm and went to England in July 1916. In September of that year he was reporting from Glasgow and Edinburgh in letters addressed to his wife. Guerrero declared that a permanent German agent met all spies in England and gave them instructions, but that he himself had not been here long enough to see this man.
In January 1917 Colonel Drake left and on 15 January Major Carter took charge of the branch. G5 was constituted into a separate branch for Oriental affairs and G2 under Major Anson was split up into four sub-sections to deal respectively with: enquiries arising out of intercepted correspondence (G2(a) Mr Marsh, Commander Henderson, Captain Hordern, Captain Cookson); enquiries arising out of matters referred by the ports control (G2(b) Major Welchman, Captain Sassoon); enquiries arising out of matter referred by P (G2(c) Lieutenant Ripley, Lieutenant Fielding); enquiries arising from any other source (G2(d) Mr Clayton, Mr G. Streatfield, Lieutenant H. Lawes, Mr H. B. Goad).
In February 1917, a considerable change took place in G Branch. In the general specification of duties it was laid down that recommendations for amendments to legislation and regulations were to be made in consultation with G1.
The duties of Gl were restricted to investigation of cases of sedition and peace propaganda arising from enemy activities; G2 retained investigation of cases of suspected espionage in Great Britain; G4 resumed the investigation of intercepted correspondence taking it over from G3(a). On the other hand three new sections were constituted:
– G3: to deal with photography, chemistry and technical research.
– G5: for translation.
– G6: for procedure and investigation in special questions.
Note: E retained control of investigations in the cases of persons in transit through the United Kingdom.
Re-organisation took place in September and again in October 1917. While the general duties assigned to G remained the same, changes were made in the section B. Photography, chemistry and technical research, and translation dropped out; the duties of G2 were taken over and expanded by G3 under the fresh definition: ‘Executive duties connected with investigation, arrest or trial of persons suspected of espionage’; to G2 were allotted general duties connected with enquiries into the bona-fides for questions connected with secret writing and correspondence.
In February 1917 the instructions issued to the police on the outbreak of war to forward to MO5G particulars with regard to any aliens who had served in any army, navy or police force were extended so as to include Chinese, Japanese, Siamese, Persians and Egyptians.
Subsequently Major Carter procured from Scotland Yard information with regard to certain members of the old Imperial Russian Secret Service who had been engaged in watching Russian exiles and revolutionaries in the capitals of Europe. Major Carter drew up a memorandum foreshadowing the adoption of special measures for watching agents of the new Russian government at work here and he proposed to gather information from Dutch and other sources. On the complaint of the General Officer Commanding at Chester that Manchester was a centre for aliens and that special preventive measures were required, an officer was sent up to investigate. He reported against taking special action but recommended that the competent military authorities should not institute or make investigations on their own account but refer all suspicious cases at once to MI5. Whether this plan was adopted does not appear but it is to be noted that such a plan involved a total change of principle from that obtaining hitherto, which was to work as far as possible through the ordinary channels e.g. the local constabulary.
Arrangements were made to keep GHQ GB(1) informed of all enquiries asked of MI5 by the commands and with this object all answers sent by MI5 were despatched in duplicate.
It was essential that in notifying GHQ I(b) of the departure of any person for France full particulars of the case should be given, and that when enquiries were made by GHQ I(b) of MI5 and no particulars were available special enquiries should be set on foot at once.
Equally it was important to maintain close co-operation with the assistants to the military attaché at the United States embassy.
In May instructions were issued that direct correspondence between MI5 and an intelligence officer attached to command headquarters was to cease and all cases involving disciplinary action against members of HM Forces were to be referred direct to GHQ HF(1).
With a view to closer co-operation it was arranged that all officers of the counter-espionage services in France should have a week’s course of instruction at the office of MI5 and afterwards opportunities were made for counter-espionage officers abroad to study the methods and work of the Postal Censor.
In March 1917 it was known that subjects of Allied countries were seeking to evade military service by scraping an acquaintance with Dutch subjects, eliciting information with regard to their birth, family etc. and then writing giving these particulars to the burgomasters of Dutch cities with a request that papers of identification should be forwarded to the writer. MI5G met this by arranging with the censor to stop and submit all such letters.
Owing to a letter intercepted in the American mail to Holland and forwarded by MI5G to the American ambassador, that official wrote begging that his government should at once establish a Postal Censorship. In the following month G4 sent to the US government a copy of the Cable Censor’s Handbook.
In January 1917 a table was made of the results achieved by MO5 to December 1916. Entered on this record were only the certainties easily accessible from documents. This means that MO5 followed cases up to a certain point but received no information unless it were specially asked for as to whether or when the recommendation for deportation was carried out by the Home Secretary.
The numbers given were made up from reference to the old Black List.
Disposal of persons known of likely to be engaged in activities prejudicial to the public safety or defence of the realm during the period October 1909 to 10 December 1916
Before war During war Totals
DISPOSAL M w M F M F Total Remarks
1. Sentenced to death 13 1* 13 1 14 *prison
2. Suicide 1 1 - 1* *during trial
3. Prison 6* 6 1 12 *Official Secrets Act
4. Prison 1 1 - 1
5. Interned 136 21 136 21 157
6. Deportation 113 11 113 11 124
7. Forbidden to re-enter UK 195 73 195 73 288
8. Prevented from leaving UK 90 30 90 20 110
9. Restricted by DRR 14B 17 6 17 5 22
10. Excluded under DRR 14 443 111 445 111 554
TOTAL 6 - 1,015 243 1,021 243 1,264
CHAPTER IV
1917
DURING 1917 the news was circulated that all papers issued at Buenos Aires must be regarded as suspect and that Mexican passports and especially those issued in London belonged to the same category. Holders of Greek passports were to be examined for Ottoman subjects from Syria had been imported into France to work on munitions and as they had no identity papers the Greek Patriarch in Paris was supplying these. German agents were also said to be entering France under cover of false papers with the crowd of repatriated prisoners of war.
Another method of evading close enquiry was reported in an Italian book on espionage. It consisted of exchanging an original passport granted in the country of birth for one procured at a consulate in a foreign country, where enquiries could not be so precise.
In January 1917 a warning came from Christiania that Finnish sailors and passengers alike were to be viewed with suspicion. It was known that the Germans were experiencing difficulty in procuring Dutch agents with credentials sufficient to justify their prolonged stay in England.
The following secret methods or possible methods of communicating information were reported in 1917: handkerchiefs embroidered in Morse Code; imitations of Raphael Tuck’s picture cards sold to Belgians interned at Harderwyk and sent by them to comrades at the Front or to refugees in France; religious books, psalters or leaflets containing prayers; newspapers sent in batches to enemy count
ries, the number of newspapers indicating the number of troops at a particular point, the colour of the ink in which the address was written indicating the arm of the service, notices were circulated to the port officers and other persons concerned. Other methods of communication were by phonographic records and by printed advertisements.
All importation into and export from this country of phonographic records was prohibited. As regards control of advertisements it was arranged that all advertisements must have a police visa before publication. It was suggested that provincial newspapers should have the option of sending advertisements to be censored in London but that ordinarily the local military authority should exercise supervision while direct police censorship should be arranged for large centres.
The question of how to stop leakage of news from the internment camp at Groningen was one of considerable difficulty; threat of court martial on the men’s return to England was no use, removal for a space to Flushing would provide a pleasant change, the cells at Groningen would provide no remedy, while stopping all leave would be hard on the innocent.
A suggestion was made that smuggling of letters should be punished by a term of imprisonment extending beyond the original furlough granted by the Dutch government; it was however a question whether that government would allow the right to take such action.
In 1917 the following methods of evading censorship and search are mentioned: papers hidden in a diplomatist’s cabin while search of the ship was in progress; letters carried on board at the last minute hidden in linen-baskets; messages hidden in vacuum flasks and hollow ten cent pieces; crews bribed to carry letters by Dutch soldiers offering drink on board the ship; abuse of Vickers White Bag from Russia; repatriated Russian Jews smuggled letters on incoming steamers; pro-Bolshevik articles transmitted to the Manchester Guardian through some channel unknown by a British MCO at Vladivostok.
In December 1916 restrictions had been put on the export through the port of printed or written matter including photographs, pictures etc., except under permit. The same restrictions were imposed upon parcels and samples. The three last examples of evasion quoted above and other changes made during 1917 in those regulations which govern the communication of news and information to and from foreign countries are significant of the immense development of certain aspects of the German attack and of some corresponding change of feeling within the country.
