The Negotiator

by George Mitchell

  In 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization was established in opposition to Israel’s existence. For the next quarter century, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, it waged yet another campaign of violence. One of the most publicized acts was the killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich by a PLO faction called Black September. Wars between Israel and neighboring Arab states broke out in 1967 and 1973. Israel prevailed in both, expanding its military superiority and its territory to include the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

  In 1977 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made a surprise, historic visit to Jerusalem, where he met with Israeli prime minister Begin. A year later Sadat and Begin accepted President Jimmy Carter’s invitation to Camp David, where they reached agreement on a framework for peace. A formal treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed on March 26, 1979. Sadat’s actions angered some in Egypt, and he was assassinated two years later. President Bill Clinton later encouraged negotiations between Israel and Jordan, and the leaders of those two countries signed a peace treaty on October 26, 1994.

  • • •

  The first Palestinian intifada, or uprising, took place in 1987, during which Hamas was established as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. That conflict resulted in the PLO’s renouncing violence and accepting a two-state solution in 1988. In 1993 the PLO recognized Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, and in 1996 it repealed the provisions in its charter that called for armed resistance and the destruction of the state of Israel. In 2000 Arafat and Israel’s prime minister Ehud Barak met with Clinton at Camp David. After they were unable to reach agreement, the second intifada broke out. It continued for four years with the loss of more than three thousand Palestinian and nearly one thousand Israeli lives.

  Arafat died in 2004 and was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas, who continues today as the president of the Palestinian Authority, the executive branch of the Palestinian government. The division among Palestinians between those who favor retaining the right of armed resistance and those who oppose violence and favor peaceful negotiation is now manifested in the competition between the Palestinian Authority, which is led by Fatah, its major political party, and Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is a secular organization and is supported by the United States. Hamas, on the other hand, seeks to establish an Islamic state, and the United States has designated it a terrorist organization. In 2007, after a brief battle in Gaza, Hamas routed the PA’s military force and seized control there. As a result the internal Palestinian split became geographic as well as political: the PA controls the West Bank, with about 2.7 million residents, while Hamas controls Gaza, with a population of about 1.8 million, although the PA still has many loyalists in Gaza and Hamas has many in the West Bank.

  After Hamas gained control of Gaza, the so-called quartet—the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia—issued a statement of principles, which called upon Hamas to commit to nonviolence, recognize the state of Israel, and accept previous peace agreements. To date Hamas has refused to do so.

  Those prior agreements include the Oslo Accords of 1993, which were the product of secret negotiations that gave the Palestinians a limited degree of self-governance under the Palestinian Authority. The signing of these accords, which promised a peace agreement to reach a two-state solution, sparked intense debate within Israel. Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister who negotiated and signed the accords, was assassinated in 1995 by an Israeli who opposed them.

  • • •

  Ariel Sharon, who had defeated Barak in 2000, unilaterally withdrew Israeli armed forces and settlers from Gaza in 2005, but tensions have remained high between Israel and Hamas along the border. Open conflict erupted in late 2008, in 2012, and, most recently, in 2014, as Israel tried to eliminate rocket fire from Gaza and destroy tunnels between Gaza and Israel, while Hamas sought the lifting of the blockade on Gaza that Israel and Egypt have imposed since 2007.

  Where does this history leave us today? My personal experiences in the region lead me to the following conclusions about the current state of Israeli-Palestinian relations:

  • The conflict has gone on for a very long time and has included a great deal of violence. As a result hostility and mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians are at very high levels. Those strong negative attitudes are intensified by a profound sense of victimization in both societies; indeed their disagreements include skepticism and even denial about some parts of the other’s narrative.

  • In the past, skepticism and disagreements were overcome by strong and committed leaders. Israel has had a peace treaty with Egypt for thirty-five years and with Jordan for twenty. Yet, mirroring attitudes in both societies, the personal level of mistrust between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Abbas is high; both often refer to the “lack of a partner,” and each appears to have no confidence in the other’s sincerity and seriousness of purpose and thus no confidence in the prospect of a successful outcome. As a result each has been reluctant to take political risks that would subject him to intense domestic criticism.

  • Both societies are also divided internally. The PA has committed to recognizing Israel, to nonviolence, to seeking recognition of an independent state through peaceful negotiation, and to compliance with previous agreements. Hamas refuses to commit to these principles.

  • In Israel many still favor a two-state solution, but many others, including several members of the cabinet, are outspokenly opposed to a Palestinian state in the West Bank.15

  • The PA has little to show for its commitment to a two-state solution through nonviolence and peaceful negotiation over the twenty years since the signing of the Oslo Accords. The continued lack of progress toward a state will undermine the PA’s status and cause more Palestinians and other Arabs to support armed resistance.

  • There have been twelve U.S. presidents and twenty secretaries of state since 1948. Each has tried to reconcile the differences between Israelis and Palestinians. In recent decades there has been substantial continuity in their policies, which include a firm commitment to Israel’s security and to the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state.

  • The ability of the United States to control events in the world, including those involving Israelis and Palestinians, is limited. But we do have unequalled power to influence events.

  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rooted deep in history and involves highly emotional issues: religion, national identity, territorial competition. It has gone on for so long, it has had such destructive effects, and the level of mistrust and hostility is so high that many in the Middle East and elsewhere regard it as unsolvable. It is of course easier to describe the problems in the Middle East than it is to prescribe a solution. But I disagree with those who have concluded that the conflict cannot be resolved. At some time, in some way, this conflict is going to end. It is in our interest, and surely the interests of Israelis and Palestinians, that it end as soon and as fairly as possible.

  The renewed pursuit of peace is important to the region and to the United States for many reasons. As 9/11 demonstrated—and as the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria remind us today—there are many evil people and groups in the world. And many of those most hostile to the United States are based in the Middle East. It is also a region where several countries are U.S. allies. Regrettably some of them are also at odds with each other.

  Peace between Israel and the Palestinians and the resulting stability in the region would help to deprive the extremists of the chaos in which they thrive. It would also allow the United States to unite its allies to confront and take preventive action against the extremists on their home turf.

  Beyond terrorism, the Middle East is centrally located between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Any conflict there could spill over and bring in other world powers in a way that could threaten U.S. political, economic, and military interests. Consider, for instance, that a large portion of the known
oil reserves are in the region, and the continuing supply of that oil remains vital to most of the world’s advanced economies, even amid the transition to a lower carbon future. Moreover the United States has long had a strong commitment to Israel’s existence and security as well as, more recently, a firm commitment to the establishment of a viable, independent, and sovereign Palestinian state.

  In the highly volatile Middle East, instability in one part of the region feeds instability in another part. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could make it possible for Israel and the Sunni-dominated monarchies to work together to combat their common foe: extremist forces across the region. Achieving these goals requires maximum effort by the United States, despite the difficulties and setbacks. The key is easy to state but difficult to achieve: it is the mutual commitment of Israel and the Palestinians to reach agreement, with the active participation of the U.S. government and the support and assistance of the many other governments and institutions that can and want to help. The international community can help best by encouraging both sides to look past their historic grievances toward a negotiation that deals with the realities of the situation today.

  In a major policy speech in Jerusalem in January 2009, President George W. Bush said:

  The point of departure for permanent status negotiations . . . is clear: There should be an end to the occupation that began in 1967. The agreement must establish Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people, just as Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people. These negotiations must ensure that Israel has secure, recognized, and defensible borders. And they must ensure that the state of Palestine is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent. It is vital that each side understands that satisfying the other’s fundamental objectives is key to a successful agreement. Security for Israel and viability for the Palestinian state are in the mutual interest of both parties.

  • • •

  The president’s main point bears repeating: the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state, but for that to happen Israel must have reasonable and sustainable security. The establishment of a Palestinian state will help Israel achieve that security. Success is in their mutual interest.

  On taking office in 2009, President Obama reaffirmed that policy. When he appointed me as special envoy to the region, he further signaled his administration’s desire to forge an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Now, as I made my first trip to the region in that position, it seemed that the culture of peace, so carefully nurtured during the Oslo negotiations in 1993, had largely dissipated, to be replaced by a sense of futility, despair, and, ultimately, the inevitability of conflict. Fighting in Gaza, which had erupted the prior year, had just ended. The Palestinians were deeply divided, and uncertainty around upcoming Israeli elections lay ahead. Few believed that there was any chance for rebooting peace negotiations, let alone achieving a peaceful end to the conflict.

  Many had given up on the two-state solution as efforts to achieve it had not succeeded. The doubts were justified, but no critic had advanced a more credible or feasible alternative. The fact that a two-state solution had not yet been achieved was not in itself conclusive proof that it could never be achieved. Peacemaking requires patience and perseverance. In Northern Ireland, for instance, centuries of discord and violence, and many failed negotiations, preceded the Good Friday Agreement. Just a few days before it was reached, a public opinion poll revealed that 83 percent of those in Northern Ireland believed that no agreement was possible.

  Of course, the history and current circumstances in the Middle East are different from those in Northern Ireland, so the benefits of comparison are limited. But it was clear to me that past failures to achieve peace do not make failure inevitable. I believe there is no such thing as a conflict that can’t be ended. Conflicts are created and sustained by human beings. They can be ended by human beings.

  A solution, however, cannot be imposed externally. The parties themselves have to negotiate directly, with the active and sustained support of the United States. The pain required to negotiate an agreement, while substantial for both sides, will be much less than the pain that will result if negotiations don’t happen or don’t succeed. As I write these words there are worrying signs, especially in Jerusalem. Always a flashpoint, the city, deeply significant to each of the three major religions in the area, now seethes with actual and threatened violence. It could erupt at any time.

  If the conflict were to resume, both Israelis and Palestinians will face an uncertain future. That, of course, includes the loss of many lives. But there are other potential dangers that both parties have to recognize. For the Israelis, the first is demography. There are now about 6 million Jews living in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In the same space there are about 5.5 million Arabs, including Israeli Arabs and Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza. The Arab birth rate overall is much higher than the Israeli; within just a few years Arabs will be in the majority. As Ehud Barak, the former prime minister and then defense minister of Israel, has said, Israel then will have to choose between being a Jewish state and being a democratic state; it cannot be both once the two-state solution is lost. That is a painful choice Israel should not have to make.

  Their second challenge is in technology. A serious military threat to Israel now comes from rockets. Hamas still has thousands of them; they’re crude, lacking in guidance and destructive power, but they do create widespread fear and anxiety in Israel. No one can doubt that, in the absence of a peace agreement, over time Hamas will rebuild and improve its arsenal. In Lebanon, on Israel’s northern border, Hezbollah already has thousands of rockets aimed in its direction; public estimates in Israel are between thirty thousand and fifty thousand. These rockets are somewhat more effective, although also limited in range. Even as I flew across the Atlantic, Hezbollah was engaged in an effort to upgrade their systems. Most threatening to Israel, however, Iran has developed rockets that can reach Israel from inside Iran itself. The Iranians don’t yet have the precision needed to strike specific targets, but they could cause vast destruction in cities.

  The United States is fully committed to Israel’s security. We have honored that commitment in part by providing enormous political, financial, and military support. In his first term President Obama authorized hundreds of millions of dollars of additional aid to Israel to accelerate development and deployment of the Iron Dome antimissile system. Although its early use has been promising, it is unknown whether that or any system will be able to intercept the number and quality of missiles that might be launched in an all-out conflict. Israel’s security might then be seriously threatened.

  Israel’s third challenge is its potential isolation. Although strong in the United States, especially in Congress, its support is declining elsewhere in the world. In 2011 the UN Security Council voted on a resolution that demanded that “Israel, as the occupying power, immediately and completely ceases all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and that it fully respect its legal obligations in this regard.” Fourteen of the fifteen members of the Council, including the United Kingdom, France, and other U.S. allies, voted in favor of the resolution; the United States voted against it and used its veto power to prevent its adoption. Although the resolution was not voted on in the General Assembly, an overwhelming majority there supported it; only the United States and Israel were opposed. In November 2012, despite intense opposition by the United States and Israel, 138 of the 193 countries in the world voted for a UN General Assembly resolution that elevated Palestinian status in the United Nations to nonmember observer state, a status shared only by the Vatican. Only nine countries opposed the resolution, while forty-one abstained.

  In October 2014 the prime minister of Sweden announced his government’s intention to recognize a Palestinian state, becoming the first major Western European government to do so. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ireland, Spain, Britain, and France. The Bri
tish Parliament voted 274 to 12 to recognize a Palestinian state, although the vote was symbolic (it was nonbinding on the government, which continues to oppose recognition). During the debate in the House of Commons, Richard Ottaway, a member of the governing Conservative Party and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said that he had “stood by Israel through thick and thin, through the good years and the bad,” but now realized “in truth, looking back over the past 20 years, that Israel has been slowly drifting away from world public opinion. Under normal circumstances I would oppose the motion tonight; but such is my anger over Israel’s behavior in recent months that I will not oppose the motion. I have to say to the government of Israel that if they are losing people like me, they will be losing a lot of people.”16

  “The vote in the French lower house of the Parliament favoring such a step was a largely symbolic vote. But it was the fifth such gesture in two months, and arguably the most important, in what has amounted to a cascade of support for the Palestinian cause and a widening torrent of criticism of Israeli policy across Europe.”17

  For me, as a supporter of Israel’s right to exist, safe and secure behind defensible borders, and for the many others who share my view, these are hard words to accept. But they should be a warning to the government of Israel and to all of its supporters in Israel, the United States, and elsewhere: the tide of world public opinion is shifting.

  Another danger, little noticed or discussed, is the divide within Israel of its Jewish and Arab citizens. The Arabs already make up over 20 percent of the population, and their growth rate is higher than for Israeli Jews. Growing along with their numbers is their disaffection. There is rising concern among many Israeli leaders about the serious adverse effects on their society of this internal division.

  Some in Israel and the United States are concerned that a Palestinian state might fail and be taken over by Hamas. That’s a valid concern. But many others believe, as I do, that the collapse of the Palestinian Authority and a takeover by Hamas is more likely in the absence of an agreement with Israel than as the result of such an agreement. One of the adverse consequences of the 2014 fighting in Gaza is the extent to which it has adversely affected the political standing of President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority among Palestinians and other Arabs, making a negotiated agreement even more difficult than it was before—not least because cease-fire agreements made with Hamas as the result of violence increase public support for the movement and erode confidence in the potential of reaching a political settlement through negotiations alone.